MILITARY  TRAINING 


STATEMENTS 


MAJ.  GEN.  LEONARD  WOOD 


SENATE  SUBCOMMITTEE  ON  MILITARY  AFFAIRS 

AND  THE  BOUSE  COMMITTEE  ON 

MILITARY  AFFAIRS 


WASHINGTON 
PRINTING 
1917 


UNIVERSAL  MILITARY  TRAINING 


STATEMENTS 

MADE   BY 

MAJ.  GEN.  LEONARD  WOOD 

BEFORE  THE 

SENATE  SUBCOMMITTEE  ON  MILITARY  AFFAIRS 

AND  THE  HOUSE  COMMITTEE  ON 

MILITARY  AFFAIRS 


J 


ON 


A  BILL  TO  PROVIDE  FOR  THE  MILITARY  AND  NAVAL 
TRAINING  QF  THE  CITIZEN  FOB 
THE  UNITED  STATES 


WASHINGTON 
GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 

1917 


\}*Qt 


STATEMENTS  BEFORE  SENATE  SUBCOMMITTEE 

DECEMBER  is.  I'Uti.  am>  JANUAR1  91,  1917 


35972 


rXIVKRSAL    .MILITARY    TRAINING. 


MONDAY,  DECEMBER   18,    1916  (AFTER  RECESS  . 

rriio  committee  reassembled  at  the  expiration  of  the  recess,  at  2 
o'clock  p.  m. 

STATEMENT  OF  GEN.  LEONARD  WOOD. 

The  Chairman.  Gen.  Wood,  the  subcommittee  which  has  been 
appointed  by  the  Committee  on  Military  Affairs  is  holding  hearings 
upon  the  subject  of  military  training  for  the  purpose  of  the  creation 
ot  a  reserve  force,  or  for  any  other  purpose  that  may  make  the  young 
men  of  the  country  available  for  duty,  and  we  would  Like  to  hear  from 
you  upon  that  subject.  You  understand,  of  course,  that  there  are 
two  or  three  measures  pending  upon  the  subject  of  universal  military 
training. 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes.  sir. 

The  Chairman.  One  bill  is  S.  L695,  another  Is  a  suggested  substi- 
tute prepared  by  the  General  Staff,  and  one  by  Capt.  flaoseley. 

Gen.  Wood.  Do  you  wish  me  to  make  a  statement  upon  that 
subject  1 

The  Chairman.  We  would  like  you  to  proceed  in  your  own  way. 
Gen.  Wood. 

Gen.  Wood.  I  believe,  Mr.  Chairman,  thai  in  addition  to  our 
regular  force,  including  in  tins  the  Naval  establishment,  we  must 
have  a  citizenry  so  trained  that  they  will  he  reasonably  efficient  sol- 
diers in  case  of  need.  1  think  that  training  as  B  permanent  propo- 
sition, on  the  general  lines  proposed  in  your  hill,  will  ultimately  meet 
the  demands  of  the  situation. 

I  think  there  are  some  modifications  which  will  suggest  themselves 

as  time  goes  on.  1  believe,  however,  that  world  conditions- are  such 
that  we  are  not  in  a  position  to  wait  for  any  considerable  period  of 
time  to  develop  our  trained  forces;  nor  should  we  adopt  any  system 
which  will  postpone  the  immediate  training  of  young  men  who  have 
reached  the  military  age.  Bach  bill  presents  certain  excellent 
features. 

I  believe  we  should  start  as  soon  as  practicable  the  training  of  the 
youth  on  the  lines  proposed  in  your  bill,  which  are  substantially 
along  the  lines  of  the  Australian  system.  We  should  immediately 
begin  the  training  of  the  youths  who  are  physically  lit  during  the  year 
in  which  they  become  19  years  of  age,  and  1  estimate  this  number  as 
500,000.  I  say  the  year  in  which  they  become  19  years  of  age, 
fearing  that  if  we  take  them  in  the  year  in  which  they  become  is 
we  shall  have  half  of  our  500,000  (it  for  military  service  arriving  at 
18  years  of  age  after  the  1st  of  July:  in  other  words,  half  of  them 
Would  be  17  when  they  came  to  US,  which  is  rather  young.  1  feel 
we  should  start  in  with  the  training  of  young  men  in  their  nineteenth 
year  witli  t  he  least  possible  delay  and  concent  rate  our  entire  available 
energy  upon  them,  if  necessary  leaving  the  instruction  of  the  younger 
boys  to  be  taken  up  after  we  have  the  system  in  smooth  running 
order.  1  am  convinced  that  a  period  of  six  months'  intensive  training 
will  be  sufficient  to  give  us  a  reasonably  effective  and  well-trainee! 
private  soldier.     I  make  this  statement  as  a  result  of  four  years  of 

in 


112  UNIVERSAL  MILITARY   TRAINING. 

observation  of  training  under  the  intensive  system  which  we  have 
had  in  force  at  the  military  training  camps,  a  system  under  which  it 
was  estimated  by  a  board  of  Regular  officers  that  as  much  was 
accomplished  in  one  month  as  is  accomplished  in  four  and  a  half 
under  average  conditions  and  methods  of  instruction  in  the  regular 
service. 

That  is  to  say,  they  have  rated  one  month  of  intensive  training 
as  we  give  it,  which  is  something  over  eight  hours  a  day,  as  equivalent 
to  about  four  and  a  half  months  under  average  conditions  in  the 
Regular  Establishment . 

I  think  that  is  a  conservative  estimate.  In  actual  hours  of  work 
it  is  equivalent  to  that  performed  in  an  enrollment  of  three  years  in 
an  average  organization  of  the  militia.  It  is  a  character  of  training 
that  is  so  intensive  that  you  could  not  impose  a  system  of  that  degree 
of  intensity  upon  any  body  of  men  for  six  months;  they  would 
become  stale.  So  we  should  have  to  adopt  a  rather  less  intensive 
system,  say  one  equal  to  3  to  1,  compared  with  the  work  we  do 
in  the  Regular  Establishment,  so  that  out  of  our  six  months  of 
intensive  training  we  would  give  young  men  the  same  number  of 
hours  under  arms  and  the  same  amount  of  training  they  would  receive 
in  18  months  in  the  Regular  Establishment.  If  anyone  proposed 
18  months  in  the  Regular  Establishment  as  the  period  of  training, 
and  that  all  physically  fit  men  should  take  it,  the  bulk  of  the  people 
would  say  it  is  too  long.  But  six  months'  training  under  the  organi- 
zation which  we  are  employing  in  these  training  camps  would  be  in 
value  and  accomplishment  fully  4|  to  1  what  we  give  the  men  in  the 
Regular  Establishment.  We  could  not  maintain  for  six  months  the 
high  pressure  of  intensive  methods  which  can  be  applied  for  one 
or  two  months,  and  as  I  stated,  it  would  be  necessary  for  us  to  reduce 
somewhat  the  hours  of  work.  We  could  maintain  for  six  months  a 
system  which  would  give  us  three  times  as  much  work  of  a  purely 
military  character  as  is  given  in  the  average  organization  of  the  Regu- 
lar Establishment.  I  desire  to  emphasize  this  statement  as  strongly 
as  possible. 

And  I  say  again  that  six  months  of  intensive  training  in  camp,  all 
of  it  under  conditions  where  the  men  have  nothing  to  do  but  receive 
and  absorb  military  instruction,  would  be  sufficient.  The  officers 
and  some  of  the  higher  noncommissioned  officers  would  require  a 
longer  period  of  training.  Speaking  now  of  the  private  soldier,  we 
should  be  able  'to  cover  pretty  thoroughly  the  instruction  in  any  arm 
of  the  service.  The  instruction  of  officers  would  probably  have  to  be 
carried  on  on  the  general  lines  laid  down  in  the  Australian  system, 
with  which  you  are  familiar,  or  on  the  lines  of  the  Swiss  system  as 
modified  to  fit  conditions  in  this  country.  There  are  about  1,030,000 — 
estimates  vary — men  reaching  the  military  age— that  is,  the  age  of 
18 — every  year.  I  think  it  is  safe  to  assume  that  not  over  one-half 
of  those  men  would  be  fit  for  military  service— that  is,  for  intensive 
training.  So  we  would  have  about  500,000  men  a  year  coming  up 
for  this  period  of  intensive  training,  which  ought  to  begin  as  soon  as 
the  season  permits  in  the  spring,  say,  May  1,  and  be  terminated  at  the 
end  of  October  of  that  year.  The  men  would  terminate  their  train- 
ing, in  other  words,  in  the  year  in  which  they  became  19  years  of  age, 
and  then  they  stand  ready  for  the  year  of  service  with  the  colors  on 
reaching  21. 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING.  113 

When  I  say  a  year  of  service  with  the  colors  I  do  not  mean  a  year 
of  service  with  the  colors  in  the  sense  of  living  constantly  in  bar- 
racks or  in  uniform,  but  I  mean  that  beginning  July  1  of  the  year 
in  which  they  are  21  and  ending  with  June  30  of  the  year  in  which 
they  are  22,  every  man  who  has  had  this  intensive  training  during 
his  nineteenth  year  and  is  physically  fit  should  serve  one  year  in 
a  troop  battery  or  other  organization  of  the  citizen  forces  of  the 
military  establishment.  The  year  of  service  should  be  commenced 
by  one  month  of  field  training.  In  other  words,  a  course  of  repeti- 
tion, in  addition  to  the  six  months,  which  he  gets  in  his  nineteenth 
year.  It  is  rather  doubtful  whether  we  would  be  able  to  give  them 
a  full  month.  We  might  have  to  shorten  that  period  of  repetition 
training  to  a  lesser  period  on  account  of  men  in  business,  but  there 
certainly  should  be  a  minimum  of  20  days — a  month,  if  we  can 
give  it — of  work  in  camp. 

Having  finished  this  period  of  intensive  training  in  camp,  men 
remain  for  the  balance  of  the  year  in  a  Federal  organization  main- 
tained at  war  strength,  completely  equipped  in  every  way  and  ready 
for  service,  it-  officers  will  be  men  wno  hare  been  trained  in  the 
Officers  Reserve  Corps  <>r  elsewhere.  [ts  entire  enlisted  personnel 
will  consist  of  men  who  have  had  six  months  of  intensive  !  raining 
followed  hy  a  course  of  repetition.  Their  stains,  so  Car  as  freedom  of 
movement,   business,  etc.,   are  concerned,   would   he  that    which   now 

pertains  in  the  case  of  the  National  Guard.  Bach  year's  da—  will 
represent  about  500,000  men,  or  about  double  the  present  National 
Guard  at  war  strength.    It>  force  will  be  composed  of  young  men  at 

the  age  <>f  physical  best  and  minimum  dependent  and  business  re- 
sponsibility. They  will  have  known  in  advance  t  hat  t  hey  are  to  render 
this  service  during  their  twenty-first  year,  and  in  case  of  a  call  such 
as  has  recently  been  made  those  affected  will  be  men  who  have  made 
preparation  forjusl  such  a  contingency.  They  will  he  men  in  the  full 
vigor  of  yout  h  and  whose  wit  hdrawal  for  Ben  ice  will  cause  a  minimum 
of  hardship  and  inconvenience.  If  conditions  should  exist  which 
render  it  probable  that  more  than  50O,OC0  men  might  he  Deeded  in 

of  a  call,  the  class  should  he  held  for  the  color-  for  an  additional 

year,  which  would  hold  in  a  condition  of  immediate  readiness  the  class 
of  21  and  class  of  22,  or  1.000,000  men.  If  additional  classes  were 
needed  they  could  he  called  by  successive  years,  23,  24,  etc.  I 
should  include  in  the  first  line  troops  men  from  21  to  28,  inclusive. 

In  other  words,  !  would  have  the  service  begin  with  the  twenty-first 
year  and  terminate  with'the  twenty-eighth,  or  a  period  of  eight  years. 
This  would  give  us  a  total  of  approximately  0  men  who  have 

had  as  good  training  as  it  is  possible  to  give  them  in  that  time. 
Ordinary  casualt  ies  would  somewhat  reduce  this  tot al,  but  it  would  he 
safe  to  say  that  we  should  have  available  at  least  3,700,000  in  this 
first-line  group  and  probably  more.  1  do  not  think  it  an  exaggeration 
to  say  that  the  classes  of  21,  22,  and  23  will  have  had  as  good  training 
and  he  as  well  informed  and  prepared  for  the  discharge  of  their  duties 
as  the  bulk  of  the  enlisted  personnel  of  our  Regular  Establishment 
to-day,  including  the  regular  reserves. 

The  Chairman.  Suppose  you  had  the  number  of  men  you  speak  of 
trained  in  the  manner  you  suggest,  how  long,  if  they  were  called  into 


114  UNIVERSAL    MILITARY    TRAINING. 

service,  would  they  have  to  he  trained  to  become  proficient  or  efficient 
soldiers  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  They  will  be  as  well  trained  as  are  our  regular  reservists 
When  they  report  and  should  be  immediately  available.  It  is  pro- 
posed to  give  them  30  days'  repetition  training  when  called  to  the 
colors. 

The  Chairman.  Yes. 

Gen.  Wood.  They  will  size  up  very  well  with  the  men  of  the  regular 
organization  to-day  and  be  better  trained  than  half  of  them.  I  do 
not  think  that  the  people  at  large  realize  that  the  Regular  Army  is 
a  constantly  changing  organization.  The  men  are  constantly  coining 
and  going.  Under  the  system  of  intensive  training  we  are  going  to  give 
the  men  instruction  under  conditions  which  will  be  at  least  equivalent 
to  three  to  one  in  the  regular  service  in  effectiveness  and  efficiency. 
I  speak  with  absolute  certainty  from  experience  in  this  matter;  at 
the  end  of  six  months  you  will  have  men  as  efficient  on  the  average 
as  the  average  of  men  in  the  United  States  Army,  at  the  end  of  18 
months. 

Senator  Brady.  Do  you  think  that  six  months'  intensive  training 
is  equal  to  three  to  one  of  Regular  Army  training  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  Absolutely.  There  is  in  my  mind  no  question  about 
it.  A  great  deal  of  the  time  of  our  Regular  Establishment  is  wasted 
time  in  a  military  sense.  The  men  have  much  nonmilitary  work  to 
do.  They  are  busy,  but  it  is  not  military  work.  Our  men  are 
stationed  in  small  posts,  a  handful  here  and  a  handful  there.  Organ- 
izations are  only  partially  filled  up,  and  when  turned  out  for  instruc- 
tion oftentimes  there  is  only  a  small  portion  of  what  should  be  a  full 
organization  present.  The  officers  have  many  detached  duties;  the 
troops  are  very  seldom  assembled  in  large  bodies  for  the  instruction 
of  the  higher  units.  Under  the  training  system  which  I  trust  will 
be  inaugurated  all  organizations  will  be  at  War  strength;  they  will 
be  in  camp  under  conditions  which  will  reduce  nonmilitary  work  to 
the  minimum;  the  training  will  be  most  valuable  to  our  officers,  for 
it  will  be  the  first  time  most  of  them  have  had  an  opportunity  to 
handle  a  war-strength  organization  appropriate  to  their  grade  under 
conditions  which  will  permit  the  maximum  amount  of  time  being 
devoted  to  purely  military  work. 

The  Chairman.  Have  you  ever  made  any  estimate  as  to  the  cost 
that  such  training  would  entail  upon  the  Government  % 

Gen.  Wood.  I  have  not  gone  into  it  in  detail.  It  is  largely  a 
matter  of  equipment,  food,  and  transportation,  and  the  wear  and 
tear  of  arms  and  equipment.  There  should  be  no  pay  for  this  service. 
It  should  be  part  of  a  man's  service  to  the  United  States,  to  the 
Nation.     I  will  make  an  approximate  estimate  and  insert  it. 

COST   FOR   6   MONTHS'  TRAINING    FOR    A    HALF    MILLION     MEN     PER   YEAR    BY   INTENSIVE 

METHOD. 

Only  Infantry,  Cavalry,  and  Field  Artillery  considered  in  estimates.  Training  for 
for  special  arms  would  be  such  a  small  percentage  of  the  total  as  not  to  change  esti- 
mates materially. 

Men. 

Infantry,  206  regiments 400,  670 

( iavalry,  20  regiments 26,  800 

Field  Artillery,  60  regiments 73,  020 

500, 490 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING.  115 

Cost  for  individuals,  6  months. 

Infantrv :  Men. 

Ration $54.  00 

<  Slothing 16. 65 

Quartermaster  field  equipment  (estimated  to  be  replaced  every 

four  periods) 3.  20 

Ordnance  (maintenance) 6.  73 

Medical  (first-aid  package) .47 

Ammunition 8.  74 

Per  infantryman 89. 79 

Total  Infantry  (400,670) 35,  976, 159. 30 

Cavalry  '  (calculated  in  same  way,  allowing  maintenance  of  1  horse  for 
every  5  men  under  training): 

Per  cavalryman 114.05 

Tol  al  (  avalry  (26,800) 3, 056,  540. 00 

Field  Artillery  J  (calculated  in  same  way,  allowing  one-fifth  horses  for 
full  field  service): 

Per  field  artilleryman 1  18.  28 

Total  Field  Artillery  (73,020) 8,  636, 805.  60 

Total  Infantry 35,  976, 159.  30 

Total  Cavalry 3,  066,  540.  00 

Total  Field  Artillery 8,  636,  805.  60 

47,  669,  504.  90 
Transportation  and  subsistence  en  route  ($15  per  man) 7,  507, 350.  00 

Total  for  individuals r,r,,  i 76,  854.  90 

Initial  expenses  (reduced  number  of  animals  for  Cavalry  and  Field  Artillery  used  in 

i fating  shelter). 


Arm. 


Regi- 
ments. 


Infantry 206 

Cavalrv 20 

Field  Artillery 60 


Total. 


Camp.       I  Cantonment. 


$12,346,082  ,  16,872,430 
1,051,660  1,523,700 
2,590,080     3,741,000 


15,987,822    22,137,130 


As  the  wear  and  tear  on  camp  equipment  requires  replacement  of  practically  all 
after  12  months'  use  and  the  cantonments  will  last  10  to  15  years  with  average  annual 
expense  for  maintenance  of  2\  per  cent  initial  cost,  it  is  assumed  the  cantonments 
will  be  established  and  maintenance  calculations  have  been  made  on  that  basis. 

The  equipment  for  transportation,  for  purchase  of  animals  for  Cavalry  and  other 
mounted  organizations,  for  any  individual  equipment  for  soldiers,  for  special  equip- 
ment for  the  various  arms  and  corps,  are  not  included  in  the  initial  expenses,  as  all 
of  these  are  necessary  for  the  reserve  stores  of  any  troops  which  we  may  have  to  raise, 
and  are  now  presumably  being  accumulated  for  our  reserves,  volunteers,  and  militia, 
in  the  place  of  which  this  civilian  force  is  being  contemplated. 

Maintenance  and  overhead  charges. 

Additional  clerical  help  and  office  supplies  (War  Department  and 

department  headquarters) 2  $1,  000,  000.  00 

Reserve  officers,  noncommissioned  officers,  and  cooks  (pay  and  allow- 
ances)  3 18,  000,  000.  00 

1  It  is  appreciated  that  the  proportion  of  these  arms  under  training  is  not  that  required  for  the  best  organ. 
izations  of  the  Army.  The  expense  of  training  these  arms,  howevei  rably  greater  than  I 
Infantry  and  the  essentials  of  discipline,  physical  training,  and  organization  can  !>.■  obtained  as  well  by  the 
Infantry  training.  In  the  event  of  war  we  should  probably  call  in  c  Lditional  classes  of  those 
trained  in  the  Cavalry  and  Field  Artillery.  For  example,  if  we  would  call  four  classes  of  Cavalry  we 
should  have  (allowing  for  casualties  I  approximately  109,000  trained  men,  and  of  Field  Artillery 
would  give  i                    Ined  artillei 

2  This  is  less  than  estimate  for  similar  services  at  present.    Simpler  system  contemplated. 
a  As  a  comparison  the  National  Guard  pay  is  $27,000,000.    Act  approved  Aug.  29,  1916. 


116  UNIVERSAL  MILITARY  TRAINING. 

Mileage  for  officers $300,  000.  00 

Maintenance  of  cantonments  (2£  per  cent  of  cost) 1  555,  000.  00 

Maintenance  of  roads,  etc.,  in  cantonments 100,  000.  00 

Water 455,  000.  00 

Light | 120,  000.  00 

Fuel  (kitchen  and  incinerators) 2,  000,  000.  00 

Crude  oil  (incinerators  and  latrines) 480,  000.  00 

General  camp  sanitation 600,  000.  00 

1 1  ire  of  camp  sites  and  damage  claims 750,  000.  00 

Office  supplies,  clerical  force  in  camps 2  500,000.00 

Medical  supplies  and  maintenance  of  equipment 1,  026,  000.  00 

Maintenance  of  camp  communication , 20,  000.  00 

Transportation  of  supplies 1,  000.  000.  00 

Camp  and  maneuver  transportation  (repairs,  gasoline,  oil) 3 1,  500,  000.  00 

Maintenance  of  animals  for  mounted  officers  and  orderlies 4  2,  769,  000.  00 

31, 175,  000.  00 

Total 86,  351,  854.  90 

Allowing  a  reasonable  amount  for  unforeseen  contingencies,  in 

round  numbers  a  grand  total  of 88,  000,  000.  00 

The  above  estimates  are  based  largely  on  the  limited  data  available  from  our  train- 
ing camps.  As  numbers  increase  and  experience  improves  administrative  methods 
the  cost  should  decrease. 

EXPENSES    OF   TRAINING   THE    21- YEAR   CLASS   FOR   A    PERIOD    OF    15   OR   30   DAYS. 

No  cantonments  or  permanent  camp  equipment  will  be  required.  The  training 
will  be  entirely  in  field  maneuvers,  using  the  transportations  supplied  for  the  six 
months'  men.  Officers  and  men  will  have  only  the  equipment  authorized  for  indi- 
viduals in  field  service.  Allowing  the  same  cost  for  transportation  to  and  from  con- 
centration points  we  should  have  for  500.000: 


15  days. 


30  days. 


Transportation 7, 500, 000 

Other  expenses 6, 250, 000 


7,500,000 
12,500,000 


13,750,000  i  20,000,000 


Any  appropriation  made  should,  of  course,  be  expendable  for  any  purpose  not  incon- 
sistent with  the  intent  of  the  law.  That  is,  the  appropriation  should  be  expendable 
for  the  various  items  entering  into  the  estimate  at  the  discretion  of  the  Secretary  of 
War.     This  will  be  necessary  for  efficient  administration,  especially  at  first. 

It  is  believed,  also,  that  railroad  rates  should  be  fixed  at  not  to  exceed  one-third 
normal  rates,  and  it  is  thought  the  railroad  companies  will  be  willing  to  do  this  as 
their  share  in  the  preparedness  movement.  A  large  percentage  of  the  cost,  especially 
for  the  21-year  class,  is  for  transportation  to  and  from  the  rendezvous.  If  this  can  be 
done,  the  cost  for  15  days'  training  will  be  reduced  to  $8,750,000  and  for  30  days' 
training  to  $15,000,000;  while  the  larger  estimate  for  the  6  months'  training  will  be 
reduced  from  $88,000,000  to  $83,000,000. 

BASE    PAY   FOR    OFFICERS. 

It  is  believed  that  the  base  pay  for  officers  should  be  smaller  and  the  increase  for 
longevity  greater.  This  in  view  of  the  large  number  of  reserve  officers  to  be  trained 
in  time  of  peace  and  the  volunteer  officers  necessary  in  time  of  war.  As  a  general  rule 
the  present  base  pay  is  greater  than  should  be  given  untrained  officers,  while  the 
increase  for  service  is  not  commensurate  with  the  increased  value  of  an  officer  of  long 
experience. 

1  To  this  must  be  added  replacement  of  cantonments  once  every  10  to  15  years. 

2  As  a  comparison  the  National  Guard  pay  is  $27,000,000.    Act  approved  Aug.  29,  1916. 
s  Based  on  experience  at  Plattsburg. 

4  One-half  Field  Service  Regulation  allowance. 


I'NIVERSAL    MILITARY    TRAINING. 


117 


The  following  tables  show  the  present  and  the  proposed  rates  of  pay: 

Present  pay. 


Pay  of  grade. 

Monthly  pay. 

Grade. 

Yearly. 

Monthly. 

After  5 
years (10 
per  cent). 

After  10 
years (20 
per  cent). 

After  15 

year 

percent). 

"  After  20 
years (40 
percent). 

Lieutenant  general     . 

$11,000 
8,000 
6,000 
4,000 
3,500 
3,000 
2,400 
2,000 
1,700 

$916.67 
666.67 
500.00 

291.67 
250.00 
200.00 
166.67 

in.  m 

Major  general 

Brigadier  general 

Colonel 

$366.67 
320.83 

Ma  oo 

LSI.  33 

155.83 

$400.00 
350.00 
300.00 
34a  00 
200.00 
170.00 

$416.  67 
375. 00 
325.00 
260.00 

IM.  17 

$416.67 

Lieutenant  colonel 

375.  00 

Major 

:m.  83 

Captain 

280.00 

First  lieutenant 

Second  lieutenant 

Proposed  pay. 


Hank. 


Bete. 

2J  years. 

5  year.-. 

$7,000 

$7,700 

$8,400 

6,000 

6,600 

7,200 

4,500 

3,000 

3,300 

3,600 

2,500 

2,750 

2,300 

2,530 

2,100 

2,400 

1,800 

J.  UN. 

1,200 

1,500 

1,800 

L3]  years. 


Lieutenant  general 

Major  general 

Brigadier  general.. 

Colonel 

Lieutenant  colonel 

Major 

Captain 

First  lieutenant... 
Second  lieutenant. 


89,100 

7.NH. 

5,850 
3,900 


8,400 

4,200 

3,220 
2,800 
2,520 
2,100 


810,500 

9,000 
6.750 

3,450 
3,000 
2,7CO 
2,250 


15  years.       17$  years. 


Lieutenant  general 

Major  general 

Brigadier  general . . 

Colonel 

Lieutenant  colonel 

Major 

Captain 

First  lie  itenant 

Second  lieutenant. 


811,300 

9,600 
7,200 
4,800 

3,680 
3,200 

2,400 


811,000 

10,200 
7,650 

5,100 

3,400 
3,000 
2,400 


ears. 

$12,600 

$13,300 

in. mm. 

11,400 

8,100 

8,550 

5,400 

5,700 

4,500 

4,750 

4,140 

3,600 

3,600 

3, (KM) 

3,000 

2,400 

2,400 

years. 


814,000 

12,000 
9,000 
6,000 
5,000 

3,600 
3,000 
2,400 


It  will  be  observed  that,  except  for  the  general  and  the  junior  officers,  there  will  be 
little  change  for  officers  of  the  Kegular  Army,  due  to  the  average  length  of  service  in 
each  grade. 

If  the  proposed  base  pay  v  ere  put  in  effect  the  reduction  in  the  estimates  for  six 
months1  training  of  500,000  young  men  amount  to  $3,818,200. 

Pot  the  repetition  course  at  21  years  of  age  the  reduction  would  be  $320,000  for 
15  days'  training  and  $640,000  for  30  days'  training. 

In  this  connection  the  effect  of  the  proposed  change  in  case  of  war  is  noteworthy. 
The  pay  of  each  division  of  volunteers  called  would  be  $452,700  less  per  annum; 
and  if  the  usual  10  per  cent  additional  pay  for  war  service  were  given  it  would  be 
$498,770  less  than  at  the  present  rates  for  each  division.  As  stated,  the  pay  is  ample 
for  inexperienced  officers,  and  the  amount  saved  in  each  division  would  purchase 
nearly  30,000  high  explosive  shell,  4.7-inch  caliber. 

We  should  all  bear  equally  our  share  of  this  burden  of  service  for 
the  Nation.  I  am  confident  that  from  the  discipline,  habits  of  regu- 
larity, and  promptness  will  result  a  great  increase  in  our  economic 
efficiency  as  a  Nation,  a  great  improvement  in  morality  through  dis- 
cipline and  its  result ing  respect  for  authority,  for  law,  and  the  con- 
stituted authorities.     I  believe  that  our  murder  rate  will  be  divided 


118  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 

by  10.  It  is  about  126  per  million  now,  as  compared  with  12  to  13 
in  Switzerland. 

The  ChaibmaN.  Mr.  Walter  Fisher  testified  here  this  morning,  and 
read  from  an  English  writer  to  the  effect  that  there  is  more  crime 
committed  in  Germany  of  various  kinds— the  book  tabulated  them — 
with  its  military-efficiency  system,  than  under  Great  Britain's,  with 
its  volunteer  service. 

Gen.  Wood.  Great  Britain  has  probably  the  best  system  of  justice 
in  -the  world,  and  the  most  prompt.  If  you  take  the  arrests  and 
trials  for  crime,  you  will  find  that  they  are  very  prompt,  and  they  are 
effective.  Great  Britain  is  exceptionally  efficient  in  that  respect.  I 
can  not  vouch  for  the  excessive  number  of  crimes,  but  certainly  the 
prompt  arrest  and  punishment  under  the  English  law7  are  such  that 
the  more  serious  crimes  are  reduced  to  a  minimum.  Great  Britain 
has  a  remarkably  low  criminal  rate,  so  far  as  capital  crimes  are  con- 
cerned. The  murder  rate  of  the  United  States  is  approximately  126 
per  million — the  heaviest  by  far  of  any  of  the  great  Christian  nations. 
The  average  in  Europe  is  anywhere  from  12  to  20,  Switzerland  rep- 
resenting the  lower  figure.  I  think  that  we  can  account  very  largely 
for  this  low-  murder  rate  by  the  discipline  which  a  man  gets  during 
his  period  of  military  training.  It  produces  respect  for  the  flag,  the 
law,  and  the  constituted  authorities,  and  it  results  not  only  in  better 
men  physically,  but  in  greater  economic  efficiency.  You  have  a 
better  physical  being,  better  coordinated  muscles— in  a  word,  a  bet- 
ter all-around  man,  from  the  moral  standpoint  and  from  the  stand- 
point of  citizenship.  This  training  tends  to  build  up  a  spirit  of 
national  solidarity  and  a  sense  of  the  obligations  of  citizenship;  the 
obligation  for  service  in  war  as  well  as  in  peace — a  sense  of  obliga- 
tion which  is  very  largely  lacking  in  our  population.  X,  think  uni- 
versal training,  service  shoulder  to  shoulder,  in  which  newcomers  and 
our  native-born  citizens  participate  will  have  great  weight  in  weld- 
ing together  these  various  and  divers  elements  and  making  good 
Americans  of  them. 

The  Chairman.  Mr.  Fisher  takes  the  position  that  we  have  the  cart 
before  the  horse;  that  we  take  military  training  as  the  principal  thing 
and  make  efficiency  the  by-product.  He  says  we  ought  to  reverse 
the  method  of  procedure  and  adopt  industrial  training  and  efficiency 
with  military  universal  training  as  a  by-product. 

Gen.  Wood.  I  think  he  is  entirely  wrong.  He  does  not  understand 
the  value  of  military  training  from  the  economic  standpoint. 

The  Chairman.  Would  it  be  possible,  in  your  opinion,  to  train  men 
in  civil  life  and  at  the  same  time  make  them  proficient  as  units? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  think  we  could  train  men  to  be  efficient  soldiers 
while  we  arc  training  them  along  industrial  lines,  but  it  would  take  a 
great  deal  of  time.  It  would  mean  that  we  should  have  to  hold  men 
probably  two  or  three  times  the  period  I  am  recommending,  and  it 
would  also  moan  the  equipment  of  the  plants  at  training  camps  which 
would  be  enormously  expensive,  and  the  maintenance  at  these  plants 
of  instructors  in  all  lines  of  industry,  and  it  would,  in  a  way,  amount 
to  failure  to  take  advantage  of  the  opportunities  for  this  training 
which  are  offered  in  the  industrial  field,  where  the  boy  has  a  chance 
to  learn  his  trade  under  conditions  more  favorable  on  a  whole  than 
the  Government  could  afford  to  maintain.  It  would  cover  an  unnec- 
essary long  time  and  would  dissipate  his  interest  in  military  training. 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 


119 


1  do  not  think  it  would  be  either  practical  or  dosirable,  The  actual 
situation  in  this  country  to-day  is  that  we  have  no  defense  in  any  way 
adequate  to  meet  an  attack  by  a  great  power.  We  are  Without 
supplies,  organization,  officers,  or  trained  men.  In  this  project  of 
general  training,  we  are  dealing  with  a  proposition  which  is  vital  to 
national  life.  We  must  place  something  in  the  way  of  a  (rained 
force  behind  our  little  Regular  Army,  and  we  can  only  do  it  on  lines 
consistent  with  the  ideals  of  democracy  through  adopting  a  system 
of  universal  military  training.  Universal  military  training  is  abso- 
lutely opposed  to  militarism.  Ii  is  the  only  purely  democratic 
method.  It  exemplifies  the  basic  principle  of  democracy:  thai  i-, 
thai  equality  of  obligation  goes  hand  in  hand  with  equality  of  oppor- 
tunity and  privilege.  This  principle  is  the  veiy  foundation  of  the 
Republic'.  We  must  gel  this  training  and  get  it  quickly  if  we  are 
going  to  have  an  adequate  military  defense  in  emergency. 

The  Chairman.  Why  do  you  say  that  we  are  practically  without 
defense  I 

Gen.  Wood.  You  have  an  Army  of  what  I  'Faking  it  all.  at  home 
ami  abroad,  some  10'.). 000  men.  I  think  we  are  up  to  that  now. 
In  this  country,  a  mobile  army  of  perhaps  43,000,  roughly  speaking; 
about  two  divisions  al  war  strength;  about   1  1,000  Coast  Artillery. 

In  all.  say  a  total  of  57,000  men  within  the  continental  limits  of  the 
United  States.  That  is  all  you  have  in  the  way  of  regular  troops 
small  number  of  auxiliary  troops.  We  can  not  depend 
on  the  militia.  You  have  seen  the  mobilization  on  the  border.  A 
more  complete  demonstration  of  the  entire  unsuitabilit y  for  actual 
service  could  not  have  been  given.  It  has  been  very  expensive,  but 
if  we  have  profiled  by  the  experience  it  w  ill  have  been  money  used  to 
advantage.  1  W  ill  secure  a  full  statement  as  to  strength  of  the  Army 
at  home  and  oversea  and  insert  it. 


Actual  ttrength  oftJu  Regular  A  runt,  bated  on  the  rt turns  for  November  SO,  except  for  organ- 
izations in  the  Philippine  Islands  and  in  China,  which  are  based  on  returns  for  ()> 

SI,   ! 


United 
States. 

Alaska. 

Porto 
Rico. 

Pan- 
ama. 

Ha- 
waii. 

Philip- 
pines. 

China. 

Total. 

Engineers 

1,420 
14,171 

5,084 
22, 169 

201 

311 

320 

4,234 

207 

989 

877 

5,436 

261 
2,136 

875 
4,990 

:::::::: 

1,303 

16         2,105 
17,664 

Cavalrv 

Field  Artillery 

Infantry 

446 

1,299 

208       40,083 

Mobile 

Coast  Artillery 

42,844 
14,098 

446 

1,299 

5,066 
1,640 

7,509 
1,264 

8,262 
2,396 

1,303 

309       67,038 
90 

Line 

56,942 

446 

1,299 

6,706 

8,773 

10,658 

1,303 

399  ,    86,526 

Prison  companies 

School  detachments 

325 
685 

6,244 

325 
691 

6,244 
768 



6 

Recruiting  parties  and 
recruits 

Recruits  en  route 

309 

269 

50 

36 

459 
547 
79 
176 

Quartermaster  Corps 

Ordnance  Department... 

Signal  Corps 

Military    Academy    de- 
tachment  

4,408 

585 

1,120 

659 
38 

89 

5 

191 

46 

1 
1 

178 

5 

44 

13 

1 

6 
1 
3 

5,556 

727 

1,571 

659 

Indian  Scouts 



38 



Regular  Army 

Hospital  Corps 

71,006 
4,903 

731 
28 

1,347 
33 

6,933 
176 

9,443 
322 

11,919 
576 

1,317 
37 

409 
10 

103, 105 
fi.ORS 

Total 

75,909 

759 

1,380 

7,109 

9,765 

12,495 

1,354 

419 

109,190 

120  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY    TRAINING. 

The  number  reported  absent  are  those  on  furlough,  and  while  most  of  them  are  in 
the  United  States,  they  are  not  counted  as  being  in  this  country  because  they  do  not 
belong  to  organizations  stationed  here,  and  they  are  not  included  in  the  strength 
outside  the  United  States  because  they  are  not  a  part  of  the  effective  strength  on  the 
date  the  returns  are  made. 

The  Chairman.  It  was  bettor  than  none,  was  it  not  1 

Senator  Thomas.  As  compared  with  the  mobilization  in  the  Spanish 
War,  it  has  some  points  of  superiority,  has  it  not  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  It  has  and  it  has  not.  As  a  promptly  available 
efficient  military  asset,  taken  as  a  whole,  it  was  of  little  value  to  meet 
trained  troops  on  either  occasion.  Of  course,  there  were  organiza- 
tions of  carefully  selected  men  who  would  have  done  their  best,  but 
it  would  have  been  a  wanton  waste  of  human  life  to  have  sent  these 
men  against  moderately  good  troops.  Again,  it  should  be  remem- 
bered that  only  a  very  small  number  of  the  organizations  could  be 
started  until  after  weeks  of  delay,  and  that  even  then  they  were 
imperfectly  equipped  and  filled  up  with  men  the  bulk  of  whom  were 
untrained  and  absolutely  unfit  for  combat.  Our  own  staff  depart- 
ments were  lacking  in  efficiency,  and,  in  my  opinion,  left  much  to  be 
desired  in  their  performance  of  duty.  This  will  always  be  the  case 
as  long  as  the  bureau  heads  are  permanent  fixtures  in  Washington 
and  the  General  Staff  is  not  in  full  coordinating  control.  The  efficient 
work  of  mobilization  was  done,  as  a  rule,  by  hue  officers  filled  with 
the  spirit  and  knowledge  which  comes  from  service  with  troops. 

The  sanitary  work  was  far  in  advance  of  that  of  1898.  Camp 
diseases  were  less.  Equipment  in  the  way  of  transportation  was 
sadly  lacking.  I  do  not  know  of  an  organization  on  the  border 
to-day  which  is  at  full  strength  and  properly  and  fully  equipped  for 
war  service.  I  include  in  this  statement  the  great  bulk  of  the  regular 
organizations.  They  are  short  of  men,  practically  all  of  them,  and 
they  lack  much  which  modern  war  considers  of  vital  importance  under 
combat  conditions.  The  Militia  are,  of  course,  much  worse  off. 
Their  situation  as  a  fighting  force  was  and  is  hopeless.  The  Regulars, 
what  there  is  of  them,  are  good  well  trained  men  and  under  Regular 
officers,  which  means  well-trained  officers. 

The  Chairman.  Is  that  due  to  the  Militia  system  or  due  to  the 
Jault  of  the  Army  itself  ? 

Gen.  Wtood.  It  is  due  to  both.  To  inefficiency  and  shortages  in 
our  supply  department,  but  the  principal  cause  of  deficiency  is  found 
in  the  Militia  itself.  This  is  not  due  to  faults  in  personnel  but  to 
unsurmountable  faults  in  the  system. 

In  the  Eastern  Department  we  have  56  per  cent  of  the  militia. 
There  is  no  criticism  to  be  made  of  the  officers  or  men;  they  are  a 
good  lot  of  individuals  and  they  have  done  the  best  they  could.  It  is 
the  system  only  that  I  am  criticising.  We  found  that  20  per  cent, 
and  a  small  fraction — I  think  it  was  20.5 — but  20  per  cent  is  near 
enough — of  all  men  in  the  militia,  and  it  should  be  remembered  that 
when  I  say  all  men  I  mean  men  who  are  in  the  militia  whose  presence 
in  it  made  it  possible  for  them  to  draw  Federal  pay — 20  per  cent  of 
them  were  physically  unfit  for  service  and  had  to  be  dropped.  In  the 
average  Infantry  regiments  you  have  about  820  men.  If  you  drop 
20  per  cent  of  them  you  would  be  down  to  the  neighborhood  of,  say, 
650.  The  governors  dropped  a  great  many  of  the  old  men  upon  the 
call  for  mobilization;  that  is,  men  who  were  obviously  too  old  to  go, 
but  whose  presence  in  the  regiments  added  much  to  the  strength  and 


UNIVERSAL    MILITARY    TRAINING.  121 

character  of  the  organizations.  After  they  were  dropped  and  the  20 
per  cent  additional  you  are  down  to  about  570  men.  Of  those  570 
men,  roughly,  50  per  cent  had  had  a  year  or  more  of  training  and  50 
per  cent  have  come  in  in  the  last  few  months,  so  you  had  a  regiment 
going  to  the  front  with  a  nucleus  of,  say,  285  men  who  had  had  a  year's 
militia  training,  which  may  mean,  perhaps,  48  to  72  hours'  drill,  or  it 
may  mean  more  or  even  less.  "  You  added  to  that  little  nucleus  285 
men  who  had  had  less  than  one  year:  many  of  them  had  come  in 
since  the  so-called  Federalization  of  the  militia  and  had  had  very 
little  training.  So  you  had  570  men  of  the  degree  of  training  I  am 
describing,  and  to  that  number  you  added  other  men  with  a  view  to 
making  up  the  war  strength  of  1,900  men,  speaking  in  round  numbers. 

That  is  what  we  sent  to  the  front.  Organizations,  the  greater 
portion  of  which  consisted  of  untrained,  undisciplined,  and  conse- 
quently undependable  men  as  soldiers.  In  some  of  the  regiments  the 
percentage  physically  defective  was  nearly  50  per  cent.  Twenty  per 
cent  was  the  average  for  the  whole  department.  It  is  to  be  remem- 
bered that  the  great  Eastern  Department  has  about  56  per  cent  of 
all  the  militia  of  the  United  States  within  its  borders,  'twenty  per 
cent  of  the  men  who  were  in  the  service  at  the  time  of  the  call  had  to 
be  dropped  because  of  physical  disability.  In  addition  to  this  num- 
ber many  were  dropped  by  the  governors.  The  estimate  of  the  train- 
ing of  the  militia  as  a  whole  prior  to  the  outbreak  of  the  war  showed 
that  64  per  cent  of  the  men  in  the  ranks  had  had  a  year  or  more  of 
service  in  the  militia:  the  balance  less  than  a  year.  The  old  men 
dropped  out  by  the  governors  came,  of  course,  from  the  64  per  cent, 
so  that  the  regiment  was  left  with  men  about  one-half  of  whom  had 
had  a  years  training  and  half  less:  many  of  them  only  a  few  months. 
The1  mounted  troops  were  not  equipped  with  horses,  almost  without 
exception:  they  had  a  few.  hut  only  a  small  per  cent  of  what  they 
required.  The  Field  Artillery  likewise— most  of  them— had  had 
little  training.  Some  had  practically  none.  Such  was  the  collec- 
tion of  willing  men  in  uniform,  equipped  with  arms  with  whose  use 
they  were  little  familiar,  who  were  Bent  to  the  front.  If  they  had  had 
to  meet  highly-trained,  well  organized  troops  they  would  not  have 
known  what  hit  them. 

Senator  Thomas.  Were  those  men  dropped  before  the  regiments 
departed  for  the  front  or  after  \ 

Gen.  WOOD.  Before.  In  some  instances  it  took  months  to  fill  a 
regiment  up  to  the  minimum  strength  required  necessary  to  muster 
it  into  the  Federal  service.  In  many  instances  regiments  were1  held 
for  long  periods  in  order  to  secure  men  to  replace  those  who  had  been 
dropped  out  because  of  physical  disability.  The  complement  to  be 
supplied  by  the  Eastern  Department  was  in  round  numbers  132,000. 
We  are  to-day  short  47,000  of  that  complement;  in  other  words, 
working  very  vigorously  on  this  matter  since  June,  we  are  still  short 
35  per  cent  of  the  full  complement. 

Senator  Thomas.  What  is  the  proportion  of  resignations  and  dis- 
charges of  men  after  they  were  mobilized  \ 

Gen.  Wood.  That  would  be  hard  to  answer  because  a  great  many 
of  these  men  were  men  with  dependent  families.  I  have  those 
statistics,  and  I  will  put  them  in  the  hearing,  if  I  may  be  permitted, 
giving  jou  the  answer  as  close  as  I  can. 

Senator  Brady.  I  wish  you  would  do  that. 


122  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 

Gen.  Wood.  We  mobilized  in  all  86,876  in  the  Eastern  Depart- 
ment. Up  to  September  25;  1916,  1,836  were  discharged  on  account 
of  dependent  relatives.  The  authority  to  do  so  was  then  recalled. 
We  have  no  record  of  the  number  so  discharged  on  the  border  from 
the  regiments  sent  from  this  department.  Fortunately  there  was 
no  enemy  to  meet  in  the  shape  of  an  organized,  well-equipped  force. 
Had  there  been  it  would  have  been  a  tragedy,  as  the  troops  were  in 
no  sense  prepared  for  campaign.  If  we  have  learned  the  impossi- 
bilities and  the  unworkability  of  the  system,  this  mobilization  will 
have  been  worth  whatever  it  cost,  because  it  should  have  taught  us 
never  again  to  place  reliance  upon  militia  organizations  for  service 
of  this  kind.  Twenty  per  cent  of  all  the  men  in  the  militia  in  this 
department  were  discharged  for  physical  disability  after  thay  had 
been  mobilized  and  in  the  process  of  taking  them  into  the  United 
States  service.  In  addition  to'  this  number  a  great  many  men  were 
discharged  by  the  governors  during  the  period  between  the  Presi- 
dent's call  and  the  response  of  the  troops.  In  other  words,  they  were 
released  before  going  to  the  mobilization  camps  and  some  after  they 
went  there. 

Senator  Brady.  How  many  of  the  National  Guard  in  numbers 
have  you  had  on  the  border  during  this  mobilization  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  From  our  department — I  can  only  speak  for  that — 
about  86,800  from  the  Eastern  Department. 

Senator  Brady.  What  is  your  judgment,  General,  as  to  what  the 
results  would  have  been  if  we  had  not  called  on  the  National  Guard 
at  all  and  have  attempted  to  raise  the  same  force  that  you  have  raised, 
by  volunteer  service  ?     Do  you  think  it  could  have  been  done  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  think  it  could  have  been  done,  but  I  think  it  would 
have  taken  a  longer  time  to  have  done  it.  The  best  regiments  of 
militia  were  gotten  off  in  the  first  eight  to  ten  days,  much  quicker 
than  we  possibly  could  have  gotten  off  volunteer  troops.  If  we  had 
had  to  meet  good  troops,  well  organized  and  well 'led,  it  would  have 
been  simply  slaughter  to  have  sent  these  untrained  militia  against 
them.  Organizations  raised  and  trained  as  these  are,  are  not  trained, 
disciplined  troops.  The  portion  which  had  had  reasonable  training 
would  not  exceed  20  per  cent.  I  believe  this  is  a  liberal  estimate. 
The  remaining  80  per  cent  were  untrained,  or  slightly  trained.  They 
were  organizations  made  up  of  enthusiastic  well-meaning  men,  wear- 
ing the  uniform  of  the  United  States  and  carrying  arms  of  whose  use 
they  knew  little  or  nothing.  They  were  not  soldiers  in  the  sense  of 
being  trained  men.  They  were  actuated  by  the  spirit  of  willingness 
to  serve.  They  were  willing  but  unprepared.  Some  of  the  regiments 
we  had  were  better  than  others.  Some  of  the  New  York,  some  of  the 
Massachusetts  and  Pennsylvania  regiments,  and  some  from  the  other 
northern  and  southern  States  were  good  militia  regiments,  but  they  were 
not  disciplined  troops  prepared  for  campaign  and  none  of  them  were  at 
full  strength  when  they  went  to  the  front,  or  adequately  equipped. 

Senator  Brady.  They  were  not  up  to  the  full  requirements  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  do  not  think  we  sent  an  organization  excepting  such 
units  as  field  hospitals  and  ambulance  companies,  to  the  front  at  full 
war  strength;  we  sent  very  few  even  approximately  full.  I  want  to 
try  to  make  it  clear  that  it  is  not  the  fault  of  the  officers  or  men;  it 
is  the  fault  of  the  defective  system 


UNIVEBSAL   MILITARY    TRAINING.  123 

Senator  Brady.  I  thoroughly  understand  your  position  in  thai 
matter,  General,  and  I  thoroughly  agree  with  you  in  your  state- 
ments. Will  you,  before  you  finish  your  remarks,  give  us  some 
information  or  some  idea  as  to  what  you  think  should  have  been 
done  relative  to  the  present  National  Guard,  as  to  the  effect  its 
present  status  lias  upon  universal  military  training: 

Gen.  Wood.  I  think  the  system  of  universal  military  training  and 
service  should  be  established  as  soon  as  possible,  and  the  enlisted 
personnel  of  the  National  Guard  replaced  by  men  who  have  had 
Federal  training — men  who  are  young  and  have  the  minimum  of 
dependent  and  business  responsibility.  In  other  words,  men  who 
can  afford  to  go  to  the  front  and  men  who  are  under  absolute 

Federal  control.  We  must  maintain  the  militia  until  the  pre- 
liminary steps  of  the  new  system  can  he  takes  and  we  have  men 
enough  reasonably  trained  for  service  in  the  Federal  Reserve  Regi- 
ments. L  think  we  should  take  into  this  new  Federal  reserve  every 
officer  in  good  standing  in  the  National  Guard.  Nothing  should 
be  done  which  appears  to  be  adverse  to  these  men.  We  should 
of  course,  take  the  men  also  who  are  of  suitable  age. 

Senator  BRADY.  Would  yon  have  that  continued  under  the  present 
form  of  governmental  control,  or  would  you  have  the  National 
Guard  revert  back  to  its  form!!-  position  as  State  militia  I 

Gen.  Wood.  I  would  drop  the  National  Guard  entirely  out  of  the 
scheme  of  Federal  defense.  If  the  States  want  to  keep  it.  of  course 
they  have,  under  their  own  sovereignty,  the  rights  to  do  so  if  Con- 
gress consents,  hut  I  feel  very  strongly  that  the  Federal  Govern- 
ment   should   not   be  dependent    upon   any   State   for   its   \\eap<»n<  of 

defense. 

Senator  BEADT.  What  you  believe  is  that  it  would  he  best  to 
have  the  National  Guard  go  back  to  its  former  status  as  a  State 
organization  '. 

Gen.  Wood.  If  it  is  to  be  maintained,  yes  sir— absolutely.  I  have 
in  effect  so  recommended  in  a  communication  which  I  think  should 
have  reached  the  War  Department  to-day.  I  feel  that  the  Federal 
Government  must  own  and  control  the  military  forces  absolutely 
and  beyond  preadventure. 

Senator  Thomas.  Was  there  observable  any  conflict  of  authority 
between  the  Federal  and  the  State  authorities  in  the  handling  of  its 
militia  during  its  recent  mobilization,  or  in  the  operations  of  the 
soldiers  on  the  border  I 

Gen.  Wood.  No  essential  one,  except  that  the  standards  of  effi- 
ciency are  all  determined  very  largely  by  the  standards  of  interest 
in  the  State.     Interest  of  State  authorities. 

Senator  Thomas.  A  necessary  result. 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes,  sir.  There  are,  of  course,  possibilities  of  radical 
differences  of  opinion.  Governors,  if  they  wish,  can  muster  out  men 
and  make  radical  changes  in  personnel  of  organizations.  In  fact, 
they  can  do  very  much  anything  with  the  militia  up  to  the  time 
of  call.  In  the  past,  as  you  know,  the  governors  of  various  States 
have  differed  with  the  policy  of  the  Federal  Government  and  in 
some  instances  have  refused  to  send  the  militia  in  response  to  Fed- 
eral call.  The  only  policv  to  be  adopted  is  that  of  universal  military 
training  and  service,  ana*  the  building  up  as  soon  as  possible  of  a 
force  of  citizen  soldiery,  officered  principally  by  trained  officers  of 
86205—17 2 


124  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY    TRAINING. 

the  Officers'  Reserve  Corps.  The  States,  of  course,  have  the  right 
to  maintain  a  militia  force  if  they  desire.  I  hope  they  will  drop  their 
militia,  however,  and  establish  State  constabulary — a  force  much 
better  fitted  to  do  the  ordinary  work  incident  to  the  maintenance  of 
public  order  than  the  militia.  This  universal  training  will  do  much 
to  build  up  a  spirit  of  national  solidarity,  to  Americanize  the  various 
new  elements  which  are  coming  into  our  population.  It  will  bring 
home  to  every  youngster  a  sense  of  his  individual  obligation  for  the 
nation  and  make  him  think  not  in  terms  of  the.  locality  but  of  the 
nation.  It  will  give  us  men  with  better  bodies,  bodies  better  co- 
ordinated and  more  responsive  to  the  will.  It  will  give  us  a  more 
effective  working  machine,  one  which  will  aid  to  individual  and 
national  efficiency7  and  be  a  strong  influence  for  the  betterment  of 
public  and  private  morals.  Once  in  force,  it  would  result  in  the 
establishment  of  such  a  condition  of  preparedness  as  would  make 
any  nation  hestitate  to  attack  us,  and  from  our  present  state  of 
wealth  and  unpreparedness  with  an  aggressive  commerce,  condi- 
tions which,  without  adequate  protection  are  a  strong  inducement 
for  war,  we  should  find  ourselves  in  such  a  state  of  preparedness  as 
would  make  any  nation  hesitate  to  attack  us  because  we  would 
be  really  ready.  • 

A  great  many  people,  and  strangely  enough,  those  who  argue 
against  militarism,  advocate  a  very  Targe  Regular  Army — an  Army 
of  perhaps  three-fourths  of  a  million  of  soldiers.  They  do  not  realize 
that  this  means  the  establishment  of  a  force  which  tends  to  militarism 
and  the  establishment  of  conditions  not  desirable  from  the  standpoint 
of  the  Republic.  So  far  as  I  know  the  opinions  of  the  more  intelligent 
officers  of  the  Army,  they  are  not  in  favor -of  a  movement  of  this  kind, 
but,  generally  speaking,  they  are  in  favor  of  universal  military  train- 
ing— a  trained  citizenry  standing  behind  an  Army  adequate  for  the 
peace  of  the  Nation.  We  do  not  want  to  build  up  a  great  mercenary 
Army  with  its  attendant  isolated  military  class.  We  want  a  Regular 
Army  of  the  size  recommended  by  the  General  Staff — about  250,000 
men.  This  force  will  be  needed  for  garrisoning  the  oversea  posses- 
sions, for  a  mobile  force  in  the  home  country  for  purposes  of  home 
defense  and  service  as  an  expeditionary  force  such  as  we  used  in  1898 
and  later.  It  will  also  serve  as  a  training  nucleus  for  the  great  mass 
of  citizens  who  will  come  under  our  direction  each  year  for  military 
training.  Back  of  this  regular  force  we  want  a  citizenry  trained, 
armed,  and  ready  to  be  soldiers,  all  of  them,  who  are  physically  fit, 
but  not  living  the  lives  of  soldiers. 

This  is  what  we  can  expect  under  a  system  of  universal  training — 
the  highest  degree  of  preparedness  with  the  minimum  of  regular  force. 

Senator  Brady.  Do  you  think  that  would  give  us  two  or  three  lines 
of  defense  ?     Your  Regular  Army  wrould  be  the  first  line  of  defense  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  The  Regular  Army  would  be  ready  for  any  expedi- 
tionary operations  and  as  a  training  nucleus  for  the  citizen  soldiery. 
It  would  also  furnish  the  reasonable  mobile  force  in  the  United  States 
and  Coast  Artillery  troops  sufficient  for  the  coast  defense  in  peace 
time.     This  would  be,  so  to  speak,  first  line. 

Senator  Brady.  What  would  be  your  second  1 

Gen.  Wood.  Citizenry  from  21  to  29  years  of  age.  And  these,  if 
trained  as  contemplated,  could  be  mobilized  very  promptly. 

Senator  Brady.  Then  what  would  you  do  with  the  State  militia' 


UNIVERSAL  MILITARY   TRAINING.  125 

Gen.    Wood.  It    should    absolutely    disappear    unless    the    State 

chooses  to  keep  armed  bodies  of  troops.  We  have  I  o  use  for  State 
troops  in  this  country.  All  officers  and  men  in  the  State  organizati*  n 
would  be  welcomed  in  the  proposed  Federal  force  if  physically  fit 
and  the  enlisted  men  were  01  suitable  age. 

Senator  Brady.  Do  you  not  believe  we  will  Decessarily  have  to 
have  a  State  militia  j 

Gen.  Wood.  I  see  what  you  are  driving  at.  I  think  that  it  is 
much  better  to  have  a  State  constabulary. 

Senator  Brady.  I  fully  agree  with  you  on  that,  but  I  wanted  to  get 
your  views  on    the  subject.     It  should  be  maintained   in  the  States, 
by  the  States  and,  for  the  State-'  use,  except  in  time  of  war. 
'  Gen.  Wood.  That  is  right,  a  State  constabulary 

Senator  BBADY.  Do  you  not  think  there  should  be  some  scheme 
to  bring  the  three  together  '. 

Gen.  Wood.  No.  I  think  the  State  constabulary  should  be  kept 
apart  and  be  used  as  a  State  police  force,  pure  and  simple,  for  the 
control  of  local  disorders.  Of  course,  in  ease  of  a  great  war  all  the 
police  force  would  perhaps  become,  in  times  of  emergency,  a  portion 

of  the  Military  Establishment. 

When  the  citizen  training  has  been  going  on  for  eight  years  we 
shall  have  4,000,000  men,  less  the  ordinary  losses  from  death  and 
disease  who  have  passed  through  the  training.  This  would  leave  us 
about  3,700,000  men  in  the  first  line  group  available  and  ready 
for  service.  We  shall  have  each  year  500.000  in  arms,  assembled  m 
regiments  or  other  tactical  organizations,  fully  equipped  for  immedi- 
ate service.  They  will  be  distributed  over  the  country  more  or 
less  as  the  militia  is  to-day,  their  numbers  being  in  accordance  with 
the  population.  That  is,  a  large  city  like  New  York  would  have  many 
organizations.  It  will  be  a  much  better  trained  force  than  the  militia 
and  its  value  about  three  to  one.  It  will  be  organized  so  as  to  con- 
stitute a  well-balanced  force  with  a  proper  proportion  of  the  dif- 
ferent arms.  It  will  be  at  war  strength,  officered  by  trained  oflicers 
of  the  reserve.  We  shall  know  exactly  what  we  have  available. 
Back  of  it  will  be  the  remaining  class  of  the  first  line  group,  the 
class  of  22,  23,  24,  25,  26,  27,  and  28,  or  about  3,200,000  men.  We 
must  have  the  arms  and  equipment  for  this  force  always  ready  and 
so  distributed  as  to  be  near  the  organizations  which  are  to  use  them. 
In  case  we  need  more  than  500,000  men  a  class  could  be  held  for  an 
additional  year,  so  that  you  would  have  the  old  class  and  the  new 
class,  or  a  total  of  1,000,000  men  ready  for  immediate  service.  In 
the  Civil  War  we  had,  North  and  South,  a  little  over  4,000,000  men. 
This  with  one-third  of  our  present  population,  no  over-sea  enemy 
and  nothing  like  our  present  coastal  wealth.  When  this  is  remem- 
bered I  feel  that  the  first  line  group,  of  3,700,000  men,  is  not  exces- 
sive. I  do  not  think  we  would  have  to  call  them  all  out  except 
in  a  great  war.  I  think  once  we  have  completed  our  organization  on 
the  basis  of  national  service  and  training  our  position  will  be  very 
secure  and  it  will  be  very  doubtful  if  any  nation  will  attack  us — it 
would  require  an  extraordinay  combination  of  force  to  attack  us 
with  any  nope  of  success.  The  arms  and  equipment  though  must  be 
maintained;  an  army  poorly  equipped  is  almost  as  helpless  as  one 
poorly  trained. 


126  UNIVERSAL    MILITARY    TilAIXLMi. 

In  the  States  yoti  would  want  a  good  constabulary  force — call  it 
what  you  want.  Slate  police  or  State  constabulary;  I  should  call  it 
constabulary — and  depend  on  such  a  force  for  State  purposes, 
because  1  believe  a  police  force  is  less  offensive  to  the  people  in  the 
suppression  of  disorders  than  a  military  force.  I  also  think  the  men 
on  a  force  of  that  sort,  police  or  constabulary,  are  much  better  fitted 
to  handle  crowds  and  mobs  than  troops.  That  is  because  of  their 
training.  The  police  are  trained  to  control  mobs  and  civil  disorders 
and  they  have  a  much  better  knowledge  of  the  best  methods  of  doing 
it.  Lack  of  this  special  training  is,  I  think,  the  fundamental  objec- 
tion to  using  the  militia  against  large  masses  of  people.  They  are 
armed  with  weapons  of  destruction  and  are  taught  to  use  them  with 
a  view  to  killing  an  enemy.  They  are  not  trained  to  suppress  civil 
disorders.  It  is  much  better  to  handle  civil  disturbances  with  police 
than  with  troops. 

Senator  Thomas.  I  think  your  view  is  very  strongly  corroborated 
by  the  experience  of  the  northwestern  police  of  the  Canadian  Gov- 
ernment and  by  the  constabulary  in  some  of  our  States,  and  the  Texas 
Rangers. 

Gen.  Wood.  That  is  right;  a  handful  of  men  handle  the  situation. 
They  know  their  problems.  It  is  an  interesting  fact,  and  I  have 
found  it  true  in  Cuba  and  in  the  Philippines,  where  we  had  to  do  a 
great  deal  of  repressive  work — that  is,  we  prevented  crime  so  as  not 
to  have  to  punish  for  it — that  there  is  very  much  less  resentment 
when  a  man  is  arrested  by  the  police  than  by  troops.  When  the 
troops  fire  into  a  crowd  there  is  tremendous  excitement.  When  po- 
liceman No.  627  fires  at  a  running  burglar  or  a  mob  the  public  never 
think  much  about  it  because  the  maintenance  of  order  is  the  police- 
man's business.  People  respect  a  trained  policeman;  I  mean,  they 
regard  him  as  an  instrument  of  the  law.  But  when  the  troops  come 
in  it  is  quite  a  different  thing.  I  think  the  State  constabulary  is  what 
our  States  should  come  to. 

Senator  Thomas.  What  proportion  of  the  Regular  force  was  the 
Government  able  to  mobilize  on  the  border  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  We  virtually  sent  everything  we  had  in  this  country 
down  there  except  the  Coast  Artillery  and  here  and  there  a  regular 
organization. 

Senator  Thomas.  Perhaps  my  question  is  misleading.  To  what 
extent  is  the  quota  of  troops  represented  in  the  Regular  Army,  or 
was,  during  this  Mexican  trouble? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  should  say  we  had  between  150,000  and  155,000 
militia  on  the  border  (not  all  at  one  time)  and  between  45,000  and 
50,000  Regular  troops  at  one  time,  including  Coast  Artillery. 

Senator  Thomas.  Were  the  regiments  full  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  The  regiments  of  Infantry  have  been  at  about  half 
strength  for  the  past  five  years  except  in  the  foreign  possessions. 
The  Cavalry  and  Field  Artillery  have  been  somewhat  better  off.  The 
Coast  Artillery  has  generally  been  near  full  strength. 

Senator  Thomas.  At  present,  what  is  the  amount,  speaking  gen- 
erally, of  the  deficit  in  the  quota  which  we  should  have  under  the  law  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  The  condition  as  to  regiments  is  about  as  follows: 
We  had  20  regiments  of  Infantry  before  the  recent  increase,  the 
oversea  regiments  were  practically  at  war  strength,  that  is,  the  regi- 
ments in   the  Philippines,   Hawaii,   and  part  of  the  regiments  in 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY    TRAINING.  127 

Panama.  The  home  regiments  averaged  about  820  to  S30  men, 
whereas  their  war  strength — I  am  giving  you  round  numbers  only — 
is  about  1,900.  We  had  four  regiments  in  the  Philippines,  four  in 
Hawaii,  and  four  in  Panama,  and  one  battalion  in  Alaska  at  effective 
strength;  the  balance  of  the, regiments  have  been  little  above  a  war- 
strength  battalion  in  numbers. 

Senator  Thomas.  To  some  extent  then  the  Regular  Army  suffers 
from  lack  of  force,  as  the  militia  docs:  that  is  to  say,  we  can  not  get 
enlistments  enough  to  fill  up  the  ranks  as  fixed  by  the  statutes. 

Gen.  Wood.  May  1  answer  that  somewhat  in  detail? 

Senator  THOMAS.  Certainly. 

Gen.  Wood.  The  strength  of  the  Infantry  regiments  in  this  country 
is  about  one-half  war  strength.  Cavalry  and  Field  Artillery  are 
each  about  25  per  cent  under  strength.  This  is  in  part  due  to  the 
evil  effects  of  long  enlistments.  The  impression  is  still  in  force  among 
the  people  that  the  long  enlistment  stands.  You  will  remember 
that  a  few  years  ago,  against  the  recommendations  of  the  General 
Staff  and  a  great  majority  of  Army  officers  consulted  at  the  various 
service  schools,  we  were  given  four  years'  enlistment  with  the  colors 
and  three  in  the  reserve.  There  was  a  great  and  Immediate  fall  in 
enlistments  after  the  enactment  of  this  law.  As  1  remember  it. 
approximately  49  per  cent.  This  was  the  direct  effect  of  the  long 
enlistment.  Men  do  not  want  to  tie  themselves  up  for  so  long  a 
period,  and  the  better  the  cla^s  of  men  the  Lett  the  disposition  to 
engage  for  so  long  a  time.  Personally,  1  always  favored  an  enlist- 
ment permitting  transfer  to  the  reserve  as  soon  as  the  man  is  trained. 

We  were  he-inning  to  overcome  the  difficulty  a  hit  through  the 
authorizing  of  discharge  by  purchase.  Moreover,  times  were  rather 
hard  and  the  labor  market  was  congested.  This  added  somewhat  in 
increasing  enlistments.  Then  came  the  war  and  with  it  high  prices 
of  labor:  and  the  growing  impression  that  there  be  no  active 

service  on  the  Mexican  border;   the  effect  of  the  professional  pacifists 

in  representing  the  Army  as  a  necessary  evil:  lack  of  any  particular 

interest  in  it;  cultivation  of  the  idea  that  the  Army  was  a  place  for 
loafers — all  these  things  had  an  effect  in  holding  hack  enlistments. 
There  was  not,  as  expressed,  that  appreciation  of  the  Army  which  is 
so  necessary  to  secure  the  right  kind  of  men.  All  these  conditions 
have  a  great  effect  upon  securing  enlistments.  Men  are  purely 
human  even  in  the  Army.  The}'  are  influenced  wvy  largely  by  sen- 
timent. Most  men  come  into  the  Army  more  for  the  experience 
than  for  the  money.  When  the  uniform  is  respected  by  our  country- 
men as  it  should  be.  enlistments  will  increase.  When  the  Army  be- 
comes a  popular  institution  and  its  function  is  understood  and  recog- 
nized as  an  essential  one,  there  will  be  no  difficulty  about  enlistments. 
With  the  passage  of  the  national-defense  act  we  secured  an  enlist- 
ment contract  which  a  few  of  us  have  been  working  for  for  years, 
an  enlistment  under  which  the  men  could  transfer  to  the  reserve  at 
the  end  of  a  year  of  honest  and  faithful  service  if,  in  the  opinion  of 
their  superior  officers,  they  were  well  trained  and  competent  soldiers. 
This  gave  a  little  impetus  to  recruiting,  but,  in  view  of  the  Mexican 
conditions,  it  has  been  considered  necessary  to  withhold  that  privi- 
lege of  transfer  to  the  reserve. 

The  present  enlistment  is  for  seven  years  -three  years  with  the 
colors  and  four  with  the  reserve— with  the  privilege  of  furlough  to  the 


128  UNIVERSAL    MILITARY    TRAINING, 

reserve  at  the  end  of  one  year  if  a  well-trained  soldier.  Now,  if  a  man 
is  transferred  to  the  reserve  at  tie  end  of  a  year  he  spends  the  balance 
of  his  enlistment,  or  six  years,  in  the  reserve.  You  see  the  point. 
Release  from  service  with  the  colors  after  one  year  for  the  efficient 
soldier.  This  will  give  us  gradually  just  what  we  wanted,  a  large 
reserve.  I  have  gone  further  and  said  let  us  transfer  men  to  the  re- 
serve the  moment  their  superior  officers  decide  they  are  well-trained 
soldiers.  The  man  may  have  had  training  in  some  other  army.  He 
may  have  been  taught  in  a  military  college,  or  he  may  have  received 
training  of  value  in  the  militia.  The  point  is,  that  when  the  captain 
of  a  company  and  his  officers  decide  Private  A,  for  instance,  is  a  well- 
trained  soldier,  we  want  him  transferred  to  the  reserve  and  put 
another  man  in  his  place  and  be  training  him. 

Senator  Brady.  I  think  that  is  a  splendid  suggestion. 

Gen.  Wood.  That  is  what  we  have  been  working  for.  But  we  have 
had  to  hold  up  the  transfers  to  the  reserve  on  account  of  the  Mexican 
situation.  The  feeling  has  gone  out  among  the  men  that  we  are  going 
to  hold  them  to  long  enlistments,  that  the  privilege  afforded  by  the 
law,  or  rather  the  favor  or  consideration  permitted  by  the  law,  is  not 
to  be  extended.  This  is  having  an  unfortunate  effect.  I  think  it 
would  be  better  to  transfer  every  man  who  is  well  trained  to  the 
reserve.  I  think  by  doing  so  we  would  show  to  the  public  generally 
that  a  man  may  come  in  and  if  he  is  decent,  intelligent,  honest,  and 
industrious,  that  he  can  be  transferred  (furloughed)  to  the  reserve  at 
the  end  of  a  year.  In  other  words,  you  will  lose  a  little  at  first,  but 
you  will  gain  in  public  confidence.  At  Plattsburg,  where  we  have  all 
kinds  and  conditions  of  men,  a  great  many  of  the  best  type  of  men 
came  to  me,  literally  hundreds,  in  a  single  season,  saying,  "If  we 
could  enlist  in  the  Regular  Army  for  a  short  period  we  would  like  to 
do  it  and  get  our  training  with  the  Regulars." 

Senator  Thomas.  I  suppose  that  would  be  possible,  would  it  not, 
after  the  Mexican  situation  is  wound  up  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  hope  eventually  it  will  come  out  in  that  way. 

Senator  Thomas.  Do  you  think  the  establishment  of  the  $30  per 
month  pay  would  prove  much  of  an  inducement? 

Gen.  Wood.  You  would  probably  get  some  more  men,  but  I  think 
it  would  be  a  national  misfortune  to  do  it. 

Senator  Thomas.  My  question  is  prompted  by  the  assertion  that 
former  Secretary  of  the  Interior,  Mr.  Fisher,  made  this  morning,  that 
the  increase  of  pay  to  that  sum  would,  in  the  opinion  of  some  officials 
to  whom  he  had  conversed — whose  opinions  were  given  and  very 
properly,  I  think — would  so  increase  the  enlistments  as  to  give  the 
Army  many  more  men  than  it  really  needed. 

Gen.  Wood.  You  can  buy  men.  It  is  simply  a  matter  of  price; 
but  it's  a  bad  policy. 

Senator  Thomas.  Precisely,  but  would  that  be  a  sufficient  price 
at  which  to  buy  a  man — $30  a  month  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  You  would  get  more  men  than  you  get  now.  You 
would  almost  double  the  cost  of  the  pay  of  the  Army,  and  once  having 
advanced  that  you  never  could  get  it  back.  Remember  that  in  war 
you  will  have  to  pay  that  same  price  to  untrained  masses  who  volun- 
teer. 

Senator  Thomas.  Do  you  think  the  advantage  is  greater  than  the 
disadvantage  of  such  a  proposition? 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING.  129 

Gen.  Wood.  T  think  the  disadvantage  would  outweigh  the  advan- 
tage many,  many  times.  I  believe  if  the  American  public  voiced  a 
real  approval  of  its  Army  and  emphasized  the  sacredness  of  the  mili- 
tary service  and  put  it  where  it  belongs,  you  could  not  take  care  of 
the  men  who  would  want  to  come  into  the  service.  But  when  a 
decent,  clean  soldier  goes  to  a  hotel  and  can  not  get  a  room,  or  goes 
to  a  theater  and  the  woman  next  to  him  moves  off  because  he  is  a 
soldier,  in  uniform,  when  instead  of  being  recognized  as  a  member 
of  an  ancient  and  honorable  profession,  he  is  looked  down  on,  you 
have  a  condition  which  has  killed  enthusiasm.  This  attitude  is  one 
of  the  strongest  influences  against  the  service  to-day. 

Senator  Brady.  You  think  there  ought  to  be  the  proper  sentiment 
behind  the  soldier? 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes,  sir.     There  should   be. 

Senator  Thomas.  I  fully  recognize  that  fact  and  tried  to  cure  it  by 
the  introduction  of  a  measure  tor  the  protection  of  the  uniform.  I 
was  only  partially  successful. 

Gen.  Wood.  It  has  done  some  good,  sir.  But  return  to  the  sub- 
ject of  a  portion  of  public  opinion  concerning  the  soldier's  occupation. 
The  professional  pacifist  and  peace-at-any-price  man — the  nonresist- 
ant,  who  believes  that  nothing  is  worth  defending — is  the  man  who 
has  cultivated  and  built  up  strong  sentiment  against  the  soldier. 
Many  of  our  better  class  of  people  have  come  to  look  upon  the  soldier 
as  an  idler  because  they  have  never  given  the  matter  of  his  occupa- 
tion and  duties  serious  attention.  This  is  due  largely  to  the  fact 
that  we  have  never  met  the  issue  squarely  in  this  country,  and  instead 
of  demanding  universal  service  we  have  left  military  service  to  vol- 
unteers. This  failing,  we  have  gone  to  the  bounty  or  the  draft. 
During  the  Civil  War  we  drafted  generally  after  the  fall  of  1862.  To 
meet  the  demands  of  the  draft  people  of  the  community  got  together 
and  in  fact  paid  men  to  go  to  the  front.  So  common  was  this  prac- 
tice that  men  at  the  front  frequently  spoke  of  the  newcomers  as  cost- 
ing so  much  a  pound.  ''Here  comes  a  bunch  of  seven  and  a  half-a 
pound  men."  In  other  words,  whatever  the  per  capita  price  was. 
Service  secured  in  this  way  resulted  in  an  undue  number  of  deser- 
tions, in  bounty  jumping,  and  other  despicable  things. 

Senator  Tin  >.\i  as.  There  is  no  distinction  between  them  and  the  men 
on  the  pension  roll. 

Gen.  Wood.  Not  a  bit. 

Senator  Brady.  I  was  going  to  ask  the  same  question  that  Senator 
Thomas  has  asked  relative  to  the  increase  of  pay.  Ex-Secretary 
Fisher  this  morning  was  very  emphatic  in  his  statement  relative  to 
that  matter,  and  in  fact  he  used  practically  the  same  expression  in 
reference  to  that  which  you  did  in  reference  to  having  the  country 
behind  the  soldier,  that  if  the  wages  or  salaries  allowed  the  soldiers 
was  placed  at  $30  a  month,  we  could  not  take  care  of  the  men  that 
would  be  ready  to  enlist. 

Gen.  Wood.  Let  us  take  it  in  another  way.  A  few  years  ago  I 
was  in  Switzerland.  I  met  a  lot  of  youngsters  coming  down  the 
mountain  one  morning.  I  said,  "Why  are  you  in  uniform?  You 
are  not  on  service."  The  men  stopped  and  looked  as  though  they 
would  like  to  push  me  off  the  trail.  After  a  moment's  hesitation  one 
of  the  party  stepped  to  the  front  and  said:  "We  are  in  uniform  be- 


130  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY    TRAINING. 

cause  we  are  proud  of  our  uniforms.  This  is  the  uniform  of  the 
Swiss;  we  are  always  proud  to  wear  it  and  we  wear  it  on  special 
occasions.  There  is  a  celebration  down  in  the  village  which  we  are 
going  to,  and  we  are  always  glad  to  wear  the  uniform  when  there  is 
any  special  occasion."  I  then  asked:  "Do  you  all  receive  military 
training?"  This  was  almost  too  much  for  them.  Another  of  the 
party  stepped  to  the  front  and  after  a  moment's  hesitation  said: 
i '  What  do  you  mean  by  asking  these  questions  ?  Do  you  not  know 
there  is  not  a  woman  in  the  village  who  would  dance  with  a  man  if 
he  did  not  take  his  military  training,  unless  he  was  a  cripple?" 

Let  us  get  a  little  of  that  spirit — the  spirit  that  makes  men  proud 
of  the  uniform  and  glad  to  wear  it.  Now,  as  to  pay.  Fifteen  dollars 
is  the  basic  pay  of  the  private  soldier.  This  pay  runs  up  to  about 
$100  in  the  higher  grades,  and  with  it  go  clothing,  food,  shelter, 
medical  attendance,  and  other  benefits.  It  is  much  more  liberal 
than  it  appears  at  first  glance.  Few  people  appreciate  what  the 
total  value  of  Army  pay  is,  and  with  it  goes  an  insurance  in  case  of 
accident  a  nd  retired  pay  after  3Q  years'  service. 

Senator  Thomas.  Perhaps  it  is  fair  to  Mr.  Fisher  to  say  here  that 
he  coupled  that  statement  with  the  further  condition  that  an  effort 
to  secure  the  rudiments  of  a  good  trade  or  occupation  should  be  also 
offered  as  a  matter  of  civic  training  to  those  soldiers  while  in  the 
Army. 

Gen.  Wood.  I  do  not  think  we  should  attempt  the  two  under  our 
proposed  system  of  intensive  training.  We  want  to  make  this  fea- 
ture the  important  one,  for  we  are  wholly  lacking  in  it,  and  many 
men  will  come  from  the  farming,  professional,  and  business  classes. 
These  men  want  their  training  as  quickly  as  they  can  get  it.  They 
receive  a  kind  of  civic  training  too  little  in  evidence  in  this  country; 
they  get  it  in  the  form  of  discipline,  promptness,  thoroughness, 
respect  for  the  flag,  the  authorities,  and  the  rights  of  others.  This  is 
the  kind  of  civic  training  our  youth  need.  The  mixture  of  classes, 
races,  and  occupations  at  Plattsburg  (and  our  training  system  will 
be  but  an  extension  and  amplification  of  the  Plattsburg  system) 
tends  to  aid  very  greatly  our  work. 

Take  it,  for  instance,  at  Plattsburg.  We  had  in  one  camp  this 
year  two  bishops  (one  was  unable  to  take  the  training),  18  clergymen 
of  one  church,  12  of  another  great  church,  and  some  40  others  repre- 
senting other  denominations.  That  was  in  one  camp  of  3,000  men. 
There  were  men  from  the  ranks  of  labor  and  men  from  the  poorer 
class — expenses  of  some  paid  by  interested  patriotic  citizens.  I 
helped  many  to  come,  as  I  had  quite  a  large  fund.  We  put  them  all 
into  the  same  uniform,  side  by  side — regardless  of  who  they  were; 
there  was  no  bunching  by  class.  They  were  assigned  by  fives  to  a 
company.  They  were  then  split  up  amongst  different  squads  in  the 
company.  There  was  no  such  thing  as  recognition  of  social  classes 
or  keeping  certain  men  together.  Probably  the  finest  thing  about 
the  camp  was  the  pure  democracy  of  that  association. 

Most  of  the  men  had  not  known  each  other  before.  Their  estimate 
of  each  other  was  based  simply  upon  efficiency  and  performance  of 
duty.  A  man  was  sized  up  and  valued  according  to  his  performance 
of  the  task  before  him.  Distinctions  as  to  wealth  and  social  condition 
absolutely  disappeared.  They  estimated  each  other  from  an  entirely 
new  standpoint— that  measured  by  the  performance  of  a. common 


UNIVERSAL    MIUTAHV    TRAINING.  131 

duty.  It  was  b  fine  elevating  influence.  For  many  of  the  men  for 
the  first  time  were  consciously  engaged  m  an  effort  to  lit  themselves 

for  national  service.  The  result  was  to  fuse  the  various  divers 
elements  into  one  homogeneous  mass  infused  with  the  idea  of  prepar- 
ing themselves  to  better  discharge  their  citizenship  obligations  from 
the  soldier's  side.  This  service  all  together  served  more  than  i 
thing  I  have  ever  Been  to  wipe  out  tin1  distinctions  between  the  rich 
and  the  poor  and  the  Jew  and  the  Gentile.  The  scion  of  the  old 
family  and  the  son  of  the  newcomer.  It  impressed  upon  all  the 
sense  of  a  common  obligation  to  country. 

Senator  BRADY.  You  think  a  trailing  camp  such  as  Plattshurg  is 
very  beneficial,  do  you  i 

U-en.  Wood.  I  think  it  has  been  a  voice  to  a  slumbering  people. 
I  think  it  is  the  most  hopeful  thing  1  have  seen. 

Senator  Thomas.  How  many  of  these  camps  were  in  operation 
last  summer? 

Gen.  Wood.  1  will  give  you  a  general  idea  of  the  movement. 
There  have  been  a  number  of  camps.     We  started  in  L913,  the  year 

before  the  war.  and  we  had  ahout    300    men.  roughly,     fcn    L914   we 

were  jus1  finishing  up  the  second  set  of  c  hen  warwame.     Wo 

had  about  650.  In  L915  we  had  ahout  ::.()()<>.  and  this  year,  from  all 
over  the  country,  about  17.000  or  is. 000  men.  and  next  year  we  are 
counting   on    about    60,000.     The    line    thing   i>    that    there    Is    every 

of  men,  all  filled  with  the  idea  of  universal  Ben  ice    service  for 

the  Nation.  As  the  camps  of  L913  were  drawing  to  an  end  a  move- 
ment was  made  to  directly  connect  certain  coll  who 
had  shown  great  interest   in   the  movement,  with  it<  further  conduct 

through  service  as  membera  of  an  advisory  committee.  Thia  com- 
mittee consisted  of  President   Drinker,  of  Lehigh:  President  Lowell. 

of    Harvard:    President    Hihhen,  of    Princeton:    Presidcin  .of 

Yale;  John  Finley,  at  the  head  of  the  New  York  Educational  Estab- 
lishment; Gen.  Nichols, of  ti  aia  Military  Institute;  President 

.lames,  of  the  University  of  Illinois:  President  Ilutchins,  of  Ann 
Arbor;  President  Denny,  of  Alabama  :  President  Schurman,  of  Cornell; 
and  President  Wheeler,  of  California.  Since  then' other  college  presi- 
dents have  been  added  to  the  numher:  President  Knight,  of  the 
University  of  the  South:  the  director  of  the  Catholic    University  in 

Washington:   President   Garfield,  of  Williams:  and   this  year  other 

college  presidents  representing  the  Rocky  Mountain  and  southwestern 
colleges  will  be  added. 

This  advisory  body  has  been  of  tremendous  service  in  building  up 
the  camps  through  indorsing  the  movement  throughout  the  college 
world.  They  have  kept  in  close  touch  with  the  camps  and  have 
visited  them  and  made  careful  inspections.  In  a  word,  they  stand 
as  sponsors  for  the  good  work  of  the  camp,  the  value  of  the  training, 
and  the  idea  it  represents.  There  is  a  general  movement  toward 
universal  service  in  the  universities.  Charles  W.  Eliot,  president 
emeritus  of  Harvard,  after  most  careful  consideration  of  this  subject. 
has  just  come  out  for  universal  training  not  only  as  a  matter  of 
national  defense,  but  for  the  betterment  of  the  men  economically 
and  from  the  standpoint  of  citizenship.  Universal  training  repre- 
sents an  extension  of  the  Plattsburg  idea.  There  will  be  no  chfliculty 
whatever  in  putting  it  in  force.  Not  over  one-half  of  our  men  are 
fit  to  take  it  physically.     I  don't  think  the  expense  is  going  to  be  in 


132  UNIVERSAL  MILITARY  TRAINING. 

any  way  prohibitive.  Transportation  will  be  one  of  the  big'features 
Transportation  lines  on  land  and  sea  should  be  called  upon  to  plaj 
their  part  in  the  game  in  this  matter  of  national  defense,  and  special 
rates  should  be  secured  for  those  who  attend  training  camps.  They 
are  preparing  themselves  to  defend  the  nation,  and  incidentally  the 
property  ana  lives  of  all  under  the  flag.  All  transportation  during 
the  period  of  training  should  be  at  a  special  minimum  rate,  and  I 
believe  the  transportation  companies  will  do  it.  If  not,  Congress 
can  take  steps  to  meet  the  situation. 

Senator  Brady.  Do  you  not  believe  that  if  we  are  going  to  adopt 
this  method  of  military  training,  or  universal  military  training,  that 
the  American  public  will  first  have  to  be  educated  up  to  what  it  really 
means  before  it  will  indorse  it,  or  do  you  think  they  are  ready  to 
indorse  it  at  this  time  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  believe  they  will  indorse  it  to-day,  if  presented  to 
them  properly.  I  have  just  come  from  St.  Louis  where  I  went  to 
take  up  the  question  of  summer  camps  next  year,  and  the  one  thing 
that  brought  the  people  to  their  feet  was  a  mention  of  universal 
service.  Incomes  from  the  miner  and  the  ranks  of  labor  just  as 
readily  as  fom  the  richer  classes.  If  you  get  a  lot  of  workmen  to- 
gether and  talk  universal  service,  and  let  it  be  understood  that  by 
universal  service  you  mean  service  under  which  no  man,  however 
wealthy,  can  buy  a  substitute,  you  will  hear  just  one  murmer  from 
the  crowd,  "  We  are  with  you  if  you  will  give  us  real  universal  service. 
We  are  willing  to  serve  the  country,  as  willing  as  any  one  to  do  our  full 
duty,  but  we  do  not  want  any  more  of  this  Civil  War  buying-substi- 
tute  business."  This  is  their  attitude  as  I  see  it.  They  are  afraid 
they  will  get  some  system  by  which  the  rich  man  can  put  up  enough 
money  to  buy  a  substitute.  Labor  is  with  you,  I'm  sure,  when  you 
can  make  it  absolutely  clear  that  it  is  universal  service  for  all,  rich  and 
poor.  Our  armies  have  always  been  filled  very  largely  from  the  ranks 
of  labor  and  it  is  an  insult  to  the  laboring  man  to  assume  that  he  has 
neither  the  patriotism  nor  intelligence  to  appreciate  the  necessity 
of  national  defense.  What  he  wants  in  service  is  real  democracy; 
a  share  and  share  alike,  shoulder  to  shoulder  proposition.  A  system 
under  which  each  man  who  is  physically  fit  must  pay  his  part  of  the 
service  tax  in  war  by  actual  service,  and  not  through  buying  another 
man  to  do  it  for  him. 

Senator  Brady.  When  you  make  every  man  bear  his  responsi- 
bility and  burden  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  Absolutely.  I  do  not  believe  you  will  have  any 
serious  trouble.  I  went  over  the  Department  of  the  East  last  year 
and  was  talking  summer  camps,  I  think,  on  about  160  or  170  occa- 
sions, at  colleges,  at  mass  meetings,  at  places  like  Lawrence,  Mass., 
where  they  have  51  nationalities.  I  never  heard  an  objection  to 
universal  service,  when  its  conditions  were  properly  explained.  I 
talked  to  the  district  leaders  in  New  York  of  different  political  creeds 
with  the  idea  of  putting  before  them  universal  service,  in  order  to  see 
what  they  thought  of  it.  They  are  for  it  if  you  will  give  them  real  uni- 
versal service.  1  think  you  will  find  that  the  leaders  of  labor  are  for  it. 
They  recognize  the  straight  democracy  of  it.  There  is  no  way  of 
getting  away  from  that  fact.  It  is  the  equality  of  obligation  accom- 
panying equality  of  opportunity  and  privilege.  It  is  the  very 
foundation  on  which  the  Republic  rests  and  no  one  can  go  back 
of  that  proposition  unless  he  does  not  intend  to  play  the  game. 


rXIVERSAI.    MILITARY    TRAINING.  133 

Senator  Brady.  The  bill  we  are  considering  would  prevent  the  con- 
dition that  you  mention  about  purchasing  a  substitute. 

Gen.  Wood.  Absolutely. 

Senator  Brady.  Every  man  would  have  to  serve  his  time. 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes,  sir.  May  I  make  a  statement  about  those  two 
bills  just  as  I  see  them  now?  With  your  permission  I  will  elaborate 
it  in  correcting  the  testimony  because  it  is  impossible  in  a  hearing 
of  this  sort  to  cover  the  many  things  that  may  occur  to  me. 

Senator  Thomas.  Before  you  go  into  that  I  would  like  to  ask  if 
you  have  made  any  estimates,  either  mental  or  otherwise,  of  the 
probable  annual  cost  of  universal  service  I 

Gen.  Wood.  We  have  made  estimates,  but  they  are  largely  guess- 
work, to  be  frank  with  you,  because  so  much  depends  upon  the 
distances  that  we  have  to  move  the  men.  A  irreat  item  will  be  the 
one  I  have  suggested,  namely,  the  railroad  rates.  Steps  should  be 
taken  to  fix  them  for  this  service.  Another  important  factor  is  the 
kind  and  amount  of  equipment  we  use. 

We  hear  arguments  in  this  country  from  some  people  who  are 
always  saying,  "You  could  not  have  the  Swiss  system  because 
Switzerland  is  a  little  country,"  and  they  say  you  can  not  have  the 
Australian  system  because  the  population  is  very  small,  Australia 
has  a  small  population, though  it  is  a  large  country.  Australia  is  a 
little  larger  than  continental  United  States  without  Alaska.  She  has 
about  one-twentieth  of  our  population  about  five  millions.  She 
carries  on  this  system  through  having  multiple  training  centers. 
For  the  purpose  of  administration,  Australia  is  divided,  as  1  remember 
it,  into  six  military  divisions  or  districts,  each  under  a  district  com- 
mander, agisted  by  a  district  stall*.  Districts  practically  correspond 
to  six  state  boundaries.  These  areas  are  again  subdivided  into 
battalion  areas.  These  are  grouped  into  brigade  areas,  the  men 
forming  a  tactical  brigade,  with  certain  technical  troops.  The 
battalion  areas  are  subdivided  into  small  training  areas.  In  the 
sparsely  settled  country  the  training  areas  are  subdivided  into  (rain- 
ing localities;  the  total  for  Australia  being  about  450.  The  training 
begins  at  ]'2  years  of  age;  the  first  two  years  calisthenics,  the  four 
following  advanced  calisthenics,  rifle  shooting,  and  simpler  military 
exercises.  They  then  enter  the  citizen  soldiery  or  citizen  forces, 
where  they  receive  about  three  months  of  intensive  training  and 
serve  until  they  pass  into  the  reserve.  The  equipment  at  the  train- 
ing ctMiters  is  extremely  simple,  just  enough  for  the  necessary  training, 
and  of  the  least  expensive  type.  We  should  follow  this  general 
principle.  Of  course,  arms  and  straight  military  equipment  always 
|iave  to  be  of  the  standard  type  used  by  the  service,  but  the  clothing 
and  garrison  equipment  could  be  reduced  to  a  minimum. 

I  think  each  of  the  bills,  the  Chamberlain  bill  and  the  so-called 
amended  or  Moseley  bill,  have  points  of  special  excellence  which 
must  be  considered  in  establishing  our  system.  We  could  not  afford 
to  start,  for  instance,  with  the  training  of  boys  and  neglect  the 
training  of  men  who  are  now  of  military  age.  We  must  commence 
immediately  the  training  of  the  latter,  ana  here  the  Moseley  draft 
is  especially  adaptable.  The  excellent  provisions  of  the  Chamber 
lain  bill  for  the  training  of  the  youth  should  be  put  into  effect  for  the 
younger  portion  of  the  community,  and  when  they  have  reached  the 
age  of  citizen  training  (the  nineteenth  year)  the  question  of  giving 


134  UNIVERSAL    MILITARY    TRAINING. 

certain  credit  for  this  training  and  reducing  somewhat  the  length 
of  time  which  they  should  serve  in  the  final  training  period  (their 
nineteenth  year)  will  conic  up  for  consideration.  These  boys  will 
have  received,  if  the  training  is  properly  conducted,  the  training  of 
the  advanced  Boy  Scout  plus  rifle  shooting,  better  knowledge  of  map 
reading,  and  the  dements  of  military  drill;  a  training  which  should 
entitle  him  to  receive  credit  on  the  six  months'  period,  but  in  no 
case  should  the  credit  exceed  three  months,  even  in  cases  where 
men  have  served  in  military  institutions  or  establishments,  unless 
they  be  a  regular  Army,  Navy,  or  Marine  Corps,  or  long  service  in 
the  militia. 

The  Australian  boy  gets  about  100  to  120  hours  a  year,  from  his 
twelfth  to  eighteenth  year.  In  other  words,  he  is  absorbing  mili- 
tary training  during  this  entire  period.  The  training  which  boys 
have  received  in  the  Boy  Scout  work  will  be  of  material  value.  In 
fact,  this  entire  Boy  Scout  movement  could  be  made  very  much 
greater  use  of  if  we  had  among  the  older  boys  rifle  shooting  and  the 
elements  of  military  drill. 

We  should  start  at  once  with  our  six  months'  training  for  the  men 
who  are  in  their  nineteenth  year  and  also  with  the  training  of  the 
younger  boys.  The  important  thing  is  to  start  immediately  the 
training  of  those  who  are  now  of  military  age.  This  six  months  of 
intensive  training,  equaling,  as  it  will,  one  and  one-half  years  of 
training  in  the  Regular  Establishment,  followed  by  a  month  of  special 
training  during  the  first  month  of  year  of  service  with  the  colors, 
should  give  us  in  two  or  three  years  a  reasonable  nucleus,  something 
that  we  can  depend  upon.  In  the  meantime,  the  Reserve  Officers' 
Corps  is  being  built  up  through  the  present  training  camps,  the 
work  at  colleges,  etc.,  and  should  be  able  to  provide  officers  as  rap- 
idly as  we  can  the  men.  Of  course,  of  the  men  in  training  there 
will  be  thousands  who  show  capacity  and  have  the  qualifications  to 
make  good  officers.  These  men  would  be  taken  up  at  the  end  of  or 
during  the  six  months'  period  and  pushed  forward  through  a  course 
of  special  training  to  fit  them  for  the  duties  of  officers  in  the  lower 
grades  and  noncommissioned  officers. 

Senator  Brady.  Whether  they  have  had  college  training  or  not  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes;  there  should  be  a  minimum  of  three  months' 
training  for  purposes  of  standardization.  Some  men  who  come  to 
the  training  camps  will  be  obviously  material  for  officers  almost 
from  the  start.  They  will  have  had  military  training  at  school  or 
college,  perhaps  will  have  served  for  a  long  time  in  the  guard,  but 
in  any  case  they  should  have  three  months  of  standardization  work 
and  additional  advanced  work  if  they  are  to  be  noncommissioned 
officers  and  officers. 

Many  questions  will  come  up  which  will  have  to  be  determined  after 
the  system  is  established.  It  is  very  probable  that  the  States  will 
eventually  feel  the  pressure  on  the  part  of  their  people  for  the  estab- 
lishment of  military  training  in  the  schools  of  the  State  in  order  that 
the  period  of  intensive  training  under  the  Federal  authority  may  be 
somewhat  shortened,  for  training  under  suitable  conditions  should  be 
given  credit.  Take  the  gradual e  of  the  Virginia  Military  Institute, 
which  (with  one  or  two  other  military  colleges)  stands  next  in  excel- 
lence to  West  Point.  We  should  give  a  graduate  of  this  institution 
credit  for  three  months  and  also  consider  him  as  having  had  training 


UNIVERSAL    MELITABY    TBAIX1NG. 


135 


which  would  make1  it  possible  to  immediately  commence  work  to 
qualify  as  an  officer.  Pennsylvania  State  Military  College,  Norwich 
in  Vermont,  and  others  are  of  the  same  general  type.  Graduates  of 
these  institutions  should  unquestionably  be  given  credit  and  con- 
sidered as  having  done  much  of  the  work  which  would  be  a  proper 
foundation  for  training  for  an  officer.  In  a  word,  as  soon  as  the  people 
of  the  States  have  recognized  that  military  training  is  going  to  receive 
some  credit  from  the  Federal  authorities  when  their  youth  come  up 
for  training  there  will  be  a  Strong  pressure  in  all  the  States  to  have 
military  training  become  a  part  of  public  education. 

Senator  Thomas.  Now  you  can  take  up  the  bill  for  consideration, 
if  you  want  to. 

Gen.  Wood.  I  really  have  covered  the  general  principles  involved, 
I  think. 

Senator  Thomas.  I  did  not  know  whether  you  wanted  to  discuss  the 
bills  in  detail. 

Gen.  Wood.  Of  the  two  bills  I  should  say  that  Senator  Chamber- 
lains is  best  designed  to  build  up  the  character  and  physique  of  our 
future  citizens,  but  that  the  Moseley  draft  is  better  for  meeting 
our  immediate  Deeds.  Senator  Chamberlains  bill  will  produ 
fairly  efficient  citizen  soldiery  in  time,  say  after  six  or  seven  y< 
The  Moseley  draft  will  give  as  a  half  million  trained  Boldiers  in  one 
year  and  a  similar  number  each  year  following.  As  explained 
already j  the  Moseley  draft  may  result  in  each  State  taking  over 
the  training  proposed  in  the  Chamberlain  bill  for  our  younger  boys. 

thus  relieving  the  Central  Government  in  pari  of  the  expense.  If  the 
States  do  not  do  this,  ultimately  the  Central  Government  should. 

But  at  present  we  should  concentrate  on  those  who  can  give 
immediate  return  in  service  if  needed.  We  have  none  too  many 
trained  instructors  as  it  Is.  Once  the  system  is  in  force,  we  shall 
develop  promptly  among  those  trained  the  necessary  instructors  for 

extending  the  work  as  far  as  we  may  desire  to. 

In  comparing  the  two  bills  I  should  say  that  Senator  Chamberlain  s 
bill  enacts  into  law  some  features  which  might  better  be  left  to  regu- 
lation, while  the  amended  or  Moseley  draft  does  not  cover  all  ques- 
tions that  may  arise.  1  have  a  tabulated  comparison  which  I  should 
like  to  insert  in  my  liea rings. 


Chamberlain  bill. 


SECTION  1. 

Prescribes  all  citizens  and  those  of 
declared  intention  shall  be  I  iable 
to  training  from  12  to  23,  in- 
clusive. 


And  exempts  certain  classes,  giv- 
ing routine  for  exemption. 


Amended  bill  (Moseleydraft). 


section  1. 

Prescribed  6  months'  continuous 
training  in  year  man  reaches  18 
years.  Section  26  prevents  pur- 
chase of  substitutes  or  release 
from  military  service  on  pay- 
ment of  money  or  any  valuable 
thing. 

Provides  exemption  for  certain 


Remarkt. 


Moseley  draft  preferable  in  that 
it  presents  manv  less  adminis- 
trative difficulties. 

It  is  more  practical  for  immediate 
operation.  Later  we  may  ex- 
tend so  as  to  get  effect  of  earlier 
discipline. 

Moseley  drift  defective  as  to  ex- 
emptions; Chamberlain  bill 
much  better. 


136 


UNIVERSAL    MILITARY    TRAINING. 


Chamberlain  bill. 


Remarks. 


section  2. 

Divides  those  under  instruction: 
12-17,  Citizen  Cadet  Corps; 
18-12,  Citizen  Army. 

section  3. 

Divides  training  into  three  periods: 
12-13,  inclusive,  90  hours  per 

year,  without  arms. 
14-15,  inclusive,  90  hours  per 
year  military  training  with 
rifle,  gallery  practice. 
16-17,  inclusive,  90  hours  per 
year  and  10  days'  camp  field 
exercises,  target  practice. 

section  4. 

120  hours  or  20  days'  camp  training 
per  year  prescribed  for  Citizen 
Army  for  6  years;  at  least  10 
days  in  camp,  anyhow. 

Section  5. 

Gives  several  different  methods  of 
putting  in  time— so  many  half 
days— so  many  full  days— or  so 
many  night  drills. 

Section  6. 

Citizens  Army  allotted  to  arms 
and  corps. 

Section  7. 

Authorizes  those  who  desire  to 
enter  either  Citizen  Army  or 
Citizen  Navy  at  18. 


Does  not  specifically  divide  or 

Provide  for  training  under  18, 
at  will  probably  have  same  re- 
sult, as  it  provides  credits  to  be 
applied  to  the  6  months  if  train- 
ing in  schools  is  given  prior  to  18. 

1  mont  h's  credit  allowed  for  1  vear 
in  military  schools  approved  by 
Secretary  of  War. 

Only  4  months'  credit  can  be 
earned,  thus  requiring  at  least  2 
months  in  camp  in  eighteenth 
year. 


Nothing  like  this  in  Moseley  draft. 
See  section  1  for  training  system. 


Nothing  like  this  in  Moseley 
draft,  except  that  training  in 
schools  may  be  accepted  for  part 
,  of  camp  training,  if  Secretary  of 
"War  approves  school  system. 


Section  12  covers  this. 


Section  12,  section  13,  and  section 
14  authorize  the  President  to 
assign  to  corps  and  departments, 
and  to  tactical  units.  Also  to 
localize  units  for  prompt  mobili- 
zation. 


Section  8. 

Training  may  be  given  in  schools, 
colleges, etc., militia,  Boy  Scouts, 
similar  organizations  approved 
by  proper  authority. 

Section  9. 

Persons  over  24  who  have  com- 
pleted training  become  members 
of  reserve,  no  age  limit  on  service 
in  reserve.  Provides  for  those 
declared  nonefficient  to  take 
course  over  again. 

Section  10. 

Prohibits  Federal  employment  to     Section  20  carries  same, 
any  person  failing  to  register  and 
perform  service  prescribed. 


Covered  partially.    See  section  7, 
giving  credits  for  school  training. 


Govered  in  part  by  section  8, 
which  authorizes  annual  muster 
by  classes.  In  case  of  call,  re- 
quires youngest  class  first.  No 
provision  for  repeating  course  for 
nonefficients. 


section  11. 

Provides  fine  and  confinement  for 
failing  to  register  and  render 
service. 


SECTION   12. 


Section  20  prohibits  Federal  em- 
ployment and  section  18  private 
employment  of  any  person  fail- 
ing to  show  certificate  of  exemp- 
tion or  of  service. 


Prohibits  discrimination  against     Section  19  provides  penalty  for 
employees  by  employers.     ,  employing  anyone  over  18  who 

has  not  a  certificate  of  training 
or  a  certificate  of  exemption. 


Moseley  draft  preferable  for  the 
present.  It  is  much  simpler; 
may  have  substantially  same 
effect. 


Moseley  system  more  practical 
at  present. 


Moseley  draft  better.  Chamber- 
lain bill  goes  too  much  into 
detail. 


Will  have  same  effect,  except  as 
to  option. 


Moseley  draft  defective  in  not 
requiring  satisfactory  service 
before  releasing  men  from  obli- 
gation. 


Moseley  draft  is  a  better  coer 
cive  measure. 


Mjseley  scheme  better,  but 
some  system  for  enforcing  the 
law  should  be  prescribed— that 
is,  a  system  of  inspection,  or 
check  of  those  employed,  or  a 
definite  report  by  employers 
with  penalty  for  false  report. 


UNIVERSAL    MILITARY    TRAINING. 


l;*7 


Chamberlain  bill. 


Amended  bill  (Moseley  draft). 


section  13. 

Provides  penalty  for  such  discrim- 
ination. 

section  14. 

Provides  penalty  for  breaches  of 
discipline. 


section  15. 

Provides  confinement  not  to  be  in 
jail  but  in  custody  of  some  per- 
son or  institution. 

section  16. 

No  person  of  notoriously  bad  char- 
acter eligible. 

section  17. 

Makes  registration  district 
appoints  Army  officers  district 
commandants. 

SECTION  18. 

Requires  registration  at  12  years 
of  age  and  report  of  change  in 
address  to  district  commander. 

SECTION  19. 


section  2— continued. 


Section  10  makes  those  under 
training  amenable  to  Articles  of 
War  or  Articles  for  Government 
of  Navy. 


Section   1   covers  in  exemptions 
but  is  not  positive. 


Section  3  gives  this  authority  to 
President. 


Covered  bv  sections  3,  4,  5,  and  15. 
Left  to  President. 


Remarks. 


A  simpler  system  than  Senator 
Chamberlain's. 


Establishes  training  districts  fur     Section  ry  well. 

Army  and  Navy. 


Moselev  draft  better.  Nothing 
should  be  enacted  into  law 
which  can  be  made  subject  of 
regulations. 


.  draft  better.  The  au- 
thorization to  use  any  de- 
partment to  keep  track  of 
trained  men  is  good. 


section  20. 

Physical  examination  and  oath  of 
enlistment. 


SECTION  21. 

Authorizes  President  to  mobilize 
Citizen  Army  when  public 
safety  demands. 


Section  8  requires  enlistment. 
Section  14  provides  officers  for 
all  purposes,  including  physical 
examination. 


section  22. 

Appointment  of  officers  and  non- 
commissioned officers  of  Cadet 
Corps. 

section  23. 

Appointment  of  officers  of  Citizen 
Army  by  President.  Arranges 
for  a  gradual  development  of 
organization  extending  over  4 
years. 

section  24. 

Provides  for  promotions  and  sen- 
iority after  system  is  in  opera- 
tion. 

section  25. 

Specifies  classes  eligible  for  com- 
missions under  regulations  by 
President. 

section  26. 

Authorizing  employment  of  Med- 
ical Reserve  Corps  for  sanitary 
supervision  and  examinations. 


Section  8  covers  and  requires  call     Moseley  draft  good  as  to  call  by 
to  be  made  by  classes,  youngest 
first.    Call  authorized  only  in  j 
time  of  war  or  imminent  danger 
thereof.    Exempts  from   call 
those  whose  creed  forbids  war. 


No  cadet  force. 


Section  31  covers  in  part,  but 
method  of  issuing  commissions 
should  be  definite. 


Not  covered. 


Nothing  in  Moseley  draft. 


Section  14  covers. 


bad  as  to  limitation  on 
call.  Chamberlain  wording 
much  better. 


Moseley  draft  incomplete. 
Probably  the  National  Defense 
Act  covers  sufficiently  in  the 
reserve  officer  clauses. 


See  remark  opposite  section  23. 


See  remark  opposite  section  23. 


138 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY    TRAINING. 


Chamberlain  bill. 


section  27. 

Authorizes  members  of  Citizen 
Army  to  accept  commission  or 
enlist  in  Regulars,  Militia,  or 
Volunteers 

section  29. 

Covers  appointment  of  noncom- 
missioned officers. 

section  29. 

Same  for  warrant  officers  and 
petty  officers  Citizen  Navy. 

section  30. 

Authorizes  members  of  Citizen 
Army  to  be  assigned  to  Marine 
Corps  when  called  for  service. 

section  31. 

No  pay.  Expenses  paid  while 
training. 

section  32. 

No  uniform  for  first  period  of  Citi- 
zen Cadets.  Uiiform  author- 
ized for  other  Cadet  periods  and 
for  Citizen  Army. 

section  33. 

Penalty  for  wearing  uniform  by 
those  not  entitled. 

section  34. 

Prohibits  intoxicating  liquor  at 
training  centers. 


section  36. 
Prescribes  issue  arms,  etc. 
section  37. 


Amended  bill  (Moseley  draft). 


section  2— continued. 
Present  laws  would  cover. . . 


Section  31  authorizes  President  to 
make  regulations. 


Same  as  above. 


Section  6  authorizes  the  number 
to  be  trained  for  Army  and 

Navy. 


Remarks. 


Moseley  draft  better. 


Same. 


Moseley  draft  should  be  ex- 
tended to  authorize  President 
to  designate  persons  to  take 
training  for  each  service. 


Section  5  covers  same  thing. 


Regular  Army  pay  and  allowances 
when  called  into  service. 

SECTION  38. 

Pensions  for  disability  while  being 
trained. 

section  39. 

Establishes  section  General  Staff 
in  charge.  Provides  50  inspec- 
tion districts. 


section  40. 

Regular  officers  detailed  with  Citi- 
zen Army  create  vacancies. 

SECTION  41. 

Establishes  a  Division  in  Office 
Aide  for  Operations,  Navy  De- 
partment. 

SECTION  42. 

President  authorized  to  make 
regulations  not  inconsistent 
with  law. 


Section  5  covers  uniforms  for  those 
in  training.  No  cadets  in  Gen- 
eral Staff  bill. 


Not  covered 

Section  28  covers 

I 
Section  16  prescribed  same 

Section  11  covers. 
Section  17  covers. 


Not  covered  except  general  au- 
thority of  President  as  to  regu- 
lations. 


Section  125,  National-Defense  Act 
should  be  extended  to  cover. 


Moseley  draft,  in  section  29, 
forbids  sale  of  liquor  to  any 
member  of  United  States  forces 
in  uniform. 


The  General  Staff  section  of 
Chamberlain  bill  is  good. 
Moseley  draft  better  on  bal- 
ance. 


Not  covered. 


Section  31  gives  President  general 
authority  to  make  regulations. 


Section  31  gives  President  same 
power. 


We  shall  need  extra  officers  and 
noncommissioned  officers. 


Moseley    draft  better.    Unwise 
to  make  law  what  should  be 


left  to  regulations. 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING.  139 

To  sum  up,  I  would  recommend  the  adoption  of  the  amended  or 
Moseley  draft,  changing  the  eighteenth  year  to  the  nineteenth  year  and 
incorporating  therein  Senator  Chamberlain's  exemptions,  his  provisions 
for  requiring  repetition  ol  the  course  of  instruction  by  those  rated  as 
nonefficients,  his  provision  for  authorizing  the  call  for  service  when 
the  public  safety  requires  such  action  rather  than  limiting  the  call 
to  war  or  the  imminent  danger  thereof,  the  authority  for  the  Presi- 
dent to  designate  those  for  naval  service,  and  the  increase  of  the 
General  .Staff  to  supervise  the  work. 

I  should  recommend  in  addition  a  section  requiring  all  those  who 
have  had  the  training  in  the  nineteenth  year  to  be  mobilized  in  their 
twenty-first  year  and  organized  into  a  citizen  army  properly  balanced 
as  to  arms  and  corps,  equipped  and  unitormed,  and  officered  by 
members  of  the  Officers1  Reserve  Corps,  except  in  the  higher  com- 
mands and  important  staff  positions,  which  should  be  tilled  generally 
by  the  detail  of  selected  regular  officers.  This  army  would  have 
from  20  to  30  days  oi  Intensive  training  in  camp  and  as  much  time 
as  possible  should  be  devoted  to  combat  exercises.  Thirty  days 
should  be  secured  it  possible.  The  men  then  Bhould  return  to  their 
homes  and  ordinary  occupations.  They  continue  for  the  balance  of 
the  year  as  part  of  a  definite  organization,  maintained  at  war  strength, 
and  fully  equipped  and  officered.  The  superior  officers  and  mecG  sA 
officers  of  the  regiment  or  organization  should  keep  in  reasonably 
■  touch  with  the* men  to  know  just  what  their  Btatus  is  as  to 
efficiency  at  all  bum  8. 

Provision  should  be  made  to  authorize  suitable  members  of  the 
National  Guard  who  obtain  their  State's  quittance  of  present  obli- 
gation to  accept  commissions  in  the  Officers'  Reserve  Corps  and  for 
their  employment  in  Federal  service  to  aid  in  organizing  and  instruct- 
ing the  Federal  citizen  force-.  There  are  many  officers  of  i  he  National 
Guard  who  have  shown  marked  ability  as  organizers.    Some  of  these 

are  now  in  State  pay  and  devote  their  lives  to  military  work.  Such 
men  are  needed  and  the  Federal  Government  should  be  able  to 
secure  their  services  under  conditions  fail-  to  them.      1   feel  that   the 

National  Guardsmen  as  a  cla^s  represent  a  high  ideal  of  patriotism — 
their  services  have  generally  been  given  at  persona]  loss.    All  must 

be  actuated  by  a  de-ire  for  military  life  and  an  interest  in  the  soldier's 
profession  or  they  would  not  make  the  sacrifices  they  have.  Those 
who  have  accomplished  creditable  results  in  spite  of  an  exceedingly 
poor  Bystem  can  be  depended  upon  to  make  a  greater  success  under 
a  proper  system.  We  need  these  men;  I  mean  not  only  officers  but 
the  enlisted  men  who  are  of  suitable  age  and  physically  fit. 

Senator  Brady.  You  may  look  over  the  matter  and  see  if  there  is 
anything  further  that  you  desire  to  discuss.  We  are  very  anxious  to 
have  all  the  information  we  can  possibly  get  in  this  matter,  and  you 
are  so  thoroughlv  equipped  that  we  are  going  to  depend  upon  you 
to  give  us  considerable  information.  Going  back  to  the  Australian 
system,  which  you  spoke  of  just  a  moment  ago,  you  doubtless  have 
given  that  considerable  study  and  thought. 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes,  sir;  I  have  been  over  it  pretty  carefully. 

Senator  Brady.  And  you  are  satisfied  that  that  system  is  a  success  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes,  sir;  of  course  you  hear  a  good  deal  of  uninformed 
opinion   upon   the  Australian   system.     The  Australian   system   in 

86205—17 3 


140  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 

limited  form  was  put  into  effect  in  the  early  days  of  this  present 
century. 

There  was  considerable  opposition  to  universal  service  at  first, 
principally  because  it  was  not  understood.  The  opposition  was  from 
the  class  we  find  here.  In  1910  Lord  Kitchener  visited  Australia, 
made  a  careful  study  of  the  military  situation  and  recommended  the 
adoption  of  a  system  of  universal  training  and  service.  Prior  to  that 
time,  training  had  only  been  compulsory  for  those  under  20  years  of 
age.  On  Lord  Kitchener's  advice  compulsory  training  was  extended 
to  include  those  up  to  and  including  26  years  of  age.  Thus  was -the 
basis  of  the  present  system  laid.  The  Australian  defense  act  is 
known  as  the  act  of  1903-1912.  The  act  was  not  in  full  effect  until 
about  1911.  There  have  been  some  minor  modifications  since.  The 
system  was  barely  beginning  to  be  felt  when  the  present  great  war 
broke  out.  One  must  remember  that  it  had  been  in  force  only  a 
short  time — practically  since  1911 — when  the  war  came,  so  you  can 
not  judge  the  system  by  the  degree  of  training  of  the  Australian 
troops  which  were  trained  only  in  part  under  this  system.  The 
system  will  not  be  in  full  effect  for  a  number  of  years.  The  men 
coming  back  from  the  great  war  will  form  an  invaluable  force  both 
as  instructors  and  in  building  up  a  proper  appreciation  of  the  vital 
necessity  of  military  training. 

With  reference  to  the  system  in  force  in  Australia  and  the  condi- 
tions under  which  it  is  applied,  there  is  a  good  deal  of  editorial  mis- 
conception. You  probably  have  read  that  Australia  has  repudiated 
conscription.  There  was  no  repudiation  of  conscription  for  national 
service  within  the  limits  of  the  Commonwealth.  Conscription  for 
foreign  service  is  what  was  rejected.  Universal  obligation  for  mili- 
tary service  has  been  definitely  adopted  and  by  overwhelming  major- 
ities. As  a  matter  of  fact,  universal  military  service  in  many  of  the 
European  countries  is  for  home  service,  as  far  as  the  phraseology  of 
the  law  goes;  so  it  should  be  remembered,  as  a  matter  of  simple  jus- 
tice that  Australia  has  not  repudiated  conscription.  She  has  refused 
to  accept  it  as  applying  to  foreign  service. 

When  I  stated  that  six  months  was  an  adequate  period,  I  consid- 
ered carefully  the  work  done  under  both  the  Australian  and  Swiss 
system.  In  1908  I  spent  six  months  in  Europe,  most  of  the  time  in 
Switzerland,  and  made  many  inquiries  concerning  the  application  of 
the  system  there,  the  efficiency  of  the  officers  and  the  adequacy 
of  the  training  of  the  men.  I  was  convinced  then,  and  am  even 
more  so  now,  that  under  six  months  of  intensive  training  we  should 
turn  out  a  very  efficient  private  soldier.  Noncommissioned  officers 
and  officers  require  special  and  additional  training.  We  find  that 
men  who  have  taken  two  or  more  periods  of  training  at  Plattsburg 
are  thoroughly  well  grounded  in  the  schools  of  the  soldier  and  com- 
pany and  have  become  fairly  well  skilled  in  rifle  practice.  Indeed, 
they  compare  very  favorably  with  the  shooting  in  the  service  and  are 
far  ahead  of  the  shooting  in  the  National  Guard.  If  we  had  a  pro- 
gressive course  covering  six  months,  we  should  turn  out  men,  as  I 
have  stated,  oven  better  trained  than  the  average  of  the  men  of  our 
Regular  Service.  There  is  absolutely  no  question  about  this.  Thoro 
has  been  a  great  deal  of  misunderstanding  about  the  European  sys- 
tem. France  does  not  require  three  years  for  the  purpose  of  training 
her  infantry.     This  was  not  the  reason  why  she  extended  the  period 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING.  141 

to  three,  veal's;  it  was  because  she  needed  one  class  more  with  the 
colors.  She  foresaw  what  was  coming.  This  gave  her  double  the 
number  of  fully  instructed  troops  immediately  available,  with  the 
colors.  Germany  has  maintained  with  her  large  population  a  two- 
year  period  for  her  infantry.  No  one  questions  its  efficiency.  She 
has  three  years  for  cavalry  and  field  artillery.  There  are  certain 
exemptions  and  special  provisions,  but  I  am  speaking  in  general 
terms.  The  German  soldier  has  gone,  through  his  training  as  a 
private  soldier  at  the  end  of  eight  to  eight  and  one-half  months.  At 
the  end  of  a  year  one-half  of  the  infantry  and  one-third  of  the  vavalry 
and  field  artillery  return  to  their  civil  occupations.  The  force  whicn 
is  loft  is  the  veteran  nucleus,  the  trained  nucleus  around  which  the 
recruits  are  assembled  for  training.  It  is  also  the  force  ready  for 
immediate  work.  Practically  one-half  of  the  army  is  a  veteran  force 
trained  and  ready.  The  other  half  is  for  the  first  oight  months  only 
partially  instructed  troops.  Conditions  in  Europe,  where  great  force-, 
representing  different  nations  are  in  close  proximity  to  each  other, 
necessitate  v<'ry  different  actions  from  those  which  confront  us  here. 
If  our  conditions  became  as  acute  and  critical  as  theirs,  we  should 
probably  have  to  hold  men  double  the  period  necessary  to  train 
them  in  order  to  have  a  large  force  always  immediately  available. 
The  European  is  not  held  the  full  period  for  training  alone. 

Senator  Thomas.  He  is  the  hold  over? 

Gen.  Wood.  He  is  the  hold  over  because  he  is  trained  and  ready. 
These  trained  men  form,  as  I  have  stated,  the  nucleus  around  which 
the  recruits  are  gathered.  Circumstances  determine  very  largely  the 
length  of  time  for  training.  If  you  have  plenty  of  highly  trained 
officers  and  noncommissioned  officers  and  can  train  your  men  in  the 
atmosphere  of  war,  where  the  psychology  of  the  situation  is  a  tre- 
mendous incentive  to  work,  you  can  accomplish  wonders  in  a  short 
time.  Russia  is  reported  to  be  bringing  some  of  her  partly  trained 
men  near  to  the  front  to  receive  their  final  training  almost  within  the 
sound  of  the  guns.  The  effect  is,  of  course,  tremendous.  The  men 
who  are  instructing  are  the  men  who  have  just  come  from  the  fighting 
area.  Their  words  and  advice  are  heeded.  It  does  not  take  much 
to  appreciate  the  difference  between  this  kind  of  training  and  train- 
ing under  conditions  of  peace.  They  know  they  are  going  in  a  few 
days  to  be  doing  the  things  which  they  are  being  taught.  Everything 
tends  to  concentration  of  effort.  As  I  have  said  before,  training  de- 
pends upon  several  things — capacity  and  suffciency  of  officers  and 
equipment,  intelligence  of  the  men,  the  national  situation,  and  the 
local  conditions  as  to  freedom  from  nonmilitary  duty.  You  might 
have  men  for  five  years  under  peace  conditions  and  under  conditions 
where  the  bulk  of  their  work  would  be  nonmilitary,  and  at  the  end  of 
that  time  have  poorly  trained  men,  for  humdrum  and  non-military 
work  would  serve  to  kill  their  interest.  Men  become  stale  through 
dragging  instruction  over  too  long  a  period  and  the  lack  of  zest. 
Success  at  Plattsburg  is  due  to  the  intensity  of  the  training,  the  fact 
that  we  have  carefully  selected  officers,  and  that  the  scheme  of  the 
work  appeals  to  the  intelligence  of  the  men.  They  go  away  keen  and 
full  of  interest  and  are  anxious  to  come  again.  Tney  gain  confidence 
in  themselves  and  in  their  officers. 

Every  moment  of  their  day  is  full;  the  work  is  progressive  and  the 
reasons  for  things  done  is  explained  as  the  work  goes  on.     There  is  no 


142  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 

comparison  between  this  kind  of  training  and  that  followed  of  neces- 
sity at  most  of  our  scattered  garrisons;  in  one  work  is  systematic  and 
progressive,  in  the  other  sadly  interrupted  by  nonmilitary  duties  which 
destroy  interest  in  the  work  and  in  the  service. 

Senator  Brady.  It  gave  them  great  confidence  in  themselves  as  well 
as  the  officers  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes,  sir;  and  it  has  been  a  great  thing  for  the  officers. 
They  do  not  want  to  go  back  to  the  old  regular  organization  again 
because  they  have  had  the  experience  of  having  war-strength  organi- 
zations and  of  having  nothing  to  do  but  buckle  down  to  truly  military 
work. 

Senator  Brady.  Pardon  me  for  diverting  a  moment,  but  Secretary 
Fisher  this  morning  made  a  very  interesting  statement  relating  to  this 
matter,  and  he  specially  discussed  the  question  of  vocational  train- 
ing in  the  Regular  Army.  He  favored  that  very  much.  How  far  do 
you  think  that  could  be  carried  to  advantage  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  If  we  are  going  to  give  vocational  training  in  con- 
junction with  military  training,  I  say,  as  a  rough  estimate,  that  we 
should  have  to  keep  the  boy  a  year  at  least,  perhaps  more.  The 
point  to  be  remembered  is  that  in  my  plan  I  desire  to  give  this  mili- 
tary training  under  an  intensive  method  and  to  make  the  period  as 
short  as  possible,  so  that  the  young  man  may  be  taken  from  his  occu- 
pation— college,  or  whatever  he  may  be  doing — for  the  least  possible 
time.  We  want  to  put  our  entire  time  in  in  giving  him  a  knowledge 
of  the  soldier's  duty;  build  up  in- him  a  sense  of  discipline  and  of  indi- 
vidual obligation  to  the  State.  I  do  not  believe  in  trying  to  combine 
this  with  industrial  training.  I  am  afraid  Mr.  Fisher  and  others  do 
not  realize  how  much  a  young  man's  economic  efficiency  is  increased 
by  this  training  itself,  through  the  habits  of  discipline,  promptness, 
coordination  of  muscle  and  will — the  making  of  him  a  better  ma- 
chine, so  to  speak.  In  the  present  condition  of  the  country,  the 
main  thing  is  to  secure  a  number  of  trained  men  as  soon  as  possible 
and  to  start  the  system  with  the  minimum  of  delay.  The  industrial 
training  will  be  taken  up  all  the  more  rapidly  and  with  better  results. 
This  is  a  direct  effect  of  the  military  training. 

Now,  the  professional  pacifist  never  thinks  of  those  things,  and 
when  I  say  professional  pacifist  I  do  not  mean  that  we  are  not  all 
pacifists  in  the  sense  of  desiring  peace,  but  I  mean  the  man  who  thinks 
there  is  nothing  worth  defending,  either  God,  country,  or  home.  He 
does  not  believe  in  military  training,  and  he  presents  a  surprising 
degree  of  agility  in  side-stepping  it. 

I  think  we  want  our  military  training  clean  cut  and  distinct,  and  I 
think  if  we  couple  industrial* training  with  military  training  it  will 
m:iko  a  botch  job.  The  man  when  he  finishes  military  training  is 
going  to  his  work  so  much  better  fitted  for  it,  through  habits  of  regu- 
larity, promptness,  and  in  much  better  physical  condition,  his  muscles 
working  in  so  much  better  coordination  with  his  will,  that  he  will 
ac  omplish  more  than  Mr.  Fisher  droams  of.  He  will  have  increased 
from  15  to  20  per  cent  in  economic  efficiency.  He  will  be  a  better 
human  machine.  I  would  rather  have  a  man  who  has  been  trained 
in  that  way.  If  you  put  him  into  any  trade,  he  will  do  his  work 
intelligently  and  thoroughly.  But  if  you  mix  the  two,  I  think  you 
will  find  a  double  period  of  training  necessary  with  inferior  results 
in  both  respects. 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING.  143 

Senator  Brady.  Mr.  Fisher,  I  think,  was  striving  to  roach  the  same 
goal  that  you  are,  only  through  a  different  channel.  Ho  was  very 
much  in  favor  of  training  along  the  line  you  suggested,  only  for 
another  purpose. 

Gen  Wood.  But  the  real  result  would  bo  a  big  mercenary  Army — 
an  Army  of  professional  soldiers.  The  very  antithesis  of  what  we 
want.  Wo  want  an  Army  of  professional  sofdiers,  big  enough  for  the 
peace  needs  of  the  Nation,  but  we  want  back  of  it  a  citizenry  trained 
to  arms  and  trained  under  conditions  which  will  cause  the  minimum 
of  interference  with  their  economic  and  educational  careers. 

Senator  BBADY.  I  won't  ask  you  to  go  into  detail  to-day,  General, 
but  in  the  final  preparation  of  your  statement    I  would  be  plei 
to  have;  your  outline  quite  fully  along  this  line  what  you  think  should 
be  done. 

Gen.  Wood.  I  will  give  it  in  a  few  words.  We  are  not  contem- 
plating an  army  which  will  he  trained  and  organized  for  a  war  of 
aggression  or  conquest.  What  we  want  is  a  citizen  force  back  of  our 
Regular  Establishment,  organized  and  trained  so  as  to  command  the 
respect  of  tie  world  sufficiently  to  make  it  certain  an  attack  upon  us 
would  he  costly  and  doubtful  of  outcome:  an  organization  which 
would  insure  our  voice  in  tl  e  world's  affaire  receiving  consideration'; 
one  wl  idi  would  enable  us  to  pursue  our  jusl  policies  wit]  out  tl  reat 
of  interference.  We  want  a  system  wl  ich  would  place  at  t }.c  Presi- 
dent \s  call  for  si;ch  duty  Vat  ional  <  '.uard  w  as  called  for,  a  force 

of  young  soldiers  free  from  binding  business,  professional,  and  family 

obligations.      We    want    a    force    which    can    he    turned    out    without 

asking  great  sacrifices  <-f  certain  classes  t<>  the  advantage  of  otl 
We  want  no  more  bouni  ies  for  service  in  war,  and  no  more  widows  and 
orphans  unless  a  struggle  for  existence  demands  the  call  of  class  after 
class.     And   we  want   a  system  which  will  call  for  a  tax  of  personal 

service  rather  than  a  tax  for  the  payment  of  others  to  perform  service. 
That  is  where  Dr.  Fisher  is  wrong.  The  citizen  should  d<>  hi-  soldier 
duty  as  i'ii  obligation  and  not  for  pay.  And  the  Army  should  not  he 
expected  to  train  men  for  civil  pursuits  beyond  making  them  strong 
and  reliable.  Of  course,  when  men  go  into  service  at  tic  call  of  the 
Government  1  mean  >er\  ice  which  follows  their  being  called  out  as 
trained  soldiers — they  must  receive  such  pay  as  tie  Government 
determines  to  he  right  ami  proper  ■■something  which  will  serve  to 
take  care  of  their  families;  hut  the  service  during  training:  that  is, 
during  the  19-year  period,  should  not  he  paid  for.  It  probably  would 
be  well  to  give  a  certain  amount  to  pay  for  the  month  of  intensive 
training  which  is  given  at  the  beginning  of  tin4  year  of  service  with 
the  colors,  hut  the  pay  given  should  he  very  small  and  should  not  he 
measured  in  terms  of  wage-earning  capacity  outside. 

The  question  appeals  to  me  as  a  soldier  more  forcibly  than  it  does 
to  Mr.  Fisher,  for  whom  I  have  the  greatest  respect.  He  does  not, 
however,  realize  or  appreciate  the  fact,  nor  do  many  people,  that  from 
the  standpoint  of  reasonable  preparedness  to  meet  attack  By  any  of 
the  great  military  nations  of  to-day,  this  country  is  in  effect  un- 
prepared. We  need,  and  need  immediately,  a  system  for  the  training 
of  men,  and  we  should  push  forward  the  manufacture  of  munitions 
and  equipment  with  all  possible  speed.  The  lessons  of  the  present 
militia  mohilization  with  its  incompleteness  of  equipment,  its 
shortages  in  all  directions,  extending  to  the  present  moment  in  many 


144  UNIVERSAL  MILITARY   TRAINING. 

things,  in  the  matter  of  clothing,  shortages  in  artillery,  shortages  in 
various  directions,  all  indicating  the  need  of  a  systematic  and  well- 
thought-out  preparation,  and  that  without  delay. 

Senator  Brady.  I  think  the  people  of  the  Nation  are  very  gener- 
ally agreed  upon  that  fact. 

Gen.  Wood.  We  must  not  only  train  our  young  men  for  military 
service,  but  we  must  organize  the  industries  of  the  country  so  that 
each  will  be  ready  to  play  its  part.  We  must  encourage,  rather  than 
discourage,  the  production  of  arms  and  munitions  by  private  con- 
een.s. 

Senator.  Brady.  If  we  adopt  this  method  what  wTill  become  of 
your  Regular  Army  ?     Will  you  be  constantly  changing  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  am  glad  you  asked  that  question.  There  are  always 
a  certain  number  of  men  who  love  the  profession  of  arms  and  the  life 
of  the  soldier.  The  moment  all  men  in  the  country  receive  training 
the  number  of  this  class  of  men  will  be  increased.  There  will  be  less 
prejudice  against  the  professional  soldier.  The  uniform  will  mean 
something  because  the  richest  man  in  the  Nation  will  wear  it  as  well 
as  the  poorest,  and  out  of  the  millions  who  have  had  training  there 
will  be  plenty  of  good  men  for  the  Regular  Army — men  who  will  be 
glad  to  follow  the  flag  and  the  life  of  the  soldier,  for  to  many  it  is 
extremely  interesting.  The  uniform  will  then  be  honored  and 
respected  in  this  country  as  it  is  not  at  present.  * 

We  shall  have  no  difficulty  in  maintaining  a  sufficient  Regular 
Army  for  over-sea  work  and  have  a  training  nucleus  at  home.  Once 
this  system  of  general  training  is  in  force,  I  do  not  think  we  shall  have 
trouble  forced  upon  us  by  any  foreign  nation.  If  we  should  have 
trouble,  we  shall  have  a  system  adequate  to  meet  it,  and  meet  it 
promptly  and  effectively. 

Just  how  large  the  Regular  Army  in  the  home  land  will  have  to  be, 
no  one  can  tell.  But,  as  our  reserve  of  trained  citizen  soldiery 
increases  and  our  organization  of  these  men  improves,  we  shall  be 
able  to  reduce  within  reasonable  limits  the  Regular  Establishment 
within  the  continental  United  States.  In  other  words,  when  the 
citizen  population  is  trained  to  arms,  the  Regular  force  can  be  reduced. 
It  must  be  remembered,  however,  that  it  will  always  be  necessary 
to  have  a  considerable  Regular  force  for  an  expeditionary  force  and  as 
a  training  nucleus. 

The  Regular  Army  will  always  be  needed  for  over-sea  service. 
Even  France  and  Germany  have  regular  colonial  troops.  We  could 
not  well  afford  to  move  garrisons  back*  and  forth  from  the  over-sea 
possessions  every  year.  Again,  troops  would  hardly  become  familiar 
with  the  new  and  often  strange  conditions  before  they  would  have  to 
return. 

Senator  Brady.  That  is  the  very  point  I  wanted  to  have  you  cover, 
and  you  have  covered  it  very  fully.  But,  speaking  of  the  Regular 
Army,  let  us  suppose  we  take  the  standard  you  suggested — 250,000 
men 

Gen.  Wood.  I  think  that  is  a  conservative  estimate;  certainly  for 
the  present. 

Senator  Brady.  Your  thought  would  be  that  we  should  keep  a 
Regular  standing  army  of  250,000  men,  and  those  men  should  come 
in  for  six  months  and  go  out — they  would  be  coming  and  going  all  the 
time. 


UNIVERSAL  MILITARY   TRAINING.  145 

Gen.  Wood.  Not  in  the  Regular  Army.  Men  in  the  Regular  Army 
would  be  enrolled  for  a  definite  period,  say  for  two  or  three  years, 
with  a  reasonable  opportunity  to  secure  their  discharge  in  case  of 
necessity. 

There  would  be  a  yearly  change  of  most  of  the  personnel  in  the 
citizen  force  in  training. 

Let  us  assume  that  we  are  boys  of  19  and  are  going  to  take  our 
training  this  year,  beginning  the  first  of  May,  because  we  want  our 
six  months  during  the  good  weather  season,  as  the  life  is  to  be  in 
camp  and  all  our  time  devoted  to  intensive  training.  We  receive 
six  months  of  intensive  training  and  then  return  to  our  homes.  On 
July  1  of  the  year  in  which  we  become  21  we  report  to  the  regiment 
or  other  organization  to  which  we  have  been  assigned.  It  will 
necessarily  be  an  organization  of  the  arm  for  which  our  training  has 
fitted  us. 

We  receive  from  20  to  30  days,  preferably  30,  of  intensive  train- 
ing— a  course  of  repetition.  We  remain  in  the  regiment  or  organiza- 
tion until  the  30th  of  June  of  the  following  year,  the  year  in  which 
we  become  22.  We  then  pass  into  that  portion  of  the  first  line  or 
first  group  of  citizen  soldiery  which  includes  all  men  up  to  their 
29th  year.  During  this  year  of  service  we  will  assume  that  we  are 
living  in  New  York  and  nave  been  assigned  to  the  Seventh  Federal 
Reserve  K eminent  with  headquarters  in  the  armory  of  the  present 
Seventh  Regiment. 

On  the  1st  day  of  July  we  report  to  the  adjutant  of  the  regiment 
for  duty,  and  when  the  regiments  assemble  we  proceed  to  the  desig- 
nated training  camp  for  30  days  of  intensive  training.  We  then 
return  to  our  homes,  which  are  in  the  immediate  vicinity,  in  New 
York  City.  The  regiment  is  fully  officered  and  equipped  and  main- 
tained at  full  war  strength.  If  anything  occurs  during  the  year  of 
our  active  service,  we  go.  If  our  year  ot  service  passes  without  any 
call,  the  class  of  the  following  year  takes  our  place.  We  have  dis- 
charged our  obligations.  In  case  of  a  serious  emergency,  possibly 
requiring  additional  men,  our  class  might  be  held  for  an  additional 
year,  and  it,  with  the  class  coming  after,  would  give  us  1,000,000  men 
organized  and  ready.  In  other  words,  there  will  always  be  500,000 
men  ready  for  an  immediate  call.  More  can  be  held  if  necessary. 
Men  during  their  year  of  service  will  not  be  living  in  uniforms,  but 
will  be  members  of  an  organized  and  equipped  force.  They  will 
follow  their  ordinary  occupations,  as  do  the  men  and  officers  of  the 
militia  to-day,  the  difference  being  that  instead  of  having  scattering 
drills  at  night  and  a  few  days  of  nasty  instruction  in  camp,  the  or- 
ganizations will  be  made  up  of  men  who  have  had  six  months  of 
intensive  training,  followed  by  a  month  of  intensive  work  beginning 
with  their  year  of  service.  We  have  known  for  years  that  we  were 
going  to  serve  in  our  twenty-first  year,  and  both  we  and  our  em- 
plovers  have  made  arrangements  to  that  end.  The  organizations 
will  be  made  up  of  young  men  who  are  at  their  physical  best,  and  at 
the  same  time  charged  with  the  minimum  of  domestic  and  business 
responsibility.  Our  plans  and  arrangements  have  been  made  with 
the  understanding  that  this  is  our  year  of  obligation  for  service  with 
the  colors.  It  wfll  prevent  the  repetition  of  conditions  such  as  exist 
to-day,  where  men  of  all  ages  up  to  the  legal  limit,  many  of  them 


146  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 

with  most  important  business  affairs,  have  been  called  for  service. 
The  result  has  been  ruinous  to  many.  The  burden  has  been  inequi- 
tably distributed,  and  the  personnel  of  the  organizations  has  not  been 
of  the  best  for  war  service. 

Senator  Brady.  You  have  been  speaking  of  the  reserve. 

Gen.  Wood.  Well,  call  it  what  you  will.     It  will  be  a  citizen  army 
behind  the  Regular  Army. 

Senator  Brady.  Would  we  or  not  have  a  regular  standing  Army 
of  250,000  all  the  time? 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes;  and  I  will  tell  you  about  how  they  will  be  dis- 
tributed. You  will  have  approximately  20,000  in  the  Philippines. 
This  should  be  necessary  as  long  as  we  hold  the  islands;  approxi- 
mately 24,000  in  the  Hawaiian  Islands.  These  islands  are  the  key 
to  the  Pacific  so  far  as  we  are  concerned  and  must  be  held.  They 
are  also  one  of  the  most  important  defenses  of  the  Pacific  coast  and 
the  Panama  Canal.  In  Panama,  when  the  garrison  is  completed, 
we  shall  have  a  force  of  about  20,000.  There  should  also  be  a  regi- 
ment in  Alaska,  or  approximately  64,000  or  65,000  men  outside  the 
country.  The  Alaska  garrison  is  more  for  the  purpose  of  maintaining 
order  than  anything  else.  It  would  not  be  adequate  for  the  defense 
of  the  Territory.  When  conditions  are  more  established  public 
order  should  be  maintained  by  a  constabulary  operating  on  the  lines 
of  the  Canadian  mounted  police  When  we  decide  on  the  garrisoning 
of  the  country,  we  shall  have  to  put  in  a  force  amounting  probably 
to  a  division.  This  would  bring  the  force  outside  the  country  up 
to  about  80,000  men,  of  which  we  need  consider  only  65,000  at  the 
present  time.  Assuming  that  65,000  are  outside  the  country,  we 
will  have  left  in  the  United  States  185,000  men,  of  whom  some  30,000 
will  be  required  in  seacoast  defenses.  The  balance  will  consist  of 
the  mobile  army — Infantry,  Cavalry,  Field  Artillery,  and  auxiliary 
troops,  Signal  troops,  Engineers,  etc.  All  of  this  force  for  a  time 
at  least  will  be  needed  as  a  training  force.  As  I  have  stated  above, 
it  may  be  possible  to  somewhat  reduce  it  when  we  have  our  system 
of  citizen  training  in  full  operation.  For  instance,  Coast  Artillery 
personnel  will  probably  be  greatly  reduced,  keeping  only  that  por- 
tion in  permanent  service  which  represents  the  highly  trained  tech- 
nical elements;  the  balance  being  filled  up  from  each  class  of  the 
citizen  soldiery  during  its  year  of  service.  Generally  speaking, 
however,  the  regular  force  should  consist  of  long-service  men.  Under 
this  arrangement  you  have  your  Regular  Army  of,  say,  180,000  to 
185,000  men,  and  back  of  it  your  citizen  force  of  500,000,  and  back 
of  this  the  balance  of  the  first-line  citizen  force  of  over  3,000,000. 
In  other  words,  we  would  always  have  ready  within  the  United 
States  a  force  sufficient  to  meet  promptly  the  first  attack.  At  least 
2,000,000  of  the  remaining  first-group  men  should  be  assigned  to 
skeleton  organizations  duly  officered,  so  that  they  can  be  quickly 
mobilized  and  brought  into  shape  in  case  of  need.  The  balance  of 
the  first-line  men  would  form  a  reserve  with  which  to  fill  up  organi- 
zations and  make  good  the  wastages  and  losses  of  war.  Arms  and 
equipment  for  the  entire  first-line  group,  from  three  and  one-half 
to  four  millions  of  men,  must  be  always  ready,  and  the  Officers' 
Reserve  Corps  must  be  sufficient  to  officer  at  once  not  less  than 
two  and  one-half  millions. 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING.  147 

Senator  Brady.  That  is  a  very  satisfactory  and  interesting  expla- 
nation, but  the  point  I  really  wanted  to  have  you  make  a  little 
clearer  to  me  is  who  would  constitute  the  brigades  and  regiments 
that  you  have  been  discussing? 

Gen.  Wood.  They  will  be  made  up  of  professional  soldiers — the 
men  who  are  following  the  career  of  arms  because  they  love  it .  Right 
here  I  should  like  to  say  that  the  pay  of  the  soldier  is  a  good  deal 
larger  than  it  appears  to  be.  The  pay  on  enlistments  is  $15  a  month. 
It  runs  up  now  to  $99  a  month  for  the  master  signal  electrician. 
With  this  goes  clothing  allowance  amply  sufficient  for  the  man; 
food,  shelter,  transportation  on  all  official  business;  medical  attend- 
ance and  a  pension  if  disabled  in  the  service;  also  retired  pay  after 
30  years  of  service. 

So  you  will  see.  sir,  that  the  money  value  is  only  a  portion  of 
what   the  num  receive-. 

Senator  Brady.  And  it  would  not  be  the  those  who  are  going  in  for 
this  intensive  training  for  six  months?  ' 

Gen:  Wood.  No.  sir;  you  might  be  able  to  use  some  <>f  these  men 
for  the  Coast  Artillery  troops  and  possibly  some  with  the  unit-  of 
the  standing  Army  on  duty  within  the  continental  limits  of  the 
United  States,  but  I  should  rather  doubt  the  advisability  of  this 
being  done  to  any  considerable  extent. 

Senator  Brady.  That  i-  a  point  that  J  think  you  would  do  well  to 
make  very  plain,  because  I  do  not  believe  the  people  generally  under- 
stand it.  The  point  is  this,  that  the  men  who  enlist  for  this  -ix 
months  intensive  training  aire  not  compelled  to  be  permanent  Boldiers 

or  make  their  lives  the  profession  of  a  soldier  unless  they  want  t 

Gen.  Wood.  That  is  right. 

Senator  BRADY.  But  they  have  the  privilege  of  doing  that  if  they 
do  wish  to  do  it  ' 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes.  sir;  Oil  the  general  lines  which  I  have  already 
explained.  It  might  be  that  we  should  find  it  advisable,  after  we 
had  sent  through  a  number  of  classes  and  had  a  reasonable  reserve  of 
trained  men,  to  permit  men  during  their  year  of  obligatory  service 
to  enlist  in  the  Regular  Establishment  wit  Inn  the  limits  of  the  con- 
tinental United  States  under  a  one-year  enlistment.  These  are  mat- 
ters of  detail  which  would  have  to  be  worked  out  once  the  system  is 
in  effect.  Generally  speaking,  the  men  who  make  up  the  regular 
organizations  should  he  regulars  serving  under  an  enlistment  of 
several  years  with  the  present  privileges  of  furlough  to  a  regular 
reserve  if  they  desired  after  a  year's  service.  They  would  be  liable 
for  service,  as  would  any  other  citizen,  during  a  certain  period  of 
their  lives,  but  inasmuch  while  serving  in  the  Regular  Army  they 
give  up  their  entire  time  and  energy  to  the  service  of  the  Govern- 
ment and  are  at  all  times  on  duty,  they  should,  of  course,  be  paid. 
The  average  citizen  soldier,  excepting  the  brief  period  of  training,  is 
allowed  to  pursue  his  regular  business.  The  Regular  gives  all  his 
time  to  the  Government,  and  is  not  allowed  to  engage  in  any  business, 
and  is  liable  to  be  sent  anywhere  at  any  time.  The  citizen  soldier 
will  only  be  paid  for  periods  when  he  is  actually  under  arms  (on  duty 
requiring  all  his  time). 

Senator  Brady.  In  my  judgment  it  is  a  very  important  question. 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes.  I  think  you  can  assume  with  perfect  safety 
when  we  have  a  large  trained  reserve,  a  citizen  army  in  being,  we 


148  UNIVERSAL  MILITARY   TRAINING. 

can  somewhat  reduce  our  Regular  Army  at  home.  In  some  of  the 
arms  a  considerable  proportion  of  the  men-  can  be  very  quickly 
trained.  Take  the  Coast  Artillery,  for  instance.  A  certain  per- 
centage of  the  personnel  must  have  a  high  degree  of  technical  training. 
Perhaps  60  per  cent  of  it  could  be  replaced  oy  men  of  short  training. 
They  are  the  men  who  handle  the  shot,  bring  out  the  powder — do  the 
heavy  work  that  does  not  require  a  high  degree  of  technical  skill. 
All  these  places  can  easily  be  filled  from  the  citizen  soldiery.  In  the 
citizen  soldiery  will  be  found  men  of  high  intelligence  for  special 
equipment  for  Coast  Artillery  work;  also  service  in  the  auxiliary 
troops,  such  as  troops  of  the  Signal  Corps,  Engineers,  etc.  It  may  be 
possible  to  carry  a  certain  proportion  of  these  men  in  the  organizations 
of  the  mobile  army,  but  as  this  force  must  be  held  always  ready  for 
expeditionary  work  as  well  as  for  training,  I  do  not  believe  the\ 
replacements  in  this  portion  of  the  force  will  be  very  large — perhaps 
25  per  cent  of  full  war  strength.  Switzerland  carries  this  skeleton- 
izing of  the  regular  organization  to  the  extreme.  In  fact,  practically 
all  that  is  maintained  constantly  in  service  is  a  corps  of  officers  and  a 
very  small  body  of  troops,  the  balance  of  the  organizations  being 
filled  up  from  the  class  of  the  trained  citizen  soldiery.  We  shall  have 
to  feel  our  way  along  gradually  and  see  to  just  what  extent  we  can 
carry  the  filling  up  of  our  regular  regiments  with  the  citizen  soldiers 
during  their  one-year  period  with  the  colors.  I  doubt  the  wisdom  of 
this  measure,  except  in  a  very  limited  way. 

The  Chairman.  Is  there  anything  further  you  desire  to  say, 
General  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  think  that  is  all. 

The  Chairman.  We  are  very  much  obliged  to  you  for  appearing 
before  us. 

Gen.  Wood.  I  regard  this  whole  question  of  national  preparedness 
as  one  of  such  vital  importance  that  anything  I  can  do  I  shall  always 
be  glad  to  do. 

Senator  Brady.  I  hope  we  shall  have  the  advantage  of  further 
information  from  you,  General. 

Gen.  Wood.  I  shall  be  very  glad  to  fill  out  my  answers  as  fully  as 
I  can.  I  think  the  important  thing  is  to  accept  the  basic  idea  of 
universal  training  of  some  sort.  It  will  be  easy  enough  to  work  out 
the  details. 

The  Chairman.  Senator  Wadsworth  is  present.  Senator,  do  you 
desire  to  ask  any  questions  ? 

Senator  Wadsworth.  I  was  going  to  ask,  General,  if  it  is  not  your 
opinion  that  no  matter  under  what  system  or  name  it  was  organized, 
any  volunteer  system  of  recruiting  in  time  of  peace  will  fail  in  aiding 
the  reserve  force  that  would  be  available. 

Gen.  Wood.  Absolutely.  The  volunteer  system  can  not  be 
depended  on.  It  is  a  system  which  will  not  give  us  either  trained 
officers  or  men.  It  leaves  everything  until  the  moment  of  war.  It 
puts  the  burden  upon  the  best  portion  of  the  population.  It  is  not 
only  undependable  but  it  is  undemocratic. 

Senator  Wadsworth.  If  I  may  interpose  this  remark — so  much 
has  been  said  about  the  failure  of  the  federalization  of  the  National 
Guard,  or  rather  that  the  federalization  of  the  National  Guard  is 
responsible  for  the  evident  defects,  my  suggestion  being  that  no 
matter  whether  they  had  been  National  Guard  or  Continental  Army 
or  Federal  volunteers,  the  same  defect  would  be  very  apt  to  appear. 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY    TRAINING.  149 

Gen.  Wood.  The  volunteer  system  would  fail  us,  judging  from  the 
experience  we  have  had.  In  the  Revolutionary  War  we  had  89,000 
men  in  1776;  42,000  Militia  and  47,000  Continentals,  or  short-term 
regulars.  In  every  succeeding  year  of  that  war  there  was  a  smaller 
force  with  the  colors. 

Senator  Thomas.  You  mean  1776? 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes,  sir:  in  1776.  Every  year  of  that  war  the  number 
of  men  with  the  colors  diminished,  and  in  1781,  although  bounties 
were  worth  in  land  and  money  as  much  as  SI, 200  per  man,  and 
Rhode  Island  had  offered  freedom  to  the  negroes  if  they  would 
enlist,  the  Government  was  able  to  secure  only  2!), 400  men.  This 
had  been  the  effect  of  the  volunteer  system.  Public  interest  had 
gradually  diminished.  During  the  entire  war  we  put  in  the  field 
396,000  men,  and  yet,  on  no  single  day  were  there  20,000  well- 
instructed  troops  available  on  any  field  of  battle.  Such  is  the  his- 
tory of  the  volunteer  system  in  the  Revolution.  The  response  was 
what  Washington  predicted  it  would  be.  As  the  excitement  of  the 
early  days  of  the  struggle  passed  away,  interest  diminished. 

In  the  War  of  1812—1814  we  followed  the  same  haphazard  lack 
of  system  and  policy.  We  had  short-term  volunteers,  bounties  and 
subsidies,  and,  :is  you  know,  few  successes  op  land.      We  had  enough 

troops  to  have  carried  out  our  mierjon  t<>  the  North,  but,  owing  to 
our  defective  system,  we  had  hard  work  to  hold  what  we  had.  The 
largest  British  regular  force  in  the  war  at  any  time  was  16,800. 
We  put  into  this  war  527,000  men. 

The  Mexican  War  was  a  war  with  a  weak  people.  We  were 
successful,  but  it  was  not  a  war  with  an  organized  and  prepared 
nation.  Again,  we  had  our  troops  far  enough  away  from  home  and 
long  enough  in  hand  to  give  them  reasonable  training.  A  relatively 
small  number  of  troops  were  employed  and  a  very  small  proportion 
of  them  were  militia.  You  all  remember  what  happened  to  Gen. 
Scott  at  a  critical  stage  of  the  campaign.  He  had  some  eleven 
regiments  of  volunteers.  The  enlistment  period  of  seven  of  them 
expired.  They  were  given  an  opportunity  to  reenlist  or  go  home. 
They  went  home,  and  he  remained  there  with  a  handful  of  troops 
to  await  reinforcements. 

In  the  Civil  War  the  South  went  to  the  draft  the  19th  of  April,  1862, 
a  year  after  the  war  began.  The  North  followed  with  the  draft  order 
of  August,  1862.  This  was  accompanied  by  riots  in  various  States, 
and  we  had  to  send  troops  to  New  York  to  regain  possession  of  the 
State.  With  the  draft  went  the  bounty  and  that  most  damnable  of 
all  practices,  the  purchase  of  substitutes.  According  to  Charles 
Francis  Adams,  we  had  something  over  504,000  desertions  out  of  a 
total  of  2,763,000  enlistments.  There  were  many  professional  bounty 
jumpers,  some  with  records  of  successful  bounty  jumping  covering 
years.  I  doubt  if  anywhere  has  desertion  been  more  rampant  than 
among  the  certain  class  of  men  who  were  in  the  service  during  the 
Civil  War.  Hundreds  of  thousands  of  good  men  responded,  and  it 
was  their  example  and  their  character  which  carried  the  war  through 
to  a  successful  finish.  We  fought  a  people  as  unprepared  as  ourselves. 
It  was  almost  two  years  before  the  outlines  of  well-organized  and  well- 
led  armies  appeared.  It  was  nea^y  nine  months  after  the  battle  of 
Bull  Run  before  operations  of  importance  followed  in  the  East.  We 
were  unorganized.     We  scrambled  through  the  war  and  eventually 


150  UNIVERSAL  MILITARY   TRAINING. 

built  up  a  good  Army,  and  at  the  end  of  it  were  for  once,  and  only 
once  in  our  history,  organized  and  prepared  for  war. 

In  the  1898  campaign  (the  Spanish  War)  we  did  not  fill  our  com- 
plement, as  you  know,  and  in  this  mobilization  the  militia  from  the 
Eastern  Department  is  about  35  per  cent  under  strength — short  of 
the  full  quota.  I  presume  it  is  about  the  same  in  other  departments. 
The  Regular  Army  is  short  of  men.  We  are  unable  to  fill  either  one 
of  them  up.  Organizations  are  without  the  necessary  equipment. 
No  soldier  could  nope  for  success  with  organizations  of  this  kind  if 
confronted  by  good  troops.  We  are  confronted  squarely  with  the 
question  of  preparedness.  Just  ask  a  soldier  what  would  happen  if 
we  had  to  meet  a  well-trained  enemy.  You  can  imagine  what 
would  have  happened  in  the  War  with  Spain  if  that  country  had 
been  a  strong,  well-organized  power. 

Our  military  preparedness  must  be  founded  upon  a  sense  of  indi- 
vidual obligation  for  service — upon  universal  service.  The  weak 
point  in  our  military  system  is  that  we  have  depended  upon  militia. 
We  have  trusted  to  militia  and  volunteers.  We  have  never  yet 
been  called  upon  to  meet  promptly  a  thoroughly  equipped  and  well- 
organized  force.  If  we  had  had  this  experience,  we  should  long  ago 
have  abandoned  these  systems,  which  are  wholly  undefendable  under 
conditions  of  modern  preparedness  and  organization  and  will  not  give 
us  a  force  adequate  in  quality  or  promptly  available.  Dependence 
upon  these  systems  means  a  wanton  waste  of  life  and  treasure. 

In  conclusion,  I  wish  to  emphasize  the  necessity  of  prompt  prep- 
aration of  an  adequate  force  of  trained  men  with  the  necessary 
arms,  equipment,  and  supplies  for  4,000,000  men.  In  my  opinion, 
there  is  nothing  of  more  vital  importance  than  that  we  should  take 
measures  to  this  end  and  take  them  immediately.  We  are  absolutely 
unprepared  in  artillery  guns  and  ammunition  for  war  and  will  con- 
tinue to  be  so  for  many  years  under  present  rate  of  progress.  There 
is  a  more  or  less  general  misconception  of  the  idea  of  the  universal 
military  training.  Many  appear  to  believe  tnat  it  means  large 
numbers  of  men  standing  in  uniform — an  enormous  standing  army. 
It  means  quite  the  reverse.  It  means  the  maximum  number  of 
men  trained  so  that  they  may  be  efficient  soldiers  if  needed.  Its 
effect,  when  the  system  is  in  full  operation,  will  be  a  relatively  small 
force  under  arms  but  an  enormous  force  of  men  available  in  case  of 
necessity — men  who  are  following  their  normal  occupations  but 
with  the  necessary  training  to  be  efficient  soldiers  if  needed.  Our 
population  is  increasing  rapidly,  and  by  the  time  the  system  is  in 
effect  the  first  line  group,  the  men  from  21  to  28  inclusive,  will  num- 
ber, when  trained,  at  least  4,000,000  of  men.  The  second  line  group 
or  class,  to  include  the  men  from  29  to  38  inclusive,  and  the  third 
line  group,  the  men  from  39  to  45.  It  is  probable  that  when  the 
system  shall  have  been  in  effect  long  enough  to  reach  the  men  of  45 
that  our  population  will  be  in  the  neighborhood  of  at  lenst  120 
millions.  The  number  of  men  who  have  been  trained  will  be  very 
large,  perhaps  17  or  18  millions.  It  is  highly  improbable  that  all 
this  force  should  ever  be  called  to  the  colors,  but  whether  they  are 
called  to  the  colors  or  not,  the  training  will  have  been  of  great  value 
from  every  standpoint:  economic,  moral,  and  from  that  of  good  citi- 
zenship, which  means  national  efficiency.  A  condition  of  real  pre- 
paredness will  have  been  created.     The  best  possible  insurance  of 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING.  151 

peace  will  have  been  secured.  The  probability  of  having  to  take  up 
arms  will  be  diminished  directly  in  proportion  as  we  are  trained  to 
do  so  effectively.  This  training  will  be  a  tremendous  influence  in 
building  up  a  spirit  of  national  solidarity. 

I  have  not  gone  into  the  details  of  providing  and  assigning  officers. 
These  are  details  which  should  be  left  to  Regulations  to  be  promul- 
gated by  the  President  through  the  Secretary  of  War  as  the  interests 
of  the  situation  develop.  Oflicers  will  be  trained  for  the  lower  grades 
through  the  period  of  intensive  training  and  subsequent  periods  of 
training.  At  least  four  millions  of  men  will  always  be  available, 
men  who  have  had  comparatively  recent  training,  and  back  of  them 
will  come  the  men  of  the  second  and  third  line  groups— men  who  have 
had  the  basic  training,  a  training  which  they  never  will  forget.  In 
•case  of  a  struggle  for  national  existence  these  men  would,  of  course, 
receive  a  short  period  of  training  after  mobilization.  The  vitally 
important  thing  is  to  commence  the  training  of  those  of  military  age 
at  once.  Gradually  we  can  work  out  the  details  of  putting  into 
effect  a  system  which  will  reach  down  to  and  include  the  youth  of 
12  and  upward  for  physical  training.  This  is  vitally  important  for 
the  well-being  of  our  people.  These  youngsters  should  also  have  a 
certain  amount  of  military  training,  such  as  rifle  shooting,  man  read- 
ing, and  elementary  military  drill  prior  to  the  time  they  become 
liable  to  the  period  of  intensive  training.  We  shall  find,  undoubtedly, 
that  this  system  will  permit  the  intensive  period  of  training  to  be 
somewhat  di  ninished  diminished  in  accordance  with  the  work  each 
individual  has  done,  hut  under  no  circumstances  should  it  be  dimin- 
ished by  more  than  three  months.  It  will  perhaps  he  necessary  to 
arrange  certain  limited  exemptions,  incident  t<>  temporary  illness  or 
unavoidable  absence.  But  these  are  matters  of  detail  which  should 
be  handled  by  Regulations  and  not  embodied  in  the  universal  service 
law. 

I  shall  take  advantage  of  your  request  to  fill  out  the  testimony  as 
much  as  possible,  including  a  statement  of  the  probable  cost  of  the 
system  of  universal  training  if  applied  on  the  lines  above  indicated. 
I  will  also  embody  an  analysis  of  the  two  bills — the  Chamberlain  bill 
and  the  so-called  Moseley  draft. 

Senator  Thomas.  I  move  the  committee  do  now  adjourn. 

(The  motion  was  agreed  to,  and  at  3.30  o'clock  p.  m.  the  committee 
adjourned  until  to-morrow  morning,  Tuesday,  January  19,  1916,  at 
10  o'clock  a.  m.) 


UNIVEESAL  MILITARY  THAIXIXU. 


WEDNESDAY,  JANUARY  31,   1917. 

United  States  Senate, 
Committee  on  Military  Affairs, 

Washington,  D.  C. 
The  subcommittee  met  at  10.30  a.  m.,  Senator  George  E.  Chamber- 
lain (chairman),  presiding. 

Present:  Senators  Thomas,  Brady,  the  members  of  the  subcom- 
mittee, and  Lee  of  Maryland,  and  Hughes. 

STATEMENT    OF    MAJ.    GEN.    LEONARD    WOOD,  UNITED    STATES 

ARMY. 

The  Chairman.  Gen.  Wood,  the  committee  has  called  you  back 
at  the  request  of  Senator  Lee  of  Maryland,  who  wanted  to  inter- 
rogate you  in  reference  to  your  testimony  heretofore,  or  possibly  in 
reference  to  the  subject  of  the  National  Guard  and  the  Regular 
Army ;  he  is  not  limited  in  his  examination.  We  shall  be  glad,  Sena- 
tor, to  have  you  go  ahead  in  any  way  that  you  see  fit. 

Senator  Brady.  Would  it  not  be  well  to  have  Senator  Lee  outline 
the  scope  of  the  questions  he  desires  to  ask  Gen.  Wood  ? 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  It  would  be  very  difficult  for  me  to  do 
that,  Mr.  Chairman.  I  think  I  had  better  simply  go  ahead  with 
what  I  have  here. 

Senator  Brady.  What  I  was  thinking,  Senator,  was  that  you  have 
probably  got  some  definite  idea  as  to  what  portion  of  his  former  testi- 
mony you  wanted  to  ask  him  about,  and  also  as  to  whether  or  not 
you  have  in  mind  bringing  up  some  new  matter.  That  is,  I  would 
like  to  know,  if  you  can  state,  whether  or  not  you  expect  to  confine 
yourself  to  his  former  testimony,  or  whether  you  thought  of  bring- 
ing up  some  new  subject  to  consider. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  I  can  very  readily  state  that  I  will 
have  to  go  outside  of  the  strict  words  of  his  former  testimony,  for 
the  reason  that  although  the  general  dealt  with  two  subjects  mainly, 
yet  there  are  subjects  that  cover  a  pretty  wide  field  in  their  collateral 
bearing.  The  general  sketched  a  very  large  Army  that  he  had  in 
mind,  some  four  millions  of  men,  and  then  he  stated  in  very  terse 
language  that  the  National  Guard  was  a  failure,  and  he  proceeded 
along  those  lines. 

Senator  Brady.  I  see  your  position.  Mr.  Chairman.  I  think  it 
would  be  well  to  let  Senator  Lee  proceed  along  his  own  lines. 

The  Chairman.  Very  well. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  General.  Mayor  Mitchel's  committee 
has  made  a  report  unfriendly  to  the  National  Guard  system,  but  in 

967 


968  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 

the  course  of  that  report  it  makes  the  following  quotation  from  the 
major  general  commanding  the  National  Guard  of  New  York: 

It  would  be  difficult  for  the  most  cunning  mind  to  develop  a  scheme  better 
calculated  fco  create  confusion,  friction,  indecision,  and  disorganization  at  a 
time  of  national  stress. 

The  committee  then  goes  on  to  say: 

The  prediction  he  then  made  as  to  the  details  of  this  confusion  and  dis- 
organization presents  a  remarkably  accurate  picture  of  what  actually  did  take 
place  last  June. 

This  refers,  of  course,  to  the  mobilization  of  the  National  Guard. 
You  wore  in  command  of  that  mobilization  so  far  as  the  Depart- 
ment of  the  East  was  concerned,  were  you  not,  General  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Gen.  O'Ryan  alluded  to  the  whole 
business,  including  the  relationship  of  the  War  Department  to  the 
mobilization.  Do  you  agree  with  the  general  summary  that  the 
arrangement  from  the  standpoint  of  the  War  Department  was  cal- 
culated to  create  confusion,  friction,  indecision,  and  disorganization 
at  a  time  of  national  stress? 

Gen.  Wood.  Senator,  may  I  ask  what  particular  portion  of  the 
arrangement  he  referred  to?  Was  he  not  discussing  the  storage  of 
supplies? 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  I  could  not  tell  you  that  he  was  dis- 
cussing that  only.  This  is  a  general  statement.  I  do  not  know 
what  it  is  connected  Avith. 

(Jen.  Wood.  I  do  not,  either.  First,  I  wish  to  correct  a  statement 
of  Senator  Lee's  to  the  effect  that  I  recommended  an  Army  of 
4,000,00,0  men.  No  such  recommendation  has  been  made  by  me. 
What  the  Senator  refers  to  is,  I  think,  the  total  of  men  between 
the  ages  of  20  and  29,  who,  I  said,  would  be  available  in  case  we 
had  general  training.  Returning  to  Gen.  Ryan's  statement,  I  shall 
be  very  glad  to  make  a  general  statement.  I  think,  sir,  that  he  was 
referring  to  the  method  of  storing  supplies  at  convenient  central 
points. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Was  there  no  confusion,  friction,  in- 
decision, or  disorganization  in  connection  with  anything  except  the 
distribution  of  supplies? 

Gen.  Wood.  There  was;  not  friction,  but  a  good  deal  of  delay 
and  a  good  deal  of  confusion. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  From  the  standpoint  of  the  War  De- 
partment? 

Gen.  Wood.  There  was  no  friction,  but  there  was  much  delay. 
The  delay  was  in  part  incident  to  the  storage  of  supplies  for  an 
immense  area  at  one  central  point.  This  mistake  was  fundamental, 
and  caused  delay  in  supplies  and  consequent  confusion.  The  War 
Department  did  what  it  could  to  correct  the  faulty  policy  and  to 
minimize  delay  once  mobilization  was  ordered.  It  could  not  over- 
come the  handicap  incident  to  the  method  of  storage  and  the  failure 
to  establish  proper  relations  between  the  department  commanders 
and. the  militia  in  time  of  peace.  Perhaps,  if  I  make  a  short  state- 
ment, it  will  give  you  a  line  of  questions  and  will  clear  up  somewhat 
the  remarks  of  the  mayor's  committee.  That  report  has  been  sent 
me,  but  I  have  not  as  yet  read  it.  I  have  it,  I  think,  with  me,  but 
I  have  not  had  time  to  read  it. 


UNIVERSAL    MILITARY   TRAINING.  969 

For  ti  long  time  a  number  of  officers  have  urged  the  storage  of 
supplies  for  the  Militia:  and  under  "supplies"  I  mean  clothing, 
arms,  equipment,  and  everything  necessary  to  equip  the  men  needed 
to  bring  the  Militia  from  peace  to  war  strength. 

ator  Lee  01  Maryland.  May  I  interrupt  you  there? 

(Jen.  Wood.  Certainly. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  You  recommended,  in  testimony  last 
year  before  the  House  committee,  the  distribution  of  those  supplies 
yourself? 

(Jen.  Wood.  I  did,  sir. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  To  make  it  easy  to  further  distribute 
them  in  an  emergency  and  to  protect  them  from  fire? 

(Jen.  Wood.  That  is  right.  It  was  recommended  that  they  be 
stored,  when  storage  was  available,  in  fireproof  rooms  in  armories 
belonging  to  the  organizations  for  which  they  were  intended  and 
held  under  the  control  dt  the  inspector  instructor  assigned  to  that 
organization.  This  would  have  made  supplies  immediately  avail- 
able. Where  such  storage  was  not  available  it  was  recommended 
that  they  be  stored  at  the  nearest  military  post,  arsenal,  or  depot; 
the  idea  being  to  avoid  just  what  did  happen  -a  very  great  unneces- 
sary delay  in  getting  supplies  out. 

This  recommendation  was  not  approved.     For  instance,  the  great 
bulk  of  the  supplies  for  the   Eastern   Department,  which  ha 
and   a    fraction   per  cent    of  the  militia   of  the  whole  United    St 
within  its  limits,  were  stored  at  the  quartermaster's  depot  in  Phil- 
adelphia.    The  problem  which  i  I  itself  on  the  L8th  of  June 
was  the  distribution  simultaneously  of  that   material   t«»  organiza- 
tions called  out  simultaneously,  including  those  from  Alabama  to 
Maine.    Of  course,  it  was  impossible  to  supply  or  equip  them  simul- 
taneously, and  there  was  delay — a   very  great   amount  of  delay — in 
getting  the  equipment  to  many  of  the  organizations,  and  that  delay 
was  largely  due  to  adhering  to  this  centralized  system  of  sto 
of  material. 

So  much  for  the  delay  in  getting  oul  supplies.  But,  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  Senator,  that  would  not  have  expedited  the  movement  of 
the  troops,  because  the  organizations,  almost  without  exceptions,  in 
some  States,  were  below  the  minimum  peace  strength.  I  am  not 
saying  it  was  not  a  fatally  defective  system,  assuming  that  we  were 
ready  to  move  the  troops,  but  the  greatest  delay  was  due  to  filjing  up 
these  regiments.  You  know  that  throughout  the  department  ns  a 
whole  we  lost,  in  round  numbers,  30  per  cent  of  the  men,  either  be- 
en use  they  failed  to  report  or  were  dropped  by  the  governors  between 
the  call  and  the  mobilization,  or  because  they  were  physically  de- 
fective: and  it  was  the  filling  up  to  minimum  peace  strength  or  above 
which  held  some  organizations  for  several  weeks.  Of  course,  we  were 
directed  to  fill  them  to  war  strength — nineteen  hundred  and  odd  for 
the  Infantry.  This  we  were  unable  to  do  in  any  instance,  and  in  our 
efforts  to  get  them  up  even  to  peace  strength  occurred  the  principal 
delay.  But  Senator  Lee  is  quite  right  in  assuming  that,  had  these 
troops  been  ready,  from  the  standpoint  that  the  personnel  was  ready 
to  move,  the  method  of  storage  of  supplies  would  have  caused  a  very 
great  delay,  as  regards  the  larger  portion  of  them. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  General,  I  will  revert  a  little  later  to 
that  loss  of  30  per  cent  by  physical  examinations,  etc.    Meantime  I 

86205—17 4 


970  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 

would  like  to  ask  you  if  you  can  not  give  us  some  incident  or  cause 
of  confusion  arising  from  the  standpoint  of  the  War  Department's 
management  in  addition  to  the  distribution  of  equipment.  For  in- 
stance, I  was  here  the  other  day,  and  the  major  general  commanding 
the  militia  of  New  York  was  testifying,  and  I  heard  him  say  that 
the  War  Department  ordered  all  these  New  York  commands— some 
18,000  of  them — to  a  central  camp  to  be  equipped,  and  that  that,  in 
his  judgment,  was  a  serious  mistake;  that  the  equipment  should  be 
sent  to  these  commands  where  they  were,  in  their  armories,  etc.,  and 
that  he  appealed  to  you  and  you  appealed  to  the  War  Department 
and  had  that  changed.    Is  that  so  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  Not  exactly,  sir.  Gen.  O'Ryan  recommended  the 
mobilization  camp — a  good  tract  of  land  with  a  suitable  country 
roundabout.  Water  had  to  be  installed,  and  some  difficulty  was 
found,  instant  to  the  single  line  of  railroad.  This  caused  us  some 
difficulty  getting  supplies  in  and  out.  I  have  no  doubt  he  did 
apply  to  me  to  have  supplies  necessary  to  equip  the  troops  sent  to 
the  different  organizations,  but  this  was  not  done,  for  the  reasons 
which  I  have  already  explained,  namely,  the  War  Department  had 
disapproved  the  plan.  Practically  all  supplies  were  at  one  central 
place,  the  Philadelphia  depot.  Gen.  O'Ryan  had  selected  a  concen- 
tration camp,  and  many  of  the  New  York  troops  were  ordered 
there.  Of  course,  then,  the  only  thing  to  do  was  to  send  this  some- 
what belated  material  to  that  concentration  camp  as  fast  as  it 
could  be  shipped  to  us.  It  would  have  been  no  use  to  have  sent  it 
to  the  armory  and  then  had  it  transshipped  to  camp.  The  mistake 
made  in  the  selection  of  the  camp,  I  think,  was  quite  a  natural  one ; 
1  am  not  disposed  to  criticize  Gen.  O'Ryan  for  that.  It  looked  like 
a  very  good  site.  There  was  some  difficulty  in  getting  supplies  in 
and  out  over  a  single  railroad;  but  none  of  those  things,  Senator, 
caused  essential  delay  in  the  movement  of  the  New  York  troops. 
Supplies  were  slow  in  arriving,  but  other  causes  delayed  the  move- 
ments of  the  troops  to  the  front.  The  delay  in  the  arrival  of  sup- 
plies was  due  to  the  fact  that  they  were  all  at  one  central  point,  and 
shipments  were  being  attempted  to  22  States  and  the  District  of 
Columbia  at  the  same  time.  It  was  a  physical  impossibility  to  get 
them  out  of  the  warehouse. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Then,  as  it  was  managed,  it  had  to  be 
all  gotten  out  of  one  warehouse  and  sent  to  another  warehouse  in 
New  York,  or  a  central  camp,  and  then  distributed  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  There  was  no  warehouse  there,  Senator.  It  was 
simply  put  under  canvas  and  distributed  immediately  to  the  organi- 
zations. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Was  there  not  an  actual  shortage  of 
quartermaster's  supplies? 

Gen.  Wood.  The  quartermaster's  supplies  were  painfully  short 
after  the  eighth  or  tenth  day.  That  department  collapsed  very 
promptly  after  that,  so  far  as  prompt  effective  supply  of  troops  was 
concerned. 

I  shall  insert  a  few  telegrams  in  the  hearings  which  illustrate  this. 
These  are  sample  telegrams  and  show  the  general  conditions  of  sup- 
ply and  need  of  distribution  of  reserve  supplies  and  equipment  near 
troops. 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING.  971 

Camp  Kanawha,  Charleston,  W.  Va.  June  28,  19  16. 
Adjutant  General,  Eastern  Department, 

Governors  Island,  N.  Y.: 

Shoes  of  entire  command  absolutely  unsuitable.  I  suggested  purchase  of 
shoes  in  local  shoe  stores  sufficient  to  give  each  man  mustered  in  one  service- 
able pair  to  enter  the  field. 

Wallace,  Major. 


Camp  Kanawha,  Charleston,  W.  Va.  June  28,  1916. 
Commanding  General,  Department  of  the  East, 

Governors  Island,  N.  T.: 
No  proper  marching  shoes  nor  marching  socks    (light  wool)    in  this  entire 
Camp,  except  in  case  of  officers.    About  7  per  cent  of  rifles  on  hand  show  muz- 
zles enlarged  to  point  of  unserviceability.     Tentage  good;  wagons  and  harness 
new  or  nearly  now;  clothing  fair;  other  equipment  not  checked  yet. 

Skerrett,  Special  Inspector. 

Camp  Holcomk,  Niantic,  Conn..  June  28,  1916. 
Commanding  General,   Eastern   Department, 

Governor*  Island,  X.  V.: 
Urge  that  you  hurry  arms,  equipment,  and  all  ordnance  and  quartermaster 
property  required  for  1,000  infantry  now  at  mobilization  camp  without  clothing 
and  equipment  of  any  kind;  also  must  have  600  each:  Coats,  breeches,  and 
leggins.  1,000  hats,  1,200  blankets,  and  1.000  meat  cans,  enps,  knives,  forks, 
and  spoons,  for  the  Field  Artillery.  Will  also  want  slickers  for  them.  Have 
tentage  for  infantry  and  artillry  and  sufficient  blankets  for  infantry  now  in 
camp,  but  no  blankets  for  artillery.     Please  hurry  shipment. 

Cole. 


Jackson,   Miss..  July  8,    (916. 

COMMANDING  GSXKBAX    K\SI1  K\    DEPARTMENT, 

Governors  Island,  X.  v.: 

Regiment   not   at   present   organized,   armed,   and   equipped    for   held    service. 

Clothing  and  equipment  in  most  of  organizations  in  very  bad  condition;  rifles 

practically    unserviceable      Practically    all    enlisted    men    are    recruits.      In    my 
opinion  at  least  10  days  before  regiment  should  move. 

Donaldson. 


Nashville,  Tenn.,  June  30,  1916. 
Commanding  General  Eastern  Department, 

Governors  Island,  N.  Y.: 
No  reply  to  my  request  for  authority  for  emergency  purchase  for  700  bed  sacks. 
Recruits  are  arriving.     We  would   like  authority    to   purchase  800  bed   sacks. 
Men  are  sleeping  on  ground;  are  without  cots,  blankets,   ponchos,  or  tentage. 
Answer. 

Spence,  Camp  Commander. 


Richmond,  Va.,  July  3,  1916. 

Commanding  General  Eastern  Department, 

Governors  Island,  x.  v.: 
Service  hats  received  were  of  very  small  sizes.     Request  that  the  following 
be  shipped  Immediately :  800  size  7.  200  size  7£.  50  size  71,  50  size  6J.     Re- 
quest instructions  to  ship  1.000  hats  sizes  6}  and  6§  to  some  place  where  the\ 
may  be  of  some  use. 

J.  B.  Bellinger. 
Colonel,  Quartermaster  Corps. 


Richmond,  Va.,  June  30,  1916. 
Commanding  General  Eastern  Department, 

Governors  Island,  N.  Y.: 
Physical    examinations    nearly    completed.     One    Infantry    Regiment    nearly 
mustered,  another  in  progress.     Equipment  now  on  hand  except  machine-gun 


972  UNIVERSAL    MILITARY    TRAINING. 

companies  and  1,500  cots.  Clothing  on  hand  except  6,000  pairs  socks,  4,000 
drawers  and  undershirts,  4.0(H)  shoes.  Above  excludes  Cavalry.  Nothing 
can  move  Inside  of  five  days. 

Skibrett,  Special  Inspector. 

Montgomery,  Ala.,  Jufy  2'/,  1916. 
Commanding  General  Eastern  Department, 

Governors  [stand,  X.  v.: 
Recommend  the  following  articles  be  shipped  as  soon  as  possible  in  order 
to  more  completely  equip  troops  at  this  cam]):  48  bags  water  sterilizing,  2,400 
cots,  4,500  mosquito  bars,  150  tents  (pyramidal,  large),  45  escort  wagons.  If 
practicable,  more  escort  wagons  can  be  issued  to  troops  on  arrival  at  destina- 
tion, as  they  are  not  needed  at  this  camp. 

Screws. 

Montgomery,  Ala.,  August  28,  1916. 
Commanding  General  Eastern  Department, 

Governors  Island,  N.  Y.: 
Tripods  for  pyramidal  tents,  target,  and  tent  pins  have  not  been  received. 
Request  instruct  ions  be  issued  to  rush  tripod  and  tent  pins ;   same  were  re- 
quisitioned for  June  24  and  July  22. 

Screws. 


Montgomery,  Ala.,  August  81,  1016. 
Commanding  General  Eastern  Department, 

Governors  Island.  X.  TV; 
Cots  requisitioned  for  June  24  and  July  22  needed  badly  at  this  camp.     Two 
thousand  cots  will  take  care  of  present  needs. 

Screws. 


EXTRACT   COPY   OF   TELEGRAM    REPORTING   DEPARTURE    OF   ALABAMA    CAVALRY. 

Montgomery,  Ala.,  December  0,  1916. 
Commanding  General  Eastern  Department, 

Governors  Island,  N.  Y.: 
First  Cavalry  and  hospital  detachment  National  Guard,  Alabama,  departed 
from  mobilization  camp  December  9,  1916.     Short  2,200  caliber  .30  ammuni- 
tion;  short  3,500  caliber  .38  ammunition.     Organizations  have  no  horses,  no 
wagon  transportation,  no  mules. 

Kaemfer. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Was  there  not  considerable  difficulty 
in  securing  a  certain  class  of  blank  forms  which  were  necessary? 

Gen.  Wood.  There  were  delays  in  that  respect ;  yes,  sir.  All  those 
defects  of  the  system  are  very  apparent.  But  the  point  to  be  empha- 
sized, I  think,  is  that  even  if  the  War  Department  had  been  properly 
organized  and  ready  to  handle  this  mobilization,  the  regiments  were 
not  full  and  the  men  were  not  trained,  and  even  if  we  had  delivered 
them  their  equipment  in  24  hours  we  should  have  still  had  organiza- 
tions only  20  per  cent  trained  and  absolutely  unready  for  field  service. 

The  shortage  of  blank  forms  was  due  partially  to  an  inadequate 
suuply,  partially  to  delay  in  the  mails,  and  partially  to  the  fact  that 
many  were  spoiled  by  the  militia.  I  shall  insert  sample  telegrams 
relating  to  this  subject. 

Camp  Whitman,  Greenhaven,  N.  Y.,  June  30,  1916. 
The  Adjutant. 

Governors  Island,  N.  Y.: 
Request  that  militia  organizations  here  be  supplied  immediately  with  books 
and  blanks  for  regimental  and  company  administration  after  muster  in.     None 
are  on  hand. 

Townsend,  Mustering  Officer. 


UNIVERSAL    MILITARY    TRAINING.  978 

Richmond.   Va..  .////)/  8,  l'JHL 
Chief  Mustering  Office*  Bastebn  Department, 

Governors  Island.  X.   Y.: 
Many  muster  rolls  and  forms  spoiled  comma  request  sixty  muster  rolls  for 
three  comma   one  hundred   forms  OU  comma   sixty  detachment   muster  in  rolls 
form  four  comma  twelve  field  comma  staff  and  band  form  five  comma  thirty 
muster  in  rolls  individual  officers  form  twelve. 

A.  M.  Shut. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  General,  is  it  not  a  fundamental  mis- 
take to  hold  the  citizen  soldiers,  whose  contribution  to  the  defense 
of  the  country  was  voluntary,  to  as  high  a  degree  of  responsibility 
as  you  would  professional  soldiers  or  the  War  Department? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  do  not  think  any  of  us  have,  Senator,  who  have 
handled  this  feature  of  the  situation  intelligently  and  fairly.  1 
have  always  made  one  very  general  statement,  and  if  it  meets  the 
committee's  approval,  in  order  to  indicate  the  character  of  the 
statement,  I  would  like  to  introduce  in  this  hearing  extracts  from 
several  public  addresses  on  this  auestion  of  the  militia  made  months 
ago,  to  show  just  what  my  attitude  as  an  officer  of  the  Army  has  been 
toward  the  whole  matter. 

The  Chairman.  Without  objection,  they  may  be  included. 

Gen.  Wood.  They  show  my  attitude  1  have  always  said  this 
about  the  militia  :  Thai  the  men  were  entitled  to  the  highest  credit 
for  their  individual  sacrifice  of  time  and  money  and  vacation;  that 
there  was  no  criticism  whatever  to  be  made  of  officers  or  men  as 
individuals,  from  the  physical,  moral,  or  any  other  standpoint;  that 
we  were  attacking  a  vicious,  independable  system,  and  not  attack- 
ing the  men  who  have,  with  the  best  of  intentions,  come  under  its 
influence.  This  is  the  whole  thing  in  a  nutshell.  1  have  not  a  word 
of  criticism  of  the  officers  and  men.  They  have  done  all  that  men 
could  do  under  a  bad  system. 

prki'.\ki;i>m:ss    for    RATIONAL    i>i:i  i:\ 

[Delivered  by  Maj.  Gen.  Leonard  Wood,  United  States  Army,  before  the  Chamber  of  Com- 
merce of  the  State  of  New  York  Mar.  22,  1916.] 

Tt  doefl  not  seem  t<t  me  that  any  argument  is  Deeded  to  convince  men  of 
ordinary  Intelligence  that  under  the  tiew  conditions  preparation  is  more  im- 
portant than  ever  before.     It  seems  Blmost   an  insult  to  have  to  tell   Intelligent 

men  these  things.    They  are  self-evident  to  the  most  casual  student  of  affairs. 

If  any  of  you  gentlemen  will  sit  down  ami  consider  carefully  and  thoughtfully 
the  problem  which  would  confront  the  United  States  in  case  of  host  ilit  ies.  the 
great  problem  of  defense,  and  attempt  to  solve  it.  T  think  the  need  of  action 
will  he  brought  home  to  you  very  quickly.  The  dangers  of  the  situation  and 
the  need  of  thorough  organization  and  preparation  .-ire  clearly  evident  to  every 
one  who  has  given  this  matter  even  the  most  superficial  consideration. 

Such  weapons  as  the  Federal  Government  has  must,  he  its  weapons  and  not 
the  weapons  of  any  State,  nor  under  even  a  limited  degree  of  State  control. 
Those  who  know  the  militia  and  understand  and  appreciate  the  handicaps 
under  which  it  labors  realize  that  it  has  done  all  that  could  he  expected  under 
r.  fatally  defective  system,  a  system  which  makes  a  high  degree  Of  efficiency 
absolutely  impossible.  The  officers  and  men  are  good.  The  Regular  Army 
to-day,  put  under  administrative  control  of  48  different  governors,  would  soon 
cease  to  be  a  dependable  force.  The  militia  should  he  transferred  absolutely 
to  Federal  control.  Attempts  to  continue  control  by  the  States  and  provide 
control  by  the  Federal  Government  in  time  of  emergency  through  dual  oaths 
of  enlistment  will  not,  in  my  opinion,  accomplish  what  we  desire,  which  is  a 
militia  which  is  Federal,  whose  control  is  vested  absolutely  in  the  Federal  Gov- 
ernment, and  whose  instruction,  discipline,  and  personnel  are  Federal  and  not 


974  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 

State  matters.  In  time  of  emergency  we  want  men  and  not  lawsuits.  We 
want  a  weapon  which  is  certain  and  dependable.  In  my  opinion,  not  less  than 
90  per  cent,  and  perhaps  more,  of  the  personnel  of  the  militia  want  to  estab- 
lish such  a  condition  as  I  have  outlined  above.  They  desire  earnestly  to  be 
Federal  soldiers. 

I  have  just  returned  from  Texas,  and  I  found  everywhere  among  the 
militia  a  strong  sentiment  for  transfer  to  Federal  control.  We  must  have  a 
Regular  Army  adequate  for  the  peace  needs  of  the  Nation,  which  includes  the 
garrisoning  our  over-sea  possessions,  an  adequate  mobile  force  at  home 
mid  adequate  coast  artillery  for  our  seacoast  defenses.  We  must  also  have  an 
absolutely  first-class  Navy,  ready  at  all  times  for  immediate  and  effective  action. 
It  must  have  all  the  elements  required  by  a  great  fleet. 

Gentlemen,  to  accomplish  these  ends  requires  time.  Time  is  a  great  and 
determining  element.  The  fact  that  we  have  unlimited  resources  in  the  way 
of  men  and  money  is  an  assurance  only  to  those  who  do  not  understand  that 
neither  men  nor  money  are  of  much  value  without  time  for  organization  and 
preparation.  Our  condition  is  understood  thoroughly  by  all  nations.  Gen- 
erally speaking,  it  is  more  thoroughly  understood  by  the  intelligent  observers 
of  foreign  nations  than  it  is  by  the  people  of  this  great  Republic. 


[Engineers,  Brooklyn  National  Electric  Light  Association,  March,  11)16.] 
THE    MILITIA. 

We  must  also  maintain  small  garrisons  in  Alaska  and  Porto  Rico.  Alaska 
is  a  tremendously  rich  country,  and  we  are  just  beginning  to  know  something 
of  its  resources.  These  over-sea  garrisons  will  amount  to  something  like 
60.000  men.  We  have  a  relatively  small  number  of  men  in  the  United  States. 
The  mobile  army  amounts  to  about  31,000.  About  13.000  or  14,000  comprise 
our  Coast  Artillery.  These  are  roughly  the  total  line  forces  within  the  United 
States.  Our  Regular  Army  must  be  maintained  in  the  highest  condition  of 
efficiency,  well  supplied,  and  thoroughly  equipped.  There  must  be  reserves  of 
men  and  material.  We  need  many  more  officers.  We  need  at  least  1,200 
additional  Regular  officers  to  work  with  the  militia,  schools,  and  colleges  as 
instructors. 

The  National  Guard  has  accomplished  about  all  that  officers  and  men  can 
accomplish  under  a  defective  system.  It  is  the  system  that  is  at  fault  and 
not  the  officers  and  men.  The  officers  and  men  have  done  creditable  work, 
but  are  working  under  a  system  which  renders  efficiency  impossible.  There 
are  128,000  men  in  the  National  Guard  in  the  entire  country,  and  it  is  very 
complimentary  to  say  that  60,000  could  be  gotten  out  in  30  days  in  efficient  con- 
dition. They  are  under  48  commanders,  governors  of  States,  who  exercise 
complete  and  full  authority  over  the  guard.  The  men  of  the  guard  are  good, 
the  governors  are  good,  but  the  system  unworkable.  If  you  should  take  the 
Regular  Army  and  put  it  under  48  commanders,  it  would  go  to  pieces  very 
quickly. 

Those  of  us  who  are  actively  interested  and  have  made  a  study  of  the 
question  know  that  the  correct  solution  would  be  to  have  them  under  Federal 
control,  and  we  are  recommending  and  urging  a  complete  and  absolute  transfer 
of  the  militia  to  the  National  Government.  We  do  not  want  to  lose  these  men 
and  officers;  we  believe  they  should  come  into  the  national  service. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  General,  how  long  has  it  been  your 
opinion,  or  have  you  given  expression  to  the  idea,  that  this  was  a 
vicious  and  undependable  system?  Did  you  have  that  opinion  when 
you  were  Chief  of  Staff? 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes,  sir;  I  think  I  can  show  you  that  very  con- 
clusively. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  You  did  not  express  it  for  publication  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes,  sir;  very  many  times. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  As  Chief  of  Staff? 

Gen.  Wood.  As  Chief  of  Staff.  You  will  find  it  running  all 
through  my  talks  at  college  commencements,  etc.,  on  military  train- 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING.  975 

ing.  You  will  find  it  is  never  a  criticism  of  the  men;  you  will  find 
an  equally  strong  criticism  of  the  volunteer  system.  And  you  will 
find  the  strongest  support  of  these  opinions  among  the  veterans  of 
the  Grand  Army  who  have  had  war  service.  They  all  recognize 
the  defects  of  these  systems;  they  mean  untrained  men  and  officers 
when  war  comes. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Can  you  state  whether  that  opinion 
was  held  by  your  successor  as  Chief  of  Staff? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  could  not  speak  for  him,  sir. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Is  that  opinion  held  by  the  present 
Chief  of  Staff,  so  far  as  you  know? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  do  not  feel  authorized  to  speak  for  him,  because  I 
have  never  discussed  this  with  him;  but,  judging  from  his  public 
testimony  here,  I  should  say  yes. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  So  the  last  three  Chiefs  of  Staff,  who 
have  had  to  administer  the  National  Guard  law,  looked  upon  it  as  a 
vicious  and  undependable  system? 

Gen.  Wood.  Well?  not  vicious  in  the  moral  aspect,  but  vicious  in 
its  effect  upon  public  safety.  I  think  that  is  unquestionably  so.  It 
does  not  provide  either  an  adequate  defense  or  a  dependable  force. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Now,  is  it  at  all  possible  for  the  human 
nature,  even  the  disciplined  human  nature,  of  an  Army  officer  to 
fairly  administer  a  law  or  a  system  which  he  looks  upon  as  vicious 
and  undependable? 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes.  I  think,  sir,  if  you  had  been  at  our  headquar- 
ters for  the  first  10  days  in  June  you  would  have  thought  it  Was. 
We  stayed  there  on  an  average  of  19  hours  a  day,  and  some  of  us 
had  our  meals  brought  to  the  office.  I  assumed  responsibility  for  the 
expenditure  of  somewhere  from  $700,000  to  $800,000  in  order  to 
buy  things  for  these  men  in  open  market  and  start  them  off  with 
some  absolutely  necessary  transport  equipment — auto  trucks,  horses, 
and  mules. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  General,  suppose  that  system  was  bet- 
ter than  you  thought,  and  that  by  enthusiastic  support  you  could 
have  improved  it  while  you  were  Chief  of  Staff,  was  it  not  too  late 
to  put  in  work  to  improve  the  svstem  after  the  call  of  the  President? 

Gen.  Wood.  When  I  was  Chief  of  Staff  I  did,  I  think,  more  in 
the  way  of  giving  the  militia  a  chance,  probably,  than  any  other 
officer  of  the  Army  had  attempted.  I  insisted — this  sounds  a  little 
personal,  perhaps,  but  I  want  to  emphasize  this  so  you  will  under- 
stand my  situation  verv  clearly — I  insisted  on  Gen.  O'Ryan's  being 
admitted  to  the  War  College.  It  was  not  generally  approved  in 
the  service.  I  wanted  to»give  him  a  fair  trial.  We  sent  officers  out 
to  Leavenworth  to  take  the  course  there. 

The  Chairman.  Officers  of  the  guard? 

Gen.  Wood.  Officers  of  the  guard.  You  will  find  that  at  all  the 
guard  functions,  which  I  attended,  I  always  supported  them 
strongly.  I.  wanted  to  give  them  just  what  you  are  driving  at,  a 
\  ery  thorough  trial,  and  I  honestly  believe  we  have  given  the  sys- 
tem as  fair  a  trial  as  any  system  ever  had. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  General,  how  can  you  say  that,  when 
the  Dick  law  was  in  operation  practically  on  the  date  of  the  mobili- 
zation, and  the  law  of  June  3,  which  the  Militia  Bureau  says  will 
make  very  material  improvements,  was  not  in  practical  and  actual 


976  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 

operation  at  the  time  of  the  call?  How  can  you  say  that  they 
were  given  a  fair  trial,  with  all  the  defects  that  the  Militia  Bureau 
has  pointed  out  in  their  report  to  be  corrected  by  the  present  law  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  am  not  speaking  of  the  future.  I  am  speaking  of 
the  things  up  to  the  time  the  mobilization  was  ordered,  and  am  say- 
ing that  we  had  given  them  every  possible  chance.  I  do  not  know 
what  is  going  to  happen  next  year. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  You  gave  them  all  the  chance  you 
could  under  the  old  Dick  law? 

Gen.  Wood.  Under  the  system  then  in  force ;  yes. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Gen.  Warfield,  the  present  adjutant 
general  of  Maryland,  tells  me  that  adverse  criticisms  during  the 
mobilization  and  since  make  it  hard  for  the  officers  to  maintain 
their  organizations.  He  says  that  men  are  not  reenlisting  or  taking 
the  proper  interest  in  the  organizations  when  they  read  in  the 
papers  every  day  uncomplimentary  remarks  by  the  Regular  officers. 
He  goes  on : 

My  belief  is  that  if  the  Army  officers  had  given  the  National  Guard  the 
loyal  support  it  deserved,  and  had  held  out  the  helping  hand  as  they  should 
have  done,  the  men  would  be  returning  from  the  border  with  a  feeling  of 
satisfaction,  and  their  patriotism  not  dampened. 

My  observation,  General,  has  been  that  the  Regular  officers  who 
were  on  the  border — the  younger  men — cooperated  very  vigorously 
with  the  National  Guard  officers  in  increasing  the  discipline  of  the 
National  Guard  units.    That  is  your  impression,  is  it  not  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  Everywhere;  both  on  the  border  and  at  home.  I 
insert  here  a  few  extracts  from  a  letter  of  an  officer  on  the  border 
which  shows  what  has  been  tried  and  what  has  been  accomplished : 

Our  troops  here  after  six  months  training  are,  I  should  say,  in  pretty  fair 
shape.  Theye  were  in  very  poor  shape  generally  when  called  out.  They 
worked  hard  from  colonels  to  privates,  and  a  finer  bunch  of  people  I  don't 
expect  to  see;  but  they  are  not  an  Army  yet.  The  privates  are  O.  K.,  not 
having  so  much  to  learn,  but  as  you  go  further  up  the  deficiencies  become 
more  and  more  apparent.  The  officers  are  not  yet  equal  to  their  positions, 
and  I  don't  see  how  they  ever  can  be  with  the  little  instruction  and  practice 
they  get  at  their  home  stations. 

We  have  had  to  rob  the  regular  regiments  of  officers,  sergeants,  clerks,  cooks, 
blacksmits,  farriers,  etc.,  in  order  to  get  the  National  Guard  regiments  in  their 
present  fairly  good  condition.  Only  a  month  ago  a  colonel  had  to  be  told 
that  he  could  draw  rations  and  forage  for  his  regiments  at  a  station  other 
than  his  own  when  he  was  on  a  practice  march.  This  is  only  an  incident 
to  show  what  simple  matters  are  not  known. 

******* 

If  we  are  to  hold  to  the  National  Guard  as  defined  by  the  defense  act  our 
Militia  Bureau  will  have  to  change  its  plans  materially.  The  troops  arrived 
here  absolutely  ignorant  of  the  simplest  details  of  administration.  I  do  not 
believe  that  10  per  cent  of  the  companies  had  either  an  officer  or  man  who 
knew  how  to  make  out  a  morning  report,  sick  book,  or  ration  return — all  were 
ignorant  of  the  handling  of  the  rations,  and  in  some  companies  men  were 
assessed  as  much  as  $5  for  the  support  of  the  mess.  Articels  of  war  were 
unheard  of  in  some  outfits,  and  Army  Regulations  an  obscure  mystery.  Only 
yesterday  I  had  to  show  a  lieutenant  colonel  how  to  make  out  a  survey 
report,  and  all  the  captains  of  a  regiment  how  to  make  their  returns  of 
ordnance. 

*  *  *  *  *•*  * 

Of  course,  if  this  (two  divisions?)  goes  into  Mexico  we  will  arrange  some- 
how. But  the  fact  remains,  as  I  have  stated  above,  so  far  as  raising,  or- 
ganizing, training,  and  equipping  this  force,  our  salvation  will  be  that  the 
enemy  is  worse  off  than  we  are  in  all  respects.  He  will  have  us  skinned  a 
mile  on  scouting  and  information. 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING.  977 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  But  Capt.  Burns,  who  testified  here 
the  other  day,  and  other  guardsmen  who  have  been  here,  gave  the 
impression  that  this  support,  which  they  had  received  from  the  line 
officers  on  the  border,  was  not  the  characteristic  of  the  War  De- 
partment officers;  that  the  guard  felt  that  they  had  not  been  fairly 
treated  by  the  War  Department  officers.  Have  you  any  remark  to 
make  on  that? 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes,  sir;  I  have  a  very  decided  remark  to  make.  The 
guard  is  coming  home,  not  with  its  patriotism  dampened,  but  is 
coming  home  a  sadder  and  a  wiser  organization.  They  have  Learned 
the  folly  of  the  system.  They  had  been  drugged  by  unintelligent 
praise,  misled  by  false  statements,  and  led  to  believe  that  they  really 
could  promptly  render  effective  service.  Many  of  the  men  of  the 
guard  are  not  going  to  reenlist.  Officers  are  resigning  in  large  num- 
bers and  they  are  doing  it,  not  because  they  are  any  less  patriotic, 
but  because  they  are  intelligent  enough  to  know  that  if  they  are  to 
be  real  soldiers  they  must  go  to  a  sound  system.  They  arc  not  going 
to  see  the  country  betrayed  by  depending  longer  upon  a  broken 
reed.  That  is  why  the  guard  officers  and  men  are  resigning.  I  do 
not  believe,  sir,  that  you  can  locate  a  dozen  instances  where  any  man 
of  standing  and  reputation  will  come  out  and  say  that  he  has  n<>t  re- 
ceived cordial  support  from  the  officers  of  the  Regular  Army.  If 
we  had  not  given  them  cordial  support,  really  nursed  them  into  (he 
field,  helped  them  in  every  way.  made  out  their  papers,  and  done 
everything  for  them,  many  of  them  never  would  have  gone.  On  the 
border,  officers  have  been  assigned,  grade  for  grade,  man  for  man. 
to  militia  companies  (this  is  outside  of  my  bailiwick,  and  I  only 
speak  from  hearsay)  to  aid  in  instructing  the  militia.  The  Regular 
Army  has  given  it  as  fair  a  chance,  has  helped  it  as  loyally  as  any 
man  here  has  ever  aided  any  cause  in  his  life,  and  any  statement  to 
the  contrary  is  not  a  statement  of  the  National  Guard  as  a  whole. 
nor  does  it  represent  the  National  Guard  opinion,  nor  is  it  a  state- 
ment of  fact. 

Now,  I  have  dealt  with  over  half  of  the  guard  of  the  country.  We 
have  had  to  send  them  and  bring  some  of  them  back.  We  sent 
officers  to  live  with  them  and  muster  them  out.  In  many  instances 
we  have  had  to  take  their  papers  from  the  beginning  of  their  en- 
rollment in  the  Federal  service  and  go  over  them  all  in  order  to  get 
them  out  in  good  order.  There  is  not  a  criticism  to  make  of  their 
spirit  or  intention,  but  they  were  not  soldiers.  They  were  often  ab- 
solutely ignorant  of  their  duties,  and  to  have  put  them  up  against 
reasonably  good  troops  would  have  been  murder. 

When  the  call  came  it  wTas  necessary  to  immediately  purchase 
horses  and  mules  for  artillery  and  cavalry  and  for  draft  purposes  in 
order  that  organizations  might  not  arrive  on  the  border  absolutely 
immobile  and  helpless.  From  the  few  available  regular  officers  in 
the  department,  boards  were  organized.  These  boards  practically 
took  over  the  entire  matter  of  selecting  and  buying  horses,  brand- 
ing them,  and  turning  them  over  to  the  organizations.  The  officers 
purchased  trucks  and  other  needed  elements  of  transportation.  They 
worked  continuously,  night  and  day,  without  regard  to  hours.  If 
their  own  reputation  had  depended  upon  the  success  of  their  efforts 
they  could  not  have  been  more  earnest  or  more  vigorous.     I  wish 


978  UNIVERSAL  MILITARY  TRAINING. 

to  emphasize  this  fact  because  any  statement  to  the  contrary  is  not 
only  /untrue  but  it  is  malicious. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  General,  you  were  in  command  of 
National  Guard  forces  on  July  26,  1916  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  I  saw  in  a  local  paper  at  that  time  a 
quotation  from  a  speech  of  yours,  which  was  delivered  at  Fort  Terry 
on  July  26,  to  the  boys'  training  camp. 

Gen.  Wood.  I  remember ;  you  wrote  me  about  it. 

Senator  Lee,  of  Maryland.  It  reads  as  follows: 

Now,  we  have  had  the  militia  system  always.  It  has  always  been  a  failure, 
not  because  the  men  are  poor  or  the  officers  poor.  They  are  just  as  good  as 
any  other  portion  of  the  population,  but  the  system  is  defective.  We  feel  that 
the  State  militia  must  eventually  belong  to  the  Federal  Government  absolutely 
and  without  any  conditions  whatever.  You  see  the  difficulties  we  have  had  in 
mobilizing  so  many  men  on  the  border.  In  this  great  eastern  department, 
with  56  per  cent  of  the  militia  of  the  whole  country  in  it,  we  have  in  four 
weeks  gotten  54,000  men  on  the  border  and  that  is  all.  These  men  are  largely 
recruits,  and  there  are  many  wholly  untrained  men. 

Did  you  consider  it  encouraging  the  guard  to  declare  that  it  was 
a  failure,  while  you  were  endeavoring  to  recruit  for  it,  and  in  com- 
mand of  this  mobilization? 

Gen.  Wood.  No,  sir;  I  did  not  consider  it  as  encouraging  the  guard, 
but  I  considered  it  a  matter  of  obligation  to  tell  the  truth.  I  was 
not  speaking  there  to  the  press,  and  only  when  I  received  your  letter 
did  I  realize  that  any  reporter  had  been  present.  It  was  a  boys' 
camp :  the  boys  had  asked  me  to  tell  them  something  about  the  militia 
mobilization,  and  it  was  on  a  military  reservation.  I  am  entirely 
responsible  for  every  word  I  said,  and  it  was  perfectly  true,  but  it 
was  not  said  for  publication  at  that  time. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Well,  it  got  out,  General,  and  must  have 
reached  the  public  at  large. 

Now,  I  want  to  call  your  attention  to  that  general  question  of 
recruiting.  In  your  report  on  the  mobilization  you  criticized  the 
Natioanl  Guard  because  it  did  not  recruit  up  to  the  war  strength. 

Gen.  Wood.  But  do  I  criticize  the  guard,  sir,  as  an  organization  ? 
I  simply  say  that  the  recruiting  was  unsuccessful.  We  have  the 
same  thing  in  our  regular  service,  so  far  as  recruiting  goes. 

Senator  Lee'  of  Maryland.  Anyway,  you  criticized  them  because 
they  did  not  recruit  up  to  war  strength,  whether  that  was  criticism 
of  the  guard  or  of  the  system.  Now,  I  want  to  ask  you  whether  or 
not,  all  over  this  country,  in  the  various  States,  there  had  not  im- 
mediately sprung  up,  under  State  systems,  on  the  call  of  the  Presi- 
dent, guard  recruitment  systems? 

Gen.  Wood.  In  some  States,  Senator,  yes;  a  very  quick  response; 
and  in  others  almost  none.  In  Kentuckv,  for  instance,  recruitment 
was  so  slow  that  in  one  regiment  of  Infantry  they  put  in  some  36 
from  a  reformatory  institution  to  fill  the  regiment  up.  We  fortu- 
nately found  that  out  and  had  them  promptly  taken  out.  That  regi- 
ment lost  in  men  about  as  fast  as  it  gained.  I  do  not  remember  the 
exact  figures  of  its  physical  disability,  but  they  ran  very,  very  high. 
In  a  New  Hampshire  regiment  we  had  the  same  difficultv.  The  men 
went  out  nt  one  end  about  as  fast  as  they  came  in  at  the  other,  be- 
cause of  physical  defects.     This  general  condition  existed  all  over 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY    TRAINING.  979 

the  country  to  a  greater  or  less  extent.  Some  of  the  older  States, 
which  had  what  you  might  call  crack  organizations,  like  the  Seventh 
New  York  or  Squadron  A  and  the  Cadet  Corps  of  Boston  and  others 
in  the  South,  had  a  waiting  list  of  recruits,  and  these  filled  up  to 
above  minimum  strength  pretty  quickly.  Massachusetts,  for  in- 
stance, was  able  to  send  some  2,500  recruits  right  on  the  heels  of  her 
first  troops,  but  that  was  during  the  moment  of  enthusiasm.  Within 
a  month  we  began  to  struggle  desperately  for  recruits,  and  we  sent 
parties,  as  you  know,  all  over  the  sections  of  country  from  which  the 
regiments  came. 

In  Pennsylvania,  for  instance,  to  give  you  an  illustration  of  the 
fact  that  we  did  play  the  game,  we  selected,  on  the  recommendation 
of  the  adjutant  general  of  the  State;  certain  popular  officers  who 
were  no  longer  on  the  active  list,  but  who  had  belonged  to  various 
Pensylvania  regiments  then  on  the  border.  Those  officers  were  re- 
called to  active  service  (Federal  service,  of  course)  and  thev  were 
put  at  recruiting  work  in  districts  where  thev  knew  the  people  and 
where  their  former  regiments  came  from,  and  where  presumably  they 
were  popular.  We  made  very  strong  efforts  to  get  recruits  from 
every  section  of  the  department 

Finally  we  established  the  recruiting  rendezvous  at  our  own  posts 
in  order  that  all  the  inconveniences  at  mobilization  camps  might  be 
done  away  with;  that  is,  they  were  sent  to  the  military  post-  along 
the  seacoast  and  elsewhere,  where  there  were  sanitary  surroundings 
and  good  quarters.  We  hoped  that  the  letters  that  they  sent  home 
would  be  encouraging.  They  had  not  been  encouraging,  I  feared, 
at  mobilization  camps,  where  the  cooking  was  poor  and  where  there 
were  many  other  unpleasant  conditions.  I  say  unpleasant  because 
they  were  unable  to  take  care  of  themselves:  they  were  as  a  class 
almost  wholly  green  men  in  all  which  related  to  field  Service  and 
life  in  camp. 

The  recruiting  at  first  was  done  by  the  States.  They  made  a  strong 
effort  to  fill  up  their  organizations. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  The  States  generally? 

Gen.  Wood.  Briefly,  immediately  upon  mustering  into  the  Federal 
service,  efforts  were  made  to  recruit  the  regiments  to  war  strength 
as  rapidly  as  possible.  A  number  of  States  secured  and  forwarded 
with  comparatively  little  delay  very  considerable  numbers  of  re- 
cruits, especially  Massachusetts  and  !Srew  York  and  several  others. 
The  Federal  recruiting  parties,  composed  of  militia  officers  and 
men,  were  mustered  in  as  soon  as  selected  and  recommended  by  the 
State's  adjutant  general.  These  detachments  were  sent  throughout 
tht  States,  recruiting  principally  in  the  areas  from  which  the  regi- 
ments came.  Every  effort  was  made  to  aid  and  stimulate  their 
work,  and  the  States  were  requested  to  cooperate  to  the  greatest 
extent  possible  in  this  work.  The  men  in  the  recruiting  parties  were 
militiamen — not  inexperienced  men  but  men  who  knew  the  situation 
and  the  personnel  of  the  guard  and  that  which  had  been  in  it.  After 
a  time  it  became  apparent  that  this  recruiting  was  not  sufficiently 
successful  to  warrant  the  expense  incident  to  its  maintenance,  and 
most  of  the  recruiting  parties  were  discontinued  and  recruiting 
for  the  guard  made  a  part  of  the  work  of  our  regular  recruiting. 
The  States  were  notified  of  this  change  and  the  reason  for  it.  and 


980  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 

were  asked  to  send  to  our  recruiting  officers  or  recruiting  rendezvous 

or  stations  all  men  whom  they  could  recommend  or  secure  for  en- 
listment in  the  guard.  That  they  might  do  this  work  effectively  and 
intelligently,  they  were  furnished  with  a  list  of  all  recruiting  sta- 
tions, rendezvous,  officers,  etc.  Under  that  system,  I  think,  through- 
out the  whole  Eastern  Department  we  only  secured  a  few  recruits. 
Do  you  remember,  Maj.  Kilbourne,  how  many  there  were? 

Maj.  Kilbourne.  I  asked  Capt.  Rockwell,  who  had  charge  of  it, 
and  he  said  the  recruiting  rendezvous  had  reported  only  three  men 
since  the  date  that  we  discontinued  recruiting. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  What  was  that  date? 

Maj.  Kilbourne.  We  discontinued  recruiting  November  22,  sir. 
The  last  report  is  November  22. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  That  effort  did  not  begin  until  the 
latter  part  of  July? 

Gen.  Wood.  It  began  on  July  5.  The  fact  that  we  should  have  a 
big  recruiting  problem  was  appreciated  from  the  first.  Under  the 
dual  control  incident  to  our  militia  system  the  troops  had  to  be  trans- 
ferred from  State  to  Federal  control  as  well  as  the  property.  Dur- 
ing the  actual  muster  we  could  not  have  recruiting  parties  scattered 
over  the  States — organizations  had  to  assemble  for  muster  in.  And 
the  recruiting  for  Federal  service  had  to  be  done  by  Federal  officials. 
As  soon  as  the  muster  had  progressed  far  enough  the  following  tele- 
gram was  sent: 

Governors  Island,  N.  Y.,  July  5,  1916. 
To  adjutant  general  of  each  State  and  District  of  Columbia    (22  in  all);  also 

to  all  senior  assistant  mustering  officers    (22),  and  to  Col.  Buffington,  New 

York  City,  and  Lieut.  R.  M.  Danford,  East  Haven,  Conn.: 

Pending  decision  on  draft  resolution  by  Congress,  recruiting  for  organiza- 
tions called  into  service  of  United  States  may  be  conducted  at  mobilization 
camps  or  by  recruiting  parties  sent  to  advantageous  points  in  area  from  which 
organizations  have  come  but  not  beyond  State  limits. 

Recruiting  parties  may  consist  of  any  officers  and  enlisted  men  now  in 
United  States  service;  Regulars,  National  Guard,  or  duly  mustered  Organized 
Militia. 

Civilian  physicians  may  be  engaged  to  make  prescribed  physical  examina- 
tion when  no  medical  officer  in  Federal  service  is  available.  Payment  for  ex- 
amination, one  recruit,  $1 ;  two  recruits  same  day,  $1.50 ;  three  recruits  same 
day,  $2;  four  recruits  same  day  $2.50,  and  40  cents  for  each  recruit  over  four 
examined  same  day.  Where  Army  posts  are  near,  recruits  should  be  taken 
there  for  examination  in  preference  to  examination  by  civilian  physician. 

Regular  Army  recruiting  officers  will  advise  as  to  details  on  request 

Recruits  accepted  in  States  where  ample  troops  are  still  at  mobilization 
points,  will  be  sent  to  such  points  and  there  join  organizations  or,  if  assigned 
to  organizations  already  forwarded,  will  be  attached  to  others  for  equipment, 
training,  and  shipment  to  border. 

Where  all  organizations  called  have  been  forwarded,  or  where  organizations 
in  camp  are  too  few  to  permit  proper  care,  accepted  recruits  will  be  sent  to 
rendezvous  designated  in  separate  message  to-day. 

It  is  imperative  that  no  chance  be  taken  of  poor  administration,  sanitation, 
supply,  or  discipline,  in  any  camp  due  to  lack  of  necessary  officers  and  men  to 
handle  same  efficently  and  timely  notice  must  be  given  these  headquarters  when 
change  to  rendezvous  system  becomes  advisable. 

Simpson. 

We  called  upon  adjutant  generals  of  States  to  recommend  officers 
for  recruiting  and  on  July  12  issued  a  printed  memorandum 
which  follows;  attention  is  especially  invited  to  paragraph  21: 


IMVERSAL    MILITARY   TRAINING.  981 

HbADQUABTSBS   Kasiki:\   I  ii:i'.\KiMi:\T. 

Governors  Island,  rk  <iti/.  July  12,  191Q. 

Memorandum : 

The  following  Instructions  from  War  Department  furnished  for  the  Informa- 
tion and  guidance  of  all  concerned: 

Instructions  i  <>!:  Recbuti 

1.  The  commanding  officer  of  any  mobilization  camp  or  rendezvous  may* desig- 
nate an  officer  us  recruiting  officer  for  each  organization  at  such  camp  or 
rendezvous,  such  details  being  Limited  to  officers  of  the  National  Guard  or 
Organized  Militia  in  the  service  of  the  United  Stal 

2.  Adjutants  General  of  States  have  been  instructed  to  nominate  not  to 
exceed  three  officers  per  regiment  and  one  for  each  separate  battalion  or  other 
separate  unit  and,  for  each  o  nominated,  one  sergeant,  one  corporal  and 
one  private,  for  duty  in  connection  with  recruiting  other  than  at  camps, 
Adjutants  General  are  requested  tu  submit  prompt  report  by  mail  on  receipt 
of  this  order,  stating  in  each  case  the  station  he  recommends  for  each  officer 
and  the  area  u>  be  covered.    This  will  invariably  be  within  limits  of  the  State. 

3.  In  submitting  this  recommendation  he  will  inform  this  office  of  the  area 

from    which    recruits    for    each    organization    can    probably    be    obtained    most 

promptly. 

4.  Whenever  practicable  ofl  should  be  recommended 
for  this  duty  t<>  avoid  employment  of  civilian  physicians  I'm-  examination. 

5.  ;r  it  be  i ^ssarj  to  detail  officers  nol  of  the  Medical  Corps  these  should 

preferably  be  assigned  to  areas  near  regular  army  posts,  if  any,  in  order  that 

recruits  may  be  taken  t<»  thi  for  physical  examination. 

G.  Where  recruiting  officers  are  not  medical  officers  and  no  medical  officer 

in   the    l.\   S.   service   is   available,   civilian   physicians  will   be  employed   at   pre- 
scribed rates  to  examine  recruits.     (See  a.  R.  i  : 

7.  Details  for  recruiting  duty  other  thai  liled  in  Par.  l  will  be  made 

from    these   headquarters. 

8.  Each  recruiting  ..nicer  will  be  informed  by  these  headquarters  when 
detailed  of  the  total  number  of  recruits  it  i-  desired  that  he  should  enlist  for 
each  organization;  this  number  may  he  changed  ;i-  recruiting  pro 

'.».    Each    recruiting   Officer   will    be   informed    when    the   mobilization    can; 
his  State  is  to  be  discontinued  and  the  rendezvous  system  adopted. 

10.  Officers  detailed  as  recruiting  officers  will  make  request  on  the  Dej 
ment  Quartermaster  direct  for  funds  required,  submitting  estimi  ■ 

11.  Officers  traveling  on  recruiting  duty  are  entitled  to  mileage,  enlisted  men 
on  recruiting  duty  will  receive  transportation  and  commutation  of  rations 
under  A.  ii.  il"J.">.  Recruits  sent  to  rendezvous  will  be  furnished  transportation 
and  subsistence  under  a.  u.  1224.  Recruiting  officers  will  apply  for  authority 
to  pay  commutation  of  quarters  to  enlisted  men  of  recruiting  parties  as  con- 
templated by  Par.  2,  G.  O.,  13,  W.  1  >..  1916.  Where  office  space  can  not  be 
obtained  without  renting  action  win  be  taken  under  <;.  <>..  84,  w.  i>..  i'M7>. 
Instructions  concerning  method  of  subsisting  recruiting  parties  and  applicants 
Cor  enlistment  will  he  found  on  form  No.  105,  Q,  M.  < '. 

12.  On  receipt  of  detail,  recruiting  officers  will  proceed  to  points  selected 
accompanied  by  not  to  exceed  three  enlisted  men  who  have  been  dul.\ 
•cepted  into  the  l\  S.  Service.  If  armories  are  available  the  recruiting  office 
will  be  established  therein:  if  there  be  no  armory  permission  will  be  requested 
to  utilize  the  office  of  the  local  U.  s.  Army  Recruiting  Officer;  if  neither  of 
these  be  available  effort  should  be  made  to  secure  office  room  in  any  public 
building  of  the  national  government,  state  government  or  city  government 
before  resorting  to  renting  of  office. 

1.°,.  Recruiting  officers  of  the  U.  S.  Army  have  been  requested  to  assist 
recruiting  officers  of  the  National  Guard  and  it  is  advised  that  the  latter  con- 
sult the  former  when  in  doubt  as  to  any  detail. 

14.  Information  of  the  establishment  of  a  recruiting  station  should  be  fur- 
nished the  local  press  with  request  that  it  be  given  prominent  notice.  The 
same  action  should  be  taken  with  respect  to  the  press  of  other  cities  and 
towns  within  each  recruiting  area.  Advertising  except  by  placard  on  station 
will  be  avoided  where  reasonable  publicity  can  be  obtained  without  it. 

15.  Request  has  been  made  for  a  supply  of  the  following  orders,  circulars 
and  forms  for  recruiting  officers.  Pending  receipt  of  these,  recruiting  officers 
may  use  forms  provided  for  recruiting  of  militia  or  of  regular  Army,  obtaining 


982  UNIVERSAL  MILITARY  TRAINING. 

same  from  State  authorities  or  from  Army  recruiting  officers,  amending  the 
oath1  to  conform  to  Sec.  70,  National  Defense  Act,  approved  June  3,  1916, 
and  making  minor  changes  where  necessary. 

FURNISHED  BY  THE  ADJUTANT  GENERAL   OF   THE  ARMY. 

General  Order  #66,  W.  D.,  1910,  Rules  for  Examining  Recruits. 

Instructions  for  the  General  Recruiting  Service,  U.  S.  Army  (A.  G.  O.,  May 
22,  1914). 

Bulletin  #3,  W.  D.,  1914.  Expendable  and  Non-Expendable  Articles,  Class 
A  and  B. 

G.  O.,  #17,  W.  D.,  1916.     Price  List  of  Clothing. 

G.  O.,  #34,  W.  D.,  1915. 

G.  O.,  #13,  W.  D.,  1916. 

Correspondence  Index  Book  (A.  G.  O.). 

List  of  Blank  Forms  and  Books  (A.  G.  O.). 


22s 

59 

78 

135 

196 

265 

25 

61 

95 

140 

260 

380 

29 

61-1 

99 

141 

262 

383 

22 

65 

104 

180 

42 

99 

105 

200 

45 

102 

160 

201 

56 

103 

165 

210 

FURNISHED    BY    THE    QUARTERMASTER    GENERAL    OF    THE    ARMY. 

Circular  #28,  Q.  M.  C,  1913,  Class  "A"  Supplies. 
Circular  #31,  Q.  M.  C,  1914,  List  of  Blank  Forms. 
Circular  #10,  Q.  M.  C,  1915,  List  of  Items. 
Notes  on  Recruiting,  Q.  M.  C,  Jan.  26,  1912. 
Following  forms : 

213        2213  U.   S.  Dept.  Labor. 
217  4  Pay  Dept. 

409  330  W.  D.  Public. 

1656  Q.  M.  C. 

FURNISHED  BY  THE  DEPOT   QUARTERMASTER,   WASHINGTON,   D.   C. 

Transportation  Requests,  Q.  M.  C.  See  page  #67,  Circular  #31,  Q.  M.  C.r 
1914. 

These  forms  will  be  distributed  promptly  when  received.  Thereafter  re- 
cruiting officers  will  apply  direct  to  the  proper  office  of  the  War  Department 
for  forms  needed.  If  expedition  is  necessary,  request  should  be  made  for 
shipment  in  small  packages  by  special  delivery  mail. 

16.  General  authority  is  given  to  enlist  for  particular  organizations  as  con- 
templated in  Par.  877,  A.  R.  Recruiting  officers  administer  the  oath  required 
by  Sec.  70  of  the  National  Defense  Act  approved  June  3,  1916.  No  further  oath 
will  be  required. 

17.  Recruiting  officers  of  the  Regular  Army  may  make  enlistments  for  the 
National  Guard  or  for  particular  organizations  thereof  sending  those  enlisted 
to  their  organizations  or  to  the  designated  rendezvous  as  contemplated  in  Par. 
19  hereof.  Recruiting  officers  of  the  National  Guard  may  accept  for  enlist- 
ment any  applicants  for  enlistment  in  the  Regular  Army,  sending  them  to 
the  proper  U.  S.  Army  rendezvous;  information  as  to  this  rendezvous  may  be 
obtained  from  the  U.  S.  Army  recruiting  officer. 

18.  Recruiting  officers  will  till  out  descriptive  and  assignment  cards  for  all 
recruits  enlisted  for  the  National  Guard  down  to  the  19th  line  below  the  double- 
line  across  the  form  on  the  front  page,  initialling  the  same  on  margin  opposite 
the  19th  line;  this  in  addition  to  signature  in  place  prepared.  This  will  not 
be  done  in  case  of  recruits  accepted  for  service  in  the  Regular  Army. 

1  The  following  is  the  form  of  oath  required  by  law. 

"  *      *     *      I    do    hereby    acknowledge    to    have    voluntarily    enlisted    this   day 

of  ,   19 — ,  as  a  soldier   In   the   National   Guard   of  the  United    States   and   of  the 

State  of  ,  for  the  period  of  three  years  in  service  and  three  years  in  the  reserve, 

under  the  conditions  prescribed  by  law,  unless  sooner  discharged  by  proper  authority. 
And  I  do  solemnly  swear  that  I  will  bear  true  faith  and  allegiance  to  the  United  States 
of  America  and  to  the  State  of  ,  and  that  I  will  serve  them  honestly  and  faith- 
fully against  all  their  enemies  whomsoever,  and  that  I  will  obey  the  orders  of  the  Presi- 
dent  of   the   United    States   and    of   the   governor   of   the   State   of  ,   and   of   the 

officers  appointed  over  me  according  to  law  and  the  rules  and  articles  of  war.     *     •     • ** 

'Amended  for  National  Guard. 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY    TRAINING.  983 

19.  A  National  Guard  recruit  will  be  forwarded  at  once  to  his  organization 
if  it  be  still  within  the  State;  otherwise  to  the  mobilization  camp  or  designated 
rendezvous.  When  delay  is  unavoidable  the  regulations  for  hire  of  quarters 
and  for  contract  for  subsistence  authorized  for  recruiting  officers  U.  S.  Army 
apply.  The  description  and  assignment  card  will  be  mailed  the  commanding 
officer  of  the  rendezvous  the  same  day  that  recruit  is  forwarded. 

20.  Orders  will  issue  from  these  headquarters  designating  the  senior  recruit- 
ing officer  for  each  state  to  whom  weekly  report  will  be  made  by  telegraph  by 
each  recruiting  officer  in  that  state  of  the  number  of  enlistments  made  and  for 
what  organizations.  The  senior  recruiting  officer  of  each  state  will  promptly 
consolidate  these  reports  and  telegraph  the  consolidated  report  to  these  head- 
quarters . 

21.  The  assistance  of  State  authorities  in  interesting  men  of  their  States  in 
applying  for  enlistment  at  the  established  recruiting  stations  will  materially 
aid  the  completion  of  the  State  organizations  and  will  be  greatly  appreciated. 

RECRUITING  RENDEZVOUS. 

22.  On  arrival  at  rendezvous  recruits  may  be  attached  to  organizations  of 
the  garrison  for  quarters,  rations  and  training.  When  the  number  is  too  great 
for  this  method  to  be  followed  recruits  will  be  organized  into  provisional  com- 
panies and  the  necessary  officers  and  enlisted  men  detailed  from  the  regular 
garrison  to  administer  such  companies. 

23.  Acting  non-commissioned  officers  may  be  appointed  in  recruit  companies 
from  members  thereof  and  the  chevrons  of  this  temporary  grade  may  be  issued 
gratuitously. 

24.  Recruit  companies  may  be  assigned  to  vacant  barracks  if  such  be  avail- 
able or  placed  in  camp  as  the  commanding  officer  may  determine. 

25.  Commanding  officers  of  rendezvous  may  require  descriptive  lists  to  be 
prepared  to  accompany  recruits  forwarded  to  destination,  or  may  forward  the 
original  descriptive  and  assignment  cards  with  slips  firmly  attached,  showing 
such  portions  of  the  soldier's  record  at  rendezvous  as  cannot  be  entered  on  the 
descriptive  and  assignment  card.  The  following  are  of  especial  importance: 
Ordnance  issued ;  quartermaster  property  issued ;  clothing  Issued ;  number  of 
typhoid  prophylaxis  treatments,  with  dates ;  records  of  summary  courts,  if  any. 

26.  Sufficient  record  of  each  recruit  will  be  retained  to  reproduce  the  more 
Important  features  of  his  record  in  event  of  loss  of  record  en  route  to  organiza- 
tion. 

27.  Recruits  will  be  vaccinated  on  arrival  at  rendezvous  if  not  already  pro- 
tected, and  will  be  given  at  least  two  treatments  of  typhoid  prophylaxis  before 
being  forwarded  to  organizations. 

28.  Recruits  will  be  thoroughly  Instructed  as  to  requirements  in  respect  to 
venereal  prophylaxis. 

29.  Commanding  Officers  of  rendezvous  will  cause  their  staff  officers  to  keep 
separate  account  of  property  for  National  Guardsmen.  Special  requisitions 
will  be  made  for  articles  needed  after  consulation  with  camp  property  officer* 
as  to  individual  property  which  will  be  shipped  from  camp  to  rendezvous. 

30.  Recruits  will  be  equipped  at  rendezvous  with  the  clothing  and  other  indi- 
vidual quartermaster  equipment  of  Equipment  "C"  and  the  individual  ordnance 
equipment  prescribed  in  the  Unit  Accountability  Manual. 

31.  Intensive  training  will  be  given  recruits  to  include  the  school  of  soldier 
and  squad  in  infantry  drill  and  some  small  arms  practice  if  a  range  be  avail- 
able ;  this  without  regard  to  the  arm  for  which  enlisted. 

32.  Post  commanders  are  authorized  to  discontinue  any  routine  Instruction 
which  will  interfere  with  the  proper  discipline  instruction,  equipment  and  for- 
warding of  recruits. 

33.  Especial  attention  will  be  given  to  cleanliness  of  recruits.  Frequent  bath- 
ing will  be  enforced,  and  on  the  day  prior  to  departure  for  the  border,  each 
recruit  will  be  required  to  bathe  and  wash  all  underclothing. 

34.  Commanding  officers  will  report  to  these  headquarters  when  100  or  more 
recruits  have  been  equipped,  and  will  recommend  an  officer  and  (if  there  be  not 
sufficient  recruits  in  the  shipment  capable  of  acting  as  non-commissioned  officer) 
not  to  exceed  three  non-commissioned  officers  or  privates  of  the  regular  garri- 
son 'to  conduct  the  recruits  to  their  organization.  Orders  will  issue  from  these 
headquarters. 

25.  The  officer  detailed  to  conduct  the  recruits  will  take  with  his  the  record* 
of  soldiers  forwarded. 


984  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 

36.  Prior  to  departure  a  sufficient  examination  will  be  made  by  the  surgeons 
to  detect  any  incipient  contagious  or  infectious  disease,  and  in  case  of  doubt 
those  suspected  -will  not  be  entrained. 

37.  Commanding  officers  of  rendezvous  are  authorized  to  hold  recruits  found 
especially  fitted  for  duty  as  acting  non-commissioned  officers  or  clerks  until 
the  final  shipment  from  (he  rendezvous.  They.will  inform  organization  com- 
manders when  such  action  is  taken. 

38.  Recruit  rendezvous  designated  for  the  National  Guard  recruits  of  the 
several  states  in  this  department  are  as  indicated  below: 

Maine — fort  in  Portland  Harbor  to  be  selected  by  Coast  Defense  Commander. 
New  Hampshire — Fort  Constitution,  Portsmouth; 
Vermont  —  Fort   Ethan  Allen. 

Massachusetts — a  tort  to  be  selected  by  Coast  Defense  Commander,  Boston. 
Rhode  Island — fort   lo  be  selected  by  coast  defense  commander  Narragansett 
Pay. 

Connecticut— Fort   II.  G.  Wright,  N.  Y. 
•  New  York  Infantry,  Fort  Hamilton;  all  other  recruits,  Fort  Totten. 
New  Jersey — Fort  DuPont,  Del. 
Delaware— Fort  DuPont,  Del. 
Maryland — Fort  Howard. 
Virginia- — Port  Myer. 
Kentucky — Fort  Thomas. 
District  of  Columbia — Fort  Myer,  Va. 
Tennessee — Fort  Oglethorpe,  Ga. 
North  Carolina— Fort  Oglethorpe,  Ga. 
Georgia — Fort  Oglethorpe,  Ga. 
Florida — Fort  Barrancas. 
Alabama — Fort  Barrancas,  Fla. 
Mississippi — Jackson  Barracks,  La. 
South  Carolina — Fort  Moultrie,  S.  C. 
Rendezvous  for  Pennsylvania  and  West  Virginia  will  be  designated  later. 

39.  Recruiting  offices  for  the  regular  army  are  now  established  at  the 
following  points : 

Recruiting  Offices. 

1.  467  Broadway,  Albany,  New  York. 

2.  Post  Office  Building,  Atlanta,  Georgia. 

3.  400  E.  Fayette  St..  Baltimore,  Maryland. 

4.  3  Tremont  Row.  Boston,  Massachusetts. 

5.  298  Main  St.,  White  Bldg.,  Buffalo,  New  York. 

6.  301  W.  Trade  St.,  Charlotte,  North  Carolina. 

7.  Third  &  Market  Sts.,  Bergner  Bldg..  Harrisburg,  Pennsylvania. 

8.  Pilchard  Bldg.,  Huntington,  West  Virginia. 

9.  405*  W.  Depot  St.,  Knoxville,  Tennessee. 

10.  139  E.  Main  St..  Lexington,  Kentucky. 

11.  640  W.  Jefferson  St.,  Louisville,  Kentucky. 

12.  126  N.  Court  St.,  Memphis,  Tennessee. 

13.  523|  Broadway,  Nashville,  Tennessee. 

14.  266  Market  St.,  Newark,  New  Jersey. 

15.  890  Chapel  St.,  New  Haven,  Connecticut. 

16.  337  St.  Charles  St.,  New  Orleans,  Louisiana. 

17.  25  Third  Ave.,  New  York  City,  New  York. 

18.  1229  Arch  St.,  Philadelphia,  Pennsylvania. 

19.  627  Smithfield  St.,  Pittsburgh,  Pennsylvania. 

20.  19  Monument  Sq.,  Portland,  Maine. 

21.  402  Westminster  Bldg.,  Providence,  Rhode  Island. 

22.  820  B.  Broad  St.,  Richmond,  Virginia. 

23.  Campbell  Ave.  &  Henry  St.,  Ferguson  Bldg.,  Roanoke,  Virginia. 
,     24.  35  Barnard  St.,  Savannah,  Georgia. 

25.  130  N.  Washington  Ave.,  Scranton,  Pennsylvania. 

26.  Bastable  Bldg.,  Syracuse,  New  York. 

DISCONTINUANCE   OF   MOBILIZATION   CAMPS. 

40.  WThen  mobilization  camps  are  discontinued  or  when  organizations  are 
too  few  to  care  for  recruits  for  organizations  at  the  border,  the  property  officer 
of  the  camp  will  ship  to  the  designated  rendezvous  all  property  pertaining  to 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING.  985 

the  individual  equipment  of  the  soldier  of  any  class,  Including  ponchos,  shelter 
touts,  persona]  ordnance  equipment  of  soldiers,  mosquito  bars,  blankets  and 

other  bedding,  extra  cots  and  tentage.  Camp  property  officers  will  communicate 
with  commanding  officers  of  rendezvous  as  to  supplies  needed  and  make  ship- 
ment of  articles  in  advance  of  abandonment  of  camps  when  needed  articles  can 
be  spared.  In  case  expedition  of  supplies  is  needed  shipments  will  he  made 
to  rendezvous  by  express. 

41.  When  mobilization  camps  are  abandoned  articles  pertaining  to  the  equip- 
ment of  organizations  and  any  articles  of  personal  equipment  which  may  he 
reported  as  not  desired  at  rendezvous  will  he  Shipped  to  the  proper  staff 
officers  of  the  station  on  the  border  of  organisations  forwarded.  Ammunition 
will  be  forwarded  to  the  same  destination.  Efforts  should  be  made  to  ship 
by  carload  lots  and  the  Department  Quartermaster  will  be  notified  of  the 
number  of  cars  needed.  He  will  be  notified  also  when  shipments  are  made,  car 
numbers,  and  destination  of  shipment  being  given  in  each  case. 

42.  Where  organizations  forwarded  to  the  border  are  known  to  have  com- 
plete Equipment  "C,"  the  property  pertaining  to  that  equipment  remaining  in 
camp  at  the  time  of  its  abandonment  will  he  returned  to  the  Depot  from 
which  received.  The  sanio  action  will  be  taken  with  respect  to  medical  supplies 
and  ordnance  stores,  except  ai  specified  in  the  preceding  paragraphs. 

43.  In  case  of  doubt  as  t<»  the  proper  destination  of  any  property,  report  will 

be  made  to  these  headquarters. 

41.  When  instructions  t'<>r  the  abandonment  of  a  camp  are  received  the  senior 
assistant   mustering  officer,  or  in  his  absence  the  senior  line  officer  p resent,  will 

report  to  these  headquarters  the  names  of  all  officers  and  en  ,sted  men  in  camp, 

in  order  that  orders  may  issue  in  each  cai 

Ak.NfY      !. 

4.~.  Attention  is  invited  to  the  requirements  of  Army  Regulations,  paragraphs 
153,  224,  840  ^77.  1118  1124,  1152,  1181,  1208  09,  1218,  1218,  1224,  1225,  1280, 
t282,  1880,  1882,  1412,  1475,  l  476,  1478  and  1484. 

By  command  of  Major  General   Wood: 

KinviN    F.    Ci  ; 

Colonel,  General  Staffs  chief  of  Staff. 
Official: 

w.  A.  Simpson, 
Adjutant  General,  Adjutant, 

We  worked  in  thorough  cooperation  with  the  States  from  the  fi 
and  the  States  aided  at  our  request  by  sending  recruits  to  the  United 
States  recruiting  stations  and  to  rendezvous  at  the  various  posts. 
Recruiting  had  practically  stopped  at  this  time.  The  reason  for  it 
was  that  interest  was  dead.  There  was  a  general  feeling  that  there 
was  to  be  no  active  service. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  That  was  later  on,  of  course? 

Gen.  Wood.  That  was  after  the  first  excitement  had  passed. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  They  could  not  find  out  until  they  had 
been  down  at  the  front  about  a  month  that  the  lack  of  active  service 
had  interfered  with  recruiting. 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Now,  General,  regular  officers  like  Maj. 
'Jen.  Barry,  and  militia  officers,  one  from  Illinois,  Capt.  Burns;  the 
adjutant  general  of  New  York,  Gen%  Stotesbury ;  the  adjutant  general 
of  Florida,  Gen.  Foster,  and  others  have  stated  that  there  was  a 
natural,  spontaneous  recruiting  under  the  National  Guard  system 
and  in  and  by  the  National  Guard  itself  immediately  on  the  call  of 
the  President  on  the  18th  of  June.  I  saw  that  going  on  myself,  in 
Maryland.  Now,  that  spontaneous  and  immediate  recruiting  took 
place  at  the  time  when  the  most  of  the  recruits  were  available,  but 
unfortunately  it  was  stopped  by  an  order  of  the  department.  I  have 
86205—17 5 


986  UNIVERSAL  MILITARY  TRAINING. 

here  a  copy  of  your  telegram  to  The  Adjutant  General,  dated  June 
20,  two  days  after  the  call  of  the  President,  in  which  you  quoted  an 
inquiry  which  you  had  received  from  the  adjutant  general  of  Florida, 
and  the  result  of  which  was  that  the  War  Department  issued  an 
order,  through  you,  stopping  that  National  Guard  recruiting. 

Gen.  Wood.  Would  you  mind  reading  that,  Senator?  We  had  a 
telegram  about  every  two  minutes  for  the  first  10  days. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  I  will  read  both.  This  is  your  tele- 
gram: 

Governors  Island,  N.  Y.,  June  20,  1916. 
Adjutant  General,  United  States  Army, 

Washington,  D.  C. 

The  following  telegram  received: 

"  St.  Augstine,  Fla.,  June  20.  Existing  Federal  regulations  covering  recruit- 
ing for  war  require  lieutenant  and  detail  of  enlisted  men  remain  at  home 
stations  and  recruit  to  war  strength, .  while  mustering  regulations  prescribe 
that  full  peace  strength  must  be  presented  to  mustering  officer  before  organi- 
zations can  be  mustered  in.  How  may  these  requirements  be  reconciled  with 
regard  to  presence  of  all  commissioned  officers  at  time  of  muster?  By  direc- 
tion governor.     Foster,  adjutant  general,  Florida." 

Instructions  requested. 

Wood. 

Two  days  afterwards  Gen.  Mills  acted  on  this  as  follows : 

r  Second  indorsement.] 

War  Department, 
Militia  Bureau,  June  22,  1916. 
To  The  Adjutant  General  : 

1.  It  is  recommended  that  the  commanding  general,  Eastern  Department,  be 
advised  to  answer  the  question  of  the  adjutant  general  of  Florida  in  substance 
as  follows: 

"  Company  should  recruit  to  maximum  possible  not  to  exceed  statutory 
maximum  while  at  home  station." 

Parenthetically  I  will  say  at  that  point  that  of  course  they  were  all 
immediately  taken  from  their  home  station  to  the  camp,  and  they 
could  not  do  that.     [Continuing:] 

All  members  of  company  must  present  themselves  for  muster  as  required  by 
law,  none  to  remain  at  home  station  for  recruiting  purposes.  After  organization 
is  mustered  into  service  of  United  States  any  additional  recruiting  necessary 
will  be  conducted  by  Federal  agencies  in  cooperation  with  the  State  authorities. 

A.  L.  Mills, 
Brigadier  General,  G.  S.,  Chief  of  Bureau. 

Gen.  Wood.  That  is  right.  When  they  were  mustered  into  the 
Federal  service  they  were  Federal  troops,  and  naturally  the  recruit- 
ment of  Federal  troops  is  a  Federal  duty.  We  did,  however,  cooper- 
ate fully  with  the  States,  and  many  of  our  recruits  were  obtained 
through  that  State  cooperation  and  assistance. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  The  Federal  authorities  finally  only  re- 
cruited 15,000  men,  I  understand. 

Gen.  Wood.  I  know.  The  recruiting  stopped  after  the  first  burst 
of  enthusiasm,  as  it  always  has  throughout  the  history  of  this  country. 

You  remember  this  happened  during  the  Civil  War.  There  was 
active  service  and  plenty  of  it.  I  shall  insert  extracts  from  Mr.  Lin- 
coln's statement  of  1863  with  reference  to  his  draft  order,  as  it  sets 
forth  very  clearly  conditions  which  must  always  pertain  under  our 
haphazard  system,  or  lack  of  system. 

It  is  at  all  times  proper  that  misunderstanding  between  the  public  and  the 
public  servant  should  be  avoided ;  and  this  is  far  more  important  now  than  in 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING.  987 

times  of  peace  and  tranquillity.  I  therefore  address  you  without  searching  for 
a  precedent  upon  which  to  do  so.  Some  of  you  are  sincerely  devoted  to  the 
republican  institutions  and  territorial  Integrity  of  our  country  and  yet  are 
opposed  to  what  is  called  the  draft  or  conscription. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  war,  and  ever  since,  a  variety  of  motives,  pressing, 
some  in  one  direction  and  some  in  the  other,  would  be  present  to  the  mind  of 
each  man  physically  fit  for  a  soldier,  upon  the  combined  effect  of  which  motive 
he  would  or  would  not  voluntarily  enter  the  service.  Among  these  motives 
would  be  patriotism,  political  bias,  ambition,  personal  courage,  love  of  adven- 
ture, want  of  employment,  and  convenience,  of  the  opposites  of  some  of  these. 
We  already  have  and  have  had  in  the  service,  as  appears,  substantially  all  that 
can  be  obtained  upon  this  voluntary  weighing  of  motives.  And  yet  we  must  some- 
how obtain  more,  unless  we  relinquish  the  original  object  of  the  contest,  together 
with  all  the  blood  and  treasure  already  expended  In  the  effort  to  secure  it.  To 
meet  this  necessity  the  law  for  the  draft  has  been  enacted. 

You  who  do  not  wish  to  be  soldiers  do  not  like  this  law.  This  is  natural, 
nor  does  it  imply  want  of  patriot  ism.  Nothing  can  be  so  just  and  necessary 
as  to  make  us  like  it  if  it  is  disagreeable  to  us.  We  are  prone,  too,  to  find  false 
arguments  with  which  to  excuse  ourselves  for  opposing  such  disagreeable 
things.  In  this  case,  those  who  desire  the  rebellion  to  succeed,  and  others  who 
seek  reward  in  a  different  way,  are  very  active  in  accommodating  us  with  this 
class  of  arguments. 

It  is  clear  that  a  constitutional  law  may  not  be  expedient  or  proper.     Such 
would  he  a  law  to  raise  armies  when  no  armies  were  needed.     But  this  is  not 
such.     The  republican  institutions  and  territorial  integrity  of  onr  country  ran 
not  be  maintained  without  the  further  raising  and  supporting  of  armies.    There 
can  be  DO  army   without  men.     Men  can  be  had  only  voluntarily  or  involun- 
tarily.    We  have  ceased  to  obtain  them  voluntarily,  and  to  obtain  them  invol- 
untarily is  the  draft — the  conscription.     If  you  dispute  the  fact  and  declare 
that    men   can   still    be   had   voluntarily    and    in   sufficient   numbers,    prove   the 
assertion  by  yourselves  volunteering  in  such  numbers  and  I  shall  gladly 
up  the  draft.     Or,  if  not  sufficient  number,  but  any  one  of  you  will  vohu. 
he  for  his  single  self  will  escape  all   the  h<>rr<>rs  of  the  draft  and  will  thereby 
do  only  what  each  one  of  at   least  a  million  of  his  manly  brethren  have  already 
done.     Their  toil  and  blood  have  been  given  SS  much  for  you  as  for  themse 
Shall  it  .-ill  be  lost  rather  than  that  you,  tOO,  will  not  bear  your  part? 

I  do  not  say  that  all   who  would   avoid   serving  in   the  war  :ire  unpatriotic: 
but  I  do  think  every  patriot  Should  willingly  take  his  chance  under  a  law  made 
with  great  care,  in  order  to  secure  entire  fairness.     This  law  was  considered, 
discussed,  modified   and  amended  by  Congress  at    great  length,  and  with   much 
labor,  and  was  finally  passed  by  both  branches,  with  a   near  approach  to  una- 
nimity.    At  least,  it  may  not  be  exactly  such  as  any  one  man  out  of  Cong 
or  even  in  Congress,  would  have  made  it.    It  has  been  said,  and  I  believe  truly, 
that  the  Constitution  itself  is  not  altogether  such  as  any  one  of  it^ 
would  have  preferred.     It  was  the  joint  work  of  all,  and  certainly  the  1 
that  it  was  so. 

The  principle  of  the  draft,  which  simply  is  involuntary  or  enforced  service,  Is 
not  new.     It  has  been  practiced  in  all  ages  of  the  world.     It  was  well  known 
to  the  framers  of  our  Constitution  as  one  of  the  modes  of  raising  arm 
time  they  placed  in  that  instrument  the  provision  that  "the  Congress  shall 
the  power  to  raise  and  support  armies."     It  has  been  used  before  in  establish- 
ing our  independence  and   it   was  also   used    under  the  Constitution    in    1812. 
Wherein  is  the  peculiar  hardship  now?     Shall   we  shrink  from  the  neees 
means  to  maintain  our  free  Government,  which  our  grandfathers  employed  to 
establish  it.  and  our  own  fathers  have  already  employed  once  to  maintain  it? 
Are  we  degenerates'."     Has  the  manhood  of  our  race  run  out? 

With  these  views,  and  on  these  principles,  I  feel  bound  to  tell  you  it  is  my 
purpose  to  see  the  draft  law  faithfully  executed. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  General,  if  it  was  known  that  that  re- 
cruiting outburst  would  be  temporary,  was  it  not  fatal  to  stop  re- 
cruiting on  the  22d  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  We  did  not  stop  it.  They  (the  militia)  were  then 
Federal  troops.  We  asked  the  cooperation  of  the  States  and  took 
hold  of  the  recruiting  because  they  were  Federal  organizations  and; 


988  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 

we  had  to  conduct  it.  The  States  were  urged  to  assist,  as  I  have 
previously  indicated. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  The  instrumentalities  were  removed 
that  were  carrying  on  the  recruiting? 

Gen.  Wood.  No,  sir.  We  used  them  to  the  fullest  extent.  You 
will  see  that  the  last  portion  of  that  telegram  says  "  in  cooperation 
with  the  State  authorities."  We  mustered  in  recruiting  officers  as 
rapidly  as  the  States  gave  us  their  names.  In  Florida,  wThere  the 
regimental  commander  organized  recruiting  parties  on  his  own  ini- 
tiative, his  action  was  promptly  approved  and  the  necessary  expenses 
authorized.  In  this,  as  in  every  other  case,  where  action  was  in  good 
faith  though  not  in  accordance  Avith  regulations,  we  sustained  their 
action. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  That  did  not  take  place  until  a  month 
later. 

Gen..  Wood.  The  State  authorities  worked  with  us  from  the  first 
day,  and  they  never  withdrew  their  assistance.  We  called  upon  them 
to  assist  us  m  every  possible  way.  I  will  put  into  the  record,  with 
the  permission  of  the  committee,  the  correspondence  with  some  of  the 
different  States,  and  in  answer  to  Gen.  Foster's  general  declaration, 
I  will  either  read  to  the  committee,  or,  in  order  to  save  time,  I  will 
insert  in  the  record  what  we  describe  as  the  Florida  correspondence. 
It  is  absolutely  typical  and  answers  every  question  you  have  raised. 

(The  correspondence  referred  to  is  here  printed  in  full  as  follows:) 

St.  Augustine,  Fla.,  June  21,  1916. 
Commanding  General  Eastern  Department  U.  S.  Army, 

Governors  Island,  N.  Y.: 
Governor  directs  me  report  that  pursuant  order  of  Secretary  of  War  Second 
Regiment  Infantry.  National  Guard  Florida,  has  been  designated  for  muster 
into  United  States  service.  Acting  under  existing  mobilization  regulations 
and  references  mentioned  in  your  telegram  to  goveror,  this  regiment  is  under 
orders  move  from  respective  home  station.  Commencing  5  p.  m.  this  after- 
noon, all  units  will  reach  mobilization  camp  at  State  camp,  Florida,  by  4 
o'clock  to-morrow  afternoon,  and  personnel,  having  been  physically  examined 
by  Government  standard,  will  be  immediately  ready  for  muster  in.  Proposals 
were  invited  and  contracts  have  been  let  for  transportation  and  subsistence. 
Regiment  has  complete  peace  strength.  Clothing,  arms,  and  equipments  except 
overcoats.  At  this  hour  it  has  full  complement  of  officers,  headquarters 
company,  with  band  and  mounted  scouts,  sanitary  detachment,  and  12  com- 
panies. Enlisted  strength  at  noon  to-day  10,006,  and  is  being  rapidly  recruited 
to  full  war  strength.  First  Regiment  Infantry,  although  not  under  orders 
for  mobilizing,  is  available.  Unless  advised  to  contrary  will  assume  that 
course  pursued  as  outlined  in  this  telegram  has  your  approval. 

Foster,  Adjutant  General  Florida. 


State  Camp,  JACKSONVILLE,  Fla.,  June  .?.>.  1916. 
Commanding  General  Eastern  Depabtment  United  States  Army, 

Governors  Island,  N.  Y.: 
Supplementing  last  telegram  regarding  physical  examinations,  it  should  be 
understood  that  enlisted  personnel  of  regiment  was  physically  examined  in  ac- 
cordance with  Government  standard  prior  to  original  enlistment,  as  they  have 
taken  oath  under  national-defense  act  and  do  not  require  to  be  mustered  in. 
State  authorities  have  understood  that  use  of  form  10  for  second  physical  exami- 
nation would  not  he  required  and  that  result  of  such  examination  could  simply 
be  recorded  on  Form  1.  To  use  Form  10  would  involve  enormous  amount  of 
clerical  labor  and  greatly  delay  movement  of  regiments. 

Foster, 
Adjutant  General  Florida. 


UNIVERSAL    MILITARY    TRAINING.  989 

State  Camp,  Fi.a  .  June  26,  1916. 
Commanding  General  Department  oi  the  Bast, 

Governors  Island,  N.  v.: 
Governor  directs  me  to  request  authority  to  purchase  iu  open  market  here  suffi- 
cient quantity  substantial  shoes  approximating  Army  standard.    This  is  neces- 
sary in  order  to  carry  out  your  instruction  of  this  date  as  to  sending  regiment  to 
fropt  at  once. 

Foster, 
Ad  jit  hint  General  Florida. 

State  Camp,  Fla.,  June  t5%  r.un. 
Commanding  General  Rasters  Departmeni  United  States  Army, 

Governors  Island,  X.  v.: 
The  equipment  and  clothing  Cor  Second  Infantry  National  Guard,  Florida, 
not  having  arrived  as  provided  tor  under  subparagraph  B,  paragraph  466,  Army 
Regulations,  the -governor  directs  me  to  request  that  all  quartermaster's  supplies 
for  held  use  of  war-st  renin h  regiment,  as  set  out  in  Table  0.  Genera]  Order,  No. 
39,  for  department  1915,  less  quantities  tor  peace-strength  equipment,  as  set  out 
in  Tahles  8  and  9.  Infantry  Equipment  Manual,  Organised  Militia,  peace,  1914,  be 

furnished,  except  that  with  regard  to  following  listed  articles  full  war-strength 
number  is  required:  Drawers,  shoes,  stockings,  woolen  undershirts,  waist  belts, 
water-sterilizing  bags,  surplus  kit  bags,  and  mosquito  bars.  Request  that  cloth- 
ing be  supplied  in  size  tariffs  as  per  Table  6,  General  order  17.  War  Department, 
1916. 
By  direction  governor. 

IPoe  i  KB, 
Adjutant  General  Florida. 

\,i;  Camp,  \'\  v..  Jum   26,  1916. 
Commanding  General,  Eastern  Department,  United  States  Army, 

am-,  rnors  Island,  \ .  v./ 
Replying  to  your  telegram  asking  when  regimenl  can  entrain,  it   has  been 

here  since  Thursday  hut   none  <>{'  the  stores  mentioned  in  subparagraph  B  para- 
graph -loo.  Army   Regulations,   have  arrived,  although  ordnance  is  said   t<>  have 

been  shipped.    Forms  No.  10  for  physical  examinations  have  just  arrived  within 

last  hour,   and   muster-in   rolls  are   not    yet    here.      In    this  situation  do   001 

how  regiment  can  he  moved  Tuesday  if  previously  given  instructions  as  to  pre- 
liminaries are  to  he  complied  with.     Shoes  are  urgently   required.     The   ; 

strength  personnel  of  this  regiment  is  partially  trained  at  par,  it  is  thought, 
with  average  National  Guard  troops,  hut  it  now  has  in  camp  aboul  seven  or 

eight    hundred   untrained   and   unequipped   recruits.      If   it    is   necessary   to   move 
the  regiment  within  next  few  days  it   is  recommended  that  the  partially  trained 
peace  Strength  he  sent    forward  and   that    authority  he  given   t«>  organize  depot 
battalion  t<»  train  the  recruits  who  should  be  held  here. 
By  direction  of  the  governor. 

FOSTER,  Adjutant  Can  rat. 


State  Camp,  Fla.,  June  27. 
Command]  ebn  Departmj 

Governors  Island,  N.  Y.: 
Request  to  know  procedure  in  ease  of  individual  enlisted  men  who  decline  to 
take   new   oath   under   national-defense  act  to  qualify   as  National   Guard  in 
Florida  regiment.     There  is  total  of  17  in  two  companies. 

Holly. 


State  Camp,  Fla.,  June  27.  1916. 
Commanding  General  Eastern  Department, 

Governors  Island,  N.  Y.: 
Following  conditions  exist  second  Florida  Infantry  mobilizing  here  regiment 
organized  according  to  law  except  as  follows  no  machine  gun  company  or 
platoon  and  enlisted  strength  each  company  includes  two  negroes  as  cook  physi- 
cal examination  officers  completed  none  rejected ;  of  eleven  hundred  seventy  five 
enlisted  men  examined   to  date  one  hundred   thirteen   rejected   one  hundred 


990  UNIVERSAL  MILITARY   TRAINING. 

twenty  four  doubtful  doubtful  cases  will  be  reexamined  mostly  under  wright 
except  one  thousand  enlisted  will  be  passed  by  surgeons  officers  and  men  pi 

by  surgeons  are  physically  sound  but  some  officers  and  majority  of  men  are 
undeveloped  and  poorly  set  up  of  twelve  hundred  thirty  six  men  in  ranks  at 
inspection  five  hundred  eighty  one  have  had  no  military  training  and  only  five 
hundred  fifty  nine  considered  by  their  officers  sufficiently  instructed  to  take  part 
in  simple  movements  in  school  of  company  one  company  unable  to  execute 
drill  under  arms  drill  of  three  companies  very  good  three  companies  good  five 
companies  fair  only  with  physically  defectives  eliminated  organizations  will 
contain  satisfactory  material  but  company  officers  and  men  will  require  four 
to  six  weeks  intensive  training  under  able  instructors  to  fit  them  for  field  serv- 
ice companies  supplied  with  sixtyfive  sets  equipment  sufficient  additional  ord- 
nance equipment  on  hand  to  equipment  regiment  at  war  strength  no  additional 
quartermaster  equipment  on  hand  8  days  after  order  entire  regiment  in  much 
need  of  underclothing  and  shoes  officers  not  provided  with  field  equipment  at 
personal  expense  field  officers  have  not  provided  themselves  with  mounts  suffi- 
cient escort  wagons  and  harness  on  hand  but  no  animals  of  any  kind  railroad 
to  camp  will  facilitate  entrainment  of  organization  excellent  facilities  for  trans- 
ferring animals  to  and  from  cars  excellent  stable  capacity  fifty  animals  in  my 
judgment  regiment  should  remain  here  until  properly  equipped  if  necessary  to 
obtain  able  instructors  to  facilitate  training  for  field  service  it  might  then  be 
sent  forward. 

Jenkins. 


State  Camp,  Fla.,  June  21,  1916. 
Commanding  General  Eastern  Department,  United  States  Army, 

Governors  Island,  N.  Y.: 
Governor  directs  me  advise  you  that  none  of  the  quartermaster's  supplies 
expected  here  from  Government  depots  for  equipment  of  war  strength  of 
regiment  have  been  received.  Men  have  been  five  days  in  the  field  without 
blankets,  cots,  or  camp  equipage,  except  as  to  peace  strength  available  from 
State  sources  and  supplied  in  accordance  with  existing  mobilization  instruc- 
tions for  peace  strength.  It  is  trusted  that  the  shipment  of  these  badly  needed 
supplies  will  be  faciliated. 

Foster, 
Adjutant  General,  Florida. 

State  Camp,  Fla.,  June  29,  1916. 
Commanding  General  Eastern  Department, 

Governors  Island,  N.  Y.: 
Request   supply   all   necessary  blank  forms  for  discharge  600   men   Florida 
regiment  on   account  physical   disqualification,   as   ordered   by   telegram,   26th 
instant. 

Holley. 


State  Camp,  Fla.,  June  29,  1916. 
Commanding  General  Eastern  Department, 

Governors  Island,  N.  Y.: 
.   Information  requested  as  to  disposition  of  men  not  citizens  and  who  have 
now  declared  their  intentions  to  become  citizens  enlisted  in  National  Guard 
and  militia. 

Holley. 


August  24,  reported  ready  to  move  except  for  machine  guns. 
War  Department  orders  did  not  permit  move  at  that  time. 
Left   October  3,  1,134  strength,   no  machine  guns  and  only   two   animals — 
those  were  private  mounts. 

Senator  Lee.  General,  let  me  read  here  an  order  by  Acting  Secre- 
tary of  War  Robert  Shaw  Oliver,  dated  September  11,  1911.  He 
outlines  the  exact  system  that  these  National  Guard  people  sought 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING.  991 

to  put   in   operation   instinctively,  of   having  local   officers   remain 
behind,  with  a  suitable  detail  of  enlisted  men,  to  continue  recruiting: 

Was  Department, 
Washington,  September  n,  1911. 

The  Governor  of  Florida. 

Tallahassee,  Via. 

Sir:  I  have  the  honor  to  request  that  your  State  adopt  the  following  war- 
recruiting  system,  modified  in  details  so  as  best  to  meet  local  conditions,  that 
copies  of  the  recruiting  plan  as  finally  completed  and  adopted  he  filed  at  the 
headquarters  of  the  territorial  division  in  which  the  several  mobilization  camps 
are  located,  and  that  you  transmit  another  copy  n»  the  Adjutant  General  of 
the  Army  for  file  in  the  War  College  Division  of  the  General  staff: 

"An  officer  of  each  local  organization  will  be  designated  as  recruiting  officer 
for  war.     He  will   keep  himself  informed  of  all   the  requirements  of  his  office 
and    he   will,    by    application    to    the   adjutant    general    of    the    State.    Terrv 
or  District  secure  the  necessary  blank  forms. 

"In  their  annual  inspections,  Federal  inspectors  will  report  whether  or  not 
local  organizations  are  prepared  to  meet  the  requirements  of  this  paragraph. 

"When  a  local  organization  is  called  into  the  service  of  the  United  States. 
its  recruiting  officer  will  at  once  begin  to  recruit  the  same  up  to  war  strength. 

"  When  the  local  organization  goes  t"  the  state  mobilization  camp  the  recruit- 
ing officer  will  remain  behind  with  a  suitable  detail  of  enlisted  men  and  con- 
tinue recruiting,  forwarding  all  recruits  to  the  State  mobilization  camp.  The 
recruiting  officer  and  his  party  will  rejoin  their  proper  organization  before  the 
latter  leaves  the  mobilization  camp. 

"Each  regiment  and  separate  battalion  will,  before  it  leaves  its  State,  Terri- 
tory, or  District,  establish  a  recruiting  party  to  recruit  for  its  organization 
during  the  continuance  of  the  war. 

"A  general  recruiting  party  for  all  militia  organizations  of  the  State,  Terri- 
tory, or  District,  will  be  maintained  at  the  State  mobilization  camp. 

"All   recruits  will  be  forwarded  through   the  State  mobilization  camp  where 
they   will   be  thoroughly   examined   physically,    fully   armed    and   equipped,   and 
instructed  :is  Ear  as  time  permits." 
Very  respectfully, 

Robert  Shaw  Olives, 

Acting  Secretary  of  War. 

Gen.  Wood.  Senator,  I  think  I  can  make  that  clear.  We  will  take 
a  regiment  in  western  New  York;  we  will  say  it  is  scattered  in  half 
a  dozen  different  towns.  We  want  to  muster  it  in  the  Federal  service. 
It  is  called  to  the  regimental  rendezvous  in  order  that  exoiy  man  and 
officer  might  be  mustered  there  (we  could  not  send  a  mustering 
officer  off  to  catch  these  recruiting  parties)  ;  but  the  moment  the  regi- 
ment came  into  camp  and  was  mustered  into  the  Federal  service  its 
officers  and  men  were  available  for  any  detail  we  saw  fit  to  make; 
and  then  it  was  that  we  used  these  officers  as  Federal  mustering 
officers.  Their  personality  and  influence  were  not  changed  by  the 
fact  that  they  had  come  into  the  Federal  service.  It  was  still  William 
Smith  of  Syracuse;  nobody  knew  whether  he  was  Federal  or  State. 
Once  we  had  mustered  them  in  and  they  were  under  our  orders,  then 
we  sent  them  out  and  used  them  as  we  saw  fit,  as  recruiting  agencies, 
and  we  invoked  the  aid  of  the  State  in  assisting  these  men. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  General,  I  know  just  what  took  place 
in  Maryland,  and  I  can  detail  it  to  you.  Our  First  Regiment,  for 
instance,  which  has  companies  stationed  all  through  the  counties, 
stayed  at  home  points  for  two  days  and  went  then  to  Laurel,  the 
central  camp.  They  were  there  about  eight  days  waiting  for  equip- 
ment. At  the  end  of  the  eighth  day,  at  11  o'clock  at  night,  by  lantern 
light,  I  saw  the  equipment  being  distributed  to  these  troops,  who 


992  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY    TRAINING. 

entrained  for  Texas  the  next  day.  Now,  they  tried  to  send  men  back 
from  Laurel  to  their  company  stations  to  recruit,  and  they  were  not 
allowed  to  do  that.  They  started  their  advertisements,  but  they  had 
to  call  them  in ;  and  no  recruiting  system  was  put  into  operation  at 
all  for  our  State  until  the  latter  part  of  July. 

Gen.  Wood.  I  will  make  inquiry  concerning  that,  Senator.  I  am 
sure  you  are  in  error. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  I  wrote  to  you  then  and  urged  that  in- 
stead of  using  a  few  staff  officers,  who  naturally  knew  little  of  line- 
officer  duty,  that  you  employ  the  old  sergeants  and  enlisted  men  who 
knew  the  localities  but  who  had  been  turned  out  by  reason  of  physi- 
cal defects,  or  having  families,  and  start  them  as  recruiting  oilicers; 
and  you  wrote  me  back  in  answer  to  that  suggestion  that  it  was  prac- 
tically too  late ;  that  the  real  trouble  was  that  there  was  no  interest ; 
and  that  the  condition  in  Maryland  was  the  same  as  that  which  ex- 
isted in  every  other  State. 

Gen.  Wood.  That  is  right.  May  I  insert  the  substance  of  the  cor- 
respondence in  the  record? 

The  Chairman.  Without  objection,  it  may  go  in. 

(The  substance  of  the  correspondence  referred  to  is  here  printed, 
as  follows:) 

The  telegram  authorizing  recruiting,  already  quoted  in  full  in  the  hearing, 
was  sent  to  Maryland  on  July  5.  On  July  10,  on  the  mustering  officer's  recom- 
mendation, Maj.  Robert  Parke  Bay,  of  Maryland,  with  four  men  was  ordered 
to  establish  a  recruiting  station  at  Baltimore;  on  July  12  the  printed  instruc- 
tions as  to  recruiting  were  prepared  and  on  the  same  date  the  adjutant  gen- 
eral of  Maryland  was  telegraphed  to  submit  names  of  officers  for  additional 
parties — one  officer  and  three  enlisted  men  for  every  battalion,  a  very  gen- 
erous allowance — he  was  asked  also  to  recommend  stations.  As  soon  as  this 
was  done  the  officers  and  men  were  mustered  in  July  26.  From  that  time  on  we 
granted  every  request  for  travel  and  aided  the  recruiting  officers  in  every  way 
possible.  We  changed  stations  and  officers  on  recommendation  of  the  officers 
themselves  or  of  the  State.  Recruiting  parties  were  continued  until  the  offi- 
cers themselves  agreed  that  it  was  useless.  When  discontinued  the  States 
were  asked  to  send  men  to  our  established  stations  to  be  enlisted.  From  be- 
ginning to  end  we  spared  neither  trouble  nor  expense  and  the  States  were 
given  every  encouragement  except  for  the  short  interval  when  recruiting  had 
to  be  interrupted  for  the  purpose  of  transferring  the  officers  from  a  State  to 
a  Federal  status.  That  the  enthusiasm  died  out  at  this  time  is  no  more  the 
fault  of  the  War  Department  than  of  the  several  State  militia  organizations. 
It  was  merely  a  fact.  The  claim  that  the  States  could  do  better  unaided  is 
not  borne  out  by  results.  We  continued  to  enlist  some  recruits  as  long  as  we 
continued  the  Federal  parties.  As  soon  as  they  were  discontinued  and  the 
adjutant  general  asked  to  send  applicants  to  the  Army  recruiting  stations 
nothing  further  was  accomplished.  The  last  week  of  recruiting  when  parties 
were  still  at  work  in  11  States  we  got  85  recruits;  from  that  date  on  only  2 
were  enlisted. 

(The  following  are  the  letters  mentioned  by  Senator  Lee  and  my 
reply  thereto.) 

United  States  Senate, 
Committee  on  Coast  Defenses, 

August  5,  1916. 
Maj.  Gen.  Leonard  Wood,  United  States  Army, 

Commanding  Department  of  the  East,  Governors  Island,  N.  Y. 
My  Dear  General:  I  take  the  liberty  of  writing  you  on  the  following  sub- 
ject— recruiting  for  the  National  Guard  of  Maryland — and  desire  to  make  the 
following  recommendations : 

First.  That  each  company  officer  be  communicated  with  and  requested  to 
designate,  out  of  men  who  were  formerly  in  his  company  but  were  not  accepted 
for  various  reasons,  the  most  efficient  for  use  as  members  of  a  recruiting  party 


UNIVERSAL   MILITABI   TRAINING.  993 

in  the  section  of  the  State  from  which  that  company  came,  and  that  proper 
steps  be  taken  to  appoint  from  such  recommended  men  recruiting  parties  to 
cooperate  with  the  recruiting  officers  now  in  the  state. 

Second.  That  the  recruiting  officers  he  authorized  to  go  from  point  to  point 
on  regular  schedules. 

Third.  That  short  advertisements.  Indicating  the  advantages  to  the  recruit 
and  the  necessity  for  the  Government  of  increasing  the  Maryland  National 
Guard  regiments  now  at  the  front,  he  circulated  in  advance  of  dates  when  the 
recruiting  parties  will  he  at  given  points. 

The  reasons  for  these  recommendations  are.  generally  speaking,  as  follows: 

The   entire    National    Guard    of   Maryland    was   ordered    to   Texas,    and    is    now 

stationed  at  Eagle  Pass.    There  are  no  enlisted  men  or  commissioned  officers  left 

in  the  State,  except  three  staff  ollicers.  who  have  not  necessarily  heeii  con- 
nected  heretofore  with  recruiting.     These  ollicers  are  now  at   various  points  in 

the  State,  but  so  far  as  my  observation  x^o*  they  have  n<.t  heen  afforded  the 
necessary  facilities  to  effectually  carry  out  recruiting  for  the  National  Guard 

of  Maryland. 

One  of  these  above-mentioned  staff  ollicers.  a  very  industrious  and  earnest 
man,  is  now  located  at  Silver  Spring,  Md.,  in  Montgomery  County,  where  T 
live,  and  which  is  a  point  tolerahly  central  to  half  a  dozen  of  the  counties  of 
the  State.  This  officer  luis  no  local  knowledge,  and  he  has  one  recently  re- 
cruited man  from  Baltimore  witli  him,  who  sits  outside  the  door  of  the  local 
armory  and,  together,  they  excite  some  little  interest  in  the  village.  In  the 
course  of  a  week  no  recruits  have  heen  secured.  This  is  in  no  sense  the  fault 
of  the  Officer,  as  he  is  doing  his  best  under  the  circumstances.  lie  has  my 
entire  sympathy. 

The  National  Guard  has  heretofore  recruited  itself,  and  it  is  now  absolutely 

necessary  to  either  get  some  members  of  the  guard  from  the  frontier  to  return 
and  do  recruiting  work  or  some  of  those  formerly  connected  with  it  to  take 
this  work  up.     It  would  he  very  inadvisable  to  bring  hack  any  men  from   Eagle 

Pass,  where  they  are  receiving  the  most  admirable  instruction  and  cooperating 
in  the  best  of  spirit  with  the  regular  forces  there.  The  two  principal  causes 
why  men  were  left  hehind  and  not  taken  to  Eagle  Pass  were  physical  defects 

or  having  dependents  that  they  could  not  leave,  <>r  the  latter  condition  added 
to  a  business  opportunity  that  could  not  he  fairly  sacrificed.  Thus  some  good 
men    of   this   class    remain    in    Maryland   and    could    attend    to    these   duties    for 

two  or  three  weeks  or  long  enough  to  ascertain  what  can  he  done. 

I    recommend    that    an   order  he   passed    by    the   Secretary   of   War   giving  the 

authority  t<»  recruiting  ollicers  for  the  sole  purpose  of  recruiting  service  to 
waive  physical  defects  of  enlisted  men.  mentioning  them  by  name  or  hy  class 
or  indicating  the  purpose  for  which  they  are  to  he  enlisted.  Also  a  modifica- 
tion of  the  order  with  reference  to  dependents,  for  this  same  purpose,  and 
that  such  men  as  may  he  available  be  enlisted  temporarily  and  employed  tem- 
porarily, and  that  the  whole  matter  be  put  in  definite  shape,  the  men  being 
advised  of  the  length  of  time  they  woutd  he  required.  The  best  form  to  fix 
this  time  would  he  hy  having  the  waiver  of  the  defects  or  the  dependents 

merely  for  the  specified  time.  I  presume  that  three  week's  would  he  ahottt  the 
proper  time  to  indicate,  at  the  end  of  which  time,  or  other  specified  time,  the 
enlisted  man  could  he  discharged,  as  desired. 

T  beg  leave  to  call  your  attention  to  the  order  of  the  President,  copy  of 
which  was  sent  you  hy  the  department  under  date  <»f  June  18,  which  says  that 
National  Guard  organizations  should  he  raised  to  the  maximum  strength 
on  as  possible  That  order  is  still  in  force.  ]  believe.  In  the  same  order 
you  were  directed  p,  muster  certain  staff  ollicers  into  the  service  for  the  pur- 
pose of  proper  camp  administration  and  to  muster  them  out  again  when  their 
services  were  no  longer  required.  It  is  clear,  therefore,  that  this  recruiting 
should  he  attended  to  effectively,  in  view  of  the  order  of  the  President,  and 
that  for  other  purposes  in  connection  with  the  mobilization  there  had  been  a 
temporary  mustering  into  tin1  service. 

In  my  judgment,  unless  something  effective  and  practical  is  done  in  connec- 
tion with  this  recruiting. f or  the  National  Guard  of  Maryland,  certainly  so  far 
as  the  rural  districts  are  concerned,  that  it  is  merely  a  waste  of  Government 
funds  and  not  calculated  to  bring  about  the  result  of  securing  recruits  afl 
directed  in  the  order  of  the  President.  I  have  seen  Gen.  Mills  in  this  matter, 
and  write  you  on  his  statement  that  you  are  the  proper  officer  to  consider  the 
recommendations  made. 


994  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 

The  situation  in  Maryland  probably  differs  from  that  in  many  other  States 
in  thai  the  entire  personnel  of  the  National  Guard,  with  very  few  exceptions, 
as  above  stated,  is  now  out  of  the  State. 
Respectfully,  yours, 

Blair  Lee. 


Plattsburg,  N.  Y.,  August  8,  1916. 
My  Deab  Senator  Lbe:  'four  letter  received,  and  I  have  sent  it  down  to 
headquarters  to  the  officer  in  charge  of  militia  affairs  with  instructions  to  give 
this  matter  careful  consideration.  We  are  working  now  through  officers  of 
the  National  Guard,  who  are  serving  as  recruiting  officers.  The  real  trouble 
is  there  is  no  interest  in  border  service,  as  the  outlook  for  active  service  does 
not  seem  to  be  very  probable.  The  condition  you  speak  of  in  Maryland  is 
found  in  every  State. 
Sincerely,  yours, 

Leonard  Wood. 
Hon.  Blair  Lee. 

United  States  Senate,  Washington,  D.  C. 

Senator  Lee,  of  Maryland.  General,  the  adjutant  general  of  Flor- 
ida says  in  a  letter  to  me  dated  January  6 : 

I  have  no  hesitancy  in  saying  that  if  this  system  of  recruiting  had  not  been 
interrupted — 

Which  they  had  under  that  order  of  Secretary  Oliver — 

the  organization  of  the  National  Guard  in  this  State  would  have  been  mustered 
in  at  full  war  strength. 

What  would  you  say  to  that  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  would  say  it  is  not  so,  sir.  It  is  absolutely  incorrect 
and  we  have  the  evidence  here  to  prove  it.  As  shown  in  the  above 
telegrams  concerning  recruitment  in  Florida,  these  telegrams  indi- 
cate just  what  occurred.  It  is  typical  of  the  situation  not  only  in 
Florida  but  also  in  other  States.  Gen.  Foster's  action  and  activities 
are  clearly  apparent.  The  situation  there  was  somewhat  difficult; 
the  cause  of  the  difficulties  being  as  indicated  in  the  above-cited 
telegraphic  correspondence. 

The  Chairman.  Is  that  the  Gen.  Foster  who  was  quite  active  with 
reference  to  the  National  Guard  legislation  here  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  He  was,  I  understand,  one  of  the  lobby  that  was  here 
at  that  time,  trying  to  put  through  the  present  militia  law. 

Senator  Lee,  of  Maryland.  Is  not  the  National  Guard  an  auto- 
matic recruiting  body?  Its  recruiting  has  not  actually  cost  the 
Government  anything,  up  to  the  time  they  were  called  into  the 
Federal  service? 

Gen.  Wood.  No,  sir. 

Senator  Lee,  of  Maryland.  Take  our  Maryland  case :  When  every- 
one of  the  National  Guard  were  ordered  out  of  the  State,  there  was 
nobody  left  there  to  recruit. 

Gen.  Wood.  I  think,  Senator,  there  were  some'  officers,  were  there 
not? 

Senator  Lee,  of  Maryland.  Three  staff  officers. 

Gen.  Wood.  I  thought  so. 

Senator  Lee,  of  Maryland.  I  saw  one  of  them,  and  he  had  one 
newly  enlisted  man  from  Baltimore  to  assist  him,  and  neither  one 
of  them  had  ever  seen  the  place  before,  and  knew  nothing  about  the 
local  people. 

Gen.  Wood.  Was  the  officer  an  intelligent  man  ? 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY    TRAINING. 


995 


Senator  Lee,  of  Maryland.  He  was  a  very  able  man  and  a  very 
earnest  man.  Of  course,  that  was  started  six  weeks  after  the  call  in 
June,  after  the  enthusiasm  had  died  down,  as  you  say.  It  was  too 
late  to  be  effective. 

Gen.  Wood.  I  think  the  real  trouble.  Senator,  in  the  recruiting 
was  that  there  was  a  large  number  of  physically  defective  men. 
A  great  number  were  excused  by  the  governors.  Take  a  typical 
regiment;  take  your  own  State.  We  have  the  figures  here,  I  think, 
for  Maryland,  and  I  think  they  average  up  very  well  with  the 
militia  as  a  whole.  I  will  be  glad  to  insert  them  in  the  record,  with 
the  permission  of  the  committee. 

The  Chairman.  Without  objection,  that  will  be  done. 

(The  statement  referred  to  is  here  printed  in  full  as  follows:) 


MARYLAND. 


ribed 
strength. 

Maximum 
strength 
attained. 

5,759 
103 
176 
157 

3,014 
89 

Field  Artillerv 

132 

149 

Total 

6,195 

3,384 

Dates  of  departure  June  .SO  to  July  7  (unusually  prompt): 

Animals 15 

chine  guns 4 

rangtb  last  armory  inspection 2,057 

In  St  ate  service  date  of  call 2, 209 

Number  of  men  excused  by  the  governor  or  other  State  ofhcials  before  muster  in 106 

Discharged  for  disability 263 

Remaining  after  physical  examination 1,95  4 

Number  who  declined  to  subscribe  to  oath  of  dual  obligation : 77 

Btrengl  b  at  .leparture 3, 252 

Recruits  enlisted  after  departure 26 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  General,  Gen.  Barry,  who  is  not 
friendly  at  all  to  the  National  Guard  system,  but  who  is  obviously 
an  officer  of  marked  ability  and  frankness,  has  said,  in  his  report 
with  reference  to  this  National  Guard  recruiting,  that  it  is  a  State 
proposition  and  can  best  be  handled  by  the  State  agencies.  I  Will 
read  from  his  report,  on  page  133  of  the  report  of  the  Militia  Bureau 
on  the  mobilization  of  the  Organized  Militia  and  National  Guard  of 
the  United  States,  1916 : 

With  the  State  troops  regiments  in  large  cities  and  companies  in  smaller 
communities  are  essentially  local :  the  personnel  of  any  such  organization  belong 
to  a  limited  neighborhood.    The  home  town  entertains  an  Intense  Interest  In 

them;  the  men  of  the  organization  retain  Interest  In  the  town;  and  to  maintain 
proper  strength  the  recruits,  duo  to  local  pride,  arc  most  easily  obtained  locally. 

To  recruit  for  such  organizations  the  best  results  are  most  likely  to  be  ob- 
tained by  men  well  acquainted  in  the  various  neighborhoods  whence  come  the 
organizations;  they  know  the  population  and  by  what  feeling  it  is  animated. 
Methods  successful  in  one  State  may  not  succeed  in  another.  Of  these  and 
other  conditions  the  State  authorities  are  best  informed  and  they  can  best  take 
advantage  of  them. 

Recruiting  for  the  National  Guard  should  be  conducted  by  the  State  author- 
ities, they  to  secure  applicants  for  enlistment  through  solicitation  by  National 
Guard  retired  or  reserve  officers,  county  and  other  officials,  or  by  such  other 
methods  as  may  he  deemed  expedient  and  to  send  all  accepted  applicants  to 
a  previously  selected  and  centrally  located  State  recruit  depot. 


996 


UN1VEKSAL   MILITARY    TRAINING. 


In  Maryland,  after  stopping  the  enlistments  which  the  guard  were 
conducting  themselves  for  the  two  days  they  remained  at  their  home 
stations  by  this  order  of  the  War  Department  of  June  22,  a  month 
or  six  weeks  intervened,  when  an  enlistment  system  was  adopted 
under  your  authority  which  sent  out  men  without  any  local  knowl- 
edge whatever,  either  the  officers  or  the  enlisted  detail.  That  is  a 
fact,  is  it  not? 

Gen.  Wood.  No;  there  was  no  such  period  of  delay;  as  shown  by 
statements  above  concerning  Maryland,  it  will  be  seen  that  three 
carefully  selected  officers  were  detailed  to  recruit  for  the  organiza- 
tions. The  list  above  shows  general  results.  Troops  could  not  be 
kept  at  home  stations  to  be  recruited  to  full  strength  because  of  the 
urgency  of  the  situation. 

Senator,  may  I  add  further  that  the  system  you  recommend  is 
exactly  the  one  we  established  in  Pennsylvania,  and  which  I  have 
already  described  to  you — picking  out  the  best  of  the  retired  officers 
and  locating  them  in  their  own  towns,  which,  by  the  way,  were  the 
towns  from  which  the  organizations  came? 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  When  was  that  done? 

Gen.  Wood.  That  was  done  in  the  Pennsylvania  organization. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Was  it  not  done  a  month  or  two  too 
late? 

Gen.  Wood.  No;  I  do  not  think  so,  assuming  that  the  men  were 
qualified  to  recruit.  I  will  supply  for  the  record  a  statement  of  the 
dates  when  the  officers  were  detailed  in  the  different  States. 

(The  statement  referred  to  is  as  follows:) 


State. 

Number 

of 
officers. 

Date  de- 
tailed. 

Total 
recruits 
enlisted. 

Alabama 

11 

7 
2 
6 
4 
11 
11 
3 
5 
19 
3 
3 

10 
50 
11 
30 

Aug-     5 
Julv   26 

...d'o 

Aug.  29 

Tulv  21 

Tulv    27 
Tulv   24 
Julv   21 
Tulv    24 
Tulv    2fi 
Tulv    21 
Julv   29 
Julv    20 
Aug.  14 
Tulv    21 
July    2(1 

544 

Connecticut 

24 

Delaware 

M 

District  of  Columbia 

754 

Florida 

63 

301 

Kentucky 

423 

Maine 

26 

Maryland 

26 

Massachusetts 

227 

Mississippi 1 

146 

New  Hampshire 

15 

New  Jersey a 

252 

New  York'. 

North  Carolina 

361 

Pennsylvania 

510 

Rhode  Island 

1 

South  ( 'arolina 

8 

6 
3 

10 
3 

Julv   21 
Tulv   22 
Tulv   21 
...do 

Aug.     4 

135 

Tennessee 

2S7 

Vermont 

24 

Virginia 

246 

West  Virginia 

542 

The  dates  given  are  those  in  which  the  final  details  were  furnished.  In 
some  States,  among  them  Maryland,  Florida,  Now  Fork,  and  District  of  Colum- 
bia, recruiting  parties  were  out  before  these  dates.  All  adjutants  general  and 
senior  mustering  officers  were  notified  the  authority  to  recruit  on  July  5  and 
all  adjutants  general  were  called  upon  to  nominate  recruiting  parties  on  July 
12.  The  officers  were  mustered  in  as  soon  as  recommendations  were  received. 
Rhode  Island  had  nearly  its  full  complement,  so  no  officers  were  mustered  in 
for  that  State.  The  adjutant  general  was  asked  to  have  applicants  sent  to 
the  United  States  recruiting  officer.  The  result  in  this  case — when  the  State 
was  left  to  Itself — indicates  what  might  have  happened  in  other  States  without 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY    TRAINING.  997 

Federal  assistance  and  impetus.  Massachusetts,  New  York,  and  Pennsylvania 
had  already  assembled  and  sent  forward  large  numbers  of  recruits  prior  to  the 
detail -of  these  special  recruiting  parties. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  But,  General,  speaking  generally,  this 
substitute  for  the  natural  system  which  the  guard  had  adopted 
itself,  either  under  local  laws  or  under  this  order  of  Secretary 
Oliver,  was  suspended  by  the  order  of  (Jen.  Mills,  just  mentioned, 
and  was  not  formally  renewed  for  six  weeks  or  a  month? 

Gen.  Wood.  No,  sir  it  was  not  suspended  except  for  the  period 
necessary  to  muster.  When  all  these  organizations  were  mustered 
into  the  Federal  service  they  ceased  to  be  State  organizations;  the 
men  and  officers  were  Federal:  and  it  was  the  same  men  and  the  same 
officer  who  went  out  recruiting  in  the  town-  where  they  were  known 
and  respected,  and  no  one  knew  whether  they  were  <  perating  for 
the  State  or  for  the  Federal  Government.  The  whole  thing,  Sena- 
tor, is  that  the  interest  petered  out  after  the  first  1  :>  or  20  (lays.  The 
States  which  sent  the  largest  Contingent  of  recruits  were  Pennsyl- 
vania. New  York,  and  Massachusetts.  They  had  a  system  of  select- 
ing men  in  advance  whom  they  knew  would  come,  and  they  promptly 
sent  forward  large  numbers-  Massachusetts  s<  mthing  like  2,500 
recruits.  These  were  received  and  -cut  forward  by  officers  who  had 
been  mustered  into  the  Federal  service.  They  were  militia  oflicers 
acting  after  muster  into  Federal  service.  I  think  we  can  .-how  you 
that  we  not  only  did  nothing  to  check  recruiting,  but  that  we  did 
everything  to  aid  it.     Am  I  n<  t  t.  Maj.  Kubourne,  in  saying 

that  our  t  fforts  in  one  State  cost  us  $400  to  get  one  recruit  - 

Maj.  Kxlbourne.  I  can  net  those  figures  exactly.  In  New  Hamp- 
shire we  -pent  about  *s7l'  before  we  got  one  recruit. 

(Jen.  Wo<>'>.  The  average  cost  per  recruit  for  that  state  was  $200. 

We  went  al!  over  the  State,  hut  it  wa>  \erv  difficult  to  enlist  men. 
Interest  had  waned. 

When  the  entire  militia  of  the  Nation  was  called  there  was  a  gen- 
eral feeling  that  there  was  to  he  active  service  on  a  large  -••ale  Men 
responded,  as  they  always  do.  in  the  moment  of  enthusiasm.  A  num- 
ber of  State-  where  arrangement-  had  been  made  to  fill  up  regiments 
in  case  of  emergency  were  able  to  gather  quickly  and   forward  large 

numbers  of  recruits.    This  is  especially  true  of  Massachusetts,  New 

York.  Connecticut,  Pennsylvania,  and  a  number  of  other  State-. 
But  those  States  where  no  such  arrangements  had  been  made  had 
considerahle  difficulty  in  filling  up  their  contingents,  because  interest 
in  the  situation  rapidly  faded  out,  and  the  feeling  that  there  was  to 
he  active  service  was  replaced  by  a  feeding  of  less  certainty.  Re- 
cruiting became  exceedingly  difficult,  and  the  difficulty  increased  as 
time  went  on  and  it  became  evident  that  it  was  to  he  largely  garri- 
son duty — important,  hut  not  furnishing  the  element  of  excitement 
which  influences  many  men  to  enlist.  It  is  absurd  and  unfair  to  try 
to  place  responsibility  for  the  lack  of  recruits  upon  any  action  taken 
by  the  Federal  Government  incident  to  the  transfer  of  troops  from 
State  to  Federal  control.  Carefully  selected  officers  did  everything 
possihle  to  secure  recruits.  The  reason  they  did -not  get  them  was 
that  public  interest  had  diminished.  It  is  a  story  as  old  as  the  life 
of  the  Nation.  A  rush  first,  and  the  moment  the  novelty  lias  worn 
off  a  bit  there  is  a  let  up.     This  is  especially  true  in  this  instance 


998  UNIVEKSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 

when  it  had  become  apparent  that  the  service  was  to  be  garrison  and 
partol  duty  and  not  active  field  service. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Will  you  agree  to  this  (  proposition, 
that  if  anything  interferes  with  the  automatic  enlistment  of  a 
National-Guard  force,  on  a  call  of  the  President  for  a  comparatively 
brief  period,  that  interference  has  practically  stopped  the  enlist- 
ment? 

Gen.  Wood.  The  whole  thing  is  a  gamble,  yes — anything  that  in- 
terferes with  it  in  the  first  burst  of  enthusiasm — because  the  en- 
listment is  not  based  on  a  general  sense  of  obligation.  It  is  largely 
emotion,  and  it  falls  promptly  once  the  excitement  has  worn  off. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Under  those  circumstances,  and  in 
view  of  the  effect  of  the  War  Department  order  of  June  22,  is  it 
fair  to  criticize  the  guard  for  not  having  enlisted  up  to  war  strength? 

Gen.  Wood.  Not  the  guard;  not  a  bit.  It  is  the  system  always; 
the  system  absolutely. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Why  the  system  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  For  this  reason,  sir :  It  is  a  system  which  leaves  every- 
thing to  be  done  by  that  delightful  method  of  confusion  which  you 
have  so  ably  brought  out  by  your  questions.  There  is  no  sufficient 
organization ;  there  is  no  certainty  as  to  who  is  coming.  That  is  why 
we  damn  the  system.  We  do  not  know  whether  the  men  are  going  to 
be  enthusiastic;  whether  their  moral  scruples  will  permit  them  to 
respond  to  the  call;  whether  they  are  opposed  to  the  action  of  the 
President  in  calling  out  troops.  We  have  no  ,certainty  whatever  as 
to  the  response;  it  is  chance  when  we  want  certainty.  That  is  why 
we  dislike  the  system  and  condemn  it.  We  know  certainly  that 
most  of  the  men  who  will  respond  will  be  untrained  in  great  part. 
I  want  to  introduce  into  the  record,  if  I  may,  in  substantiation  of 
that  point  certain  correspondence  with  Eepresentative  McKellar  of 
Tennessee.  It  consists  of  certain  letters  addressed  to  him  by  con- 
stituents protesting  that  he  had  understood  that  the  militia  of  Ten- 
nessee was  ready  to  respond  immediately,  and  describing  the  hetero- 
geneous mass  of  ununif  ormed,  undisciplined  men  that  were  then  being 
sent  to  the  front  without  arms,  equipment,  or  training.  The  possi- 
bility of  this  condition  being  general  is  the  reason  we  dislike  the 
system.  There  is  no  intention  to  reflect  upon  the  men  or  the  officers. 
It's  a  kind  of  referendum  in  a  crisis.  The  President  calls  for  men. 
Organizations  are  at  half  strength.  The  response  depends  upon  the 
popularity  of  the  proposed  move.  No  one  knows  how  many  are 
coming  or  what  will  be  their  condition  as  to  training  and  fitness. 
It  is  a  gamble,  and  the  stake  may  be  the  life  of  the  Nation.  It  is  a 
gamble.  No  certainty  when  there  should  be  the  greatest  possible 
certainty. 

(The  correspondence  referred  to  is  here  printed  in  full,  as  fol- 
lows:) 

House  of  Representatives, 

Washington,  June  SO,  1916. 
Gen.  H.  P.  McCain, 

Adjutant  General,,  War  Department. 

Dear  Gen.  McCain  :  Inclosed  please  find  two  letters,  one  from  Mr.  Mallory 
and  the  othjer  from  Mr.  Beecher,  two  of  our  best  citizens  in  Memphis,  which 
letters  explain  themselves. 

I  do  not  see  how -this  could  have  happened,  and  I  would  he  glad  for  you  to 
look  into  it  and  let  me  know. 
Very  truly,  yours, 

K.  D.  McKellar. 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING.  999 

Memphis,  Tenn.,  June  28,  1916. 
Hon.  K.  D.  McKellar, 

Washington,  D.  C. 

My  Dear  Mo:  What  I  have  seen  and  read  in  the  newspapers  in  the  last 
few  days  in  reference  to  the  preparedness  of  our  militia  has  brought  to  my 
mind  vividly  the  conversation  I  had  with  you  in  your  office  one  evening  while 
you  were  here  recently,  and  over  and  over  in  my  mind  the  thought  comes:  Can 
it  be  possible  that  you  are  being  misinformed  on  this  most  vital  question  to 
every  American  citizen? 

Night  before  last  I  witnessed  the  Memphis  troops  leaving  here  for  Nash- 
ville— a  fine  lot  of  young  men;  however,  to  me  it  indeed  was  a  pitiful  sight. 
Not  of  a  disregard  of  our  Government  of  its  duty  toward  these  young  men  in 
the  ill-prepared  and  seemingly  indifferent  way  in  which  the  Government  was 
caring  for  them. 

I  can  not  say  it  for  a  fact,  but  I  am  told  that  the  uniforms  these  men  wore 
were  winter  uniforms,  although  they  left  here  in  midsummer;  doubtless  some 
high  official  in  the  military  service  iii  Washington  will  excuse  the  efficiency  of 
our  preparedness  on  this  point  by  saying  a  light-weight  uniform  will  be  fur- 
nished them.  There  were  many  men  in  line  dressed  in  their  citizen  clothes, 
from  a  well-tailored  suit  to  the  gresy  clothes  of  the  laborer;  they  wore  straw 
hats,  derbies,  and  caps,  truly  a  motley  sight.  Possibly  some  high  military  offi- 
cial in  Washington  will  give  us  an  excuse  that  uniforms  will  be  furnished  these 
men  when  they  reach  camp:  yet  our  militia  has  been  mobilizing  here  in  the 
city  for  eight  days. 

I  have  not  attempted  t<>  draw  to  you  a  real  picture  as  it  presented  itself  to  me 
of  the  above  departure  Of  our  troops,  and  yet  I  wish  to  say  that  during  yester- 
day I  heard  many  of  your  close  friends  describe  tiio  sii  nation  with  far  more  con- 
cern than  1  have  attempted  to  tell  it  to  you  here.  The  above  is  not  from  hear- 
say ;  it  actually  happened  under  the  eyes  of  fully  r.0,000  of  the  citizens  of 
Memphis. 

I  am  inclosing  you  a  clipping  from  the  Cincinnati  Enquirer  of  June  25  describ- 
ing the  failure  on  the  part  of  some  high  military  official  in  Washington  in  refer- 
ence to  the  Ohio  troops;  I  also  inclose  you  a  dipping  from  the  New  York  Times 

of  June  26  showing  the  failure  of  some  high  military  official  of  our  Government 

to  meet  the  situation  for  the  New  York  troops. 

Mr.  Billings,  who  has  been  in  the  employ  of  this  company  for  the  last  three 
months  and  who   lives   in  Chicago,   has  just    received   a    letter   from   one  of  his 

friends  who  is  a  member  of  Machine  Gun  Troop  a  of  the  First  Cavalry  of 
Illinois,  stating  that  his  command  is  unable  to  go  forward,  they  being  unable  to 
secure  any  machine  ,uruns  for  their  command,  and  this,  too,  after  $25,000  had 
been  raised  by  public  BUb8Cription  to  purchase  these  uruns. 

.Mai-.  I  am  giving  you  this  information  not  in  the  way  of  criticism  personally, 
but  I  do  think  it  is  time  for  the  proper  parties  in  Washington  to  wake  up.  set 
aside  politics,  and  give  the  proper  parties  th<>  Government  support  that  the 
Mexican  situation  demands;  for  certainly  from  what  has  transpired  in  Memphis 
the  papers  can  DOt  be  far  wrong  in  the  news  they  are  giving  the  world  about  our 
Utter  unpreparednesa  A  situation  sad  to  think  of  with  the  conditions  that  have 
confronted  this  nation  since  August  1,  1914. 

He  who  fools  himself  unconsciously  is  working  a  misfortune  for  some  one. 
Most  truly,  yours, 

B.  L.  Malloby. 


Memphis  Cotton  Exchange, 
Memphis,  Tenn.,  June  28, 1916. 
Hon.  K.  D.  McKei.i.ak. 

Washington,  D.  C. 

Dear  Sir:  When  you  were  here  a  couple  of  weeks  ago  I  listened  with  interest 
to  your  statements  as  to  the  militia  being  prepared.  The  call  to  arms  has  dis- 
proved all  of  this.  The  Memphis  companies  are  without  adequate  equipment  to 
a  considerable  extent,  and  the  same  is  true,  of  New  York  and  several  others. 
This  is  all  due  to  the  rottenness  of  State  politics.  No  officeholder  cares  in  time 
of  peace  whether  the  militia  is  properly  equipped,  and  personally  I  would  like  to 
see  the  various  States  deprived  of  any  voice  or  control  over  military  matters  in 
this  State  where  office  seeking  occupies  all  the  time  of  our  politicians. 
Yours,  truly, 

B.  B.  Beecher. 


1000  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY    TRAINING. 

[Second  indorsement.] 

War  Department,  Militia  Bureau, 

July  6,  1916. 
To  The  Adjutant  General: 

It  is  recommended  that  an  investigation  be  made  to  determine  the  responsi- 
bility for  the  neglects  and  failures  alleged  in  the  inclosed  letters  and  clippings. 

A.  L.  Mills, 
Brigadier  General,  Q.  S.,  Chief  of  Bureau. 

[Third  indorsement.] 

War  Department, 
Adjutant  General's  Office, 

July  8,  1916. 
To  the  Commanding  General,  Eastern  Department, 

Governors  Island,  N.  Y. 
For  report. 
By  order  of  the  Secretary  of  War. 

P.  C.  Harris,  Adjutant  General. 

[Fourth  indorsement.] 

Headquarters  Eastern  Department, 

Governors  Island,  N.  Y.,  July  10, 1916. 
Respectfully  returned   to  The  Adjutant  General's  Office,  War  Department, 
Washington. 

1.  The  within  letters  and  newspaper  clippings  set  forth  conditions  which  have 
not  been  unusual  in  the  mobilization  of  the  militia,  even  in  the  States  where  the 
militia  is  best  prepared.  I  doubt  if  the  responsibility  for  these  conditions  can 
be  specifically  charged  to  any  person  or  persons.  It  is  the  fault  of  a  system  and 
of  a  policy  under  which  we  have  proceeded  for  years.  The  militia  has  been 
called  to  the  colors  at  full  war  strength.  A  good  many  were  unable  to  respond 
to  the  call  and  were  discharged  from  the  militia  immediately  prior  to  the  mobili- 
zation, and  new  men  were  taken  in.  It  was,  moreover,  necessary  to  increase  the 
strength  of  most  of  the  regiments  from  peace  strength  to  war  strength,  which 
resulted  in  taking  with  them  to  the  mobilization  point  as  many  new  men  as  pos- 
sible. Probably  85  per  cent  of  these  men.  were  green  men  without  previous 
training.  Naturally,  as  only  peace-strength  equipment  and  clothing  is,  as  a  rule, 
kept  with  the  organizations,  they  were  without  sufficient  uniforms  or  equipment 
for  the  additional  men,  and,  as  they  represented  many  of  the  walks  of  life  from 
which  the  militia  is  drawn,  their  clothing  varied. 

2.  The  necessary  additional  uniforms  and  equipment  were  ordered  sent  to  the 
mobilization  camps.  Consequently  the  new  men,  the  additional  recruits,  were 
without  uniforms  or  equipment  and  proceeded  to  the  camps  in  the  clothes  they 
had  at  the  time  of  enlistment.  The  delay  in  securing  the  equipment  was  inci- 
dent to  the  unsound  policy  which  has  resulted  in  the  storing  of  equipment  and 
arms  at  central  points  often  remote  from  the  troops  to  bo  supplied.  For  in- 
stance, practically  everything  for  this  department  was  stored  in  Philadelphia 
at  the  quartermaster's  depot,  with  rather  limited  railroad-yard  facilities,  and 
decidedly  limited  space  for  rapid  handling  of  this  vast  amount  of  material. 
The  area  to  be  supplied  by  this  depot  covered  the  territory  from  Maine  to  Ala- 
bama. The  building  was  literally  crowded:  it  was  a  physical  impossibility  to 
get  it  out  and  distribute  it  so  that  there  would  be  anything  like  a  simultaneous 
issue.  Near-by  States  got  there  supplies  more  promptly  than  the  remote,  but 
these,  in  some  instances,  suffered  delays  incident  to  difficulty  in  getting  at  the 
supplies,  it  being  necessary  to  ship  to  other  States  first  in  order  to  get  rid  of 
the  mass  of  supplies  before  others  could  he  gotten  at.  It  has  been  urged  re- 
peatedly that  regiments  should  maintain  in  their  armories  the  necessary  sup- 
plies and  equipment  to  bring  them  to  war  strength,  wherever  the  armories  had 
secure  storage  rooms,  and  that  where  such  was  not  the  case  their  supplies 
should  bo  stored  in  the  nearest  depots,  military  posts,  or  arsenals,  so  that 
under  conditions  such  as  necessitated  the  recent  order  to  mobilize  the  militia 
of  the  country  simultaneous  shipment  could  be  made  promptly  from  as  many 
points  as  possible. 

3.  Only  about  64  per  cent  of  the  militia  at  peace  strength  have  had  a  year's 
service.  The  rest  is  new  and  largely  uninstructed,  and  when  it  is  remem- 
bered that  from  the  older  ncrsonnol  a  considerable  number  of  meh  have  been 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING.  1001 

discharged  for  business  and  family  reasons  prior  to  going  to  the  camps  of 
mobilization,  and  a  considerable  number  found,  on  physical  examination  after 
muster,  to  be  deficient,  and  that  the  war  strength  of  the  regiment  is  some- 
thing over  twice  the  peace  strength,  in  other  words,  that  practically  60  per 
cent  of  the  war  strength  of  the  regiment  is  new,  the  delay  in  filing  up  and 
equipping  the  regiments  will  be  understood,  also  the  appearance  of  a  large 
number  of  men  without  arms  or  equipment  in  the  regiments  en  route  to  the 
State  mobilization  camps. 

4.  With  reference  to  machine  guns:  We  have  been  without  an  adequate 
supply  of  machine  guns  for  the  Regular  Army  and  militia  for  years,  and  have 
had  absolutely  none  for  Volunteers.  In  order  that  the  machine-gun  companies 
belonging  to  the  regiments  going  to  the  border  may  have  the  very  modest 
allowance  of  four  guns  per  regiment  (which  is  about  one-sixth  what  they 
should  have  if  the  companies  were  organized  in  accordance  with  modern  prac- 
tices) we  are  to-day  stripping  the  seacoast  of  the  machine  guns  assigned  to 
them  for  land  defense. 

5.  With  reference  to  uniforms:  The  cotton  uniform  is  not  kept  in  reserve 
for  war  purposes,  nor  should  it  be.  It  will  be  found  entirely  unsuitable  for 
campaign  purposes  within  the  continent  of  the  United  States,  even  on  the 
border.  It  does  not  give  adequate  protection  from  the  sun  and  is  cold  and 
uncomfortable  at  night.  Our  troops  during  our  frontier  service,  much  of  it 
along  the  border,  wore  wool,  and  they  would  come  to  it  again  in  case  of  cam- 
paign.    There  is  no  ground  for  complaint  about  the  uniform. 

6.  The  defects  in  training,  organization,  morale,  and  transportation  were 
not  visible  to  the  writers  of  these  letters.  The  whole  mobilization,  from  the 
standpoint  of  military  efficiency,  has  been  a  pronounced  failure.  We  are  sending 
men  to  the  front,  clothed  in  uniform,  bearing  arms  with  which  a  large  portion 
of  them  are  almost  wholly  unfamiliar.  They  are  not  trained  soldiers  in  any 
sense.  To  send  them  against  a  well-trained  enemy  would  be  to  sacrifice  them 
without  a  chance  of  their  success,     it  i<  not  the  fault  of  any  particular  person 

or  persons.  It  i<  the  result  of  a  system  under  which  the  Nation  has  treated 
the  Whole  military  question  with  indifference  for  generations.  The  existing 
condition  can  only  be  remedied,  first,  by  having  trained  men  behind  the  organi- 
zations to  fill  them  up  promptly:  Second,  by  having  the  supplies  and  equipment, 
either  in  the  armories  or  near  at  hand,  where  they  can  be  gotten  at  and  dis- 
tributed promptly;  third,  by  thoroughly  training  officers  and  noncommissioned 
Officers  of  the  militia  in  their  duties  through  adequate  periods  of  field  training, 
indoor  work  alone  will  not  do  it:  fourth,  by  having  adequate  reserve  supplies 
sufficient  to  equip  the  Regular  Army  and  militia  to  war  strength  and  to  equip 
volunteers;  fifth,  by  placing  the  militia  under  direct  Federal  control. 

In  view  of  the  lack  of  training  and  the  defective  system,  the  method  of 

storage,  etc.,  the  mobilization  has  been  all  that  could  have  been  expected. 
Every  soldier  of  intelligence  who  has  studied  the  question  expected  things  to 
happen  just   about  as  they  have.    Quartermaster's  supplies  in  certain  lines 

have  been  exhausted  for  some  time,  although  the  mobilization  is  only  about 
half  complete,  because  there  was  no  adequate  reserve  of  supplies  and  no  method 
of  effective  system  for  promptly  providing  them  from  the  manufacturer. 
There  was  no  effective  system  for  promptly  providing  animals  for  mounted 
organizations.  This  was  thoroughly  well  known.  It  has  been  necessary  to 
buy  new  animals  and  to  send  them  green  and  unbroken  to  be  handled  by  men 
equally  green  and  unbroken,  ignorant  of  their  care  either  at  home  or  in  the  field. 
The  whole  system  points  to  lack  of  organization,  lack  of  foresight,  and  lack 
of  preparation.  Our  officers  and  men  in  the  Regular  Establishment,  Staff  as 
well  as  line.  have,  as  a  class,  obtained  rather  remarkable  results,  everything 
considered. 

7.  There  is  nothing  unusual  to  investigate  in  this  report.  It  is  a  statement 
of  facts  and  of  general  conditions  of  unpreparedness,  a  condition  which  varies 
only  in  degree. 

8.  In  closing,  I  wish  to  emphasize  the  fact  that  no  criticism  cat)  fairly  be 
made  of  either  officers  or  men  of  the  militia.  It  is  the  system.  Certain  espe- 
cially good  organizations  have  in  part  overcome  it,  but  these  are  limited  in 
number. 

Wood,  Major  General  Commanding. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  General,  may  I  ask  you  this  question? 
Would  you  consider  any  cunning  device  of  a  mind  unfriendly  to  the 
National  Guard,  or  would  you  consider  any  natural  mistake  of  the 
86205—17 6 


1002  UNIVERSAL    MILITARY    TRAINING. 

War  Department  in  managing  the  National  Guard — either  of  those — 
part  of  the  National  Guard  system? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  would  not  call  cunning  devices  of  an  unfriendly 
mind  part  of  the  National  Guard  system.  We  were  lacking  in  the 
Supply  Corps  in  effective  management  of  certain  features  necessary 
for  eifective  and  prompt  guard  mobilization.  I  am  entirely  frank  in 
stating  so.  I  refer  to  the  system  of  storage,  failure  to  have  supplies 
in  sufficient  quantity,  or  plans  made  adequate  to  secure  them. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  That  is  a  very  important  statement, 
because  you  consider  all  of  the  omissions,  if  any,  of  the  War  Depart- 
ment as  part  of  the  National  Guard  system? 

Gen.  Wood.  If  they  result  from  the  system  they  must  be  a  part, 
because  the  machinery  by  which  the  War  Department  reaches  out 
and  gets  hold  of  the  militia,  and  the  conduct  of  militia  affairs,  is  nec- 
essarily a  part  of  the  militia  system,  in  the  sense  that  it  is  the  means 
through  which  we  bring  the  militia  into  the  Federal  service.  No 
such  trouble  could  occur  under  a  system  of  universal  training. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Now,  General,  right  there,  you  say 
"  the  means  by  which  it  reaches  out  and  gets  hold  of  it "  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  But  suppose,  blindly  and  mistakenly, 
it  reached  out  and  did  not  get  hold  of  it. 

Gen.  Wood.  As  it  has  frequently  in  the  past. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Is  that  the  fault  of  the  National  Guard 
system  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  That  is  the  fault  of  the  National  Guard  system  abso- 
lutely. There  is  no  sufficiently  certain  method  of  getting  hold  of  the 
militia ;  we  don't  know  what  or  how  much  we  are  going  to  get. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  I  wanted  to  get  that  statement  from 
you,  because  it  throws  a  great  light  on  what  yon  have  been  talking 
about. 

Gen.  Wood.  If  you  wish  it,  let  me  go  into  that  a  little  more  fully. 

Of  course,  you  are  very  familiar  with  the  old  law  of  1792,  under 
which  all  men  between  18  and  45  were  made  members  of  the  military 
force  of  the  United  States. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Which  law  was  a  dead  letter  for  over  a 
hundred  years. 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes.  That  law  required  so  many  days  of  training  each 
year,  and  it  was  a  Federal  proposition,  really.  That  was  replaced 
by  the  Dick  law  of  1903,  with  modifications.  I  think,  of  June,  1906, 
1908,  and  1910 ;  May  and  April,  also,  in  1914 — April,  as  I  remember 
it.  The  system  was  further  amplified  by  minor  modifications  based 
on  those  laws,  in  the  shape  of  orders,  always  with  the  idea  of  better- 
ing the  condition  of  the  guard  and  improving  its  efficiency.  But, 
unfortunately — and  this  statement  applies  to  the  department  itself — 
while  we  assigned  inspector-instructors  to  groups  of  different  guard 
regiments  and  guard  organizations  all  over  the  Union  and  assigned 
at  each  department  headquarters  an  officer  in  charge  of  militia 
affairs,  we  did  not  coordinate  sufficiently  this  machinery.  Those 
inspector-instructors,  for  instance,  had  no  relation  whatever  with 
department  headquarters.  They  were  controlled  entirely  by  the 
Bureau  of  Military  Affairs  of  the  War  Department.  Up  to  the  time 
of  mobilization  the  department  commander  had  passing  through  his 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING.  1003 

office  certain  reports  concerning  the  militia,  their  training,  their 
strength,  their  equipment;  but  he  was  not  in  a  position  to  go  out  and 
inspect  in  person  the  militia  or  to  keep  himself  sufficiently  in  touch 
with  it;  that  is,,  from  the  standpoint  of  an  officer  acting  as  an  in- 
spector. He  was  not  in  a  position  to  carry  out  corrective  measures. 
At  the  date  of  mobilization  he  had  suddenly  thrown  upon  him  the 
entire  problem  of  mobilizing  the  militia.  All  these  inspector-in- 
structors from  the  Gulf  to  Maine  and  from  the  Ohio  to  the  coast  re- 
ported for  instructions.  Then  for  the  first  time  the  department  com- 
mander came  into  intimate  contact  with  the  militia.  In  other  words, 
it  was  a  system  under  which  a  maximum  of  change  was  required 
when  the  minimum  was  desirable. 

Senator  Lei:  of  Maryland.  That  is.  when  the  national  emergency 
took  place? 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes:  and  for  the  first  time  the  department  commander 
was  in  a  position  of  oflicial  responsibility  and  had  the  authority  to  go 
into  the  militia  situation.  Up  to  that  time  it  was  a  thing  from  which 
lie  was  in  effect  excluded,  so  far  as  any  detailed  knowledge  or  admin- 
istrative control  went. 

That  led,  of  course,  to  an  added  burden  of  work  on  department 
headquarters;  tor  the  first  time  these  instructor-inspectors  reported 
to  the  department.  I  have  urged  for  some  time  that  instructor- 
inspectors  should  be  on  the  staff  of  the  department  commanded  and 
that  all  supplies  necessary  to  bring  militia  from  peace  to  war 
strength  should  be  stored  as  are  our  supplies  for  Regular  troops  of 
the  department — under  the  control  of  the  department  commander — 
and  that  instructor-inspectors  should  report  to  him.  Then,  if  he  is 
not  fully  informed  afi  to  the  militia,  it  will  be  his  fault;  you  have  a 
fixed  responsibility:  you  can  make  him  responsible.  But,  under  the 
system  as  it  is,  the  situation  is  as  though  you  were  assigned  to  com- 
mand the  North  Atlantic  Fleet  and  were  never  allowed  to  go  aboard 
it  except  as  a  guest  or  to  know  what  the  condition  of  the  ships  was 
except  as  the  result  of  friendly  or  personal  inquiry  or  through  re- 
ports sent  by  the  ships'  officers.    There  was  no  personal  touch. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  You  are  talking  about  the  depots  now  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  am  talking  about  the  instructor-inspectors,  who 
should  really  be  on  the  staff  of  the  department  commander,  because 
the  moment  mobilization  is  ordered  the  department  commander  be- 
comes solely  responsible  for  the  mobilization  of  the  militia ;  that  is, 
its  assembly,  physical  examination,  and  muster  into  the  Federal 
service.     That  is  his  work. 

Senator  Brady.  But  he  has  no  official  control  of  it  up  to  that  time? 

Gen.  Wood.  Not  a  vestige  of  real  control  of  any  kind.  He  causes 
an  inspection  to  be  made  once  a  year  under  general  War  Depart- 
ment orders  to  see  what  the  amount  and  condition  of  the  militia 
equipment  is.  This  inspection  is  known  in  advance  and  it  amounts  to 
very  little.  The  condition  at  this  mobilization  was  one  under  which 
the  department  commander  was  suddenly  called  upon  to  take  charge 
of  the  mobilization  of  approximately  132,000  troops.  He  and  his 
staff  then  for  the  first  time  began  to  have  that  degree  of  contact  and 
control  which  they  should  have  had  long  before,  and  would  have  had 
under  a  sound  system  of  organization  and  arrangement  for  mobiliza- 
tion.    At  the  moment  of  mobilization  there  occurred  the  greatest 


1004  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY    TRAINING. 

amount  of  change.  The  department  commander,  hitherto  without 
control  or  detailed  knowledge,  was  suddenly  called  upon  to  assume 
full  responsibility. 

The  Chairman.  But  you  had  no  authority  to  do  it?. 

( Jen.  Wood.  Not  a  bit  of  authority. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Is  there  not  authority  in  the  new  law 
for  that? 

Gen.  Wood.  No,  sir.  In  my  opinion  there  is  no  sufficient  authority. 
As  a  matter  of  practice,  the  system,  with  all  the  defects,  which  were 
brought  out  in  this  mobilization,  is  still  in  effect.  There  is  a  little 
more  Federal  supervision,  but  there  is  still  dual  control,  and  this  is 
the  fatal  defect  of  the  whole  system.  The  new  law  may  operate  to 
diminish  somewhat  the  degree  of  dual  control,  to  amplify  a  little 
the  powers  of  the  Federal  Government,  to  control  somewhat  the 
action  of  the  State,  but  it  has  not  given  the  Federal  Government 
that  clean-cut,  unquestioned  control  which  it  must  have  if  the  force 
is  to  become  a  well-trained,  promptly  available  military  asset.  In 
the  last  analysis  about  all  that  the  Federal  Government  can  do  is  to 
withdraw  financial  aid.  The  department  commander  is  still  left 
without  that  contact  and  supervisory  power  which  he  should  have. 
He  is  not  only  without  this  power  from  the  standpoint  of  the  new 
law,  but  he  is  carefully  excluded  from  it  as  a  representative  of  the 
War  Department.  The  instructor-inspectors  are  still  acting  under 
the  order  of  the  Militia  Division.  There  is  still  that  pronounced 
failure  to  recognize  the  defects  of  the  system  and  its  method  of 
control  through  the  War  Department — the  defects  which  made  this 
mobilization  a  farce  and  might  have  made  it  a  tragedy  if  we  had  had 
to  meet  an  effective  enemy.  I  am  claiming  that  the  department  com- 
mander should  be,  so  far  as  the  militia  in  his  department  goes,  and 
so  far  as  State  control  will  permit  him  to  go,  exactly  in  the  position 
that  he  is  with  reference  to  Regular  troops — he  should  be  the  su- 
perior instructor-inspector  of  the  War  Department,  and  he  should 
be  charged  with  full  official  responsibility  for  seeing  that  those 
troops  are  always  fully  equipped  and  ready  to  move ;  and  if  they  are 
not,  it  should  be  shown  that  he  has  made  the  requisitions  upon  the 
War  Department  and  done  everything  in  his  power,  and  the  respon- 
sibility placed  exactly  where  it  belongs. 

I  will  submit  a  brief  statement  relative  to  the  old  law  and  the  new : 
new : 

Authority  Granted  to  Federal  Government  over  the  National  Guard  by 
the  Dick  Bill  and  Its  Amendments  as  Compared  to  that  Granted  by 
the  Act  of  June  3,  1916. 

dick  bill.  national-defense   act. 

Control  of  system  of  organization  of  National  Guard  units. 

The    regularly    enlisted,    organized,  The    organization    of    the    National 

and      uniformed      active     militia      in  Guard,    including   the    composition    of 

States,    Territories,    and    District    of  all  units,   shall  be  the  same  as  that 

Columbia  who  have  or  shall  partici-  prescribed     for    the    Regular    Army, 

pate  in  annual  appropriation  shall  con-  The  President  has  power  to  prescribe 

stitute  the  "  Organized  Militia."     The  particular  unit  or  units  as  to  branch 

organization   should   be   the   same   as  or   arm   of  service  to  be   maintained 

that  prescribed  for  the  Regular  Army,  in  each  State,  Territory,  and  District 

(Sec.  2,  act  May  27,  1908.)  of  Columbia.     (Sec.  60.) 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 


1005 


Maintenance  of  troops  other  than  those  authorized. 


No  specific  regulations. 


No  troops  shall  be  maintained  other 
than  those  authorized  under  act  of 
June  3   (sec.  61). 

Note. — Does  not  preclude  organiza- 
tion* and  maintenance  of  State  police 
or  constabulary. 


Strength  of  the  National  Guard. 


No  defining  terms,  except  that  no 
State  shall  be  entitled  to  the  benefits 
of  appropriations  unless  the  number 
of  its  regularly  enlisted,  organized,  and 
uniformed  active  militia  shall  be  at 
least  100  men  for  each  Senator  or  Rep- 
resentative in  Congress  to  which  the 
State  is  entitled.  (Sec.  2,  act  June  22, 
1906.) 


(a)  The  law  prescribes  that  the 
number  of  National  Guardsmen  in 
each  State  one  year  from  date  of  pas- 
sage of  act  of  June  3  shall  be  200 
enlisted  men  per  Senator  and  Repre- 
sentative in  Congress,  and  in  each 
Territory  and  the  District  of  Columbia 
such  Dumber  as  is  prescribed  by  the 
President.     (Sec.  62.) 

(b)  Bach  subsequent  yearly  incre- 
ment shall  not  be  less  than  60  per 
cent  until  the  total  peace  Btrengtb 
will  correspond  to  800  enlisted  men 
per  Senator  and  Representative 
(Sec.  62.) 


Exemption  from  mil  it  in  duty. 


Exemptions  authorized  without  re- 
gard to  age  and  other  limitations;  in- 
cludes same  classes  as  act  June  3, 
except  as  noted  under  defense  act. 
(Sec.  2,  ad  Jan.  ZL  VMS.) 


emptions   as   to  classes   same  as 

bill,  inn   includes  artificers  and 

workmen    in    navy    yards.      AM    es 

tions  are  from  militia  service  Id  com- 
batant capacity,  subject  to  regulations 
prescribed  by  President,  bu1  do  person 
s.»   exempted    shall   be   exempt    from 

militia    service    in    any    capacity    that 

the  President  shall  declare  to  be  non- 
combatant     <  Sec,  00. 1 


Disbandnu  nt  of  organization*. 


Nothing. 


National  Guard  organiza 
whose  members  shall  be  entitled  to 
and  shall  have  received  compensation 
under  act  of  June  3  shall  be  disbanded 
without  the  consent  of  the  President. 
(Sec.  68.) 


Training. 


(a)  Number  of  drills. — It  is  re- 
quired that  organizations  furnished 
with  material  of  war.  unless  excused 
by  governor,  to  assemble  for  drills  or 
target  practice  at  least  twenty-four 
times  per  year.  Duration  of  such 
drill  periods  not  prescribed.  (Sec.  18, 
act    .Ian.   21,  1903.) 

(  h)  nitration  and  character  of 
drills,  attendance. — Nothing. 


(a)  Number  of  drills. — Bach  com- 
pany, troop,  battery,  and  detachment 
in  National  Guard  shall  assemble  for 
drill  and  instruction,  including  indoor 
target  practice,  not  less  than  forty- 
eight  times  each  year.     ( Sec.  92. ) 


(b)  Duration  and  character  of 
drills,  attendance. — Credit  for  assem- 
bly for  drill  or  indoor  target  practice 
shall  not  be  given  unless  there  shall 
be  in  attendance  a  number  equal  to 
or  in  excess  of  a  minimum  to  be  pre- 
scribed by  President,  and  duration  of 
each  assembly  or  drill  for  winch  credit 


1006 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 


(c)  Encampments,  <t<-.  -Organiza- 
tions furnished  with  materials  of  war, 
unless  excused  by  governor,  required 

to  participate  in  practice  marches  or 
camps  of  instruction  at  least  5  con- 
secutive days  per  year.  (Sec.  18,  act 
Jan.  21,  1903.) 

(d)  Joint  Army  maneuvers,  etc. — 
Secretary  of  War  is  authorized  upon 
request  of  governors  to  arrange  for 
joint  encampments,  maneuvers,  etc., 
with  Regular  Army.  During  such 
period  militia  is  to  receive  same  scale 
of  pay  as  Regular  Army.  (Act.  Apr. 
21,  1910.) 


is  given  shall  he  at  least  1*  hours  and 
character  of  training  such  as  pre- 
scribed by  Secretary  of  War.    (Sec.  92.) 

(c)  Encampments,  etc. — organiza- 
tion shall  participate  in  encampments, 
maneuvers,  including  outdoor  target 
practice,  at  least  15  days  each  year, 
unless  such  organization  shall  have 
heen  excused  from  participation  there- 
in by  Secretary  of  War.     (Sec.  92.) 

(d)  Joint  Army  maneuvers,  etc. — 
Under  regulations  prescribed  by  Presi- 
dent, Secretary  of  War  is  authorized 
to  provide  for  joint  encampments,  ma- 
neuvers, etc.,  with  Regular  Army. 
During  such  period  National  Guard  is 
entitled  to  same  scale  of  pay  as  Regu- 
lar Army.     (Sec.  94.) 


Inspections. 


(a)  The  Secretary  of  War  to  cause 
to  be  made  by  officers  detailed  by  him, 
at  least  once  each  year,  inspection  of 
organizations  of  the  militia.  (Sec.  14, 
act  May  27,  1908.) 

Note. — The  supervision  of  this  in- 
spection was  delegated  to  department 
commanders.  (Par.  354,  Regulations 
Organized  Militia,  1910.) 

(b)  Reports  of  inspection  were  for- 
warded to  department  commanders 
who.  after  examining  same  and  adding 
such  remarks  as  they  desired,  were 
forwarded  to  Chief  Division  Militia 
Affairs.  (Par.  357,  Regulations  Or- 
ganized Militia,  1910.) 


Secretary  of  War  shall  cause  an  in- 
spection of  the  National  Guard  to  be 
made  at  least  once  each  year  by  in- 
spectors general,  and  if  necessary 
other  officers  of  the  Regular  Army  for 
purpose  of  determining  general  condi- 
tions of  organizations.     (Sec.  93.) 


Appointment  of  officers. 


(a)  Right  of  appointment  of  offi- 
cers.— Right  reserved  to  the  State. 
(Art.  I,  sec.  8,  Constitution  of  the 
United  States.) 

(b)  Appointments  subject  to  limita- 
tions.— Nothing. 


Appointment  of  officers  in  District 
of.  Columbia  and  Territories. — The 
commanding  general,  District  of  Co- 
lumbia, shall  be  appointed  and  com- 
missioned by  President.  (Sec.  7,  act 
Mar.  1,  1889.) 

President  of  the  United  States  may 
appoint  adjutant  general  of  the  Dis- 


(a)  Right  of  appointment  of  offi 
cers. — Right  reserved  to  the  State 
(Art.  I,  sec.  8,  Constitution  of  the 
United  States.) 

(b)  Appointments  subject  to  limita- 
tions.—1.  Age,  21-64.  (Sec.  58.)  2. 
Selection  of  those  recommended  for 
commissions  in  National  Guard  limited 
to  certain  classes.  (Sec.  74.)  3.  Those 
recommended  for  commissions  subject 
to  mental,  moral,  and  physical  exami- 
nation by  board  of  three  commissioned 
officers,  composed  of  Regular  Army  or 
National  Guard,  or  both,  appointed  by 
Secretary  of  War.  ( Sec.  75. )  4.  Those 
commissioned  must  be  subscribers  to 
oath  of  office  as  prescribed  in  section 
73,  national  defense  act.     (Sec.  74.) 

Appointment  of  officers  in  District 
of  Columbia  and  Territories. — Adju- 
tant general  of  District  of  Columbia 
appointed  by  President,  with  such 
rank  and  qualifications  as  he  may  pre- 
scribe.    (Sec.  66.) 

Adjutant  general  of  Territory  shall 
be  appointed  by  President,  with  such 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY    TRAINING.  1007 

trid  of  Columbia.     (Sec.  9,  act  Mar.     rank  and  qualifications  as  he  may  pre- 
1,  1889.)  scribe.     (Sec.  G6.) 

In  Territories  officers  of  militia 
shall  be  appointed  in  such  manner  as 
may  be  provided  by  the  governor  and 
legislative  assembly  of  each  Terri- 
tory.    (Sec.   1857,   K.  S.) 

Elimination  of  officer*. 

So  method  specified.  (a)  The  moral   character,  capacity, 

and  general  fitness  for  service  of  any 
officer  may  at  any  time  be  determined 
by  a  board  of  three  officers,  and  if 
findings  are  unfavorable  to  officer  and 
approved  by  appointing  official  au- 
thorized to  appoint  such  officer,  the 
officer  In  question  shall  be  discharged. 
(Sec.  77.) 

(o)  Vacation  of  commission  for  ab- 
sence without  leave  for  three  months. 
(Sec.  77.) 

(c)  Sentence  of  general  court-mar- 
tial.    (Sec.  77.) 

(d)  Resignation.     (See  77.) 

Limitations  of  State  authorities  in  acceptanci  nations  of  officers. 

No  limitations.  Congress    by    national-defense    act, 

having    assumed     control     respecting 

qualifications  of  officers  (sec  75)  and 
continuity  of  their  services  (sec.  77). 
it    has  been   held   th;it   in   time  of  peace 

the  assent  of  the  War  Department  is 

required  to  the  separation  of  an  officer 

from  the  National  Guard  by  resigna- 
tion. (Dec.  J.  A.  <;..  July  28,  191ft 
p.  5,  bul.  84.) 

Bnhstmonts. 

(a)  Age,  18  to  45  years.     (Sec.  1,  (a)  Age,  18  to  45  years.     (Sec  58.) 
act  May  27.  1908.) 

(b)  Enlistment    period. — None   pre-  (6)   Enlistment   period.   -Enlistment 
scribed.  period   shall    be   six    years,    divided    as 

follows:  First  three  years  in  active 
organization,  remaining  three  years  in 
National  Guard  Reserve;  privilege  of 
continuing  In  active  service  during  en- 
tire enlistment  period  authorized. 
(Sec.  69.) 

(c)  Qualifications.  —  None     pre-         (c)     Qualifications.  —  Qualifications 
scribed.  for  enlistment  shall  be  same  as  those 

for  Regular  Army.     ( Sec.  69. ) 

(d)  Oath  of  enlistment. — None  pre-  (d)   Oath    of    enlistment. — Oath    of 
scribed.                                                             enlistment  prescribed.     (Sec.  70.) 

Discharge  of  enlisted  men. 

No  provisions.  (a)  Enlisted  men  to  be  discharged 

in  such  form  and  with  such  classifica- 
tion as  prescribed  for  Regular  Army. 
(Sec.  72.) 

(o)  The  discharges  in  times  of 
peace  prior  to  expiration  of  term  of 
enlistment  may  be  given  under  regula- 
tions prescribed  by  the  President. 
(Sec.  72.) 


1008 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 


Accounting  for  property. 


(a)  Secretary  of  War  authorized  to 
procure  by  purchase  or  manufacture 
and  issue,  necessary  equipment  of  all 
kinds  required  for  equipping  Organ- 
ized Militia.     (Sec.  13,  act  1908.) 

(&)  Prescribes  law  in  procedure  of 
disposition  and  replacement  damaged 
property,  etc.,  and  that  the  money 
value  of  property  lost  or  destroyed 
through  carelessness  or  neglect  be 
charged  against  allotment  to  State. 
( Sec.  4,  June  22,  1906. ) 


(c)  Nothing. 


(d)  All  stores  to  be  annually  ac- 
counted for  by  governors  of  States  and 
Territories  and  commanding  general 
of  District  of  Columbia,  as  prescribed 
by  the  Secretary  of  War.  (Sec.  3,  act 
June  22,  1906.) 


(a)  Adequate  provision  for  protec- 
tion and  care  of  property  to  satisfac- 
tion Secretary  of  War  essential,  con- 
dition precedent  to  issue  thereof. 
(Sec.  83.) 

(&)  Prescribes  law  in  procedure  of 
disposition  and  replacement  of  dam- 
aged property,  etc.,  and  that  the  value 
of  property  lost  or  destroyed  through 
carelessness  shall  be  charged  to  ac- 
countable State,  Territory,  or  District 
of  Columbia,  and  to  be  paid  by  funds 
therefrom  other  than  Federal.  (Sec. 
87.) 

(c)  Penalty  for  failure  to  comply 
with  law  reference  reimbursement 
Federal  Government  for  property 
charged  to  the  State,  is  disbarment 
from  participation  in  appropriations 
until  reimbursement  has  been  made. 
(Sec.  87.) 

(d)  Accountable  officer  for  funds 
and  property  shall  be  appointed,  desig- 
nated, or  detailed  by  governor  df  each 
State  and  Territory,  and  commanding 
general  of  the  District  of  Columbia, 
subject  to  approval  by  the  Secretary 
of  War.  Returns  for  property  and 
funds  shall  be  rendered  by  such  officer 
so  appointed  under  regulations  pre- 
scribed by  the  Secretary  of  War.  ( Sec. 
67.) 


Detail  of  officers  and  noncommissioned  officers  of  the  Regular  Army  to  duty  as 
instructors  of  the  National  Guard. 


Upon  the  application  of  the  governor 
of  any  State  or  Territory  furnished 
with  material  of  war  the  Secretary  of 
War  may,  in  his  discretion,  detail  one 
or  more  officers  or  enlisted  men  of  the 
Army  to  report  to  the  governor  of  such 
State  or  Territory  for  duty  in  connec- 
tion with  the  Organized  Militia.  Such 
assignments  may  be  revoked  at  the  re- 
quest of  the  governor  of  such  State  or 
Territory,  or  at  the  pleasure  of  the 
Secretary  of  War.     (Act  Mar.  3, 1911.) 


(a)  The  Secretary  of  War  shall  de- 
tail officers  of  the  active  list  of  the 
Army  and  may  detail  one  or  more 
enlisted  men  to  duty  with  the  National 
Guard.     (Sec.  100.) 

(b)  Officers  so  detailed  may  accept 
commissions  in  National  Guard  in  dis- 
cretion of  President.     (Sec.  100.) 

Note. — Under  paragraph  28,  letter 
Militia  Bureau,  November  1,  1916,  No. 
210651,  inspector-instructors  are  in- 
formed that  the  matter  of  their  being 
commissioned  in  National  Guard  or- 
ganizations must  originate  with  State 
authorities.  In  the  said  letter,  under 
paragraph  25  (h),  inspector-instructors 
and  noncommissioned  officers  on  duty 
with  the  National  Guard  will  not  be 
relieved  from  duty  at  the  request  of 
State  authorities  except  for  cogent  rea- 
sons. Any  charges  arising  against  them 
will  be  investigated  and  they  will  be 
given  ample  opportunity  to  reply  there- 
to before  action  looking  to  their  relief 
will  he  taken  by  the  War  Department. 


UNIVERSAL  MILITARY   TRAINING.  1009 

Discipline. 

(a)   The     discipline     of     Organized  (a)  Discipline  (which  includes  train- 

Mllitia  shall  be  t  he  same  as  that  pre-  ing)  of  the  National  Guard  shall  con- 
scribed  for  the  Regular  Army.  (Sec.  form  to  the  system  prescribed  for  the 
."».  act  1908.)  Regular  Army.     (Sec.  91.) 

(b)  System  of  courts-martial  and 
procedure  thereof,  limits  of  punish- 
ments, etc.,  are  prescribed.  (Sees.  107 
to  108,  inclusive) 

Passing  of  officers  to  the  National  Guard  Reserve. 

Nothing.  (a)    Officers  of  National  Guard  ren- 

dered surplus  by  dishandment  of  their 
organizations  shall  be  placed  in  Na- 
tional Guard  Reserve,    (Sec.  77.) 

i  h)  ( Officers,  on  own  application,  may 
be  placed  in  National  Guard  Reserve. 
(Sec.  77.) 

Noncompliance  with  existing  laws  and  r<  filiations. 

The  annual  allotment  to  any  State,  Any  State  failing  or  refusing  to  corn- 
Territory,  or  District  of  Columbia  ply  or  to  enforce  within  time  limit 
shall  be  available  only  under  such  con-       fixed    by    President    any    requirements 

dit ions  as  may  be  prescribed  by  Sec-  of  act  or  regulations  promulgated 
retary  of  War  to  secure  general  in-  thereunder  the  National  Guard  thereof 
creased  efficiency  of  Organized  Militia,  will  be  deprived  as  the  President  may 
(Act  Apr.  27,  1914.)  direct    from  further  Federal  support. 

(Sec.  116.) 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Under  the  old  Dick  law  there  was  no 
money  furnished  for  these  inspectors  to  go  to  see  the  State  troops. 

Gen.  Wood.  It  is  furnished  now,  sir. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Under  the  new  law 

Gen.  Wood.  No;  under  the  old  law.  Senator,  if  you  will  pardon  me. 
We  appropriated  some  millions  of  dollars  to  aid  the  various  States  in 
militia  matters,  and  out  of  this  money  they  appropriate  certain 
amounts  for  the  mileage  of  these  officers.  That  was,  as  a  rule,  from 
money  given  by  the  Federal  Government  to  the  State. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  That  was  reconverted  to  a  Federal 
purpose  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes ;  after  being  given  to  the  State. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Gen.  Barry  recognized  that  these  in- 
structors, who  should  be  the  active  agencies  for  improving  the  dis- 
cipline of  the  militia,  should  be  separated  from  the  inspectors  of  the 
militia.    Do  you  agree  with  that  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  May  I  state  it  a  little  more  fully  than  you  have  ? 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Yes. 

Gen.  Wood.  The  reason  for  that  recommendation  was  as  follows: 
It  is  undesirable  to  have  a  man  who  has  been  instructing  a  group 
of  organizations  to  also  inspect  them.  It  is  practically  calling  upon 
an  officer  to  inspect  and  report  upon  his  own  work.  We  have  over- 
come this  difficulty  by  having  men  inspect  the  regiments  instructed 
by  others.  I  have  submitted  a  very  full  recommendation,  setting 
forth  what  I  believe  to  be  a  sound  policy  with  reference  to  the  rela- 


1010  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 

tions  which  should  exist  between  the  department  commander  and 
instructor  inspectors,  as  follows: 

(The  recommendation  referred  to  is  here  printed  in  full,  as  fol- 
lows:) 

Headquarters  Eastern  Department, 

June  22,  1915. 
From:  Department  commander. 

To:  The  Adjutant  General,  United  Slates  Army,  Washington,  D.  C. 
Subject:  Relationship  of  department  commander  with  the  Organized  Militia. 

1.  With  reference  to  your  letter  of  June  3.  1915  (2245346-C),  informing  me 
that  the  Secretary  of  War  had  disapproved  the  recommendations  contained  in 
my  letters  of  January  5  and  March  15,  1915  (ED  12507-B  and  12507-E),  I 
wish,  in  view  of  the  apparent  misconception  of  the  subject  matter  of  my  letters, 
as  indicated  by  the  reply  above  referred  to.  to  submit  the  following  statement ; 
not,  however,  with  a  view  of  requesting  further  consideration  of  my  recom- 
mendations, as  I  can  but  conclude  from  the  tone  of  the  letter  that  no  further 
suggestions  are  desired.  Your  letter  of  June  3  does  not,  in  my  opinion,  clearly 
reply  to  the  questions  which  I  have  brought  up.  My  letter  of  January  5  in 
no  way  discusses  the  relationship  of  the  Organized  Militia  with  the  War  De- 
partment.   That  letter  (Jan.  5)  was  as  follows: 

"  12507-B. 

"  1.  In  view  of  the  necessity  for  arranging  well  in  advance  the  schedule 
of  events  in  the  North  and  South  Atlantic  Coast  Artillery  districts,  I  request 
that  the  department  commander  be  authorized  to  take  up  directly  with  the 
authorities  of  the  United  States  Military  Academy  and  Organized  Militia  of 
the  Coast  Artillery  Reserves,  the  question  of  dates  for  their  annual  encamp- 
ments. 

"  2.  This  is  necessary  in  order  that  the  details  may  be  properly  worked  out 
and  all  concerned  informed  well  in  advance.  It  is  desired  that  these  headquar- 
ters be  furnished  as  soon  as  possible  with  a  copy  of  the  Annual  Instruction 
Order  for  Coast  Artillery  Troops. 

"  3.  It  is  proposed  to  authorize  the  commanding  officers  of  the  North  and 
South  Atlantic  Coast  Artillery  districts  (subject  to  the  general  supervision  of 
these  headquarters)  to  transfer,  as  may  be  needed  for  temporary  service, 
boats  and  artillery  material  from  one  defense  command  to  another,  also  such 
personnel  as  may  be  required  for  service  as  umpire,  etc.  I  believe  that  this 
procedure  is  advisable  in  order  that  the  commanding  officers  of  these  districts 
may  be  given  a  proper  measure  of  responsibility  for  the  efficient  conduct  of 
practice  and  instruction,  throughout  the  limits  of  their  commands.  The  pro- 
cedure outlined  is  in  '  general  accord  with  the  recommendations  submitted  by 
Gen.  Bailey,  prior  to  his  relief  from  the  command  of  the  North  Atlantic  Coast 
Artillery  district,'  and,  as  will  be  seen,  requested  that  in  view  of  the  necessity 
of  arranging  well  in  advance  the  schedule  of  events  in  the  North  and  South 
Atlantic  Coast  Artillery  districts,  that  the  department  commander  be  furnished 
with  a  copy  of  the  Annual  Instruction  Order,  C.  A.  C.  and  that  he  be  authorized 
to  take  up  directly  with  the  authorities  of  the  United  States  Military  Academy 
and  the  Organized  Militia  within  the  limits  of  the  department,  the  question 
of  dates  for  these  exercises.  This  was  most  desirable  in  order  to  make  the 
necessary  arrangements  well  in  advance,  as  this  instruction  has  to  be  carried 
out  through  the  cooperation  and  with  the  assistance  of  regular  troops  of  the 
department.  In  order  to  avoid  as  much  as  possible  interference  with  their 
regular  program  during  the  outdoor  season,  it  is  important  to  know  in  advance 
what  is  to  be  done  in  connection  with  instruction  of  the  militia.  This  was 
clearly  and  specifically  stated,  and  I  believe  that  the  wisdom  and  desirability 
of  such  procedure  is  obvious." 

2.  On  February  6,  no  formal  information  having  been  received,  the  request 
for  information  was  renewed.  In  the  meantime  I  had  been  in  Washington 
and  understood  from  Brig.  Gen.  Mills,  Division  of  Militia  Affairs,  that  these 
requests  were  under  consideration  and  that  the  policy  would  be  approved. 
See  letter  of  February  6,  these  headquarters  (12507-C).  On  March  15,  a 
memorandum  was  'furnished  the  Chief  of  Staff  in  the  form  of  a  letter 
(12507-E),  stating,  what  I  believe,  should  be  the  relations  between  the  de- 
partment commander  and  the  Militia  of  the  department,  and  pointed  out 
the  desirability  of  the  department  commander  being  consulted  by  the  War 
Department  with  reference  to  the  establishment  of  the  various  camps,  etc. 
This  letter  was  as  follows: 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING.  1011 

"  Replying  to  your  memorandum  of  February  8,  1915: 

"  First  As  to  the  memorandum  of  the  Secretary  of  War  of  January  .SO,  1915. 
I  fail  to  understand  his  interpretation  of  the  first  paragraph  of  my  letter  of 
January  5,  1913  (12507-B,  ED,  2227754,  A.  <;.  <>.).  This  paragraph  states 
what  is  desired.  This  does  not,  as  I  understand  it,  in  any  way  affect  the 
relations  between  the  Federal  Government  and  the  National  Guard,  but  tends 
to  make  the  department  commander  the  Secretary  of  War's  representative  to 
a  greater  extent  than  is  the  case  at  present.  Under  the  existing  system  the 
character  and  amount  of  the  instruction  is  prescribed,  and  properly,  by  the 
Secretary  of  War  through  the  Division  of  Militia  Affairs  of  the  Chief  of 
Staff's  office,     in  order  to  carry  out  these  orders  it  is  necessary  to  furnish 

officers,  in  some  instances  troops,  a  well  as  funds  for  mileage.  Troops  of  the 
department,  however,  must  be  instructed  and  have  a  certain  amount  of  field 
training.     Under  the  procedure  at   present   in  force,  instead  of  referring  to 

the  department  commander  the  plan  of  instruction  of  the  Militia  within  the 
department,  with  a  statement  of  the  officers  and  organisations  to  be  instructed 
and  directing  him  to  arrange  for  the  prescribed  instruction  -the  first  infor- 
mation is  generally  a  letter  of  instruction  from  the  War  Department  direct- 
ing the  department  commander  to  arrange  for  camps  at  certain  posts  or  places 
within  the  department  for  certain  periods  of  time.  This  is  sent  to  the  de- 
partment commander  generally  without  any  previous  reference  to  him  or 
any  preliminary  inquiry  as  to  funds  or  to  the  department  orders  and  arrange- 
ments for  the  Instruction  of  regular  troops.  What  was  recommended  was 
that  the  department  commander,  once  he  has  been  informed  as  to  what 
troops  are  to  participate,  the  amount  and  kind  of  instruction,  the  period  for 
which  they  will  be  available,  etc..  be  allowed  to  take  the  matter  up  with  the 
State  authorities  within  the  department  with  a  view  to  arranging  the  de- 
tails, i.  e.,  the  exact  time  and  dates  for  the  different  organizations,  in  order 
that  there  may  be  the  minimum  of  interference  with   the  plans  for   instruction 

of  the  troops  of  the  department.  It  is  understood  that  instruction  of  the 
Militia,  because  of  its  occupations,  must   in  a  general  way  take  precedence 

over  the  instruction  of  the  regular  troops  as  to  time;  but,  under  the  scheme 
proposed,  measures  could  be  taken  to  avoid  to  a  large  extent  conflict  in  ar- 
rangements. Moreover,  there  is  at  each  department  headquarters  an  officer 
in  Charge  of  militia  affairs,  who  in  case  the  regular  division  is  called  into 
the  field  becomes  the  department  commander,  and  if  the  Militia  is  to  be 
mobilized  is  charged  with  this  work.  He  at  present  has  little  contact  with 
Hie  Militia  and  the  Militia   are.  with  the  exception  Of  the  brief  period  of  joint 

Instruction  every  other  year,  largely  cut   off  from  official   contact   with  the 

department  commander  and  department  authorities.  This  is  not  a  sound 
policy,   neither   does   it    tend   to   the  establishment    of   that    thorough    knowledge 

of    the    Militia    by    the    department    authorities,    nor    to    tl stablishment    of 

those  relations  which  should  exist  ;  QOT  docs  it  tend  to  build  up  a  condition 
which    would     facilitate    the    mobilization    of    the    Militia     in    case    of    sudden 

emergency.     When  the  present   Division  of  Militia  Affairs  was  organized  as 

a  division  of  the  office  Of  the  Chief  of  Staff  the  general  situation  concerning 
the  Militia  was  such  as  to  necessitate  a  considerable  measure  of  concentration. 
It  was  not  the  purpose  at  that  time  to  continue  Indefinitely  such  degree  of 
centralization,  but  rather  to  gradually  place  the  department  commanders  in  a 
position  of  close  contact  with  the  Militia  within  the  limits  of  their  depart- 
ments, once  the  existing  conditions  were  corrected. 

"In  my  (►pinion  the  inspector  Instructors  should  be  attached  to  department 
headquarters  through  the  office  of  the  officer  in  charge  of  militia  affairs,  who 
should  have  general  supervision  over  their  discharge  of  duty,  so  far  as  such 
supervision  may  be  necessary.  These  officers  are  now  without  any  direct  con- 
nection with  headquarters,  and  neither  the  department  commander  nor  the 
officer  in  charge  of  militia  affairs  have  any  relations  with  them  which  either 
warrants  an  exercise  of  supervision  or  authorizes  the  securing  of  information 
concerning  actual  conditions  in  the  militia. 

"The  procedure  recommended  will  facilitate  the  work  of  militia  instruction 
and  tend  to  build  up  those  relations  between  the  militia  and  the  department 
authorities  which  will  enable  the  latter  to  become  thoroughly  familiar  in  time 
of  peace  with  conditions  existing  within  the  militia  and  not  render  it  necessary 
to  familiarize  themselves  with  militia  conditions  at  the  moment  of  mobilization 
when  all  is  confusion.  In  any  case  it  is  believed  that  department  commanders 
should  be  authorized  to  deal  directly  with  inspector  instructors  in  all  matters 
which  pertain  to  mobilization.     At  present  the  department  commander  has  no 


1012  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 

authority  to  call  upon  the  inspector  instructors  for  information  upon  this  sub- 
ject. In  other  words,  a  condition  exists  which  does  not  tend  to  that  degree  of 
preparedness  for  mobilization  which  should  exist,  but  rather  to  one  which  ren- 
ders it  difficult  for  the  department  commander  to  familiarize  himself  with  con- 
ditions which  would  be  of  vital  importance  to  him  in  case  a  prompt  mobilization 
of  the  militia  were  necessary.  It  is  an  unsound  administrative  situation  and 
prejudicial  to  the  prompt  mobilization  of  the  milita.  To  accomplsh  this,  the 
authority  immediately  charged  with  the  mobilization  must  be  thoroughly  famil- 
iar in  advance  with  everything  pertaining  thereto,  including  the  conditions  as 
to  the  equipment  and  preparedness  of  the  troops. 

"As  an  illustration  of  existing  conditions  four  letters  of  instructions  have 
recently  been  received  relative  to  camps  of  instruction,  as  follows : 

"(a)  For  Infantry  officers  at  the  several  State  camps. 

"(fc)  For  Cavalry  officers  at 'Fort  Ethan  Allen,  Vt,  and  Fort  Oglethorpe,  Ga. 

"(c)  For  Field  Artillery  officers  at  Tobyhanna,  Pa.,  and  Anniston,  Ala. 

"(d)  For  medical  officers  and  noncommissioned  officers  of  the  Organized 
Militia  and  medical  officers  of  the  Reserve  Corps  at  Tobyhanna,  Pa.,  and  Fort 
Oglethorpe,  Ga. 

"The  places  and  times  for  these  camps  have  been  selected  without  any 
reference  of  the  matter  to  these  headquarters  or  any  knowledge  by  the  militia 
division  of  the  plans  for  the  field  work  of  the  troops  of  the  department  or  of 
available  funds  for  moving  officers.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  department  is 
without  mileage  funds  necessary  to  send  officers  to  these  camps  as  instructors. 
It  can  be  readily  seen  that  orders  issued  in  this  manner  cause  confusion  and  do 
not  tend  to  the  best  results.  The  method  of  procedure  fails  to  in  any  way  con- 
sider the  plans  of  the  department  as  to  its  regular  work.  I  think  such  disregard 
is  unnecessary." 

The  final  paragraph  of  this  letter  states  explicitly  the  situation  and  points 
out  the  desirability  of  the  department  commander  knowing  something  of  what 
is  intended.  The  department  commander  is  charged  with  the  instruction  and 
efficiency  of  the  regular  troops  of  his  command,  and  he  has  certain  duties  in 
connection  with,  the  militia,  and  I  believe  that  good  administration  indicates 
clearly  the  desirability  of  his  having  the  fullest  possible  information  well  in 
advance  so  that  he  may  make  the  necessary  plans. 

3.  There  was  nothing  in  these  recommendations,  so  far  as  I  can  see,  that 
involved  the  relationship  of  the  Federal  Government  and  the  Organized 
Militia.  With  reference  to  the  statement  in  paragraph  (b),  letter  of  June  3 
(A.  G.  O.,  2245346-C,  HED  12507-F),  "also  he  is  charged  with  the  elaboration 
of  plans  for  the  mobilization  of  militia  when  called  into  the  Federal  service, 
which  responsibility,  by  the  way,  has  not  yet  been  met."  On  February  13  the 
department  commander  forwarded  to  the  Secretary  of  War  a  report  of  the 
officer  in  charge  of  militia  affairs,  Eastern  Department,  requesting  certain 
information,  in  order  that  this  very  question  of  mobilization  of  militia  could 
be  intelligently  taken  up  (12672-A).  This  letter  has  neither  been  acknowledged 
nor  any  reply  to  the  questions  therein  asked  received.  The  matter  of  elaborat- 
ing plans  for  the  mobilization  of  militia  in  this  department  is  a  comparatively 
simple  one,  but  in  view  of  the  questions  raised  by  the  officer  in  charge  of 
militia  affairs  I  deemed  it  wise  to  obtain  the  decision  of  the  Secretary  of  War 
on  what  seemed  to  be  important  points  before  these  plans  were  taken  up. 
With  reference  to  the  statements  made  in  subsequent  portions  of  your  letter 
of  June  3,  I  believe  that  I  am  reasonably  familiar  with  the  relationship  which 
exists  between  the  Federal  Government  and  the  militia.  Many  of  the  existing 
regulations  were  prepared  under  my  general  supervision.  Nowhere  in  my 
letters,  within  referred  to,  is  there  the  most  remote  suggestion  or  implication 
that  the  War  Department  could  give  orders  to  governors  of  States,  much  less 
that  the  department  commander  could  do  so,  nor  is  there  any  thought  or  sug- 
gestion of  interfering  with  or  diminishing  the  dignity  of  communication  of 
the  Federal  Government  with  the  governors  of  States.  The  advisory  capacity 
of  inspector-instructors  is  fully  understood.  What  was  clearly  indicated  was  that 
the  department  commander  and  the  officer  in  charge  of  militia  affairs,  should, 
without  in  any  way  originating  policy,  be  the  senior  representatives  of  the  War 
Department  in  its  dealings  with  the  militia  authorities  within  the  limits  of  the 
department,  and  that  the  officers  on  duty  within  the  department  limits  should 
be  attached  to  the  office  of  the  officer  in  charge  of  militia  affairs  in  order 
that  there  might  be  a  fuller  understanding  and  more  complete  cooperation.  I 
believe  that  this  policy  is  sound  and  that  Its  initiation  would  tend  greatly  to 
improve  the  efficiency  of  the  work  being  done.    There  was  no  question  what- 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING.  1013 

ever  raised  concerning  the  formulation  of  policy  by  the  department  authorities; 
in  fact,  it  was  clearly  stated  that  it  must  be  originated  by  the  Secretary  of 
War,  nor  was  there  any  suggestion  concerning  the  allotment  of  funds  to  the 
different  States  by  department  commanders. 

4.  In  submitting  this  letter  I  wish  to  state  most  positively  that  it  is  not 
submitted  in  any  spirit  of  controversy,  but  simply  with  a  view  to  clearing  up  on 
the  records  what  1  can  only  conclude  from  your  letter  of  June  3  is  an  entire  mis- 
conception of  the  purpose  of  my  recommendations.  My  object  was  t<>  estab- 
lish what  I  believed  to  be  a  greater  degree  of  cooperation,  more  helpful  rela- 
tionship, and  thorough  understanding  between  the  department  commander,  his 
principal  assistant  in  militia  matters,  and  the  militia  authorities  of  the  various 
States. 

Leonard  Wood. 
Major  General,  Commanding. 

(Mailed  June  26,  1915,  a.  m.) 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  You  agree  with  Gen.  Barry  on  that? 

Gen.  Wood.  Oh,  yes;  in  principle.  We  take  the  inspector  from 
one  State  or  one  district  and  send  him  to  inspect  the  work  of  the 
inspector  in  another.  For  instance,  if  1  was  assigned,  we  will  say,  to 
the  Second  Maryland  Regiment  or  the  Fifth  New  Jersey,  and  Senator 
Lee  were  assigned  to  another  one,  as  inspectors,  I  would  inspect  his 
regiment  and  he  would  inspect  mine,  so  that  there  might  not  be  too 
much  of  the  .personal  equation. 

Senator  Brady.  It  certainly  would  not  be  proper  to  have  a  man 
inspect  his  own  work. 

Gen.  Wood.  No;  certainly  not. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  That  has  been  the  system  up  to  date? 

Gen.  Wood.  No,  sir.  As  a  rule,  instructor- inspectors  do  not  in- 
spect troops  which  they  have  instructed.  For  several  years  I  have 
been  trying  to  secure  action  placing  the  instructor-inspectors  on  the 
stall'  of  the  department  commander  with  relations  as  set  forth  in  the 
above  letter.  You  will  not  find  the  detailed  instructions  governing 
the  duties  of  instructor-inspectors  in  the  militia  law.  You  will  find 
these  in  general  orders  and  circulars.  In  brief,  the  department  com- 
mander should  be  the  superior  inspector  and  the  senior  representa- 
tive of  the  War  Department  in  all  matters  relating  to  the  militia 
within  the  limits  of  his  department.  His  contact  should  be  so  close 
and  so  intimate  that  when  mobilization  is  ordered  he  will  be  as  fa- 
miliar with  the  militia  and  its  equipment  and  training  as  with  the 
regular  troops  under  his  command. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Gen.  Barry  says  in  his  fifth  item,  on 
page  136,  report  of  October  19,  1916 : 

The  position  of  Inspector-instructor  should  be  abolished.  There  should  be  two 
'•lasses  of  officers  on  regular  duty  with  the  National  (iuard — ono,  Instructors; 
and  the  other,  Inspectors. 

An  Instructor  should  be  assigned  from  the  Regular  Army  to  each  regiment, 

or  other  Independent  unit,  of  the  National  Guard.  When  suitable  mobilization 
camps  are  selected  and  the  administrative  staff  of  such  camps,  composed  of 
regular  officers,  assisted  by  staff  officers  and  noncommissioned  officers  of  the 
National  Guard,  there  would  be  no  necessity  for  taking  instructors  away  from 
their  regiments  in  order  to  perform  staff  duties  at  mobilization  camps  just  at 
the  time  when  their  services  are  most  needed  with  their  organizations. 

In  other  words,  these  instructors  were  taken  from  that  and  made 
mustering  officers. 

Gen.  Wood.  They  had  to  be,  sir.  We  were  very  short  of  regular 
officers,  as  you  know.  Moreover,  they  were  well  informed  on  local 
conditions. 


1014  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY    TRAINING. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Gen.  Barry  continues : 

The  Instructor  should  accompany  the  organization  wherever  it  goes  and  might 
be  given  suitable  rank  therein  when  the  organization   Is  called   Into  Federal 

service. 

Inspectors  of  the  National  Guard  should  be  carefully  selected  from  officers 
on  the  active  list  of  the  Regular  Army.  They  should  i>e  assigned  to  department 
headquarters,  and  their  sole  duty  should  be  to  Inspect  the  National  Guard 
organizations  within  the  department  and  the  instructors  thereof. 

Only  by  having  these  two  classes — instructors  and  Inspectors — will  It  he  possi- 
ble to  make  anything  like  an  efficient  machine  out  of  the  various  and  varying 
units  of  the  National  Guard. 

Senator  Brady.  What  is  your  opinion  about  that,  Senator  Lee? 
Do  you  not  believe  that  should  be  done? 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Absolutely;  but  under  the  present  ar- 
rangement it  is  a  Federal  condition  and  not  a  National  Guard  condi- 
tion, not  a  local  condition. 

The  Chairman.  Is  it  a  deficiency  in  the  law  or  a  deficiency  in  not 
enforcing  the  law  that  we  have? 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  I  should  say  it  was  a  failure  of  sound 
military  judgment  somewhere,  either  in  the  War  Department  or  in 
legislation. 

Senator  Brady.  Is  it  not  a  failure  of  some  of  the  States  to  pass 
the  law  ? 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  The  States  had  nothing  to  do  with  it. 
They  were  the  victims  of  the  omission.  The  effect  was  upon  the  State 
troops.  This  system  of  instruction  and  inspection  was  vital  to  the 
discipline  of  the  National  Guard,  and  yet  it  was  defective. 

Senator  Brady.  Do  the  laws  of  the  States  permit  the  National 
Government  to  inspect  in  that  manner? 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  The  States  could  not  take  the  Regular 
Army  system  and  remodel  it.  That  must  come  from  Congress  and 
the  War  Department. 

Senator  Brady.  Do  you  not  believe,  Senator  Lee.  that  what  we 
really  need  in  this  matter  is  cooperation  between  the  States  and  the 
National  Government,  and  out  of  this  chaotic  condition  to  bring  in 
something  that  will  be  really  beneficial  in  the  way  of  military  en- 
deavor ? 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Senator,  I  think  that,  so  far  as  I  can 
judge,  there  has  been  no  lack  of  willingness  to  cooperate  on  instruc- 
tion by  the  States.    I  think  Gen.  Wood  so  testified. 

Senator  Brady.  I  feel  that  way  myself  about  it;  but,  with  all  the 
cooperation  that  we  have  been  able  to  give  between  the  States  and  the 
Government,  it  seems  to  me  we  still  lack" something  in  the  way  of  law. 

Gen.  Wood.  Senator,  may  I  state  right  here,  in  order  to  clarify  this 
discussion  as  much  as  possible,  that  these  instructor-inspectors,  when 
they  go  to  a  State,  report  to  the  adjutant  general  of  the  State  and 
are  under  his  exclusive  orders?  The  department  commander  has 
nothing  to  do  with  them — no  control  over  them  in  their  relations 
with  the  militia.  They  act  under  the  orders  of  the  adjutant  general 
of  the  State,  and  w7hen  they  report  they  report  to  the  adjutant  gen- 
eral, and,  as  a  matter  of  courtesy  to  the  governor,  they  are  on  his  staff, 
and  the  department  commander  has  nothing  to  do  with  them. 

Senator  Brady.  I  remember  when  I  was  governor  of  my  State  that 
the  adjutant  general  would  bring  the  report  of  the  inspection  to  the 
executive  office  and  preserve  it. 


I'MVKHSAi.    MII.MAKY     TRAINING.     '  1015 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  General,  if  this  group  of  officers  report 
to  the  adjutant  general  of  the  State  of  Maryland  as  instructor-inspec- 
tors from  the  War  Department,  the  adjutant  general  of  Maryland 
would  hardly  have  the  authority  or  the  relationship  to  say,  "  You 
gentlemen  can  not  be  instructor-inspectors." 

Gen.  Wood.  He  can  not  properly  say  that. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  He  could  not  say,  "  I  am  going  to  stop 
some  of  you  from  inspecting  and  make  you  instructors,  and  T  am 
going  to  have  one  of  you  merely  an  inspector."  He  could  not  do  that, 
could  he? 

Gen.  Wood.  He  can  not  do  that.  Their  general  functions  are  fixed 
by  War  Department  orders.  Your  idea  is  not  a  bad  one  at  all.  The 
reason  that  we  have  had  to  combine  the  functions  is  due  to  the  short- 
age of  officers. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  I  would  respectfully  agree  with  Gen. 
Barry's  recommendation  that  they  should  have  the  single  function. 

Gen.  Wood.  Of  course,  Senator,  we  should  not  need  as  many  in- 
spectors as  we  do  instructors. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Wry  few  inspectors;  say  one  for  a 
State. 

<ien.  Wood.  Of  course,  that  would  depend  upon  the  number  of 
organizations  to  he  inspected  and  the  arm.  If  this  scheme  which  I 
have  outlined  is  accepted,  i.  e.,  attaching  instructors  to  the  staff  of 
the  commanding  general  of  the  department,  it  should  he  done.  Our 
regular  inspector  general  and  his  assistants  would  make  the  detailed 
inspection  of  the  militia,  just  as  they  do  in  case  of  the  Regular  troops, 
and  the  function  of  these  other  officers  would  be  principally  that  of 
instructors.  I  hope  this  plan  will  be  approved!  The  fundamental 
objection  to  the  present  militia  system  is  that  these  troops  are  really 
Stale  organizations,  they  are  not  Federal.  The  whole  system  in  its 
working  and  results  is  founded  on  uncertainty  and  clouded  by  ob- 
scurity. We  do  not  know  what  we  have  as  a  military  asset.  It  de- 
pends too  much  on  State  action.  This  is  the  crucial  defect.  I  am  not 
disposed  to  criticize,  as  I  have  repeatedly  said,  either  officers  or  men. 
They  have  done  the  best  they  could  under  the  defective  system.  It  is 
the  system  that  we  are  after.  National  defense  must  be  by  national 
troops,  not  State. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  General.  I  will  submit  for  your  inspec- 
tion and  insert  in  the  record  War  Department  Bulletin  No.  58,  dated 
August  2,  1916,  being  a  telegram  from  Gen.  Funston. 

(The  bulletin  referred  to  is  here  printed  in  full,  as  follows:)        % 

Wak  DkPABTMINT   PRESS   r.ri.i.KiiN    No.   58. 

August  2,  U)i&— 10.30  a,  m. 
Following  telegram  lias  been  received  from  (Jen.  Funston: 
"I  wish  to  call  attention  of  the  War  Department  to  the  carnival  of  lying 
being  indulged  in  by  many  of  the  correspondents  who  accompanied  the  State 
troops  to  the  border.  I  have  never  seen  nor  heard  of  anything  that  approaches 
it  for  sheer  maliciousness  and  shamelessness.  While  there  are  honorable  excep- 
tions, many  of  these  correspondents  are  men  of  no  judgment  or  balance  and  have 
had  so  little  experience  in  the  world  that  they  seem  to  have  no  sense  of  balance 
or  proportion. 

"  Ordinary  inconveniences  or  deprivations  that  to  a  man  of  real  soldierly  in- 
stincts are  merely  subjects  for  jokes  are  magnified  into  most  distressing  stories. 
They  persistently  neglect  to  say  anything  about  the  excellent  and  creditable 


1016  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 

% 
things  that  they  see.  and  if  they  can  see  nothing  to  find  fault  with,  they  manu- 
facture lies  out  of  whole  cloth.  The  effect  is  to  distress  needlessly  the  families 
and  friends  of  the  members  of  the  State  organizations  and  to  make  people  of 
other  nations  think  we  are  a  degenerated  race  of  sissies  and  mollycoddles, 
Incapable  of  being  made  into  soldiers.  I  have  endured  these  pests  as  long  as  I 
propose  to  and  shall  hereafter  bar  offenders  from  camp  and  prohibit  them  from 
accompanying  troops  on  the  march." 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  I  will  ask  you  whether  or  not  that  did 
not  have  a  discouraging  effect  upon  enlistment.  I  do  not  mean  the 
bulletin;  I  mean  the  rumors. 

Gen.  Wood.  The  report  of  alleged  bad  conditions  and  inconven- 
ience ? 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Yes;  the  "carnival  of  lying"  about 
the  conditions  of  the  troops,  their  food,  etc.;  whether  that  did  not 
have  an  effect  upon  enlistment- 
Gen.  Wood.  I  do  not  believe  it  would  have  deterred  you  or  the 
average  man  who  intended  to  serve  the  Nation.  I  believe  it  deterred 
a  good  many  feeble-hearted  ones. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  In- this  connection  I  will  put  into  the 
record  a  telegram  which  I  sent  Gen.  Bliss,  and  his  answer  on  the  same 
subject. 

(The  telegrams  referred  to  are  here  printed  in  full  as  follows:) 

July  28,  1916. 
Maj.  Gen.  Tasker  H.  Bliss, 

El  Paso,  Tex. 
You  are  quoted  in  papers  here  as  stating  your  intention  to  recommend  to  the 
Secretary  of  War  that  all  guardsmen  on  the  border  who  are  discontented  with 
camp  life  be  sent  back  home  as  soon  as  the  military  exigency  permits.  The 
guard  is  doing  good  work  on  the  border  and  knows  it  and  is  being  well  han- 
dled, I  hear.  Any  recommendation  or  action  yielding  to  alleged  discontent  or 
discrimination  as  to  service  would  be  injurious  to  discipline  and  improvement. 
I  can  not  believe  that  you  made  such  a  statement  and  consider  it  merely  an  at- 
tempted attack  from  some  persons  hostile  to  the  development  of  the  National 
Guard  and  trying  to  use  your  name  for  false  ends.  Please  telegraph  me  collect 
whether  or  not  you  made  the  statement  alleged. 

Blair  Lee. 


Columbus,  N.  Mex.,  July  28,  1916. 
Senator  Blair  Lee, 

Washington,  D.  C: 
The  only  statements  made  by  me  in  reference  National  Guard  conditions  on 
border  are  to  be  found  in  my  daily  reports  to  Secretary  of  War.    Anything  else 
is  a  lie.    The  universal  spirit  of  cheerfulness  and  contentment  in  the  National 
Guard  troops  is  the  finest  thing  I  ever  saw. 

Tasker  H.  Bliss. 
t 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  I  call  your  attention  to  the  item  of  the 
cost  to  the  Government  of  recruiting  154,230  men  serving  on  the 
border,  from  the  National  Guard,  out  of  which  total  139,230  were 
recruited  by  the  guard  itself,  without  cost  to  the  National  Govern- 
ment— deducting  15,000  recruited  by  the  Federal  Government. 

Gen.  Wood.  That  was  preliminary  to  the  call,  principally;  yes, 
sir. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  A  large  number  accrued  to  the  guard 
after  that,  because  the  Government  only  recruited  15,000. 

Gen.  Wood.  We  had  in  the  entire  National  Guard  throughout  the 
Union,  when  they  were  called  out,  something  over  138,000. 


UNIVERSAL    MILITARY    TRAINING.  1017 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  This  is  a  small  item.  The  cost  of 
recruiting  the  Regular  Army  is  $19  a  man;  so,  if  the  National 
Guard  system  recruited  139,230  men,  it  saved,  from  the  standpoint 
of  a  Federal  recruiting  agency,  $2,511,800  to  the  National  Govern- 
ment. But  is  not  that  an  item  worth  considering,  from  the  stand- 
point of  a  system? 

Gen.  Wood.  May  I  state  your  case,  to  see  if  I  understand  it 
clearly  ? 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Yes,  sir. 

Gen.  Wood.  You  stated  that  the  National  Guard  had  in  its  ranks 
through  its  own  efforts  139,000  men,  in  round  numbers? 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Yes,  sir. 

Gen.  Wood.  Those  men  were  recruited,  as  I  understand  it,  as 
members  of  State  organizations  prior  to  the  President's  call? 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  No,  sir;  I  beg  your  pardon.  Those 
were  the  men  who  went  to  the  border  and  were  accepted  by  the  Fed- 
eral Government. 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes,  sir.  They  were  recruited  by  the  States,  most 
of  them,  prior  to  the  Federal  call.  They  wTere  part  of  the  Organized 
Militia  when  called.  As  you  know,  about  50  per  cent  of  the 
militia — I  am  quoting  here,  the  statement  of  the  Department  of 
Militia  Affairs;  it  does  not  quite  hold  true  in  this  department — 
about  50  per  cent  of  the  men  who  were  on  the  rolls  of  the  guard,  for 
one  cause  or  another,  were  QOt  Bent  to  the  border.  Some  were  re- 
jected for  physical  reasons,  sonic  were  excused  by  the  governors 
after  the  call— improperly,  as  they  had  no  authority  to  do  it — and 
others  failed  to  respond.  So.  whatever  the  cost  of  the  139,000  men 
originally  was,  you  would  have  to  double  it,  so  far  as  the  effective 
returns  to  the  Federal  Government  were  concerned.  Of  course, 
that  was  done  as  State  organizations,  recruited  as  they  ordinarily 
are;  and  I  have  no  doubt  that  they  got  the  individual  man  more 
cheaply  than  we  could  the  Regular  soldier.  As  recruits  for  the 
militia  came  from  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  organization's 
headquarters,  there  is  no  cost  of  maintenance  en  route,  railroad 
transportation,  etc.,  which  are  charged  against  the  Regular  recruit. 
When  we  have  universal  service,  recruiting,  its  cost  and  its  uncer- 
tainties, will  be  a  thing  of  the  past. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  I   think  you   misunderstand   what  I 
!  mean,  General,  because    1    am  dealing  with  figures  of  the  finally 
accepted  men  who  went  to  the  border  and   served.     There   were 
154,230  of  these  men. 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes;  about  that  number,  I  think. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Now,  deducting  from  that  number  the 
15,000  that  the  Federal  instrumentalities  recruited  and  which  are 
stated  in  the  report,  it  leaves  clearly  and  unmistakably,  out  of  the 
finally  accepted  men,  139,230  that  must  have  been  enlisted  by  the 
activities  of  the  militia  themselves. 

Gen.  Wood.  All  right,  sir. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  If  you  multiply  this  by  the  average  cost 
to  the  United  States  Army  of  enlisting  a  man,  $19,  this  item  alone 
has  saved  the  Government  $2,511,800.  I  will  concede  that  there  is 
something  still  to  be  deducted  from  that.  There  is  the  cost  of  trans- 
portation, equipping,  handling,  and  feeding  the  number  of  men  that 

86205—17 7 


1018  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 

were  rejected,  which  must  have  been  a  very  large  number,  either  20 
per  cent  or  30  per  cent — there  were  practically  none  in  some  com- 
mands and  50  per  cent  in  others;  we  will  say  20  per  cent — allowing 
$40  a  head  as  the  cost  of  each,  there  was  a  cost  of  $1,256,000  that 
should  be  deducted  from  the  other  saving  to  show  the  net  saving  of 
the  Guard  system  to  the  National  Government  as  a  recruiting  agency. 
On  this  question  of  supplies,  General:  When  you  thought  it  your 
duty  to  criticise  the  National  Guard  system  at  that  time  you  were 
really  very  active  and  very  complimentary  to  the  summer  camping 
system,  which  you  yourself  had  had  a  great  deal  to  do  with  starting; 
and  there  has  been  some  criticism  in  connection  with  the  failure  to 
have  equipment  on  hand  for  the  National  Guard  and  the  Regular 
Army ;  that  this  equipment  had  been  diverted  from  the  depots  to  the 
Plattsburg  and  other  camps.  I  will  read  from  a  statement  in  a  local 
newspaper : 

When  the  matter  of  issuing  this  equipment  to  the  training  camps  at  Platts- 
burg, Fort  Ogelthorpe  and  other  places  was  under  consideration  at  the  War 
Department,  it  is  said,  officers  of  the  militia  division  saw  what  it  meant  to  the 
National  Guard  and  made  a  strenuous  hut  unsuccessful  protest  against  it.  The 
War  Department  overruled  the  protest  and  decided  to  issue  the  clothing,  failing, 
apparently,  to  see  the  point  made  by  the  militia  division.  (Washington  Even- 
ing Star,  June  26,  1916.) 

Now,  is  it  not  a  matter  of  fact  that  distribution  was  made  before 
the  call,  from  the  storage  places  to  these  summer  camps,  and  de- 
creased the  available  supply  of  equipment? 

Gen.  Wood.  The  request  for  the  distribution  of  supplies  for  the 
summer  camps  was  made,  I  think,  in  April.  It  was  made  by  order 
of  the  War  Department.  At  that  time  there  was  no  authority  vested 
in  the  department  commander  to  move  anything  from  a  depot,  nor 
is  there  ever  such  authority  until  the  militia  is  called  into  the  Federal 
service  or  a  great  emergency.  There  was  at  that  time,  of  course, 
no  anticipation  of  this  call  of  the  militia.  The  summer  camps  had 
been  going  three  years,  and  each  year  we  had  shipped  to  the  mobili- 
zation camp  a  month  or  two  in  advance,  in  order  that  they  might  be 
prepared,  overhauled,  and  cleaned  up  and  promptly  available,  the 
necessary  equipment  for  the  training  of  the  estimated  number  of 
men.  Last  year  we  looked  forward  to  a  large  number,  and  the 
recommendation  went  out  in  routine  form,  probably  some  time  after 
mid  year,  requesting  the  department  to  make  the  necessary  shipments 
of  supplies.  That  it  did  reduce  the  amount  of  available  reserves  of 
arms  and  equipment  is,  of  course,  self-evident;  but  that  there  was 
any  anticipation  or  thought  or  intent  to  cripple  the  militia  it  is 
unnecessary  to  state  is  wholly  untrue  and  unreasonable. 

On  February  3,  1917,  the  following  memorandum  was  sent  to  de- 
partment quartermaster,  department  signal  officer,  department  sur- 
geon, department  Ordnance  officer.     Their  replies  are  given  below  : 

It  was  staled  in  the  hearing  before  the  Senate  Committee  on  Military  Af- 
fairs that  the  equipment  needed  for  the  National  Guard  had  been  deflected  by 
Gen.  Wood  for  use  at  Plattsburg. 

Please  look  this  up  with  reference  to  your  department's  equipment,  and 
give  me  a  brief  memoranda  on  it.  The  general  has  charged  me  with  gathering 
the  necessary  data  to  extend  his  hearings  on  this  point  as  requested  by  the 
committee. 

C.  E.  Kilbourne, 

Major,  General  Staff. 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY    TRAINING.  1019 

No  supplies  nor  equipment,  pertaining  to  the  Medical  Department,  In  the  knowl- 
edge of  this  office,  were  diverted  from  the  National  Guard  by  Gen.  Wood  for 
use  at  Plattsburg  camps. 

('has.   Um-hard, 
ColomL  Medical  Corps,  Department  Surgeon, 
Office  Department  Surgeon, 

Governors  island,  N.  v.,  February  5,  t917. 

[First  indorsement.] 

HEADQUARTERS,    K.\s  ikux    1  ►EPARTMENT, 

Fi  bruary  5,  1917. 
To  Commanding  General,  Eastern  Department. 

1.  There  is  no  record  in  this  office  of  Buch  action. 

\  M  . 

Colonel,  Ordnance  Department,  D.  0.  O. 


Headqi  nt, 

\.,r  fork  City,  February  G,  1017. 
Prom:  Department  signal  officer,  Eastern  Departmei 
To:  Maj.  Kilboume,  Governors  island,  N.  ?. 
Subject:  Signal  Corps  equipment 

1.  Practically  every  Item  of  Signal  dorps  equipment  Issued  In  connection 
wiiii  the  1916  Instruction  camps  at  Plattsburg,  N.  v..  was  ordered  shipped 
to  the  camp  prior  to  the  call  of  the  Presides  of  June  IS,  1916,    The  only  ex- 

:   items  consisted  of  some  photographic  material,  winch  is  not   issued  to 
troops,  one  radio  pack-frame  equipment,  and  some  message  boots;  these  were 

supplied   the  camp  after  the  call. 

2.  Every  issue  of  Signal  Corps  property  to  these  camps  was  made  under 
specific  orders  of  the  Chief  Signal  Officer  of  the  Army. 

:•..  .\o  Signal  Corps  equipment  needed  for  the  equipment  of  the  National 
Guard  was  deflected  by  any  office  of  these  headquarters  for  use  at  the  camps. 

4.  The  Chief  Signal    Officer  of  the  Army   nndohutedly   considered    the   Signal 

Corps  equipment  at  the  camp  available  tor  use  elsewhere  in  case  of  emergency, 

and  SUCh  as  he  ordered  shipped  elsewhere  w:iv  immediately  so  shipped. 

Carl  T.   Haktman. 

Major,  Signal  Corjix. 


Ferruary  13,  1917. 
Memorandum   t«>  Maj.   Kilburn.    in   re   shipment   of  equipment   from  supply 

deport  No.  1.  at  Philadelphia,  to  Plattsburg  instruction  camp  in  1916. 

1.  The  records  of  the  department  quartermaster'!  office  indicate  as  fol- 
lows, to  wit  : 

(a)  Letter  No.  354,  Plattsburg,  dated  April  18,  1916,  from  department 
quartermaster  to  Quartermaster  General   requested  authority  to  call  on  the 

proper   depots   to   ship   such   quantities   of   articles   as    were   enumerated    in   an 

attached  list  to  Plattsburg  Barracks,  N.  v..  for  use  ai  the  military  training 
camp.  The  amounts  on  the  list  were  based  OH  a  maximum  camp  attendance 
at  any  one  time  of  3,600.  Authority  was  requested  at  the  same  time  to  increase 
the  call  if  the  numbers  to  attend  the  camp  were  increased.  The  request  in 
this  letter  was  granted. 

(6)  Under  date  of  May  11.  1916,  Maj.  Lawton.  Quartermaster  Corps,  in 
absence  of  the  officer  designated  camp  commander  at  Plattsburg  ('amp,  re- 
quested  that  equipment  for  1,800  men.  in  addition  to  the  3,600  already  esti- 
mated for,  ho  shipped  to  reach  Plattsburg  by  June  LM>.  1916.  The  depots 
affected  were  notified  by  these  headquarters  under  date  of  May  18  to  make  this 
shipment.  Under  dates  of  May  22  and  May  L'.'i  the  depot  quartermaster,  Phila- 
delphia, stated  that  he  could  not  supply  from  stock  certain  articles  required 
for  the  training  camps,  such  as  blankets,  cots,  pyramidal  tents,  but  thai  these 
could  be  supplied  from  the  stock  pertaining  to  field  supply  depot  No.  1,  in  which 
ample  supply  is  stored,  if  authorized  by  the  Secretary  of  War. 

(c)  Under  date  of  June  1  a  letter  was  written  from  these  headquarters  to 
the  Adjutant  General  of  the  Army  requesting  that  such  supplies  as  were  re- 


1020  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 

quired  at  the  training  camp  at  Plattsburg,  N.  1\,  which  could  not  be  supplied 
by  the  designated  depots  be  furnished  from  the  supplies  stored  in  field  supply 
depot  No.  1  as  recommended  by  the  depot  quartermaster,  Philadelphia,  Pa., 
these  supplies  to  be  returned  to  field  supply  depot  No.  1  upon  completion  of  the 
camp.  The  Quartermaster  General,  under  date  of  June  7,  1916  (second  indorse- 
ment on  the  letter),  stated  that  no  objection  was  seen  to  authorizing  certain 
supplies  available  at  hold  supply  depot  No.  1  being  used  for  this  purpose,  and 
that  they  should  be  returned  to  that  depot  after  having  been  inspected  for 
serviceability,  such  as  had  become  unserviceable  to  be  replaced  by  new  supplies. 

(d)  The  recommendation  of  the  Quartermaster  General  was  approved  by 
the  Secretary  of  War  in  the  third  indorsement  No.  2408987,  dated  June  12, 
1916. 

2.  It  will  be  seen  from  the  above  that  the  shipment  of  supplies  to  the  training 
camp  at  Plattsburg  from  those  stored  in  field  supply  depot  No.  1  was  approved 
and,  it  is  understood,  the  shipments  were  made  before  the  call  of  the  President 
for  the  mobilization  of  the  National  Guard  on  June  18,  1916. 

-3.  When  these  supplies  were  needed  for  the  issue  to  the  National  Guard  the 
blankets  were  shipped  from  Plattsburg  to  the  points  designated  by  the  depot 
quartermaster  in  Philadelphia,  and  other  blankets  which  were  purchased  in 
the  open  market  were  issued  to  instruction  camp. 

4.  All  shortages  in  cots,  tentage,  etc.,  at  the  instruction  camp  at  Plattsburg 
were  supplied  as  far  as  practicable  from  the  posts  in  the  department  or  by 
purchase. 

5.  The  use  of  the  supplies  pertaining  to  field  supply  depot  No.  1  do  not  in 
any  manner  affect  the  supplying  of  the  National  Guard,  as  those  supplies 
which  were  required  by  the  Quartermaster  Corps  to  issue  to  the  National  Guard 
were  returned  for  that  use. 

6.  The  maximum  equipment  shipped  to  the  instruction  camp  at  Plattsburg 
was  for  8,400  men  and  had  all  of  this  equipment  been  supplied  by  the  Quarter- 
master Corps  from  its  depots  it  should  not  have  affected  the  supplying  of  the 
National  Guard  by  the  Quartermaster  Corps,  as  the  total  number  of  the  National 
Guard  mobilized  amounted  to  approximately  135,000  men. 

7.  The  small  amount  of  supplies  used  at  Plattsburg  from  field  supply  depot 
No.  1  to  make  up  what  the  Quartermaster  Corps  could  not  furnish  from  its 
supplies  at  the  depots  pertaining  to  the  Regular  Army  could  not  possibly  have 
materially  affected  the  supplying  of  the  mobilized  National  Guard. 

8.  By  comparing  the  date  of  the  call  for  the  mobilization  of  the  National 
Guard  with  the  dates  of  the  shipments  of  supplies  from  field  supply  depot  No. 
1  to  Plattsburg  Barracks  it  will  be  seen  that  the  statement  that  the  supplying 
of  the  National  Guard  had  been  impeded  by  the  department  commander  order- 
ing supplies  from  field  supply  depot  No.  1  to  Plattsburg  Barracks  is  not  cor- 
rect for  the  following  reasons,  to  wit : 

(a)  The  ordering  of  the  supplies  from  field  supply  depot  No.  1  to  Plattsburg 
was  authorized  by  the  Secretary  of  War. 

( b )  That  this  ordering  antedated  the  President's  call  for  the  National  Guard. 

(c)  That  the  supplies  pertaining  to  field  supply  depot  No.  1  necessary  for 
the  National  Guard  were  shipped  to  them  from  the  camp  at  Plattsburg. 

J.  B.  B. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Was  it  not  rather  a  lack  of  foresight  ? 
Because  you  testified  yourself  that  for  three  years  we  had  been  con- 
fronted by  a  serious  condition  of  things  on  the  border. 

Gen.  Wood.  No,  sir;  there  was  no  lack  of  foresight,  as  we  had 
reason  to  believe  that  reserves  were  ample  for  the  militia  at  war 
strength  plus  the  Regular  Army  demands  and  some  in  excess.  As 
to  the  border  situation,  that  has  been  serious  since  1912.  At  least 
such  is  my  opinion;  not  a  condition  of  great  national  danger,  but 
locally  serious. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Our  whole  Regular  Army  had  been 
assembled  on  the  border  and  had  been  watching  this  situation  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  That  is  right;  practically  all  our  mobile  army  in 
this  country. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  It  was  so  imminent,  so  to  speak,  that 
certain  commanders  were  warned  officially  by  War  Department  letters 


rXIYKKSAL    .MILITARY    TRAINING.  1021 

of  the  11th  of  May.  of  a  probable  call  of  the  militia.  Was  that 
official  notice  sent  out  to  all  the  department  commanders'? 

(Jen.  Wood.  I  have  no  recollection  of  receiving  anything  other 
than  the  letter  of  May  11  to  which  I  have  already  referred.  This 
was  simply  a  letter  of  instructions  as  to  forms.  The  instructions 
were  carried  out. 

The  summer  camps  were  started  in  1913.  Equipment  was  fur- 
nished, as  I  have  above  explained.  The  troops  were  ordered  to  the 
border  in  1911;  I  think  that  was  the  first  order.  They  were  par- 
tially withdrawn  and  they  sent  again  in  1912,  and  they  were  very 
largely  added  to  late  in  1912.  I  was  chief  of  staff  at  the  time,  and 
that  was  done  in  order  that  the  incoming  administration  might  find 
the  instrumentality,  so  far  as  the  Regular  Army  was  concerned,  at 
hand  and  immediately  available  for  the  carrying  out  of  any  policy 
that  it  decided  upon. 

With  reference  to  supplies  and  the  shortage,  T  will  quote  now 
from  memory,  and  insert  in  substantiation  of  what  1  say  a  letter 
which  is  official  and  correct. 

You  will  find.  sir.  that  on  the  17th  day  of  Last  January  the  Quarter- 
master General  of  the  United  States  Army,  in  testifying  before  the 
House  Military  Committee,  in  reply  to  questions  stated  as  given  in 
the  following  communication : 

[Eighth  indorsement.] 

Headquabti  ;:\  Depab 

December  :'.'.  1916. 
To  The  Adjutant  Qenebai  of  the  Abmt: 

1.  Inviting  attention  to  the  memorandum  of  the  Department  Quartermaster 
(7th  fad.-  especially  par.  12).  it  is  concurred  In  us  are  the  general  conclu- 
sions embodied  In  the  7th  Indorsement  The  department  has  not  been  able 
to  supply  the  troops  cither  promptly  or  within  reasonable  time,  :intl  had  it 
been  necessary  to  send  the  militia  al  war  Btrength  to  any  field  of  Immediate 
activity,  they  would  have  gone  largely  unprepared  so  far  as  the  Quartermaster 
General's  Department  was  concerned. 

2.  in  January,  1916,  the  Quartermaster  General  stated  .-is  follows,  in  reply 
to  a  question  hy  the  chairman  of  the  House  Military  Committee  (see  page  24, 
House  Military  Committee,  Jany.  17.  1M0)  : 

"Question,  is  there  any  extra  equipment,  over  and  above  the  equipment  you 
have  for  the  Regular  Army  and  the  National  Guard? 

"Answer  (by  the  Quartermaster  General).  Xes,  Sir;  we  have.  <>r  could  pur- 
chase in  a  short  time  enough  to  equip.  I  should  say.  250.000  men." 

Later  in  the  same  hearing  (page  25)  he  said: 

"This  together  with  the  100.000  now  equipped  in  the  Regular  Army,  the 
180,006  in  the  militia  who  are  now  equipped,  and  the  supplies  that  we  have  in 
the  storehouses,  say  for  loO.OOO  men.  would  give  us  an  equipment  of  clothing 
and  equippage  for  from  600.000  to  700,000  men  in  ninety  days." 

Later  he  says  : 

"We  have  sufficient  clothing  to  equip  150,000  men  in  the  depots  and  store- 
houses." 

This  was  in  addition  to  the  equipment  of  the  Regular  Army  which  was  100,000 
and  the  equipment  of  the  militia  which  was  estimated  to  he  130,000. 

Further  on  in  the  same  hearing,  on  the  same  page,  he  says: 

"  In  ninety  days  we  OUght  to  have  equipment  for  600,000  to  700,000  men, 
with  sufficient  deliveries  to  maintain  those  who  are  now  or  may  he  equipped." 

I'p  to  the  present  time  we  have  mobilized  not  more  than  160,000  militia,  and 
the  Regular  Army  is  109,000.  at  home  and  abroad,  and  the  militia  in  service 
to-day.  which  is  far  under  160,000,  is  not  yet. equipped; 

3.  If  these  statements  were  even  approximately  correct,  it  is  not  understood 
why  supplies  were  not  promptly  forthcoming,  as  the  total  number  of  militia 
mobilized  was  (as  already  stated)  not  In  excess  of  160,000  men,  and  the  Regular 
Army  within  the  continental  limits  of  the  United  States  amounted  to,  roughly, 


1022  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 

from  I.".. 000  to  76,000  men.  of  whom  only  46,000  or  47,000  were  sent  to  the 
border.  Generally  speaking,  those  were  reasonably  well  equipped  so  far  as  the 
Quartermaster  Department  was  concerned. 

4.  Mobilization  indicates  the  necessity  for  radical  changes  in  the  methods  of 
Supply,  and  the  maintenance  of  an  adequate  reserve  supply,  so  distributed  as  to 
be  promptly  available  and  within  easy  reach  of  organizations.  It  is  believed 
that  the  amounts  spent  for  express  and  special  freights,  combined  with  other 
Charges  Incident  to  delay  of  mobilization  were  in  excess  of  what  suitable  build- 
ings for  reserve  militia  supplies  at  posts  conveniently  situated,  would  have  cost. 
(In  this  connection  attention  is  invited  to  3rd  Ind.  of  report  submitted  this  date, 
with  reference  to  report  of  the  board  of  officers,  distribution  and  storage  of 

(\G  °417794\ 
1-    These  reserve  supplies,  at  least  to  the  extent 

of  an  amount  adequate  to  supply  deficiencies  and  equip  the  men  necessary 
to  bring  the  militia  to  war  strength,  should  be  under  the  immediate  control 
of  the  department  commander,  through  his  proper  staff  officer.  For  instance, 
the  supplies  for  New  York  should  either  be  stored  in  fire-proof  armories  of 
the  regiments  to  which  they  are  to  go,  or  should  be  stored  on  Governors 
Island,  so  that  they  can  be  distributed  in  periods  measured  not  by  weeks,  but 
hours. 

5.  It  took  us,  even  at  first,  longer  to  get  supplies  for  certain  regiments  than 
it  took  the  great  armies  of  France  and  Germany  to  mobilize,  get  their  equip- 
ment, and  reach  the  battle  field.  It  is  now  six  months  after  the  call  for  mobi- 
lization, and  troops  are  still  unsupplied,  as  applications  from  the  Southern 
Department  for  supplies  here  and  elsewhere,  clearly  indicate.  The  supply 
situation  is,  from  the  standpoint  of  military  efficiency,  exceedingly  bad. 

Leonard  Wood, 
Major  General,  Commanding. 

The  following  is  the  memorandum  of  the  Department  Quarter- 
master on  supply  b}^  his  corps: 

[Seventh  indorsement.] 

Office  Quarterm aster,  Eastern  Department, 

December  11,  1916. 
To  Commanding  General,  Eastern  Department. 

1.  In  my  opinion  the  Quartermaster  Corps  failed  fundamentally  to  perform 
the  functions  with  which  it  is  charged  by  statute  and  by  paragraph  455  (b), 
Army  Regulations,  1913,  and  the  fact  that  the  State  authorities  had  not 
equipped  their  troops  as  provided  by  paragraph  455  (a),  Army  Regulations, 
1913,  simply  intensities,  in  my  opinion,  the  failure  of  the  Quartermaster  Corps 
to  perforin  its  functions  as  the  supplying  of  the  equipment  for  the  minimum 
strength  of  National  Guard  organizations  was  also  the  duty  of  the  Quarter- 
master Corps. 

2.  So  far  as  I  was,  or  have  been,  able  to  discover,  the  Quartermaster  Corps 
had,  at  no  time  previous  to  the  departure  of  the  National  Guard  organizations 
of  the  Eastern  Department  for  duty  on  the  border,  furnished  the  equipment 
which  it  was  required  to  furnish  under  paragraph  455  (b),  Army  Regulations, 
1913.  without  requisition. 

3.  In  fact,  I  am  quite  certain  that  not  a  single  National  Guard  organiza- 
tion pertaining  to  the  Eastern  Department,  no  matter  how  well  equipped  by 
the  State  authorities  on  the  basis  of  the  minimum  strength  of  organizations, 
left  for  duty  on  the  border  fully  equipped  as  required  by  regulations  and  this 
condition  was  unquestionably  due  to  the  failure  of  the  Quartermaster  Corps  to 
perform  its  functions. 

4.  After  a  lapse  of  weeks  and  months  from  the  date  of  the  call  of  the  Presi-. 
dent  on  June  18,  1916,  the  Quartermaster  Corps  had  still  failed  to  equip  the 
organizations  of  the  National  Guard  pertaining  to  the  Eastern  Department  on 
the  basis  required  of  it  by  paragraph  455  (b),  Army  Regulations,  1913. 

5.  Whatever  responsibility  uiay  lie  with  the  State  authorities  for  their  failure 
to  comply  with  paragraph  455  (a),  Army  Regulations,  1913,  so  far  as  they 
controlled  its  execution,  I  fail,  to  see  its  pertinency  to  the  feature  of  the 
Quartermaster  Corps  to  comply  with  paragraph  455  (b),  Army  Regulations, 
for,  had  the  Quartermaster  Corps  complied  promptly  and  efficiently  with  the 
latter,   the  National   Guard   organizations   would   have   received   immediately 


I   MYHKSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING.  1023 

equipment  for  918  men,  which  Is  the  difference  between  the  peace  strength  of 
a  National  Guard  infantry  Regiment,  which  is  918  enlisted  men.  and  the  war 
strength  of  tin*  same,  which  is  1,836  enlisted  men.  not  Including  sanitary  units 
(per  tables  of  organization). 

6.  This  would  have  equipped  the  peace  strength  of  the  organizations,  though 
they  had  no  equipmenl  whatsoever  in  their  possession,  and  permitted  their 
being  forwarded  immediately  t<>  the  border  for  duty  as  the  minimum  strength 
of  organizations  was  the  basis  set  by  the  War  Department,  so  fur  as  personnel 
was  concerned,  tor  master  into  the  Federal  service  and,  when  equipped,  for 
forwarding  to  the  border  for  duty.  When  the  recruits  necessary  to  bring 
these  organizations  up  to  the  war  Strength  laid  been  obtained,  they  could  have 
been  equipped  and  sent  to  their  organizations  on  the  border. 

7.  The  failure  of  the  State  authorities  to  comply  with  paragraph  loo  (a), 
Army  Regulations.  1013.  and  the  use  of  SUCC  supplies  as  were  shipped  by  the 
Quartermaster  Corps  to  remedy  this  failure  of  the  State  authorities,  does  not, 
in  my  opinion,  warrant  the  deduction  that  "as  a  result,  no  doubt,  articles  were 
obtained  that  were  not  as  good  a  quality  as  the  standard  samples,  but  which, 
under  the  circumstances,  were  the  best  that  could  be  obtained."  because  the 
quality  and  character  of  articles  which  were  purchased  by  the  Quartermaster 
Corps  and  furnished  to  some  of  the  National  Guard  organizations  were  so 
flagrantly  below  any  standard  of  quality  or  of  suitability  for  the  purposes 
intended  that  they  should  never  have  been  purchased  at  all.  even  if  the  failure 
to  do  so  eliminated  completely  the  equipment  or  these  troops  with  these 
articles. 

8.  I  desire  to  state  further  that  I  am  of  the  opinion  that  suitable  articles  of 
a  quality  at  least  equal  to  that  of  the  standard  samples  could  have  been  pur- 
chased, and  that  the  responsibility  U^v  not  making  such  purchases  must  lie  with 
the  Quartermaster  ( Jorps, 

9.  Perhaps  the  statement  that  "the  organizations  in  question  have  undoubt- 
edly long  ago  been  properly  equipped"  Is  correct,  but  from  the  impressions 
which    I    have   received   as   to  the  completion   of  the  equipment    of  the   National 

Guard  organizations  pertaining  to  the  Eastern  Department  since  they  left  the 

territorial  jurisdiction  of  this  department,  1  am  of  the  opinion  that  this 
statement  is  not  correct  and  that  many  of  these  organizations  are  nol  yet 
completely  equipped  as  they  should  have  been  equipped  by  the  Quartermaster 
Corps,  without  requisition,  under  paragraph  465  (b),  Army  Regulations,  1913, 
at  the  time  of  the  call  on  June  18,  191ft 

10.  The  fact  that  "no  further  complaints  have  been  received"  is  not,  in  my 
mind,  retroactive,  and  does  not  relieve  the  Quartermaster  Corps  of  its  failure 
to  perform  promptly  and  efficiently   its  functions  at    the  time  that   they   should 

have  boon  performed. 

11.  I  do  not  desire  my  remarks  to  be  construed  as  a  criticism  of  individuals 
but  of  the  results  which  flowed  from  the  failure  of  any  individual  who  failed 
in  any  particular  to  perform  the  functions  with  which  he  was  charged  with 
intelligence,  efficiency,  and  promptness. 

12.  I  recommend,  in  the  interest  of  the  service  and  for  the  efficient  and 
economical  administration  of  its  business,  that  no  further  correspondence  be 
continued  on  particular  reports  of  the  failure  of  the  supply  departments  to 
perform  their  functions  efficiently  and  promptly  during  the  late  mobilization 

of  the  National  Guard  troops  but  that  a  general  Investigation  and  report  be 
made,  using  particular  cases  as  exhibits  for  such  investigation  ami  report. 

13.  "  When  there  is  medicine  to  be  taken  there  is  no  use  playing  with  the 
spoon,"  and  I  make  the  above  recommendation  because  I  consider  that  the 
Quartermaster  Corps — not  necessarily  specific  members  of  it — failed  abso- 
lutely to  perform  its  functions  efficiently  for  the  supplying  of  the  troops  of  the 
National  Guard  of  the  Eastern  Department,  which  were  mobilized  under  the 
call  of  the  President  dated  June  18,  1916. 

14.  There  is  much  work  of  the  Quartermaster  Corps  yet  to  be  done  toward 
settling  indebtedness  of  the  Federal  Government  in  the  Eastern  Department 
incident  to  their  mobilization  and  which  may  amount  to  millions  «»f  dollars. 

15.  Hence  my  recommendation  in  the  12th  paragraph,  because  I  wish  to 
avoid  the  excessive  and,  to  my  mind,  absolutely  unnecessary  amount  of  corre- 
spondence now  existing  in  the  transaction  of  the  business  of  the  Army  and  with 
the  hope  that,  by  transacting  this  business  as  a  whole  instead  of  piecemeal,  it 
will  greatly  reduce  the  amount  of  correspondence  necessary  to  perform  this 
duty. 

Belli  ngkr. 
Col.,  Quartermaster  Corps. 


1024  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Who  was  that,  General? 

Gen.  Wood.  Gen.  Aleshire.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  I  sent  a  regiment 
of  Alabama  cavalry  to  the  front  recently  short  1,100  horses  which 
it  was  to  receive  on  the  border,  so  it  \\  as  ha  idly  fair  to  call  it  a  short- 
age; short  saddles  for  a  number  of  troops;  bridles,  I  think,  for 
seven;  sabers  for  three:  they  had  not  a  machine  gun,  a  machine  gun 
animal,  or  machine  gun  pack  equipment.  These  I  suppose  they  got 
on  the  border.  This  was  the  fault  of  the  Regular  Army  supply 
corps;  there  is  no  question  about  that.  These  green,  uninstructed 
troops  were  wiiolly  unprepared  for  service  when  they  got  there. 
They  were  admirable  gentlemen,  but  they  were  not  soldiers;  and  they 
went  to  the  theater  of  presumptive  operations  against  a  possible 
and  presumptive  enemy.  Otherwise  they  would  not  have  been  sent 
there.  There  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy  they  are  to  be  introduced 
to  their  horses,  practically  untrained,  and  receive  a  large  portion  of 
their  equipment.  Their  total  unfitness  for  immediate  service  is  ap- 
parent. Complete  equipment  for  this  organization  should  have 
been  received  by  it  in  its  camp,  and  it  should  have  had  as  many  days 
training  as  possible  before  going  to  the  border. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  You  took  a  position  before  the  House 
committee  last  year  that  troops  of  Cavalry  that  had  no  mounts  and 
Artillery  that  had  no  horses  should  not  be  sent  to  a  front  and  pro- 
vided with  horses  in  the  presence  of  an  enemy? 

Gen.  Wood.  No,  sir;  before  this  committee. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  General,  I  think  the  condition  of  these 
National  Guard  organizations  was  "  horseless,"  and  your  opinion 
was  against  supplying  unmounted  Cavalry  and  batteries  with  horses 
and  other  equipment,  presumably  in  the  presence  of  an  enemy? 

Gen.  Wood.  The  so-called  mounted  organizations — Cavalry,  Fiejd 
Artillery,  and  certain  auxiliary  troops,  such  as  Signal  Corps  troops- 
were,  in  general  terms,  without  horses.  They  were  without  adequate 
machine  guns  as  a  rule;  they  were  without  proper  Field  Artillery 
equipment  in  many  instances. 

The  following  correspondence  deals  with  the  supply  of  equipment 
of  the  First  Alabama  Cavalry  and  indicates  its  condition  as  to 
supply  when  it  left  for  the  front: 

November  24,  1916. 
From  :  Department  Commander. 
To :  The  Adjutant  General  of  the  Army. 
Subject :  Equipment  of  First  Alabama  Cavalry. 

1.  Attention  is  invited  to  the  following  telegram : 

"Montgomery,  Ala.,  November  22,  1916. 
"  Reference  your  telegram  June  22  report  First  Cavalry  National  Guard 
Alabama  entirely  equipped  with  clothing  and  quartermaster  supplies.  Rea- 
sonably well  equipped  with  ordnance.  Some  shortage  still  exists  as  regards 
spurs,  bridles,  and  saddles.  Ordnance  arriving  in  broken  lots  daily.  Recom- 
mend moving  of  regiment  to  border  now.  Request  all  ordnance  not  already 
shipped  be  sent  to  regiment  on  border  to  complete  its  equipment. 

"  Kaempfer." 

2.  Is  it  not  possible  to  equip  this  regiment  promptly  and  send  it  to  the 
border  fully  equipped?  The  mobilization  of  the  militia  now  has  been  going  on 
for  some  months  and  it  would  seem  not  unreasonable  to  request  that  the 
Ordnance  Department  supply  this  regiment  promptly  unless  there  is  an  actual 
shortage  of  reserve  equipment. 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING.  1025 

8.  The  attached  copy  of  letter,  which  has  just  been  received,  confirms  the 
above-quoted  telegraphic  request. 

Leonard  Wood. 
Major   General,    United   States   Army. 

[First  indorsement.] 

Special  2486488.    A.  G.  O.,  Nov.  27,  1916.    To  The  Chief  of  Ordnance. 

[Second  indorsement.] 

Ordnance  Office,  December  l.'t,  1916. 
To  The  Adjutant  General,  U.  S.  Army  : 

L  All  of  the  articles  involved  in  the  shortages  of  ordnance  equipment  re- 
ported within,  except  some  bridles,  spurs,  and  saber  scabbards,  were  shipped  to 
the  1st  Alabama  Cavalry  on  or  before  December  5,  1916.  It  is  expected  that 
the  excepted  articles  will  be  supplied  in  the  near  future. 

2.  This  office  has  been  informed  that  these  troops  departed  from  Mobile,  Ala., 
for  Fort  Sam  Houston,  Texas,  on  the  9th  instant,  and  directions  have  been 
given  to  have  the  articles  still  due  the  troops  shipped  to  that  place. 

William    Crozier. 
Brig.  Gen.,  Chief  of  Ordnance. 
By  S.  B.  Babbitt, 

Col.,  Or  (I.  Dept. 
[Third  indorsement.] 

Wak    I»i:i\\kim 
Adjutant  General's  I  n  i  i 

in  a  m h<  r  /5,  1916. 
To  the  Commanding  General.  Eastern  Department,  inviting  attention  to  the 
preceding  indorsement  hereon. 

By  order  of  the  Secretary  of  War. 

Wm.  M.  Cuiiksh.wk, 

Adjutant  Gem  ral. 
[Fourth  indorsement.] 

Headquarters  Eastern  Department, 

December  in,  1916.  . 
To  The  Adjutant  General  of  the  Army  : 

1.  Noted. 

2.  The  First  Regiment  of  Cavalry,  Alabama  National  Guard,  left  for  the 
border  with  the  following  shortages  in  equipment: 

Saber  scabbards 264 

Nose  or  feed  bags 616 

Saddles 264 

Saddlebags  264 

Bridles 440 

Halters 704 

Complete  equipment  of  machine  guns. 

Field  ranges 15 

Horses  1, 100 

Complete  equipment  of  mules,  riding,  pack,  and  draft. 
Complete  equipment  of  wagon  transportation. 

Leonard  Wood, 
Major  General,  Comdg. 
[Fifth  indorsement] 

A.  G.  O.,  Dec.  20,  1916.    To  the  Chief  of  Ordnance. 

[Sixth  indorsement.] 

Ordnance  Office,  January  11,  1917. 
To  The  Adjutant  General  : 

1.  At  the  time  the  First  Regiment  of  Alabama  Cavalry  was  transferred  to 
the  border  part  of  the  bridles  were  en  route  to  the  mobilization  camp  am* 
necessary  steps  were  taken  to  locate  this  material  and  divert  its  shipment  to 


1026  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 

the  Sun  Antonio  Arsenal.  The  remaining  articles  of  horse  equipment  required 
to  complete  the  equipment  of  this  regiment  of  Cavalry  were  shipped  from  the 
Rock  Island  Arsenal  to  the  commanding  officer,  San  Antonio  Arsenal,  under 
date  of  December  7.  1916,  and  the  balance  of  the  saber  scabbards  required  was 
shipped  from  the  Springfield  Armory  to  the  commanding  officer,  San  Antonio 
Arsenal,  under  date  of  December  16,  1916. 

2.  The  necessary  instructions  have  been  given  for  the  machine-gun  troop  of 
this  regiment  to  be  equipped  upon  its  arrival  in  the  Southern  Department. 

3.  In  view  of  the  above,  it  is  believed  that  the  equipment  of  the  First  Ala- 
bama Cavalry  with  ordnance  stores  is  now  complete. 

William    Crozier, 
Brig.  Gen.,  Chief  of  Ordnance. 
By  S.  B.  Babbitt, 

Col.,  Ord.  Dept. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  What  did  you  have  to  do  in  that  respect 
when  this  call  was  made  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  We  were  told  first  not  to  send  organizations  to  the 
front  until  they  were  reasonably  ready.  On  the  heels  of  that  came 
an  announcement  that  the  department  was  going  to  purchase  horses 
in  the  West,  and  that  they  would  be  sent  to  the  border  and  the  troops 
equipped  when  they  arrived  there.  In  the  meantime,  in  response  to 
certain  confidential  urgent  communications,  and  feeling  that  it  was 
simply  folly  to  have  Field  Artillery  arrive  on  the  border  without 
horses  and  Cavalry  arrive  on  the  border  without  mounts,  especially 
Field  Artillery,  as  they  could  not  move  their  guns,  we  bought  enough 
horses  to  give  each  gun  and  caisson  a  team  sufficient  to  drag  it  into 
position,  and  we  provided  every  regiment  of  Infantry  that  was 
short  of  transportation  with  at  least  two  motor  trucks  or  a  few 
animals;  and  we  bought  a  number  of  thousand  horses  and  mules 
for  the  Cavalry  and  Artillery  that  was  sent  with  the  first  rush,  be- 
cause to  send  troops  down  without  mounts  or  transportation  under 
the  grave  conditions  that  appeared  to  be  threatening  seemed  unwise 
and  to  indicate  a  lack  of  appreciation  of  the  fact  that  without  trans- 
portation and  mounts  they  would  be  of  little  use  and  might  be  quite 
helpless.  It  was  the  old  condition  of  the  Spanish  War  over  again. 
It  was  the  inefficiency,  absolute,  startling,  and  complete,  of  the  sup- 
ply departments.  In  only  one  staff  department  were  the  conditions 
markedly  improved,  so  far  as  I  know,  and  that  was  the  medical. 
The  Engineers  are  line  troops. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Did  not  the  medical  people  send  out 
timely  circulars  in  advance,  May  10,  1916? 
.     (Ten.  Wood.  I  could  not  tell  you  that  offhand. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  The  reports  so  indicate. 

Gen.  Wood.  That  department  showed  the  effects  of  the  lessons  of 
1898  in  greatly  improved  handling  of  the  sanitary  situation.  The 
Quartermaster's  Department  and  the  Ordnance  Department  showed 
little  improvement,  as  I  saw  them.  I  can  say,  sir,  without  fear  of 
successful  contradiction,  that  there  is  not  and  has  not  been  on  the 
border  since  the  call  for  mobilization  in  June  a  single  organization, 
either  militia  or  regular,  which  is  at  war  strength  and  fully  equipped 
for  modern  war,  with  the  possible  exception  of  here  and  there  an 
individual  field  hospital  or  ambulance  company.  I  will  add  here 
certain  extracts  from  our  records  showing  delajrs,  shortages,  and 
difficulties  in  procuring  supplies;  also  a  statement  showing  short- 
ages in  certain  State  organizations  on  October  31,  over  four  months 
after  the  call.     These  indicate  conclusively  the  breakdown  in  the 


UNIVERSAL    MILITARY    TRAINING.  1027 

supply  departments  referred  to  before  and  suggest  very  clearly  the 
frightful  catastrophe  that  would  have  overtaken  us  had  we  been 
called  upon  to  mobolize  not  only  the  militia,  but  great  numbers  of 
volunteers  to  meet  a  swift  and  strong  attack  from  a  real  military 
power. 

NORTH    CAROLINA. 

Camp  Glenn, 
Morehead  ('it;/.  X.  C.,'  June  28,  1916. 
Adjutant  General,  Eastern  Department, 

Governors  Island,  N.  Y.: 
No  equipment  or  clothing  required  to  be  sent  to  this  camp  by  subparagraph  B, 
paragraph  455  A.  R.  has  been  received  period  neither  lias  this  office,  with  excep- 
tion of  blankets,  been  notified  thai  any  has  been  shipped  period  the  third  NC 
Infantry  is  due  here  July  first,  hut  there  is  do  tentage  t<»  shelter  them  period 
unless  these  supplies  are  expedited  it  will  be  some  time  after  mastering  before 
they  are  equipped  for  the  field  period  Neither  have  any  books  or  blank  forms 
been  received  by  The  Adjutant  General  of  the  Army  for  the  regimental  and 
company  administrations,  as  required  by  paragraph  14,  mustering  regulations. 

Parsons, 

Gamp  Glenn, 
Morehead  City,  X.  ('..  July  20,  1916. 
Commanding  Genb  Dbpabtmi 

Governor*  island,  x.  v. 
Request  that  seven  hundred  cots,  seven  hundred  ponchos,  thirty  five  hundred 
mosquito  bars  be  sent  this  camp  period  cots  and  ponchoes  needed  to  complete 
equipment;  mosquito  bars  need  to  supply  entire  command. 

Hunt. 
,  Second  indorsement.] 

n  Quart 
Philadelphia,  Pu.  July  28,  1916. 
To  Commanding  General,  EC  Department, 

Governors  Island,  X.  )'.: 
1.  The  following  articles   remain   due  on   requisition   in    favor  of  the  senior 

mustering  officer,  Gamp  Glenn,  Morehead  city.  N.  c : 

46  hat  cords,  Cavalry.    Can  be  supplied  about  Aug,  5th. 
2,858  ponchos.    Can  be  supplied  about  Aug.  10th. 

381  bags,  surplus  kit.     Will  be  supplied  Aug.  4th. 
2,014  bars,  mOBQUitO.     Will  be  supplied  about  Aug.  20th. 
2,914  cots.     It  is  expected  that  this  item  will  bo  Supplied  in  small  lots 
from  time  to  time  between  this  date  and  Aug.  15th. 
It  is  expected,  however,  to  make  shipment  of  440  cots  and  493  ponchos  about 

Aug.  1st.    This  latter  to  ever  the  request  made  in  original  telegram  herewith. 

G.  M.  S.  &  Penrose. 


Camp  Glenn, 
Morehead  City,  N.  C,  Aug.  18,  1916. 
Comdg.  General,  Eastern   Departmi 

Governor*  Island,  X.  v.: 
Have  shortages  necessary  to  complete  equipment  C  for  this  command,  as 
given  in  my  report  mailed  July  thirty-first,  been  ordered  furnished  period 
Shoes  and  trousers  needed  period  list  of  clothing  unissued  giving  sizes  was 
forwarded  July  thirtieth  was  same  furnished  clothing  depot  for  information 
and  guidance  in  furnishing  supplied  needed. 

Hunt. 


Camp  Glenn,  Morehead  City,  N.  C,  Sept.  20,  1916. 
Commanding  General  Eastern  Department, 

Governors  Island,  N.  Y.: 
Railroad  authorities  have  all  transportation  ready  for  moving  this  command. 
Overcoats,  sweaters,  and  underclothing  to  completely  equip  now  on  hand,  but 
no  woolen  coats  or  breeches  have  been  supplied.     *     *    * 


1028  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 

Telegram  was  sent  July  22nd  to  the  mustering  officer  at  Camp  Glenn,  North 
Carolina,  directing  him  to  furnish  immediately  report  indicating  the  shortages 
and  equipment  of  the  North  Carolina  troops,  and  he  submitted  a  5-page  list  of 
the  articles  necessary  for  the  equipment  indicating  the  shortages  from  peace 
to  war.    The  following  essential  articles  are  extracted  therefrom : 

Shortage, 
Article:  war  strength. 

Axes  and  helves 226 

Bags,  surplus  kit 411 

Bars,  mosquito 6,  005 

Bed  sacks 5,  890 

Blankets,  olive  drab 6,  721 

Buckets,  galvanized  iron . 282 

Clothing—  ) 

Breeches,  pair 5,  001 

Drawers,  pair l 6,  204 

Laces,  shoe,  extra,  pairs 8,212 

Leggins,  canvas,  pair 2,  093 

Shirts,  flannel,  o.  d 4,  284 

Shoes,  marching,  pair 4,  988 

Stockings,  pair 8,  272 

Undershirts 5,916 

Cots 3,  325 

Overcoats 6,005 

Pins,  tent,  shelter 11,  409 

Tents,  shelter,  half — 

Dismounted 3.201 

Mounted 247 

Tentage :  Heavy  tents,  complete — 

Pyramidal,  large . 286 

Pyramidal,  small 132 

Gloves,  woolen,  o.  d . 3,  863 

As  late  as  August  24th  the  quartermaster  depots  which  should  have  furnished 
the  articles  indicated  on  this  5-page  list  had  not  succeeded  in  supplying  them, 
though  many  of  the  articles  were  ordinary  commercial  articles. 

SOUTH    CAROLINA. 

Camp  Moore,  Styx,  S.  C,  July  10,  19lu. 
Commanding  General  Eastern  Department, 

Governors  Island,  N.  Y.: 
Request  express  shipment  of  five  hundred  number  one  leggins;  twenty-five 
number  one,  seventy-five  number  two  slickers;  six  hundred  number  one  shirts; 
one  hundred  forty  number  one  and  six  each  breeches,  cotton;  one  forty-four 
size  seven,  ninety-six  sizes  seven  one-eighth,  and  seven  one-quarter  each  hats; 
five  hundred  ponchos;  five  hundred  cots;  forty  size  six  one-half  C  and  D  each; 
twenty  sizes  seven  and  seven  one-half  EE  each,  and  twenty  size  eight  EE  shoes. 

Graham. 
[First  indorsement.] 

Headquarters  Eastern  Department, 

July  11,  1916. 
To  Depot  Quartermaster, 

Philadelphia,  Pa.: 

1.  Requesting  shipment  by  express  of  those  articles  which  can  be  supplied. 

2.  Following  report  is  desired:  (a)  What  articles  can  not  be  furnished  now? 
(&)  Approximate  date  supplies  can  be  furnished,  if  at  all. 

By  command  of  Maj.  Gen.  Wood : 

Adjutant  General,  Adjutant. 


Philadelphia,  Pa.,  July  25,  1916. 
Commanding  General  Eastern  Department, 

Governors  Island,  N.  Y.: 
Quartermaster  General  advised  South  Carolina  still  short  of  supplies,  and  di- 
rects this  office  to  call  on  you  for  quantities  and  articles  required  to  complete 
equipment.    Please  furnish  information  early  date. 

Penrose. 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING.  1029 

Governors  Island,  N.  Y.,  July  26,  1916. 
Senior  Assistant  Mustering  Officer, 

Columbia,  S.  C: 
Wire  depot  quartermaster  Philadelphia  direct  quantities  and  articles  of  all 
supplies  still  short  and  required  to  complete  equipment.     Send  mail  copy  thereof 
to  these  headquarters. 

Simpson. 


Mobilization  Camp,  Styx,  S.  C,  August  Jt,  1916. 
From :     Mustering  officer. 

To :  Commanding  general,  Eastern  Dept.,  Governors  Island,  N.  Y. 
Subject :  Shortages  in  equipment. 

1.  In  compliance  with  your  telegram  of  July  27th,  1916,  the  enclosed  lists  of 
shortages  In  equipment  from  various  organizations  in  this  camp,  except  Troop 
A,  Cavalry,  which  I  have  been  unable  to  obtain. 

2.  None  of  the  essentials  can  be  purchased  in  this  vicinity.  Few  of  the  minor 
articles  could  be  purchased,  but  only  at  retail  prices ;  and  then  they  might  have 
to  be  procured  from  Charleston  or  Atlanta,  which  is  impracticable. 

J.  Malcoln  Graham, 
Captain,  19th  Infantry. 
5  inclosures. 

The  inclosures  to  this  letter  consist  of  lists  of  shortages,  separately  by  or- 
ganization, which  cover  nine  pages  and  include  the  following,  to  wit  : 

Bars,  mosquito ' 2,  465 

lints,  service,  With  tying  cord 904 

Laces,  shoe,  prs 1,  200 

<  Jots - 817 

Pins,  tent  shelter 4,850 

Ponchos 1,316 

Slickers 63 

Tents,  shelter  halves 

Tents,  shelter  halves,  mounted 98 

Shot's,  marching 1,  444 

Head  nets,  mosquito 208 

Tents,  pyramidal 39 

Tents,  pyramidal,  small : 49 

Breeches,  prs 784 

Drawers,  prs 730 

Shirts,  O.  D 784 

Undershirts 730 

Blankets 100 

Hats,  service 74 

Leggins,  canvas,  prs 30 

TENNESSEE. 

Nashville,  Tenn.,  June  28,  1916. 
Prom:  senior  assistant  mustering  officer. 
To :  Commanding  general,  Eastern  Department. 
Subject :  Progress  of  mobilization. 

2.  "  No  quartermaster  equipage,  clothing,  or  shoes,  or  supplies  have  been  re- 
ceived. A  message  was  received  from  the  depot  quartermaster,  St.  Louis,  say- 
ing, ■  Can  not  make  shipment  clothing  for  a  few  days.  Will  advise.'  There  have 
been  issued  to  troops  about  twenty-two  hundred  bed  sacks  and  blankets  and 
tentage  for  an  equal  number  of  men,  while  the  strength  of  the  command  is  over 
twenty-five  hundred  enlisted  men.  There  is  an  actual  shortage  for  troops  in 
camp  of  bed  sacks,  blankets,  and  tents  for  three  hundred  men.  The  blankets  are 
not  absolutely  necessary,  because  during  this  weather  ponchos  and  shelter- 
halves  can  be  used  in  their  place ;  however,  Tennessee  has  no  cots,  and  to  keep 
the  men  from  sleeping  on  the  ground  I  advised  the  camp  commander  to  pur- 
chase in  open  market  sufficient  bed  sacks  or  mattress  covers  to  supply  the  men 
who  had  no  bed  sacks.  There  are  three  or  four  hundred  in  camp  without  uni- 
forms of  any  kind.     There  is  a  shortage  in  equipment,  such  as  water  cans, 


1030  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 

garbage  cans,  and  other  minor  supplies.  From  this  it  can  be  seen  that  no 
troops  can  leave  this  camp  until  these  quartermaster's  supplies  and  clothing, 
including  shoes,  are  received  and  issued,  unless  in  the  direct  emergency." 

W.  N.  Hughes,  Jr., 
Captain  of  Infantry. 

Nashville,  Tenn.,  June  28,  1916. 
Quartermaster's  Department,  United  States  Army,  W.  H.  Hughes,  capt.  Infan- 
try,   senior   mustering   officer,    commanding    general,    Eastern   Depart.,    Gov- 
ernors Island,  New  York: 

No  clothing  or  quartermaster's  supplies  received  from  any  depot.  Blankets, 
clothing,  and  sheets  badly  needed  to  equip  troops  in  camp.  Not  possible  to  send 
any  units  forward  until  shoes  are  received. 

Hughes. 


Governors  Island,  N.  Y.,  June  30th,  1916. 
Depot  Quartermaster, 

St.  Louis,  Mo.: 
Following  telegram  received  from  adjutant  general  Tennessee :  "  No  clothing 
or  quartermaster's  supplies  received  from  any  depot.     Blankets,  clothing,  and 
sheets  badly  needed  to  equip  troops  in  camp." 

Bellinger. 


Nashville,  Tenn.,  June  29,  191G 
Commanding  General,  Eastern  Department, 

Governors  Island,  N.  Y.: 
Request  authority  for  emergency  purchase  for  700  bed  sacks;  no  cots  nor 
blankets  in  camp;  absolutely  necessary  to  keep  men  off  of  ground;  recommended 
by  chief  surgeon.     Please  expedite  answer. 

Spence, 
Camp  Commander. 

Governors  Island,  N.  Y.,  June  30,  1916. 
General  Spence, 

Nashville,  Tenn.: 
Depot  quartermaster,  Saint  Louis,  has  been  telegraphed  regarding  your  sup- 
plies and  directed  to  authorize  purchase  of  bed  sacks,  as  requested,  unless  he 
can  ship  you  by  express  same  or  cots  and  blankets.     He  will  telegraph  you  direct 
on  this  subject. 

Simpson. 


Governors  Island,  N.  Y.,  June  SO,  1916. 
Depot  Quartermaster, 

St.  Louis,  Mo.: 
Commanding  officer,  mobilization  camp,  Tennessee  National  Guard,  requests 
authority  for  emergency  purchase  for  seven  hundred  bed  sacks,  stating  no  cots 
or  blankets  in  camp.  Surgeon  recommends  men  be  kept  off  ground.  ,  Have  you 
shipped  by  express  supplies  for  this  State?  If  so,  on  what  date?  If  not,  when 
shipment  will  be  made,  Please  telegraph  information  immediately,  and  also 
telegraph  to  camp  commander  station  regarding  supplies  for  his  troops.  If  you 
can  not  ship  him  by  express  cots  or  bed  sacks  and  blankets,  please  telegraph  him 
authority  to  purchase  seven  hundred  bed  sacks,  as  he  requests,  and  get  him 
cots  and  blankets  by  express  as  soon  sis  posible. 

Simpson. 


St.  Louis,  Mo,  July  1,  1916. 
Department  Commander, 

Eatern  Department,  Governors  Island,  N.  Y.: 
Your  wire  reference  Tennessee  Militia;  have  authorized  commanding  officer 
purchase  seven  hundred  bed  sacks  and  will  ship  him  seven  hundred  blankets  by 
express  to-day.     No  cots  on  hand  and  have  cleaned  up  market  for  immediate 
delivery. 

Stanley. 


IMVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING.  1031 

Mobilization  Camp, 
Nashville,  Torn.,  July  1,  1916. 
From :  Senior  asst.  mustering:  officer. 
To:  Commanding  officer,  Eastern  Department. 
Subject:  Progress  of  mobilization. 

2.  No  quartermaster  stores,  clothing,  or  shoes  have  been  received  to  date,  and 
tbe  command  is  still  lacking  in  tentage,  blankets,  and  bed  sacks. 

t  W.  N.  Hughes,  Jr., 

Captain  Infantry. 


Nashville,  Tenn.,  July  3. 
Commanding  General  Eastern  Department. 

Governors  Island,  N.  Y.: 
Six  hundred  blankets  received  from  Philadelphia  depot  and  seven  hundred 
from  St.  Louis  depot  to-day  by  express;  a  small  shipment  of  quartermaster  sup- 
plies marked  for  issue  to  camp  surgeon  were  received  yesterday  and  to-day;  no 
other  supplies  have  been  received  fmin  depol  quartermaster,  St.  Louis,  nor  has 
any  advice  been  received  by  any  official  in  camp  as  to  when  any  will  be  shipped; 
supplies  are  still  urgently  needed. 

EUOHES. 


Governors  Island.  N.  Y..  July  3,  1916. 
Chief  Mustering  Omi 

Nashville,  Tain.: 
These  headquarters  have  telegraphed  depot  quartermaster,  St.  Louis,  to  tele- 
graph direct  t<>  your  camp  Information  regarding  the  shipment  of  supplies  now 
due  troops  there.  Please  Inquire*  11  any  of  the  camp  officials  has  received  a 
communication  on  this  subject  from  St.  Louis,  and  telegraph  these  headquar- 
ters Immediately  if  supplies  have  not  yet  been  received;  and  if  not.  when  they 
are  expected  to  arrive. 

Simps 


Nashvili.k.   Ti:nn.,  July  3,    1916. 
Commanding  Generax  Kastekn  Department, 

Governors  Island,  N.  Y.: 
Request  authority  to  purchase  shoes  in  the  open  market  in  broken  lots. 

Borches, 
Capt.  Quartermaster. 


July  3,  1916. 
Camp  Quartermaster. 

Nashville,  Tennei* 

Your  request  to  purchase  shoes  disapproved.     St.  Louis  depot  directed  furnish 
supplies. 

Simpson. 


Governors  Island,  N.  Y.,  July  3,  1916. 
Depot  Quartermaster,  St.  Louis,  Mo.: 

Please  telegraph  immediately  information  called  for  in  telegram  these  head- 
quarters dated  June  thirtieth  regarding  supplies  needed  for  Tennessee  National 
Guard  in  camp  at  Nashville,  Tenn.  Have  you  shipped  the  supplies  for  this 
guard  to  Its  mobilization  camp?  If  so,  when  was  shipment  made,  and  was  it 
made  by  express?  If  not  yet  made,  when  will  shipment  be  completed?  Have 
you  communicated  direct  with  chief  mustering  officer  that  mobilization  camp 
furnishing  information  regarding  shipment  these  supplies?  Camp  quartermas- 
ter requests  authority  to  purchase  shoes  in  open  market.  If  you  can  express 
them  shoes  immediately,  please  do  so,  and  telegraph  these  headquarters  time 
shipment  will  leave  St.  Louis.  If  you  can  not  express  them  shoes  immediately, 
please  notify  those  headquarters  to  that  effect. 

Simpson. 


1032  UNIVERSAL  MILITARY   TRAINING. 

Nashville,  Tenn,  July  8-16. 
Commanding  General  Eastern  Department, 

Governors  Island,  N.  Y.: 
Five  thousand  seven  hundred  and  twenty-four  pair  of  drawers  from  St.  Louis 
depot  received.    When  unpacked,  forty-five  hundred  developed  to  be  boys'  sizes, 
largest  size  thirty-two  inch  waist ;  practically  none  of  these  drawers  can  be 
used. 

Hughes. 


Governors  Island,  N.  Y.,  July  9,  1916. 
Chief  Mustering  Officer, 

Mobilization  Camp,  Nashville,  Tennessee: 
Reference  your  telegram  reporting  unusable  articles  of  equipment  furnished 
from  Saint  Louis  depot,  you  will  return  all  such  immediately  by  exress  to 
depot  quartermaster  Saint  Louis.  Telegraph  him  direct  the  articles  which  you 
need  to  reasonably  equip  your  command  as  indicated  by  Major  Brady,  furnish- 
ing him  sizes  required.  He  has  been  directed  to  supply  these  immediately  by 
express  and  to  notify  these  headquarters  of  such  articles  he  can  not  supply. 

Simpson. 


Governors  Island,  N.  Y.,  July  9,  1916. 
Depot  Quartermaster, 

Saint  Louis,  Missouri: 
Chief  Mustering  Officer,  Mobilization  Camp,  Nashville,  Tennessee,  reports 
"  Forty-five  hundred  of  the  fifty-seven  hundred  twenty-four  pairs  of  drawers 
received  from  Saint  Louis  depot  were  boy's  size,  largest  size  thirty-two  inch 
waist;  practically  none  of  these  drawers  can  be  used."  Major  Brady,  depart- 
ment inspector,  reports  "  following  additional  vital  items  needed  before  troops 
will  be  reasonably  equipped  for  transfer ;  four  hundred  bedsacks,  ten  hundred 
twenty-eight  ponchos,  ten  hundred  fifty-two  shelter  halves,  sixty-five  pyramidal 
tents.  Also  twenty-five  hundred  drawers  and  five  thousand  pairs  socks  to  re- 
place unsatisfactory  items  just  received."  Please  communicate  directly  With 
Mustering  Officer,  Mobilization  Camp,  Nashville,  Tennessee,  and  supply  imme- 
diately by  express  the  articles  necessary  to  equip  this  command.  He  has  been 
directed  to  return  the  unusable  articles  by  express.  Please  telegraph  these 
headquarters  when  you  will  be  able  to  make  this  shipment  and  specify  such  of 
the  articles  indicated  as  your  depot  can  not  now  supply  with  date  on  which  you 
will  be  able  to  supply  them. 

Simpson. 


Governors  Island,  N.  Y.,  July  10,  1916. 
Depot  Quartermaster, 

Saint  Louis,  Mo.: 
No  reply  yet  received  to  telegram  sent  from  these  headquarters  yesterday  re- 
garding prospective  shipment  of  supplies  from  your  depot  to  mobilization  camp, 
Nashville,  Tennessee.  Please  telegraph  these  headquarters  immediately  when 
you  will  be  able  to  ship  articles  indicated  in  that  telegram  specifying  articles 
which  your  depot  will  not  be  able  to  supply  immediately  and  date  upon  which 
you  will  be  able  to  supply  them. 

Simpson. 


St.  Louis,  Mo.,  July  11,  1916. 
Department  Commander,  Eastern  Department, 

Governors  Island,  N.  Y.: 
Can  not  supply  Tennessee  drawers,  ponchos,  tent  pins,  and  pyramidal  tents. 
Ponchos  contracted  for  delivery  three  or  four  weeks.    Tents  and  drawers  due 
from  Philadelphia.     Time  delivery  not  known.     Remainder  articles  called  for 
will  be  shipped  to-morrow. 

Stanley. 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING.  1033 

Nashville,  Tenn.,  Sept.  1,  1916. 
Commanding  General, 

Governors  Island,  Eastern  Department,  N.  Y.: 
A  number  of  cases  malaria  have  appeared  in  this  camp ;  mosquito  bars  requi- 
sitioned   for   July   seventeenth   have   not   been   received.    They    are   urgently 
needed  for  the  proper  protection  of  the  command,  as  mosquito  pests  is  bad ; 
twenty-five  hundred  needed  for  present  strength. 

Cox. 


Governors  Island,  N.  Y.,  September  1st,  1916. 
Depot  Quartermaster, 

St.  Louis,  Missouri: 
Mobilization  camp  at  Nashville,  Tennessee,  reports  a  number  of  cases  malaria 
have  appeared  in  camp.  Mosquito  bars  requisitioned  for  July  seventeenth  have 
not  been  received.  They  are  urgently  needed  for  the  proper  protection  of  the 
command,  as  mosquito  pests  are  bad.  Twenty-five  hundred  needed  for  present 
strength.     Please  expedite,  advising. 

Simpson. 


Governors  Island,  N.  Y.,  September  6th,  1916. 
Department  Quartermaster, 

San  Antonio,  Tex.: 
It  is  contemplated  sending  the  Tennessee  troops  to  the  border.    They  are 
short  twenty-five  hundred  mosquito  bars  and  fifty  largo  pyramidal  tents.     Could 
these  or  any  part  thereof  be  supplied  to  troops  on  arrival  from  available  stock 
on  hand  in  your  department?     Please  wire  reply. 

Horton,  In  Charge. 


Quartermaster,  Governors  Island,  N.  Y.: 

Reply  telegram  to-day,  no  mosquito  bars  or  pyramidal  tents,  large,  in  stock 
this  depot. 

W 1 1.  kins. 


MISSISSIPPI. 

Telegram  received  at  Governors  Island,  N.  Y. : 

Jackson,  Miss.,  Sept.  15,  1916. 
The  Commanding  General  Eastern  Department. 

Governors  Island,  N.  Y.: 
'  Reference  requisition  equipment  tor  Mississippi  forwarded;  several  articles 
not  yet  received.  One  hundred  pyramidal  tents,  large,  asked  for;  hoard  offleeri 
now  find  all  unserviceable  except  forty-one;  minimum  number  absolutely  neces- 
sary one  hundred  and  thirty-eight  pyramidal  large,  and  thirteen  wall,  complete. 
Request  depot  quartermaster  expedite  supply  balance  requisition,  but -especially 
tentage,  ponchos,  and  shelter  halves  by  express,  advising  when  delivery  can  be 
expected. 

Pickering. 


Governors  Island,  N.  Y.,  September  16. 
Depot  Quartermaster,  St.  Louis,  Mo.: 

Following  telegram  received  senior  mustering  officer,  Jackson,  Mississippi : 
"  Reference  requisition  equipment  for  Mississippi  forwarded  ;  several  articles  not 
yet  received.  One  hundred  pyramidal  tents,  large,  asked  for;  board  officers  now 
find  all  unserviceable  except  forty-one;  minimum  number  absolutely  necessary 
one  hundred  and  thirty-eight  pyramidal,  large,  and  thirteen  wall,  complete.  Re- 
quest depot  quartermaster  expedite  supply  balance  requisition,  but  especially 
tentage,  ponchos,  and  sjielter  halves,  by  express,  advising  when  delivery  can  be 
expected."    It  is  requested  that  shipment  of  these  supplies  be  expedited. 

Simpson. 
86205—17 8 


1034  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY    TRAINING. 

State  Mobilization  Camp, 

Jackson,  Miss.,  Sept.  16,  1916. 
From :  The  senior  asst.  mustering  officer. 

To:  The  commanding  general  Eastern  Department,  Governors  Island,  N.  Y. 
Subject:  Requisitions,  equipment,  N.  G.  of  Miss. 

1.  With  reference  to  my  telegram,  dated  September  15th,  on  the  above  subject, 
there  is  forwarded  inclosed  herewith  req'n  No.  2,  covering  the  balance  or  the 
unfilled  portions  of  req'n  No.  1,  dated  July  15th,  1916,  and  telegraphic  requests. 

2.  Requisition  No.  1  did  not  cover  the  following,  which  were  asked  for  by  tele- 
graph, viz : 

1,  890  mosquito  bars. 
892  hat  cords,  Inf. 
1,  529  hats,  service. 
1,662  belts,  waist. 
1,  341  ponchos. 

100  tents,  pyramidal,  complete. 
54  tents,  wall. 
19  canvass  latrine  screens. 
1,320  shelter-tent  halves. 
2  tents,  storage. 

3.  As  per  my  telegram  of  the  15th  instant,  it  has  been  necessary  to  increase 
the  number  of  pyramidal  tents  to  138  and  reduce  wall  tents  to  13. 

4.  In  view  of  the  fact  that  it  is  required  that  the  Miss,  troops  be  fully  equipped 
before  proceeding  to  the  border,  it  is  recommended  that  prompt  steps  be  taken 
to  supply  the  balance  of  the  equipment  due.  The  depot  quartermaster,  St.  Louis, 
advises  in  telegram  dated  the  15th  inst.  that  "  No  ponchos  or  pyramidal  tents  on 
hand ;  few  sweaters."  Although  the  St.  Louis  depot  is  designated  as  the  depot 
of  supply  for  Mississippi,  it  is  requested  that  the  pyramidal  tents,  ponchos, 
sweaters,  and  other  articles  covered  by  the  inclosed  requisition,  not  on  hand  at 
St  Louis,  be  furnished  by  some  other  depot. 

5.  To  facilitate  matters,  a  copy  of  this  requisition  has  been  sent  direct  to  the 
D.  Q.  M.,  St.  Louis. 

Richard  It.  Pickering, 

Capt.,  Infantry. 

[Q.  M.  C.  Form  1G0.J 

Requisition   No.   2. 

September  16,  1916.  • 
126  Bags,  surplus  kits. 
2  Ladles,  soup. 
26  Pans,  dish. 
8  Desks,  field,  small. 

1  Pannier,  veterinary. 

8  Pouches,  music,  O.  D. 
730  Powder,  calcum,  chloride,  cubes. 
390  Rope,  picket  line  $". 
32  Salt,  rock,  lbs. 
15  Stretchers,  shoe. 
908  Sweaters. 
1, 890  Towels,  face. 

2  Typewriters,  Remington,  No.  10. 
1,  890  Bars,  mosquito. 

892  Hat  cords,  Infantry. 
1,662  Waist  belts. 
1,341  Ponchos. 
1,320  Shelter  tents,  halves. 

138  Tents,  pyramidal,  large,  complete,  with  poles,  tripods,  and  pins. 
13  Tents,  wall,  complete,  with  poles,  ridges,  and  pins. 
2  Tents,  storage,  complete,  with  poles,  ridges,  and  pins. 
19  Latrine  screens,  canvas. 

Chas.   L.   Dulin, 
Capt.  Q.  M.  C,  N.  O.  Miss.  Camp,  Quartermaster. 
Approved : 

Geo  C.  Hoskins, 
Colonel  1st  Inf.  N.  O.  M.,  Camp  Swep  Taylor,  Jackson,  Miss.,  Commanding. 


UNIVERSAL    MILITARY    TRAIN ING.  1035 

Telegram  received  at  Governors  Island.  X.  v.: 

Jackson,  Miss.,  September  22,  1916. 
The  Commanding  General  Eastern   Department, 

Governors  Island,  N.  Y.: 

Depot  Quartermaster,  St.  Louis,  reports  no  mosquito  bars  available.  Pro- 
curable in  New  Orleans  at  price  not  to  exceed  one  dollar  and  ton  cents  each. 
Request  Depot  Quartermaster.  New  Orleans,  purchase  one  thousand  eight  hun- 
dred and  ninety  bars  and  ship  here  immediately. 

Pickering. 


Governors  Island,  N.  Y.,  October  2,  1916. 
Depot  Quartermaster,  St.  Louis,  Mo,: 

Reference  first  indorsement  these  headquarters,  September  nineteenth,  requi- 
sition equipment  Mississippi,  please  advise  at  once  what  has  been  shipped  to 
date  and  date  remainder  will  be  shipped. 

Simpson. 


ALABAMA. 

Montgomery,  Ala.,  August  n\  1916. 
Colonel  .1.  P>.  Bellini 

Quartermaster  Corps,  Eastern  Department,  Governors  Island,  x.  v.: 

Can  buy  in  local  market  four  thousand  mosquito  bars  at  sixty  cents  cadi,  de- 
livered within  two  weeks  from  date  of  order;  good  material,  approved  by  mus- 
tering officer  here;  please  answer. 

Huim.\Ki>.   Adft.   General. 


Governors  Island,  \.  v..  August  18th,  1916. 

pEPOT  QUARTERMASTER,  St.  Louis,  Mo.: 

Following  telegram  received  adjutant  general,  Montgomery,  Alabama: 

"('an  buy  in  local  market  four  thousand  mosquito  bars  at  sixty  cents  each. 
Delivery  within  two  weeks.  QOOd  material,  approved  by  mustering  officer  here." 
Requisition  submitted  to  your  depot  calls  for  four  thousand  one  twenty-eight 
mosquito  bars.  Advise  by  wire  if  you  have  supplied  any.  and  if  so.  amount,  or 
if  you  consider  purchase  in  local  market  at  price  quoted  above  advantageous. 

Simpson. 


Governors  Island,  N.  v..  August  21,  1916. 
Adjutant  General  Hubbard, 

Montgomery,  Ala.: 
Your  telegram   seventeenth,   purchase  locally   four  thousand    mosquito  bars 
sixty  cents  each,  delivery  within  two  weeks;  material  approved  by  mustering 
officer  approved.    Certify  bill  to  Depot  Quartermaster,  St.  Louis,  for  payment. 

Simpson. 


St.  Louis,  Mo.,  Auyust  21,  1916. 

Department  Commander  Eastern  Department, 

Governors  Island,  N.  Y.  City.: 
Your  wire  eighteenth,  recommend  purchase  locally  of  four  thousand  mosquito 
bars  at  sixty  cents  for  Alabama  militia;  certified  bill  to  be  sent  this  office  for 
payment. 

Stanley. 

Montgomery,  Ala.,  August  28,  1916. 
Commanding  General  Eastern  Department, 

Governors  Island,  N.  Y.: 
Tripods  for  pyramidal   tents,  target,  and  tent  pins  have  not  been  received. 
Request  instructions  be  issued  to  rush  tripod  and  tent  pins;  same  were  requi- 
sitioned for  June  twenty-fourth  and  July  twenty-second. 

Screws. 


1036  UNIVERSAL  MILITARY   TRAINING. 

It  whs  reported  by  the  mustering  officer  of  these  headquarters  that  supplies 
had  been  furnished  the  Alabama  troops  which  were  inferior  quality  and 
appeared  to  be  secondhand,  causing  the  following  communication  to  be  sent : 

Headquarters  Eastern  Department, 

Aug.  22,  1916. 
To  Senior  Assistant  Mustering  Officer, 

Mobilization  Camp,  Montgomery,  Ala.:  * 

1.  You  will  examine  the  articles  reported  in  this  communication  as  being 
of  inferior  quality  and  secondhand  and  report  to  these  headquarters  promptly 
the  actual  condition  of  these  articles. 

In  case  you  find  hats  or  shoes  either  secondhand  or  of  inferior  quality,  a 
few  samples,  not  exceeding  half  a  dozen  pairs  of  shoes  and  a  half-dozen  hats, 
should  be  sent  to  these  headquarters  by  official  parcel  post  or  express  as  exhib- 
its to  your  report. 

3.  Please  expedite  action  on  this  matter.  Bv  command  of  Major  General 
Wood. 

A.  G.  Jenkins, 
Adjutant  General,  Adjutant. 

Office  Senior  Mustering  Officer, 
Mobilization  Camp,  Montgomery,  Ala.,  August  2Sth,  1916. 
To  Commanding  General,  Eastern  Department, 

Governors  Island,  N.  Y.: 

1.  I  have  examined  the  articles  reported  in  the  enclosed  communication,  and 
find  that  the  hats  and  shoes  are  an  inferior  quality,  and  hats  marked  NGP 
appear  to  be  secondhand.  I  am  sending  by  parcel  post,  this  date,  two  pair 
shoes,  brand  "  Hardware,"  and  six  hats.  All  of  these  articles  were  received 
in  the  first  shipment  of  quartermaster  supplies  and  were  issued  in  cases 
where  the  troops  had  no  hats  or  shoes  of  any  description.  The  shoes  above 
referred  to  are  not  only  too  heavy  but  in  number  of  cases  have  worn  out  after 
about  three  weeks'  wear. 

2.  The  quartermaster  has  noted  the  inferior  quality  of  the  hats  and  shoes 
above  mentioned  prior  to  the  receipt  of  this  communication,  and  intended  to 
take  the  matter  up  officially  with  the  department  as  soon  as  all  supplies  requisi- 
tioned for  had  been  received.  Will  also  state  that  this  matter  was  called  to  the 
attention  of  Major  James  P.  Brady,  C.  A.  C,  inspector,  on  his  arrival  at  this 
camp  August  23,  1916,  which  he  noted. 

3.  In  all  cases  where  shoes  and  hats  of  an  inferior  quality  was  issued,  com- 
pany commanders  were  notified  to  note  same,  and  at  the  proper  time  survey 
proceedings  would  be  instituted,  or  report  made  to  the  department,  with  the 
view  of  rectifying  same.  I  recommend  that  in  all  cases  where  issue  were  made 
of  these  inferior  articles  that  the  regulation  shoes  and  hats  be  exchanged  for 
same.  This  can  be  accomplished  as  stated  above,  i.  e.,  company  commanders 
have  records  of  these  issues. 

4.  A  shipment  of  regulation  shoes,  spec.  1206,  1,714  pairs,  was  received  by 
the  camp  quartermaster  August  23,  1916,  and,  as  far  as  practicable,  in  cases 
where  the  shoes,  brand  "  Hardware,"  referred  to  above  was  issued  and  have 
not  been  worn,  same  will  be  exchanged  by  him.  The  quartermaster  has  in 
stock  not  issued  approximately  200  pairs  of  "  Hardware "  brand  shoes  and 
about  900  hats,  samples  of  which  were  forwarded  by  parcel  post  this  date. 

In  the  first  shipment  of  shoes  received  there  was  a  mixture  of  regulation 
russets  and  commercial  brands  "  Reliance,"  "  Master,"  "  Hardware,"  "  East," 
and  "  Endurance,"  boxes  marked  "  Hamilton-Brown  Shoe  Company." 

Wm.  P.  Screws, 
Li.  Col.,  Jfth  Inf.,  N.  G.  Ala. 

Shipment  is  being  made  this  date  by  parcel  post  of  six  pairs  of  shoes  and  six 
hats  as  exhibits  to  support  of  mustering  officer's  report,  dated  August  28th, 
1916. 

Albert  B.  Kaempfer, 
Captain,  Infantry,  Mustering  Officer. 


Headquarters  Eastern  Department, 

December  2nd,  1916. 
To  the  Adjutant  General  of  the  Army  : 

1.  These    samples    have    been    examined    at    these    headquarters    and    their 
quality  found  to  be  very  inferior. 


UN1VEKSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING.  1031 

2.  It  Is  believed  that  their  purchase  was  a  waste  of  Government  funds,  and 
that  more  suitable  articles  could  have  been  purchased. 

3.  The  following  items  of  clothing  arc  being  forwarded  to  the  office  of  the 
Quartermaster  General  under  separate  covers  and  it  is  recommended,  after 
examination,  that  the  articles  be  returned  to  depots  from  which  supplied  : 

Samples  received  from  mobilization  camp,  Montgomery,  Alabama  : 

1  pair  shoes,  black. 
Samples  received  from  mobilization  camp,  Nashville,  Tennessee: 

1  pair  drawers   (summer). 

1  hat,  service. 

1  shirt,  c.  d.  wool. 

1  pair  shoes,  black. 

4  pairs  shoes,  russet. 

1  pair  stockings,  cotton. 
Samples  received  from  mobilization  camp,  Fort  Thomas,  Kentucky  : 

1  pair  shoes,  russet. 

2  pairs  shoes,  black. 
1  hat,  service. 

Leonard  Wood, 
Major  General,  Commanding. 

Montgomery,  Ala.,  October  20,  19161 
Commanding  General  Eastern  Departmi 

Governors  Island,  X.  V. 
Reference  your  telegram  October  nineteen  all  outstanding  requisitions  for 
clothing  and  equipage  for  Cavalry  regiment  have  n<>i  been  filled.  When  requi- 
sitions now  outstanding  are  filled  regiment  will  be  fully  equipped  Shortage 
at  present  approximately  as  follows:  HHghteen  paullns,  large,  fifteen  hundred 
shelter  ten  halves  complete  with  poles  and  pins,  two  thousand  BOeks,  fourteen 
hundred  fifty  leggings,  eight  hundred  breeches  cotton  sixes  one  to  twenty,  one 
thousand  breeches,  woolen,  si/.es  one  to  twenty-lour;  seven  hundred  < 
woolen,  size  three  to  seven;  eight  hundred  coats,  cotton,  size  one  to  seven;  six 
hundred  olive  drab  llannel  shirts,  size  two  and  three.  Packers'  list  has  been 
received  on  seven  hundred  drawers  and  one  hundred  twenty  pairs  shoes. 
Requisition  now  being  forward  for  eight  hundred  pairs  shoes,  one  thousand 
undershirts  to  care  for  probable  recruits. 

Kaempfer. 


Montgomery,  Ala.,  October  21,  1916. 
Commanding  General  Eastern  Department, 

Governors  Island,  X.  V. 
Referring  to  your  endorsement  eighteenth,  clothing  requisition  for  needed  to 
equip   Cavalry    and    recruits.     Eight   hundred    breeches,    cotton,    size   one   to 
twenty.     Eight  hundred   seventy-six  coats,  cotton,   si/.es  one  to  six.     Request 
rush  shipment. 

Kaempfer. 


Montgomery,  Ala.,  October  26,  1916. 
Commanding  General  Eastern  Department. 

Governors  Island,  N.  Y. 
Over  fifty  per  cent  of  this  command  is  still  without  uniform  clothes  of  any 
description;  it  is  an  urgent  need  of  both  cotton  and  woolen  uniforms. 

R.  E.  Steiner, 

Colonel. 


Montgomery,  Ala.,  November  1,  1916. 
Commanding  General  Eastern  Department, 

Governors  Island,  N.  Y. 
Reference  your  telegram  October  28th,  calling  for  report  on  supplies  shipped" 
Oct.   25th,   following   articles   are   lacking:  Two   hundred   thirty-nine  breeches, 
wool;  eighty-Six  coats,  wool;  six  hundred  shirts,  llannel.  Other  supplies  of  thi» 
shipment  received  on  October  28th  and  Nov.  1st. 

Kaempfer; 


1038  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 

report  cm. ted  fob  by  ad.tti  am   general  of  the  army. 

Office  Quartermaster,  Eastern  Department, 

November  16,  1916. 
From :  Department  quartermaster. 
To:  Commanding  general,  Eastern  Department. 
Subject:  Data  relative  to  business  Quartermaster  Corps  in  supplying  National 

Guard  called  into  Federal  service. 

With  reference  to  the  letter  from  the  Adjutant  General  of  the  Army,  No. 
2457329,  dated  September  21,  1916,  calling  for  certain  information  in  connec- 
tion with  the  mustering  into  the  Federal  service  of  the  National  Guard 
organizations  covered  by  the  call  of  the  President  dated  June  18,  1916,  I  submit 
the  following  replies  to  that  portion  of  the  letter  of  the  Adjutant  General  of 
the  Army  which  pertains  to  the  business  of  the  Quartermaster  Corps,  to  wit : 

(/)  1.  I  enclose  a  memorandum  marked  "A"  indicating  the  dates  upon 
which  the  National  Guard  organizations  left  their  State  mobilization  camps  for 
the  border. 

2.  There  was  delay  in  moving  the  National  Guard  organizations  to  the 
border,  and  such  causes  for  this  delay  as  are  attributable  to  the  business  per- 
taining to  the  Quartermaster  Corps  are  considered  to  be  the  following,  to  wit: 
First.  The  failure  of  the  Quartermaster  Corps  to  function  promptly,  accurately, 
and  efficiently  under  that  portion  of  paragraph  455-1.  (b)  which  states  that 
"  The  Federal  supply  departments  concerned  will  ship  at  once  to  the  senior 
mustering  officers  at  the  proper  State  mobilization  camps,  without  requisition, 
etc.,  etc."  The  cause  for  this  failure  appeared  to  be  due  to  the  fact  that  the 
commanding  officers  of  the  field  supply  depots  were  not  specifically  and  promptly 
notified  of  the  issue  of  the  President's  call,  and  had  not  received  specific 
instructions  to  begin  shipment  when  so  notified.  In  this  connection  the  com- 
manding officers  of  these  field  supply  depots  should  be  given  instructions  to 
report  immediately  by  telegraph  to  the  department  commanders  whose-  troops 
they  are  to  supply  for  detailed  instructions  as  to  the  sequence  in  which  their 
organizations  are  to  be  supplied.  Such  instructions  would  have  obviated  the 
delay  caused  in  the  Eastern  Department  by  supplies  being  shipped  to  mobiliza- 
tion camps  at  which  troops  had  not  arrived  before  they  shipped  supplies  to 
mobilization  camps  at  which  troops  had  arrived.  Second.  The  failure  to 
have  sufficient  supplies  in  stock  to  equip  completely  the  National  Guard  or- 
ganizations between  peace-strength  and  war-strength.  Third.  The  apparent 
lack  of  arrangements  to  insure  a  prompt  supply  of  essential  personal  equipment 
of  a  suitable  kind  and  quality  to  promptly  supply  the  deficiency  between  the 
stock  on  hand  and  the  amounts  of  these  articles  necessary  to  supply  the  Na- 
tional Guard  organizations  between  peace  and  war  strength. 

(g)  1.  The  National  Guard  organizations  as  a  whole  were  not  equipped, 
as  was  contemplated  by  Army  regulations,  to  their  peace  strength. 

2.  Such  equipment  as  they  had  in  their  possession  and  which  had  been 
furnished  by  the  Quartermaster  Corps  was  the  same  as  that  furnished  for  the 
Regular  Army. 

3.  One  of  the  material  causes  for  the  delay  in  supplying  National  Guard 
organizations  was  due  to  the  fact  that  supplies  furnished  to  equip  National 
Guard  organizations  from  peace  to  war  strength  were  used  to  make  good  their 
shortages  of  equipment  to  peace  strength. 

(h)  First.  The  necessary  equipment  and  supplies  to  be  furnished  by  the 
Quartermaster  Corps  were  not  on  hand  in  the  depots  designated  to  supply  the 
National  Guard  organizations  located  in  the  Eastern  Department,  for  these 
depots  reported  that  they  did  not  have  certain  supplies  and  were  unable  to 
supply  them.  Second.  Considerable  delay  was  caused  in  moving  organizations 
to  the  border,  due  to  this  lack  of  supplies,  and  the  length  of  this  delay  would 
have  been  greatly  increased  had  the  War  Department  not  directed  that  the 
troops  should  be  forwarded  to  the  border  without  waiting  for  supplies  to 
equip  them  beyond  the  absolutely  necessary  minimum  for  a  short  period  of 
field  service. 

(i)  First.  I  do  not  consider  that  any  material  delay  was  occasioned  in  mov- 
ing the  troops,  due  to  a  lack  of  adequate  transportation  facilities,  provided 
the  available,  and  in  my  opinion  entirely  suitable,  facilities  had  been  used. 
Second.  There  was  a  delay  in  moving  the  troops  when  it  was  determined  that 
they  must  be  moved  in  tourist's  sleeping  cars,  because  the  total  number  of 
tourist's  sleepings  cars  in  the  United  States  was  not  sufficient  to  move  all  of 
the  troops  as  soon  as  they  were  ready  to  be  moved.    Third.  I  do  not  con- 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING.  1039 

sider  that  any  unnecessary  hardship  was  caused  by  lack  of  provisions  or  ac- 
commodations, but  the  reports  received  on  the  troop-train  movement  indicate 
that,  in  a  few  cases,  some  inconvenience  was  caused  due  to  the  lack  of  experi- 
ence of  the  officers  in  charge  of  the  troops  and  the  troop  trains  in  obtaining 
provisions  and  in  utilizing  them  and  the  troop-train  accommodations  to  their 
maximum  efficiency. 

Resume'. 

The  deficiencies  in  the  transaction  of  the  business  of  the  Quartermaster  Corps 
during  the  mobilization  of  the  National  Guard  under  the  presidential  call  of 
June  18,  1916,  were  in  general  as  follows : 

1.  Failure  of  paragraph  455-lb  A.  K.  1913,  to  function. 

2.  Failure  to  provide  promptly  suitable  animals  for  mounts  and1  draft. 

3.  Failure  to  have  the  National  Guard  troops  equipped  with  clothing  for 
peace  strength. 

4.  Failure  to  have  on  hand  sufficient  clothing  and  certain  other  supplies  to 
equip  the  troops  from  peace  to  war  strength. 

5.  Failure  to  obtain  prompt  deliveries  of  suitable  supplies  to  make  up  the 
shortages  in  supplies  necessary  to  equip  the  National  Guard  from  peace  to 
war  strengh. 

6.  The  purchasing  of  supplies  of  clothing  wholly  unsuitable  In  character  and 
quality. 

7.  The  most  essential  supplies  which  were  not  on  had  for  issue  and  which,  in 
some  cases,  were  not  supplied  for  several  months  afterwards  are  as  follows, 
to  wit: 

Bars,  mosquito.  Shoes. 

Cots.  Tent  pins. 

Drawers.  Tents,  pyramidal. 

Hats.       *  Uniforms,  cotton. 

Ponchos.  Uniforms,  wool. 
Shirts. 

Samples  of  some  of  the  articles  of  clothing  furnished  by  the  St.  Louis  depot 
and  shipped  to  mobilization  camps  in  the  Eastern  Department  are  forwarded 

under  separate  cover  for  your  information. 

J.  B.  BEi.i.iNf;r.u. 
Colonel,  Quartermaster  Corp». 

GEORGIA. 

Washington,  D.  C,  July  10,  1916. 
Commanding  General  Eastern  Department, 

Governors  Island,  N.  Y.: 
Following  message  repeated  to  you  for  Investigation  and  report:  "Repre- 
sentative Vinson,  of  Georgia,  telephoned  this  afternoon  asking  whether  some- 
thing could  not  be  done  to  correct  deplorable  condition  of  mobilization  camp 
at  Macon,  Georgia.  He  states  there  are  five  thousand  troops  there.  At  least 
fifty  per  cent  are  supposed  to  sleep  on  ground  in  rainy  weather  because  of 
lack  of  cots,  and  governor  has  been  forced  to  buy  all  cots  in  State  of  Georgia. 
He  also  states  that  soldiers  at  Macon  are  not  supplied  with  shoes  and  other 
equipment." 

McCain. 


Governor's  Island,  N.  Y., 

July  11,  1916. 
The  Adjutant  General  of  the  Army, 

Washington,  D.  C: 
Replying  to  yours  tenth  concerning  shortage  cots  and  shoes  Georgia  mobiliza- 
tion camp.  No  cots  have  been  available  in  quartermaster  depots  either  at 
Philadelphia  or  Saint  Louis  for  some  time,  due  to  failure  to  maintain  ade- 
quate reserve.  Every  possible  effort  is  being  made  here  to  purchase  in  open 
market.  Day  before  yesterday  all  available  cots  in  hands  of  Coast  Artil- 
lery at  Scriven  were  ordered  to  this  camp  as  an  emergency  measure,  and 
yesterday  morning  the  balance  required  were  purchased  in  open  market  in 


1040  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 

New  York  and  shipped  by  express  and  should  now  be  in  bands  of  officers  on 
the  ground.  Donaldson,  inspector,  reported  satisfactory  sanitary  condition, 
and  that  while  clothing  of  troops  arriving  was  in  bad  condition  there  was  ample 
on  band,  but  not  yet  issued  to  supply  all  concerned. 

Wood. 


Telegraphic  instructions  were  immediately  sent  to  Ft.  Scriven,  Ga.,  and  Ft. 
Moultrie,  S.  C,  to  ship  immediately  by  express  all  available  cots  to  mobilization 
camp  at  Macon,  Ga.     Other  goods  were  purchased  in  the  open  market. 

Some  2,G00  cots  were  purchased  in  open  market  in  New  York  City,  and 
enough  of  these,  with  those  sent  from  the  posts  indicated  above,  were  shipped  to 
Macon,  Ga.,  to  meet  the  needs  of  the  situation. 

Headquarters  Eastern  Department, 
Governors  Island,  New  York  City,  July  18,  1916. 
From :  Department  commander. 
To:  The  Adjutant  General  of  the  Army. 
Subject:  Shortages. 

1.  The  depot  quartermasters  at  Philadelphia  and  at  St.  Louis  have  reported 
to  these  headquarters  that  they  can  not  furnish  the  following  class  of  articles 
for  the  troops  now  in  the  State  mobilization  camps,  viz : 

Philadelphia  depot  shortages: 

Prs.  breeches. 

Hats. 

Ornaments. 

Shirts. 

Bed  sacks. 

Cots. 
St.  Louis  depot  shortages : 

Drawers. 

Hats  and  cords. 

Socks. 

Waist  belts. 

Bed  sacks. 

Cots. 

Mosquito  bars. 

Ponchos. 

Pyramidal  tents. 

2.  It  is  stated  that  some  of  these  articles  can  be  furnished  when  received 
from  contractors,  but  no  date  is  indicated  when'  they  will  be  available. 

3.  These  articles  must  be  supplied  these  troops  before  they  can  be  forwarded 
to  the  border,  and,  as  the  depots  can  not  furnish  them,  authority  is  requested 
for  these  headquarters  to  purchase  them  as  near  to  standard  specifications  as 
possible. 

Leonard  Wood,  Major  General. 


These  headquarters  being  informed  by  the  depot  quartermasters,  Philadelphia, 
that  it  was  impossible  to  state  when  mosquito  bars  could  be  furnished,  went 
into  the  open  market  and  purchased  mosquito  bars  as  follows,  to  wit : 

Aug.  23, 1916, 1,  200  bobbinette  mosquito  bars  with  frames,  at  $1.39 

each $1,668.00 

Aug.  23,  1916,      350  bobbinette  mosquito   bars   with   frames,   at   $8 

dozen 233.  34 


Total 1,  550  bobbinette  mosquito  bars  with  frames. 

It  being  impossible  to  purchase  any  more  bobbinette  mosquito  bars  an  order 
was  placed  for  5,000  mosquito  bars  of  the  best  cheesecloth,  at  $1  each,  which 
were  delivered  within  ten  days  of  the  placing  of  the  order. 

Not  only  did  this  action  of  these  headquarters  obtain  prompt  delivery  of 
mosquito  bars  which  permitted  regiments  that  were  being  held  in  mobilization 
Camps  for  this  article  to  be  forwarded  to  the  Mexican  border  for  duty  imme- 
diately after  receipt  of  mosquito  bars,  thus  saving  the  Government  $1,000  a 
day  for  retaining  these  troops  in  their  mobilization  camps  at  home,  but  resulted 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 


1041 


in  an  actual  saying  to  the  Government  of  approximately  $18,850  on  the  price 
paid  for  these  mosquito  bars,  as  the  contract  price  of  the  Quartermaster  Corps 
for  bobbinette  mosquito  bars  at  this  time  was  about  $4.20. 

Call  of  the  President  for  mobilization  of  the  National  Guard  June  18,  1916 — Out- 
8tanding  deflcU  ncies  Oct.  81,  1016  (4  months  and  LI  days  after  the  call). 


Ala- 
bama. 

District 
of  Co- 
lumbia. 

Florida. 

Georgia. 

Ken- 
tucky. 

Missis- 
sippi. 

New 
Hamp- 
shire. 

New 
Jersey. 

Animals: 

61 

30 
1,890 
1,662 
1,890 

162 

4, 128 

1,860 
50 

1,890 

248 

750 

383 

1,380 

500 

1,890 

3,516 

2,000 
100 
750 

2,000 
500 

425 
500 

1,000 

482 

Cots . . . 

3,000 

600 

1,890 

3,516 

1,286 

Hats 

150 

565 

892 

141 
67 

525 

Pins  tent 

35,000 

2,182 

383 

1,500 
1,300 

15,896 
1,321 

1,100 

.  ' 

508 

100 

341 

2,000 
2,010 

200 

318 
150 

908 

400 

1,200 

New 

York. 

North 
Caro- 
lina. 

Pennsyl- 
vania. 

South 
Caro- 
lina. 

Tennes- 
see. 

Ver- 
mont. 

West 

Vir- 
ginia. 

Total. 

Animals: 

36 
1,237 

61 
220               95 

490 
44 

118 
31 

*       886 

Ill 

865 
1,465 

650 
914 
674 
830 



750 

3,087 
196 

2,398 

262 

19,583 

3,937 

1,237 



262 

12,140 

145 

4,836 
11,426 

Cots 

1,170 

197 
M 

870 

3,147 

Hats. 

3,433 

67 

3,825 
67 

1,724 

564 

16 

304 

244 
15 

1,200 
700 
45 
784 
1,025 
250 
2 

5,000 

340 

24 

60,320 

246 

8,261 

1,191 

4,514 

750 
117 

5,323 

191 

4 

98 

2,100 

Wagons   E   W 

21 

The  foregoing  show  some  of  the  shortages  of  the  troops  on  official  record  la 
this  department 

Recently  an  officer  who  had  been  on  duty  with  Gen.  Pershing's  expedition 

informed  an  officer  of  my  staff  that  the  troops  were  suffering  for  lack  of  winter 
clothing;  that  the  temperature  frequently  fell  below  freezing;  that  their  requi- 
sitions for  winter  clothing  had  not  been  honored,  and  that  the  troops  of 
Pershing's  expedition  felt  that  they  were  being  sacrificed  in  order  to  favor  the 
militia  on  the  border.  This  officer  stated  in  addition  that  as  he  passed  along 
the  border  he  found  that  this  was  not  so;  that  both  the  Regulars  and  the  militia 
on  the  border  were  suffering  similarly  from  a  lack  of  proper  clothing. 

These  statements  can  readily  be  confirmed  by  reference  to  the  reports  made 
by  the  commanding  general,  Southern  Department,  to  the  War  Department. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  You  are  talking  about  the  Regular 
Army? 

Gen.  Wood.  The  Regular  Army,  just  the  same  as  the  militia,  so 
far  as  equipment  goes.  The  Regulars  are  instructed  men,  with  in- 
structed officers,  and  are  available  to  the  limit  of  their  number  and 


1042  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 

equipment;  the  militia  are  not.  The  Regular  Infantry  in  this  coun- 
try has  been  at  or  below  half  war  strength  for  the  past  five  years,  and 
we  have  been  short,  as  you  know,  of  Artillery.  The  only  radio  com- 
pany in  the  Canal  Zone  was  ordered  north  with  its  wireless  equip- 
ment. 

The  condition  of  the  Field  Artillery  material  is  shown  by  the 
following  extract  from  an  indorsement  by  the  Chief  of  Ordnance : 

I  assume  this  is  in  addition  to  that  in  the  hands  of  troops. 

4.  The  following  is  a  statement  of  the  Field  Artillery  material  and  machine 
suns  completed  and  under  manufacture: 


Batteries 
available 
for  issue. 

Batteries 
under  man- 
ufacture. 

3-inch  gun 

115 

7 

»5 

•  11 

*5 

20 

3.8-inch  howitzer 

g 

5* 

la 

4.7-inch  howitzer 

6-inch  howitzer 

6 

1  6  converted  batteries. 


*  2  batteries  of  each  in  store  at  Fort  Williams,  Me.  ^ftSff  eAfSmIS'enth  Provisional  Regiment  <*  He^y 

•  2  at  Watervliet  Arsenal.  J    Field  Artillery. 

It  is  expected  that  the  batteries  under  manufacture,  with  the  exception  of 
the  3.8-inch  Howitzer  batteries,  will  be  completed  within  the  year. 

******* 

William  Crozieh, 
Brigadier  General,  Chief  of  Ordnance. 

For  machine  guns,  as  you  know,  we  had  to  go  to  the  British  Gov- 
ernment. They  let  us  have  some  240  or  250  of  one  of  the  best  light 
guns  made,  the  Lewis  gun.  These  were  not  what  we  got  for  the 
troops  going  to  the  border. 

I  insert  a  letter  from  the  Chief  of  Ordnance  as  to  our  machine-gun 
supply. 

June  22,  1916. 
From  :  The  Ordnance  Office. 
To :  The  Adjutant  General  of  the  Army. 
Subject :  Status  of  machine-gun  supply. 

1.  Fifty-four  regiments  of  the  Organized  Militia  have  properly  approved 
machine-gun  organizations,  and  of  these  44  are  completely  equipped,  including 
four  guns  each,  5  regiments  have  no  equipment,  and  5  require  the  automatic 
machine  rifles  with  tools,  accessories,  spare  parts,  and  pack  outfits,  but  have 
the  personal  equipment. 

2.  Ninety-nine  complete  Infantry  regiments  and  3  complete  Cavalry  regiments 
have  been  ordered  mobilized,  so  that  58  regiments,  which  will  shortly  be  in  the 
Federal  service,  are  without  machine  guns. 

3.  The  records  of  this  department  show  that  there  are  available  at  ordnance 
arsenals,  general  supply  depot  No.  1,  Schuylkill  Arsenal,  at  the  base,  Columbus. 
N.  Mex.,  and  the  seacoast  forts  intended  for  provisional  regiments  of  Coast 
Artillery,  a  total  of  141  machine  guns,  of  which  69  are  Benet  and  72  Maxim, 
model  of  1904;  deducting  6  which  are  counted  as  being  on  hand  at  the  base, 
Columbus,  N.  Mex..  leaves  133;  of  these.  45  are  required  1*<»r  the  equipment 
of  nine  new  regiments  to  be  organized  under  the  national-defense  act  in  the  imme- 
diate future.  This  leaves  90  guns,  of  which  18  are  Benet  and  72  Maxim,  model 
of  1904. 

4.  It  is  considered  important  that  at  least  18  Benet  guns  and  22  Maxim  should 
be  retained  for  replacements  during  repairs  of  guns  in  service  and  for  other 
special  demands.  This  number  is,  of  course,  inadequate,  but  the  entire  supply 
is  so  small  that  it  is  thought  it  should  be  reduced  to  a  minimum. 

5.  In  addition  to  the  above,  there  are  in  the  United  States  67  Maxim  auto- 
matic machine  ^uns,  model  of  1904,  in  the  hands  of  Coast  Artillery  troops  and 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING.  1043 

now  assigned  to  land  defense  of  seacoast  fortifications,  and  25  Colt  automatic 

machine  suns,  which  are  of  an  old  model,  but  might  be  used  in  emergency. 

6.  It  will  be  seen  from  the  above  figures  that  the  supplying  of  four  machine 
guns  to  each  militia  regiment  to  be  mustered  into  the  service  is  impossible  even 
if  the  Colt  guns  be  used  and  the  Maxims  at  seacoast  fortifications  be  applied 
to  that  purpose.  It  is  therefore  recommended  that  for  the  present  the  machine- 
gun  organizations  of  militia  still  to  be  equipped  be  furnished  two  guns  each 
instead  of  four. 

7.  It  is  also  recommended  that  this  office  be  given  authority  to  direct  turn- 
ing in  of  all  Maxim  automatic  machine  gun  equipment  from  seacoast  fortifica- 
tions to  such  arsenals  as  may  be  most  advantageous  in  order  that  with  the  pack 
outfits  they  may  be  made  ready  for  assignment  to  such  machine-gun  organiza- 
tions as  may  be  formed,  including  those  pertaining  to  provisional  regiments  that 
may  be  formed  for  Coast  Artillery,  none  of  which  have  been  provided  for.  The 
seacoast  organizations  which  are  now  on  duty  on  the  bonier  are  not  formed 
into  regiments  and  have  no  machine-gun  equipment. 

8.  It  is  further  recommended  that  similar  authority  be  given  to  this  office  to 
have  the  30  machine  guns,  with  pertaining  equipment,  now  at  seacoast  fortifica- 
tions and  originally  intended  for  the  equipment  of  provisional  regiments  of  Coast 
Artillery,  turned  in  to  arsenals  for  overhauling  and  application  of  equipment  of 
nine  new  regiments  to  be  formed  in  the  regular  service. 

William  Croziek, 
Brigadier  dcneral,  Chief  of  Ordnance. 

"Recommendation  to  reduce  guns  to  be  issued  to  militia  regiments  is  disap- 
proved on  informal  recommendation  of  the  Chief  of  Ordnance,  as  additional  guns 
have  since  been  secured." 

Two  hundred  and  forty  Lewis  guns  wciv  secured. 

The  recommendation  referred  to  follows: 

[  Fourth  Indorsement.] 

Obdnance  Office,  July  t6,  1916. 
To  The  Adjutant  General  ok  the  Akmy  ■ 

1.  The  final  recommendation  of  this  office  intended  that  action  should  be  taken 
as  has  now  been  done,  namely,  that  the  militia  regiments  should  be  provided 
with  four  machine  guns  each,  and  that  the  Maxim  automatic  machine  guns, 
caliber  .30,  model  of  1904,  at  Coast  Artillery  posts  should  be  turned  in  to  arsenals. 
The  total  number  of  machine  guns  now  available  after  having  purchased  those 
which  could  be  secured,  is  still  very  limited. 

William  Ckoziek, 
Brigadier  General,  Chief  of  Ordnance. 

The  Chairman.  Why,  was  not  that  troop  down  at  Carrizal,  which 
was  annihilated  by  the  Mexicans,  armed  with  machine  guns?  The 
Mexican  troop  had  machine  guns. 

Gen.  Wood.  I  do  not  know,  sir;  I  think  they  had  them.  We  have 
adhered  to  a  gun  which,  I  believe,  has  received  very  general  condem- 
nation— the  Benet-Mercie — and  we  have  been  experimenting  with 
one  gun  after  another  for  years.  But  it  is  the  old  story  of  not  accept- 
ing the  best  in  the  world  and  at  least  starting  even  with  the  other 
fellow ;  and  if  a  crisis  came  again  to-morrow  you  would  have  to  do 
exactly  the  same  thing  and  if  it  came  any  time  within  the  next  year 
you  would  have  to  do  the  same  thing.  You  would  have  to  go  to  some 
foreign  government  or  suspend  some  foreign  contract  and  use  a  gun 
which  does  not  use  our  ammunition  or  depart  entirely  from  your 
present  method  of  procedure,  in  order  to  have  sufficient  effective  guns 
for  a  force  of  several  hundred  thousand  men. 

The  Chairman.  If  we  happened  to  be  at  war  with  that  power,  we 
would  be  in  a  bad  situation,  would  we  not? 

Gen.  Wood.  We  would.  T  would  like  to  go  into  this  question  of 
modern  arms  and  equipment  a  little  more,  because  this  is  where,  as  I 
see  it,  the  blame  falls  largely  on  the  supply  departments  of  the  Regu- 


1044  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 

lar  Army.  The  militiaman,  if  he  had  the  equipment,  would  be  worth 
little  as  a  soldier  unless  well  trained;  but  the  regular  soldier,  while 
well  trained  as  a  rule,  has  not  the  equipment  and  arms  which  modern 
war  demands.  The  organization  of  the  British  company  to-day  at 
the  front  is  250  men  and  6  officers.  There  are  in  each  company  8 
machine  guns — Lewis  guns.  There  are  no  Infantry  regiments  at  the 
front  in  the  British  Army;  the  brigades  are  made  up  of  battalions. 
The  brigade  consists  of  four  battalions.  Each  battalion  has  about 
1,000  rifles.  There  are  4,000  rifles  in  the  brigade.  There  are  128 
Lewis  guns  in  each  brigade  in  the  British  Army  on  the  western  front 
and  back  of  each  brigade  a  company  of  16  Vickers — a  splendid  gun 
of  heavier  type;  there  is  no  better  heavy  gun.  This  is  the  gun  we 
have  adopted,  but  there  is  just  as  marked  a  distinction  between  the 
two  types  of  machine  guns  as  there  is  between  heavy  and  light  field 
artillery,  and  they  are  interdependent.  The  light  gun  goes  with  the 
rush  forward  with  the  line;  the  heavy  gun  is  more  in  the  role  of  the 
heavy  artillery — it  is  not  moved  as  readily.  Now,  the  British,  with 
the  experience  of  the  war,  have  144  machine  guns  for  about  4,000 
rifles. 

Senator  Brady.  We  have  no  such  provision  as  that  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  We  have  no  such  provision.  Our  recent  machine-gun 
board  recommended  6  "machine,  guns  of  the  Vickers  type  for  an 
Infantry  regiment  of,  in  round  numbers,  1,750  rifles,  as  against  72 
which  the  British  now  have  for  2,000  rifles,  and,  by  the  way,  I 
am  informed  that  they  are  going  to  greatly  increase  the  number. 

Now,  our  proposed  machine-gun  equipment  after  all  the  experience 
of  this  war  is  six  Vickers  per  Infantry  regiment.  The  experience  of 
the  great  war  is  an  open  book  to  the  whole  world,  so  far  as  machine 
guns,  their  number,  type,  and  uses  go.  Both  the  light  and  the  heavy 
guns  have  their  functions  and  both  must  be  had.  We  must  build  each 
in  time  of  peace  and  should  have  a  reserve  of  at  least  30,000  of  them 
ready.  We,  especially,  shall  need  them,  as  our  attitude  at  first  will 
be  a  defensive  one.  It  must  be  a  gun  using  our  rifle  ammunition  and 
must  be  built  in  time  of  peace.  We  can  well  afford  to  adopt  the  best 
heavy  type,  the  Vickers,  and  must  also  adopt  the  best  light  in  the 
proportion  of  about  eight  light  to  one  heavy.  If  we  don't  act  and 
act  promptly,  we  shall  be  caught  as  we  were  in  the  Spanish  War  and 
in  the  present  mobilization.  We  shall  be  without  this  all-important 
weapon. 

Senator  Hughes.  When  you  said  a  while  ago  that  the  Regulars 
were  equipped,  you  meant  that  they  were  trained ;  you  did  not  mean 
that  they  had  the  equipment? 

Gen.  Wood.  They  had  not  the  full  equipment,  arms,  and  appliances 
needed  in  modern  war. 

Senator  Hughes.  I  understood  you  to  say  that  the  Regulars  were 
thoroughly  equipped. 

Gen.  Wood.  They  were  thoroughly  trained,  as  a  rule,  not  equipped. 

Senator  Hughes.  That  is  what  I  thought  you  meant. 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes;  we  are  building  in  this  country  a  number  of 
very  good  machine  guns. 

Senator  Brady.  Have  we  developed  a  first-class  type  of  machine 

Gen.  Wood.  The  Lewis  gun  has  been  adopted  practically  unani- 
mously as  the  light  gun  of  the  British  service  and  is  being  built  for 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING.  1045 

the  French ;  and  I  think  it  is  safe  to  say,  when  you  see  great  nations 
struggling  for  life  adopt  a  gun,  that  they  are  not  adopting  it  lightly. 

Senator  Thomas.  May  I  ask  a  question  which  is  somewhat  foreign 
to  the  examination  of  Senator  Lee  ?  The  experiments  that  have  been 
made  by  Army  officers  upon  the  Lewis  gun  recently  have  resulted  in 
its  rejection,  have  they  not ! 

Gen.  Wood.  The  experiments  made  under  conditions  prescribed  by 
the  Ordnance  Department;  but  the  experience  which  one  board,  the 
board  that  convened  at  Plattsburg.  bad,  was  unanimously  in  favor 
of  the  Lewis  gun.  This  test  closely  simulated  service  in  war  condi- 
tions. 

Col.  Lewis  was  very  anxious  that  his  own  country  should  use  his 
gun,  and  in  1911  and  1912  he  offered  its  free  use  t<>  our  Government. 
This  offer  was  made  to  me  in  my  official  capacity  as  Chief  of  Staff, 
representing  the  Secretary  of  War.  The  offer  was  unconditional. 
Nothing  came  of  it,  as  it  was  rejected  after  test  under  conditions 
which  indicated  very  clearly  a  failure  to  appreciate  the  very  dis- 
tinct uses  and  functions  of  the  light  and  heavy  machine  guns.  The 
rejection  has  delayed  our  securing  this  most  excellent  gun,  which  is 
easily  the  best  of  the  light  type  of  gun.  We  may  find  a  better  one 
later.    When  it  comes  we  should  get  it. 

Senator  Thomas.  I  was  very  much  surprised,  in  view  of  the  fact 
that  it  seems  to  be  used  with  great  effect  on  the  battle  fields  of  Europe, 
where  it  is  said  to  be  superior  to  any  other  gun,  that  it  should  have 
resulted  so  unfortunately  here. 

(Jen.  Wood.  It  is,  1  think,  a  great  misfortune  that  (he  ordnance 
test  did  result  unfortunately.  I  think  that  a  succession  of  tests  in 
the  hands  of  line  officers  of  the  Army  of  actual  experience  with 
machine  aims,  under  service  conditions,  would  have  had  a  different 
result. 

Senator  Brady.  The  fact  that  the  British  Government  has  adopted 
that  gun  in  time  of  war  seems  to  be  a  complete  recommendation  for 
the  gun. 

Gen.  Wood.  I  think  that  when  a  highly  intelligent  people,  strug- 
gling for  life,  adopt,  after  more  than  a  year  of  use,  a  weapon  to  the 
exclusion  largely  of  others,  and  give  it  an  eight  to  one  predominance 
as  against  their  own  gun,  the  Vickers.  it  is  pretty  safe  to  take  serious 
notice  of  what  they  have  done. 

Senator  Brady.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  has  not  our  Ordnance  De- 
partment practically  rejected  the  Lewis  gun? 

Gen.  Wood.  On  two  or  three  occasions;  yes,  sir — under  tests  pre- 
scribed by  the  Ordnance  Department. 

The  Chairman.  I  understand  it  has  done  it  again  recently. 

Gen.  Wood.  Again  recently ;  yes,  sir. 

Senator  Thomas.  Were  the  recent  tests  made  by  men  who  were  un- 
familiar with  the  use* of  machine  guns? 

Gen.  Wood.  The  Lewis  gun,  on  the  occasion  last  referred  to,  was 
rejected  on  the  reports  of  previous  tests.  There  was  no  actual  test 
of  the  gun  on  this  occasion.  The  board  was  not  composed  of  men 
who  had  ever  handled  the  Lewis  gun.  I  doubt  if  any  of  them  had 
any  service  familiarity  with  it.  The  Lewis  machine  gun  has  stood, 
on  thousands  of  occasions,  the  test  of  actual  war,  of  perhaps  the 


1046  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 

greatest  war  the  world  has  ever  seen,  and  that  it  is  an  effective  gunT 
and  does  meet  the  test  of  war,  and  it  is  for  war  that  we  are  building 
guns,  is  evidenced  by  the  fact  that  Great  Britain  is  building  the  gun 
in  enormous  quantities  in  England,  and  as  rapidly  as  possible  in  this 
country.  We  may,  and  undoubtedly  will,  have  some  day  a  better 
light  gun  than  the  Lewis,  probably  a  better  heavy  gun  than  the  Vick- 
ers,  but  they  are  both  excellent,  dependable  guns,  and  we  should  have 
a  large  supply  of  each,  about  eight  light  guns  to  one  heavy. 

Senator  Thomas.  Does  that  not  indicate,  without  using  harsher 
terms,  a  good  deal  of  unwisdom  in  selecting  men  to  make  the  test? 

Gen.  Wood.  That  I  could  not  say. 

Senator  Brady.  I  think  it  is  hardly  fair  to  ask  Gen.  Wood  to 
pass  upon  a  question  of  that  kind. 

Senator  Thomas.  I  can  speak,  at  all  events. 

Senator  Brady.  That  is  right;  you  and  I  can  speak,  but  Gen. 
Wood  is  not  in  a  position  to  speak. 

Senator  Thomas.  It  would  seem  to  me  that  a  test  made  under  such 
circumstances  is  no  test  at  all. 

Gen.  Wood.  The  situation  is  this :  You  have  two  types  of  machine 
gun.  You  have  got  a  gun  which  some  people  say  is  not  a  machine 
gun.  They  call  it  an  automatic.  It  is  a  gun  which  one  man  can 
carry,  wThich  does  not  require  a  tape,  a  tape  feed,  or  an  ammunition 
box.  Under  the  present  method  of  attack,  a  trench  is  blown  up  and 
perhaps  a  huge  crater  formed,  or  a  trench  is  captured,  and  you  have 
to  seize  it  and  organize  against  the  counter  attack.  In  other  words, 
you  have  to  establish  very  promptly  fire  superiority — a  great  volume 
of  fire.  You  can  not  run  forward  with  heavy  guns  sitting  up  on 
tripods.  Your  men  have  got  to  drop  into  shell  holes,  with  any  sort 
of  cover,  and  if  they  have  got  a  gun  that  they  can  lie  prone  on  their 
stomachs  and  fire,  a  gun  they  can  carry  themselves,  that'  is  the  gun 
they  will  all  turn  to.  There  are  a  number  of  these  guns.  The  Brit- 
ish have  turned  to  the  Lewis,  and  they  have  built  it  as  a  result  of  two 
and  a  half  years  of  experience.  We  have  adopted  the  Vickers,  and  it 
is  an  excellent  gun,  the  best  of  the  heavy  type ;  but  that  is  more  a  gun 
for  defensive  positions.  The  important  thing  is  that  we  must  have 
some  kind  of  a  light  gun.  If  we  go  on  waiting  to  develop  the  best 
kind  of  a  gun  in  the  world  we  never  shall  have  it,  because  there  never 
will  be  a  best.  The  best  of  to-day  is  the  second  best  of  to-morrow. 
We  must  get  something  now. 

Senator  Brady.  Nevertheless,  it  is  a  fact  that  at  the  present  mo- 
ment, while  the  British  Government,  engaged  in  the  throes  of  war,  is 
manufacturing  and  using  that  gun  as  much  as  they  can,  the  American 
Government,  in  time  of  peace  and  preparing  for  war,  is  f  ejecting  that 
same  instrument  of  war. 

Gen.  Wood.  That  is  correct,  sir.  I  believe  we  are  to  give  it  another 
trial  some  time  next  spring. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  General,  the  reports  of  the  major  gen- 
erals in  command  of  the  departments  of  the  Army  are  very  interest- 
ing matter,  and  of  course  you  are  familiar  with  your  own  report.  I 
will  call  your  attention  to  some  features  in  the  reports  of  the  other 
generals  in  command  of  the  departments  and  ask  your  views,  with  the 
idea  of  seeing  whether  you  concur  with  them  or  not. 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING.  1047 

Maj.  Gen.  T.  H.  Barry,  commanding  the  Central  Department,  in 
speaking  of  organizations  as  affecting  preparedness,  states  (p.  130  of 
the  report  issued  by  the  Militia  Bureau)  : 

In  no  State  was  the  National  Guard  prepared  to  take  the  field  at  once.  In 
most  cases  this  unpreparedness  was  mainly  due  to  the  faulty  system  under 
which  the  National  Guard  is  organized,  supplied,  and  controlled.  In  others,  the 
State  authorities  were  partially  responsible. 

I  understand  that  to  mean  that  in  other  cases — not  the  most — there 
was  some  responsibility  on  the  State  authorities,  but  that  in  most 
cases  the  unpreparedness  was  due  to  national  organization  and  con- 
trol. Do  you  understand  that  from  your  experience?  Is  that  about 
the  way  it  happened  in  your  department? 

Gen.  Wood.  No,  sir.  1  should  lay  emphasis  on  the  word  "  control " 
in  Gen.  Barry's  report.  The  unpreparedness  of  the  militia  was  fun- 
damentally due  to  lack  of  sound  training.  They  were  not  trained  sol- 
diers and  could  not  effectively  perform  their  military  functions 
against  an  efficient  enemy.  Training  depends  very  much  upon  State 
interest.  In  some  States  interest  in  the  militia  has  been  very  slack, 
as  indicated  by  lack  of  appropriations  and  preparations  to  take  care 
of  the  militia,  armories,  etc.  State  sentiment  is  lukewarm  or  indif- 
ferent. In  such  a.  State  you  find  poorly  prepared  militia.  There  was 
slowness  and  shortcomings  on  the  part  of  the  Federal  Government  in 
providing  the  necessary  equipment,  but  I  want  to  emphasize  again 
that  even  had  this  equipment  been  ready  the  militia  could  not  have 
gone  to  the  front  as  an  effective  force.  They  were  largely  untrained, 
largely  recruits. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Under  the  militia  clause  of  the  Consti- 
tution the  National  Government  has  a  power  to  provide  for  organiz- 
ing, arming,  and  disciplining  militia  forces — all  of  those  three 
powers.  Your  opinion  is,  therefore,  that  the  National  Government 
has  omitted  to  provide  for  organizing,  arming,  and  disciplining? 

(Ion.  Wood.  It  can  provide,  but  it  has  no  power  to  really  insist. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  That  is  a  constitutional  question.  If  it 
can  "  provide,"  it  should  be  able  to  insist. 

Gen.  Wood.  If  you  can  remove  it  absolutely  from  State  control, 
then  you  would  have  a  Federal  organization. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  If  we  can  provide  for  organizing, 
arming,  and  disciplining,  then  we  can  enforce  it? 

Gen.  Wood.  You  can  if  you  can  take  it  from  the  State  authori- 
ties.    The  States  have  the  power  to  govern. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  You  think  that  we  can  not  enforce  it 
upon  or  through  State  authorities? 

Gen.  Wood.  You  can  not  do  it. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  That  is  your  opinion  as  a  constitutional 
lawyer? 

Gen.  Wood.  That  is  my  opinion  as  a  soldier. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  I  will  take  that  question  up  a  little 
later  with  you,  General,  and  make  a  comparison  between  the  militia 
clauses  of  the  Swiss  constitution  and  our  Constitution,  and  show 
that  the  Swiss  have  succeeded  in  getting  these  things  done  by  the 
Cantons. 

Gen.  Wood.  Very  well,  sir. 


1048  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Gen.  Barry  further  says  (p.  132),  re- 
ferring to  this  cutting  out  of  so  many  physically  unfit  men : 

I  recommend  that  the  officers  and  enlisted  men  of  the  National  Guard  be 
examined  physically  at  least  once  a  year  by  medical  officers  of  the  United 
States  Army,  and  that  men  found  physically  unfit  be  discharged  at  once. 

That  could  have  been  done  at  any  time,  under  the  power  and  dis- 
cretion of  the  Federal  Government? 

Gen.  Wood.  That  could  be  done,  and  that  is  an  excellent  sugges- 
tion. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  It  could  have  been  done  at  any  time, 
could  it  not? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  doubt,  sir,  whether  it  could  have  been  done  until 
ihey  had  come  under  the  new  law. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Were  there  not  pretty  complete  powers 
of  inspection  under  the  old  Dick  law  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  They  were  fairly  extensive,  but  the  adoption  of  Fed- 
eral standards  was  left  to  State  authorities,  and  we  accepted  their 
certificates  as  to  whether  they  had  examined  their  men. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  You  did  not  have  to  accept  it;  you 
could  turn  the  company  down  if  it  did  not  suit  you  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  We  could  turn  them  down  if  they  did  not  suit  us; 
but  I  do  not  think  of  any  instance  where  medical  officers  were  ever 
sent  into  the  State  to  examine  the  men  in  time  of  peace  except  as  a 
result  of  some  special  report. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  That  was  simply  a  Federal  omission? 

Gen.  Wood.  No,  sir ;  there  was  no  power  to  do  more  than  withdraw 
assistance. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  You  will  not  say  that  it  would  have 
been  unlawful  under  the  provisions  of  the  Dick  law  to  have  had  a 
medical  inspection? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  think  we  could  have  had  it. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  You  will  admit,  though,  that  if  there 
had  been  timely  medical  inspection  by  Federal  authority  of  the 
militia,  this  loss  could  have  been  nearly  totally  avoided  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  All  that  were  then  physically  defective;  yes.  The 
men  who  were  excused  by  the  governors  and  those  who  failed  to  re- 
spond would  not  have  been  covered ;  but  otherwise,  yes. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  You  testified  in  your  direct  testimony 
that  the  governors  could  excuse  men.  Do  you  want  to  qualify  that  ? 
They  can  not,  without  Federal  consent,  under  the  present  law? 

Gen.  Wood.  Not  after  the  men  have  accepted  the  dual  oath,  if  the 
new  law  proves  to  be  constitutional. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Certainly. 

Gen.  Wood.  That,  of  course,  is  a  condition  that  we  are  now  ap- 
proaching. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  On  this  subject  of  physical  require- 
ments Gen.  Barry  suggests  (p.  133)  : 

Some  modification  should  be  made  in  the  physical  requirements  for  adminis- 
sion  of  National  Guard  officers  and  men  when  the  organizations  are  transferred 
to  Federal  service.  It  is  unreasonable  to  require  the  same  physical  standard 
of  a  field  officer  of  20  years'  service  as  is  required  for  a  young  recruit.  Many 
excellent  officers  can  not  pass  the  required  eye  test  without  their  glasses,  but 
can  see  perfectly  with  glasses.  Regulations  should  be  prepared  showing  the 
deviation  from  the  standard  permitted  under  certain  circumstances.  The 
requirements  should  also  be  modified  for  officers  and  men  of  mature  years  and 
long  service. 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY    TRAINING.  1049 

What  can  you  say  as  to  the  fact  that  men  of  long  service  were  cut 
out,  evidently  by  some  of  the  details  of  these  regulations  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  That  is  right ;  yes,  sir. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Which  could  be  modified  in  the  inter- 
ests of  general  efficiency  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  do  not  think  so,  Senator. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  You  do  not  think  so  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  No,  sir.  Except  for  very  minor  defects  in  the  case  of 
officers  of  experience. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  You  do  not  agree  with  Gen.  Barry  on 
that  recommendation? 

Gen.  Wood.  Not  entirely  on  that;  no,  sir.  I  do  on  certain  things, 
Senator. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Let  me  read  along,  and  maybe  you  will 
agree  with  it : 

Whether  or  not  the  physical  requirements  governing  acceptance  of  officers 
and  enlisted  men  arc  modified  as  above  suggested,  it  is  highly  desirable  that 
department  commanders  be  given  authority  to  waive  minor  defects  in  weight, 
height,  eyesight,  etc. 

Gen.  Wood.  We  had  that  this  year ;  yes,  sir. 
Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  He  continues : 

The  fact  that  during  the  early  part  of  the  past  mobilization  all  such  applica- 
tions for  waiver  had  to  go  to  the  War  Department  resulted  in  the  loss  of  many 
desirable  officers  ami  men  and  in  considerable  delay  and  dissatisfaction  all 
around. 

Gen.  Wood.  I  assumed  I  had  authority  and  accepted  many,  where, 
for  instance,  there  was  slightly  defective  eyesight  or  a  few  teeth 
gone,  or  something  of  that  sort,  that  evidently  would  produce  no  dis- 
ability. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Gen.  Barry  makes  strong  recommenda- 
tions for  acquiring  suitable  tracts  of  land  for  mobilization  purposes, 
or  using  military  reservations.    He  says  (p.  134) : 

Except  in  the  comparatively  rare  cases  wbere  suitable  tracts  of  land  are 
owned  by  States  and  set  aside  for  1  he  training  and  mobili/at  ion  of  the  National 
Guard,  existing  Army  poets  and  United  States  reservations  within  the  State 
should  have  been  utilized  wherever  practicable.  This  would  greatly  have  ex- 
pedited the  mobilisation  of  191ft 

Sites  for  future  mobilization  should  be  selected  with  the  utmost  care  by  a 
board  of  specially  qualified  officers.  Accessibility,  good  railroad  connections,  a 
reasonable  amount  of  drill  ground,  and  a  target  range  permitting  practice  np  to 
600  yards  are  absolutely  essential.     The  fad   that  the  mobilization  camp  would 

be  the  logical  place  for  the  assembling  and  training  or  newly  formed  regiments. 
and  of  unassigned   recruits  should  also  be  considered   and.  if  practicable,  the 
ground  available  should  include  areas  of  varied  terrain  suitable  for  field  train- 
ing of  recruits  and  small  units. 

Upon  the  selected  site  should  be  built  the  necessary  office  buildings  and 
suitable  storehouses  for  ordnance,  quartermaster,  and  other  stores.  These 
buildings  should  be  permanent. 

All  that  is  good,  is  it  not? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  would  put  it  this  way,  Senator:  It  would  be  ex- 
cellent for  the  training  of  men  who  must  be  brought  to  the  colors 
after  war  had  commenced;  but  if  our  system  is  to  be  maintained 
and  be  effective  the  organizations  must  always  be  at  strength  (have 
sufficient  reserves)  so  that  they  will  be  ready  for  immediate  mo- 
bilization. To  assume  that  under  conditions  of  modern  preparedness, 
86205—17 o 


1050  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 

as  to  possible  attack  on  us,  we  are  to  send  our  troops  to  a  camp,  for 
instance,  to  be  drilled  and  instructed  and  given  target  practice,  of 
course,  means  that  they  would  not  be  available  promptly.  What  I 
recommended  in  a  similar  report  (which  I  will,  with  your  permission, 
put  into  the  record),  is  that  our  organization  should  be  so  main- 
tained as  to  numbers,  equipment,  and  efficiency  that  we  can  mobilize 
it  just  as  we  do  our  Regular  troops.  For  instance,  if  we  decide  to 
remove  the  garrison  from  Fort  Ethan  Allen,  we  will  telegraph  the 
commanding  officer,  "  Take  your  regiment  and  go  to  Texas."  Take 
a  New  York  regiment,  for  instance.  We  want  to  be  able  to  wire 
the  colonel,  "  Take  your  regiment  and  proceed  to  El  Paso."  He 
should  have  with  him,  in  the  first  place,  a  certain  number  of  men 
suitably  instructed  and  ready.  He  should  have  also  back  of  him 
a  list  of  men  who  have  passed  through  the  regiment  or  other  regi- 
ments, who  are  listed  as  efficient,  as  a  reserve;  and  he  should  have 
at  his  armory,  or  at  the  neighboring  military  pest,  the  necessary 
equipment.  We  found  this  year  that  it  was  better  to  mobilize  regi- 
ments where  they  had  a  good  armory,  at  the  armory. 

In  this  connection  I  cite  the  following  letter  of  October  1,  1916. 
Attention  is  especially  invited  to  the  statement  of  the  Adjutant 
General  transmitting  statement  from  the  Chief  of  Ordnance,  that 
his  (ordnance)  supplies  were  exhausted  June  27  by  the  mobilization 
of  the  militia  up  to  that  date : 

From :  Department  commander. 
To :  The  Adjutant  General  of  the  Army. 

Subject:  Mobilization  of  militia,  Eastern  Department,  for  period  ending  July 
31,  1916. 

1.  The  inclosed  supplementary  report  to  the  one  forwarded  Jnly  17,  1916,  is 
submitted. 

2.  Briefly  reviewing  the  situation  presented  attention  is  particularly  invited 
to  the  following  salient  points : 

(a)  Thirty  per  cent  of  the  number  of  enlisted  men  in  the  State  service  at 
the  date  of  the  call  of  the  President,  June  18,  1916,  were  discharged  because 
of  physical  disability.  Such  a  proportion  of  ineffectives  is  amazing  when  it  is 
considered  that  Delaware  and  North  Carolina  are  the  only  States  in  this  De- 
partment that  have  not  adopted  the  standards  of  the  Regular  Army  physical 
examination  prior  to  entry  into  the  service.  The  lax  methods,  in  this  con- 
nection that  must  have  been  employed  are  well  demonstrated  in  the  cases  of 
Georgia  and  Kentucky,  both  of  which  States  average  for  each  organization  pre- 
sented 50  per  cent  physical  rejections  and  the  unnecessary  monetary  loss 
incident  thereto  in  the  way  of  "  pay,  clothing,  and  keep  "  of  such  men,  they 
being  entitled  to  such  from  the  date  they  responded  to  the  call  of  the  Presi- 
dent, will  be  a  considerable  item.  As  the  mobilization  has  proceeded,  the 
paramount  idea  seems  to  have  been  on  the  part  of  the  States  to  simply  supply 
men  regardless  of  their  physical  qualifications  or  disqualifications.  In  many 
instances  a  strong  effort  has  been  made  to  bring  about  the  mustering  into  the 
service  of  physically  unfit  men  and  to  prevent  the  mustering  out  of  the  service 
of  those  who  are  physically  unfitted  for  active  duty. 

(&)  Of  the  total  number  responded  to  the  call  of  June  18.  only  July  31 
there  remained  in  mobilization  camps  in  this  department  practically  34  per 
cent.  Departures  have  been  delayed  primarily  because  of  lack  of  equipment 
and  secondarily  the  inability  of  organizations  to  recruit  to  the  authorized 
minimum  peace  strength.  This  feature  as  well  as  the  number  of  recruits 
received  for  organizations  that  have  been  forwarded  to  the  Southern  Depart- 
mnet,  which  is  7.5  per  cent  of  the  number  required  to  recruit  such  organizations 
to  our  war  strength,  is  believed  to  be  a  result  of  increasing  in  probability  of 
immediate  active  service,  but  regardless  of  the  cause  the  facts  as  stated  remain. 

(c)  With  reference  to  shortages,  especially  in  the  Ordnance  and  Quarter- 
master Departments,  this  developed  early  in  the  mobilization,  and  has  indi- 


IMVERSAL   MILITARY    TRAINING.  1051 

gated  a   condition  of  serious  shortage  in   these  departments.     The  Adjutant 
General  on  June  27  telegraphed  these  headquarters  as  follows : 
44  With  reference  to  your  request  for  authority  to  communicate  directly  with 

depots  in  matter  of  ordnance  material,  Chief  of  Ordnance  reports  mobilization 
of  militia  has  practically  exhausted  small  reserve  supply  in  hands  of  his 
department,  and  that  it  is  essential  that  limited  amount  of  stores  remaining 
on  hand  should  be  held  suhjeet  to  order  of  War  Department  to  moot  most 
urgent  needs." 

This  statement  is  significant  and  indicates  very  clearly  what  would  have 
happened  had  we  bad  occasion  to  meet  an  enemy  who  was  prepared  or  meet 
a  force  of  any  strength.  This  matter  will  he  handled  more  in  detail  in  the 
final  report.  Serious  shortages  also  developed  in  the  Quartermaster  Depart- 
ment in  the  very  early  stages  of  the  mohilizatioii  and  indicated  the  department 
was  almost  wholly  unready  to  meet  the  demands  of  war.  even  under  conditions 
of  minor  gravity,  in  the  military  sense,  which  characterized  our  possible  clash 

With  Mexico. 

(d)  The  system  of  furnishing  horses  through  collecting  them  in  the  Middle 

WeM  and  sending  them  to  the  frontier  to  he  assigned  To  untrained  mounted 
organizations  on  arrival  has  been  a  pronounced  failure  and  should  never  he 
resorted  to  again.     Mounted  organizations  have  been   held   for  months  without 

horses  awaiting  shipment  to  the  border.    On  arrival  it  wilt  require  additional 

months  to  train  the  men  for  the  mounted  service,  and  an  equally   long  time  to 

train  the  mounts.  These  organizations  should  have  had  their  horses  assigned  to 
them  in  camp  and   their  training  conducted    there.     To  assemble   the  men  and 

animals  of  mounted  organizations  in  the  theater  of  war  and  in  the  immediate 
presence  of  a  presumptive  enemy,  in  my  opinion,  is  a  most  unwise  and  hazard- 
ous procedure. 

3.  The  evidence  as  gathered  for  til.-  period  as  covered  by  this  report  serves 
only  to  emphasize  the  correctness  of  the  statements  made   in   the  previous 

report  and  has  fully  justified  the  recommendations  made  in  preceding  years 
to  the  effect  that  reserves  of  men  and  animals  must  he  provided  in  time  of  peace. 
Arms  and  equipment  sufficient  to  arm  and  equip  regiments  at  war  strength 
must  be  kept  in  the  armories  or  in  depots  under  Government  control  as  near 
as  possible  to  the  troops  concerned.     The  present   system   of   concentrating 

supplies  has  been  an  absolute  failure,  has  CAUSed  much  delay  and  a  great  and 
unnecessary  outlay  of  money  incident  to  shipping  by  express,  etc.  This  depart- 
ment has  been  stripped  of  medical  officers,  cooks,  bakers,  and  technical  troops 
in  a  desperate  effort  to  take  care  of  and  render  more  efficient  this  largely 
untrained,  largely  unequipped  force  of  militia.  This  mobilization  has  demon- 
strated a  condition  which  should  never  be  allowed  to  occur  again,  and  has 
shown  conclusively  that  we  could  not  have  possibly  met  even  a  small  well- 
prepared  force  with  any  hope  of  success.  It  is  not  the  men  and  officers  in  the 
militia  who  are  at  fault,  but  rather  the  system.  If  this  demonstration  of 
entire  unreliability  and  workability  of  our  present  militia  system  pro\. 
be  sufficient  to  bring  about  the  adoption  of  a  sound,  rational  system,  the  lesson 
will  be  well  wortli  what  it  cost. 

Leonard  Wood. 
Major  General,  United  states  Army. 


1052 


(   NIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 
RECAPITULATION. 


[Figures  heroin  are  subject  to  correction.  This  tabulation  is  based  on  reports  received  in  some  cases  from 
Federal  officers  and  in  others  from  National  Guard  authorities,  and  neither  correspond  with  previous 
reports.  This  is  especially  true  for  columns  1,  3,  and  4,  but  even  these  columns  are  believed  to  be  correct 
to  within  :\  per  cent.  At  the  present  time  appropriate  action  toward  correcting  discrepancies  is  being 
.taken.] 


Organization. 


On  rolls  of 

organization 

at  date  of 

call. 


Offi- 
cers. 


Alabama 170 

Connecticut I  140 

Delaware 29 

District  of  Columbia 90 

Florida 48 

Georgia 182 

Kentucky I  169 

Maryland 157 

Massachusetts 277 

Maine 55 

Mississippi 49 

New  Hampshire 70 

New  Jersey i  190 

New  York 702 

North  Carolina 186 

Pennsylvania 6 19 

Rhode  Island 17 

South  Carolina 95 

Tennessee 107 

Vermont 57 

Virginia 135 

West  Virginia 52 

Total 3,596 


En- 
listed 
men. 


On  said  rolls 

who  reported 

in  response 

to  call. 


2,670  i 
2,470 

430 
1,891 

653 
2,637 
2,279 
2,146 
4,572 

998 

957 
1,082 
2,857 
13,397 
2,535 
9,427 

476 
1,364 
1,788 

803 
2,225 

987 


Offi- 


137 

29 

85 

48 

179 

169 

157 

275 

55 

49 

68 

188 

678 

185 

614 

17 

95 

107 

57 

136 

47 


58,644   3,544 


En- 
listed 
men. 


2,286 
2,457 

425 
1,730 

574 
2,386 
1,987 
2,056 
3,413 

961 

951 
1,021 
2,795 
12,823 
2,381 
8,743 

379 
1,262 
1,552 

768 
1,984 

742 


On  said 
rolls  who 

were 
excused  or 


from  service 

by  governor 

or  State 


either  before 

or  after 

reporting. 


Offi- 
cers. 


53,676 


En- 
listed 


184 
82 
34 

114 
5 

975 
35 

103 


Such 
members 
who  failed 
to  pass  the 
final  physi- 
cal exam- 
ination. 


Former 
members  of 
Organized 

Militia 
who  applied 
for  enlist- 
ment on  or 

after  the 
date  of  call. 


Offi- 
cers, 


,  En- 
listed : 
men. 


Offi- 


237 

389 

1,127 

136 

864 


243 
85 
54 
31 


633 
369 
148 
322 
165 
208 
848 
234 
169 
284 
2 
245 
274 
790 


2 

220 

236 

1 

108 

9 

101 

14 

333 

4 

203 

5 

220 

4 

12 

12  I 

10       669 

21    1,175 

....  9 
7  j  318 
3       487 


77 
474 
169 


2 

5 
2 
1 
13 

14 
(l) 

16 
7 
2 

11 


96   4,863  J     130  8,069  ;    109     4,631 


En- 
listed 
men. 


185 


931 
201 


<3. 


universal  military  training. 

i 1 1 . ( •  A  PITULATI ON— Continued. 


1053 


. 

Such 

cants 

faile 

past 

fii 

Phy 

exai 

tu 

? 

9 

10 

•« 

1  tr-unization. 

Such  appli- 
cants who 
failed  to 
pass  the 

final 
physical 
examina- 
tion. 

Without 
former 
service  who 
applied  for 
enlistment 
in  organiza- 
tion. 

appli- 
who 

d  to 
the 

ml 
sical 
aina- 
m. 

With  for- 
mer service 
in  the 
Tnited 
States 
Army, 
Navy,  or 
Marine 
Corps,  who 
applied  for 
enlistment. 

Such  appli- 
cants who 
failed  to 
pass  final 
physical 
examina- 
tion. 

In  organiza- 
tion at  time 

of  muster 
who  failed 
to  take  oath 
as  National 

Guard  as 

prescribed 
in  new 

national- 
defense  act. 

Ofli- 
cers. 

En- 
listed 
men. 

Offi- 
2 

En- 
listed 
men. 

Offl- 

cers. 

Kn- 
listed 
men. 

Offi- 
cers. 

En- 
listed 
men. 

Offi- 
cers. 

En- 
listed 
men. 

Offi- 
cers. 

En- 
listed 
men. 

58 

1 

1    K48 

529 
15 

"2 

1 
1 

A 

56 

71 

17 
2 

103 

(  onnecticut  i 

"230 

Delaware 

1 

District  of  Columbia 

22 
20 

187 
969 

21 

10 
3 
2 

22 
4 

:::::: 7 

Florida 

i 

L',060 

1      • 

......          16 

Georiria 

30 

193 

Maryland 

79 

77 

ts 

1      1,139 

Maine 

14 

98 

a 

-'7 

9 

140 



(')         (*) 
2         40 

1           14 
13 

6 
3 
3 
12 

9 
26 

<"2 

4 
1 
8 

1 

40 

Mississippi 

..... 

1 

201 

100 

255 

1,223 

1,168 

(') 

326 
53 

240 
31 

136 

\ew  Hampshire 

4 

New  Jersey : . . . 

..... 

1,856 
8   171 

1 

N'ew  York  ^. 

7          443 

5 

Pennsylvania 

417 

Rhode  Island 

(i; 

50 
21 

(l) 

319 

South  Carolina 

I 
S 

1,182 
145 

Tennessee 

1          552 

Vermont 

17 

Virginia 

1^ 

211 

Virginia 

130 

Total 

4 

731          M 

30,530 

2 

7  015 

25  1  «ra 

163 

15     4.400 

1  No  record. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  That  is  what  I  understood  Gen.  O'Ryan 
testified  here.     You  agree  with  him  about  that. 

Gen.  Wood.  Let  me  just  state  this.  It  will  be  a  little  roundabout. 
We  sent  a  good  many  regiments  to  the  moblization  camps  above 
New  York.  They  spent  a  day  or  so  getting  ready  to  move  up  there, 
and  a  day  or  two  getting  into  camp.  Conditions  were  not  wholly 
sanitary;  the  men  were  not  familiar  with  camp  life,  most  of  them; 
they  had  poor  cooks.  They  were  there  just  about  long  enough  to 
get  more  or  Less  knocked  out  and  upset  in  every  way.  Then  they 
were  hustled  onto  trains  and  sent  off.  Toward  the  end  of  the  mobi- 
lization we  all  came  to  the  conclusion  that  it  would  have  been  better 
to  mobilize  them  at  the  armories,  to  contract  to  feed  them  at  hotels 
and  restaurants,  and  put  them  on  trains,  with  their  equipment,  and 
send  them  to  the  front;  that  as  it  was  they  only  lost  efficiency  and 
really  learned  nothing.  There  was  great  confusion,  and  there  were 
very  few  officers  to  instruct  them. 

As  to  mounted  troops,  we  must  also  pursue  a  somewhat  similar 
system  if  we  are  going  to  have  an  effective  and  promptly  responsive 
force.  We  must  have  the  animals.  It  is  easy  enough  to  get  them. 
Have  vour  options  secured  on  your  horses  and  pay  so  much  a  year. 


1054  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY    TRAINING. 

When  your  mounted  troops  are  called  out,  simply  reach  out  and  exer- 
cise your  option  and  avoid  all  this  delay  and  confusion. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  I  would  like  to  call  to  your  memory 
the  provision  for  horses  in  the  Swiss  system. 

Gen.  Wood.  That  is  a  very  good  one. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  They  put  a  horse  out  with  the  indi- 
vidual man,  who  after  a  certain  number  of  years  becomes  the  owner 
of  that  horse. 

Gen.  Wood.  This  is  a  modification  of  that. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  It  is  subject  to  inspection.  The  horse 
is  thus  maintained  for  a  number  of  years,  always  available  for 
military  purposes,  without  expense  to  the  Government. 

Gen.  Wood.  We  can  do  the  same  thing. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  I  do  not  believe  the}r  do  that  for  their 
artillery  horses. 

Gen.  Wood.  I  think  what  we  would  have  to  do  here  is  simply  to 
secure  options  on  our  horses,  so  that  we  can  reach  out  and  get  them 
whenever  we  want  them.  Some  must  always  be  with  the  organiza- 
tion for  training  and  drill. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Coming  back  to  this  camp  suggestion 
of  Gen.  Barry's. 

Gen.  Wood.  There  is  much  in  it  that  is  admirable,  Senator. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Do  you  not  think'  there  is  use  for  it 
in  connection  with  annual  mobilizations,  no  matter  what  force  you 
have,  whether  you  have  a  militia,  or  the  Army  that  you  have  in 
mind,  or  whether  you  have  just  the  Regular  Army  which  Gen. 
Barry  prefers?  He  is  a  perfectly  frank  soldier,  and  he  thinks  all 
reliance  should  be  put  on  the  Regular  Army.  But  whatever  Army 
you  have,  ought  it  not  to  be  mobilized  annually,  as  the  Swiss  do? 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes,  sir.  In  Europe,  speaking  generally,  including, 
of  course,  Switzerland,  they  have  field  maneuvers,  as  we  did  in  Massa- 
chusetts in  1909.  We  covered  2,000  square  miles  of  an  old,  well  built- 
up  State.  We  had  military  operations  all  over  this  area.  We  have 
maneuvers  every  year  about  Plattsburg — last  year  with  six  or  eight 
thousand  men  out  at  one  time.  We  pay  the  damages  and  pay  the 
rentals  for  camps,  and  we  find  it  is  much  more  economical  and  it 
gives  us  greater  terrain.  The  great  objection  to  these  training-camp 
sites  is  that  the  officers  soon  become  familiar  with  every  nook  and 
cranny  in  them,  and  every  advantage  and  disadvantage  of  terrain, 
and  the  maneuvers  eventually  reduce  themselves  more  or  less  to  a 
farce.  You  need  a  great  deal  of  terrain  to  operate  in.  For  instance, 
you  can  start  your  opposing  forces  30  or  40  miles  apart  and  have 
them  go  through  all  the  preliminary  arrangement  for  contact  that 
Ave  have  in  actual  war.  You  see  at  once  how  much  more  advan- 
tageous it  is. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  It  is  like  hunting  with  a  bird  dog  that 
knows  the  ground  where  the  coveys  are  against  one  that  does  not? 

Gen.  Wood.  Absolutely. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  On  this  subject  of  blanks  Gen.  Barry 
says : 

A  complete  supply  of  blank  forms  needed  upon  muster  in  and  for  the  routine 
administration  and  supply  of  the  entire  State  National  Guard  after  its  muster 
into  the  Federal  service  should  be  kept  on  hand  at  all  times  in  the  various 
armories  or  mobilization  camps. 


IMVERSAL    MILITARY    TRAINING.  1055 

Gen.  Woon.  That  is  right.  May  I  say  something  with  regard  to 
that? 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Certainly. 

Gen.  Wood.  All  the"  supplies  for  the  militia  should  be  obtained 
just  as  are  supplies  for  the  Regular  troops.  They  should  use  the 
same  forms,  with  a  rubber  stamp,  for  intsance,  "Militia  of  Mary- 
land," and  requisition  on  the  department  ordnance  officer  or  depart- 
ment quartermaster.  By  doing  that  you  gradually  make  those  troops 
more  and  more  a  part  of  the  departmental  force. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  On  this  subject  of  horses  Gen.  Barry 
says  that  the  National  Guard  organizations  were  practically  im- 
mobile units  so  far  as  field  service  was  concerned. 

Gen.  Wood.  That  is  absolutely  true,  sir. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  They  are  going  to  go  back  to  that  under 
present  conditions? 

Gen.  Wood.  They  will  go  back  to  it  unless  we  establish  the  system 
I  have  spoken  of,  of  having  options  on  the  horses.  In  other  words, 
establish  a  condition  which  will  give  us  an  immediately  available 
reserve  of  horses.  It  is  quite  as  necessary  to  train  horses  as  it  is  to 
train  men.  The  idea  that  you  can  mount  so-called  Cavalry  organiza- 
tions made  up  of  half-green  men  on  all-green  horses  and  send  them 
into  a  campaign  with  any  hope  of  success  is  indicative  of  the  most 
profound  ignorance  of  the  requirements  of  service.  The  same  is 
true  to  a  lesser  extent  of  the  Artillery  horse.  He  must  be  a  selected 
horse  and  have  had  some  training. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  On  the  subject  of  machine  guns,  Gen. 
Barry  believes  very  strongly  with  you.  that  all  regiments  should  be 
properly  equipped.  He  touches  again  on  the  subject  of  blanks.  Evi- 
dently that  is  an  important  matter. 

Gen.  Wood.  There  was  a  delay  in  connection  with  blanks;  and  in 
that  connection  blanks  should  be  kept  at  each  department  head- 
quarters, ample  for  that  entire  department.  In  fact,  they  should  be 
kept  as  far  as  possible  with  the  militia  organizations  themselves  and 
be  immediately  available. 

The  Chairman.  That  is  for  muster  in  and  final  muster  out? 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes,  sir.  We  had  a  good  deal  of  delay  incident  to  the 
receipts  of  forms.  Fortunately  it  did  not,  as  a  rule,  delay  the  move- 
ment of  troops,  because  they  were  not  ready:  but  if  they  had  been 
ready  it  would  have  delayed  them. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Col.  Frederick,  who  is  chief  mustering 
officer  of  the  central  department,  says  in  his  report  (p.  137)  : 

The  muster  in  of  the  National  Guard  of  tliis  department  was  greatly  handi- 
capped  by  the  shortage  of  necessary  blank  forms  and  delay  in  the  receipt  of 
additional  blank  forms  requested  by  telegraph.  Telegrams  showing  the  num- 
bers and  amounts  of  forms  required  were  sent  your  office  on  June  20,  June  21, 
and  June  24.  Some  of  the  forms  asked  for  did  not  arrive  at  these  headquarters 
until  July  20.  This  office  appreciates  the  fact  that,  due  to  the  urgency  of  the 
situation*  and  the  large  number  of  troops  ordered  mustered  in,  the  delay  in  re- 
ceipt of  forms  was  unavoidable,  but  for  future  mobilization  there  should  be  kept 
on  hand  at  all  times  at  department  headquarters  or  at  designated  mobilization 
points  the  maximum  number  of  blank  forms  that  can  be  used. 

That  is  absolutely  correct? 
Gen.  Wood.  Yes,  sir. 


1056  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Gen.  Funston,  in  his  report  as  major 
general  commanding  the  Southern  Department,  said  (p.  139)  : 

There  was  a  serious  lack  of  blank  forms  of  all  kinds,  which  resulted  in  delays 
in  the  preparation  of  records  and  reports  and  in  the  instruction  of  the  National 
Guard  in  the  use  of  these  forms. 

Gen.  Wood.  Senator,  I  think  all  those  questions  of  shortage  of  sup- 
plies, equipment,  clothing,  blanks,  etc.,  can  be  accepted  as  pertaining 
to  any  department  except  the  medical.  I  do  not  think  they  are  sub- 
ject to  question;  I  mean  that  I  think  they  obtain  in  every  territorial 
department. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Here  is  a  general  matter  to  which  he 
refers,  which  is  not  a  matter  of  blanks,  but  is  a  matter  of  condensing 
and  clarifying  a  very  important  process,  namely,  mustering  in.  Gen. 
Funston  says  (p.  139)  : 

The  main  fault  which  still  remains,  and  which  demands  radical  treatment,  is 
the  process  of  muster  in,  which  is  too  complicated  and  takes  too  much  time  and 
labor.  The  mere  fact  that  there  are  so  many  regulations  condemns  it.  The 
process  must  be  simplified  so  as  to  be  applicable  in  a  real  emergency.  The  troops 
when  called  out  should  be  ready  for  muster  in.  An  emergency  being  real,  the 
troops  offered  by  the  State  should  be  accepted  at  once  and  sworn  into  Federal 
service.  It  would  seem  that  this  desirable  condition  can  be  brought  about  by  an 
insistence  in  peace  times  on  the  physical  requirements  and  by  the  abolishment  of 
the  present  complicated  property  accountability  and  transfer.  Federal  inspec- 
tion in  peace  times  should  include  a  physical  examination.  With  the  new  provi- 
sions of  the  national-defense  act  as  to  pay  and  property  responsibility,  it  would 
seem  that  a  peace  accountability  could  be  devised  which  would  avoid  any  inspec- 
tions, inventories,  and  transfers  of  property  on  mobilization. 

It  has  been  suggested  that  there  should  be  on  hand  at  all  times  and  kept 
up  to  date  in  each  company  office  a  separate  muster-in  roll  for  each  member. 
The  record  of  each  officer  and  man  should  be  entered  on  a  standard  mobiliza- 
tion form  similar  to  a  descriptive  list.  Space  should  be  provided  for  the  use 
of  the  medical  examiner  of  the  Regular  Army.  The  national-defense  oath 
should  be  found  somewhere  on  this  roll.  These  ready-to-use  muster-in  rolls 
should  be  in  triplicate  (one  original  and  two  carbons),  and  the  three  held 
together  in  a  perforated  sheet.  Checking  of  these  muster-in  rolls  and  of  the 
descriptive  lists  should  be  a  duty  of  the  organization  commander  and  of  the 
Federal  inspector.  The  latter  should  also  examine  and  check  the  enlistment 
papers  on  file  in  the  company  office. 

General,  in  connection  with  the  loss  in  number  by  physical  examina- 
tion I  want  to  call  your  attention  to  an  extract  from  "  The  Organized 
Militia  Regulations  of  the  War  Department,"  1910,  page  117: 

*  *  *  Provided,  That  in  such  States  or  Territories  or  the  District  of  Co- 
lumbia as  shall  have  adopted  a  standard  of  physical  examination  for  enlist- 
ment and  reenlistment  of  the  Organized  Militia,  approved  by  the  Secretary  of 
War.  such  militia  shall  be  deemed  under  the  law  "  fit  for  military  service,"  and 
shall  be  duly  mustered  into  the  service  of  the  United  States  as  such.  Under 
these  conditions,  as  soon  as  practicable  after  such  muster  in,  without  interfering 
with  the  supreme  duty  of  the  militia — the  defense  of  the  country — and  in  such 
a  manner  as  not  to  prevent  their  employment  against  an  enemy,  a  physical 
examination  will  be  made  by  a  medical  officer  of  the  Army,  detailed  for  the 
purpose,  who  shall  note  all  cases  of  defect  and  cause  the  same  to  be  entered  on 
the  muster  roll  against  the  name  of  each  individual,  stating  in  each  case  whether 
the  defect  so  noted  existed  prior  to  the  muster  in  of  the  soldier.  *  *  *  (Par. 
460,  Army  Regulations,  1910.) 

Also  the  following  from  report  by  Capt.  Gibson,  inspector  instruc- 
tor, September  14, 1916 : 

*  *  *  The  views  held  by  Army  surgeons  as  to  the  standard  required  of 
recruits  and  those  held  by  civilian  doctors  are  so  wide  apart  as  to  bear  lidle 
resemblance. 


IN1VERSAL    MILITARY    TRAINING.  1057 

You  will  observe  that  the  above  regulation  wasted  no  time  on  an 
effort  to  reconcile  standards  in  an  emergency,  but,  in  a  way  not  to 
interfere  with  "  the  supreme  duty,  the  defense  of  the  country,"  exam- 
inations to  protect  the  Government  against  false  pension  claims  was 
provided.  New  regulations  or  orders  were  passed  for  this  mobiliza- 
tion of  June  18,  1916,  requiring  a  strict  examination.  It  eliminated 
many  men  and  caused  much  delay.  Why  was  the  new  system  intro- 
duced at  that  crisis,  General?  The  examination  provided  in  1910 
Army  Regulations,  just  read,  would  have  met  the  requirements  of 
section  115  of  the  new  law,  would  it  not? 

Gen.  Wood.  This  was  done,  Senator,  to  protect  the  Federal  Gov- 
ernment against  claims  for  pensions  for  disability  which  existed  at 
time  of  muster  into  the  Federal  service,  disability  which  may  have 
arisen  since  the  State  examination  or  been  overlooked  by  the  State 
officers.  The  emergency  was  not  such  as  to  justify  omitting  this 
precaution.  That  it  was  necessary  is  evident  from  the  large  number 
of  rejections,  averaging  20  per  cent  of  all  men  in  the  guard,  even 
after  muster  in  and  not  counting  those  dropped  by  the  governors  and 
those  who  failed  to  appear.  The  details  as  to  physical  conditions  at 
the  time  of  entrance  into  Federal  service  are  the  basis  for  future 
claims.  Much  of  our  accounting  system  in  the  matter  of  payments 
is  complicated,  but  there  are  requirements,  many  of  them,  of  the 
Treasury  Department.  The  new  system,  as  you  call  it.  was  not  new. 
There  was  nothing  in  the  new  regulations  which  prohibited  the  elimi- 
nation of  the  unfit  for  service  once  they  were  in  the  Federal  Service, 
but  there  was  much  which  prohibited  their  being  sent  to  the  front. 
They  were  not  fit  to  serve  as  soldiers,  and  had  thev  been  sent  would 
have  further  swollen  our  present  pension  list. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Especially  when  it  was  required  to  ex- 
clude from  service  an  experienced  man  for  the  technical  reason-,  as 
mentioned  by  Gen.  Barry,  this  entire  change  of  system  rapidly  de- 
creased the  trained  men  that  were  available  in  the  National  Guard. 

Gen.  Wood.  I  doubt,  Senator,  if  there  is  anything  in  which  I  dis- 
agree with  you  about  shortages  of  our  Government  supplies  or  any- 
thing I  could  admit  more  frankly  than  I  have  as  to  our  shortage  of 
equipment.  It  is  the  unfit  condition  of  the  militiaman  when  he  came 
to  the  colors  and  the  fact  that  he  is  not  in  condition  for  service  which 
led  to  the  rejection  of  these  men ;  nothing  else. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  That  is  under  the  old  law.  I  will  go  on 
now  with  another  one  of  these  reports.  I  should  like  to  go  back  to 
that  camp  question.  In  connection  with  camps  for  mobilization 
purposes  generally,  by  reason  of  the  billeting  system  being  unknown 
in  this  country  and  particularly  objected  to  by  our  institutions  and 
people,  does  it  not  make  it  more  necessary  for  us  to  have  permanent 
camps  for  military  assemblage? 

Gen.  Wood.  For  the  training  of  men,  Senator,  who  come  to  the 
colors  after  war  begins.  Those  camps,  I  think,  we  need,  and  we  have 
a  number  of  them  scattered  over  the  country.  I  refer  to  places  such 
as  Pine  Plains  and  the  larger  State  camps. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Are  they  really  not  needed  at  all  times 
for  all  military  assemblages?  Take  any  troops  we  may  have,  no- 
matter  how  good  their  training  may  be,  they  will  get  out  of  condition 
in  a  short  time,  will  thev  not  ? 


1058  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY    TRAINING. 

Gen.  Wood.  We  need  training  camps  at  all  times.  We  are  trying 
to  get  them  now  for  our  summer  training.  We  have  some,  and  need 
more.  We  need  areas  for  our  United  States  military  training  camps 
for  youths;  that  is,  tracts  not  big  enough  for  maneuvers,  but  large 
enough  for  the  purpose  desired,  and  so  situated  as  to  permit  the 
troops  to  work  over  the  surrounding  country. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  The  increased  length  of  service  in  France 
to  three  years  did  not  strike  me  as  justifying  the  inference  you  made, 
or  somebody  else  here  made,  that  it  takes  three  years  to  make  soldiers. 

Gen.  Wood.  I  stated  just  to  the  contrary.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  that 
particular  increase  in  length  of  service  was  incident  to  the  situation 
menacing  Europe. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Did  they  not  simply  want  an  increased 
force  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  They  wanted  200,000,  or  whatever  the  number  was, 
additional  men  with  the  colors. 

Eight  here  I  should  like  to  bring  out  one  point  in  this  connection. 
In  a  recent  discussion  with  a  very  eminent  and  well-informed  French 
officer,  who  has  been  charged  with  the  training  of  some  of  these  troops, 
I  asked  him  how  long  after  calling  a  man  to  the  colors,  I  mean  a 
new  recruit,  he  would  be  willing  to  send  him  to  the  front?  He 
answered  four  and  one-half  months;  men  with  four  and  one-half 
months  of  training  are  not  fully  trained,  but  they  can  be  sent  mixed 
in  with  other  men.  The  increase  of  a  year  was  simply  to  give  more 
men  with  the  colors  and  was  not  for  the  purpose  of  increasing  the 
instruction  period. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  I  will  go  ahead  with  the  report  of  Brig. 
Gen.  William  L.  Sibert,  Western  Department.    Gen.  Sibert  says: 

The  War  Department,  by  letter  of  May  11,  1916,  notified  these  headquarters 
of  a  probable  call  for  the  militia  of  this  department.  The  necessary  blank 
forms  for  muster  in  were  at  the  same  time  furnished. 

You  said  you  did  not  receive  that  notice?     * 

Gen.  Wood.  Lieut.  Keene,  who  was  on  duty  in  the  militia  office, 
does  not  recollect  any  letter  indicating  that  the  militia  were  to  be 
called,  nor  do.  I.  A  letter  was  received  with  reference  to  certain 
blanks  and  forms  which  should  be  on  hand  in  case  the  militia  would 
be  called.  There  was  no  warning — simply,  a  routine  letter  telling  us 
what  should  be  done  under  certain  conditions.  There  was  nothing  to 
indicate  any  immediate  call  of  the  militia. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Did  you  receive  any  notice  from  the 
department  about  May  11,  1916,  that  the  militia  would  probably  be 
called  for  in  your  department? 

Gen.  Wood.  Capt.  Keene  does  not  recall  any  such  letter  nor  do  I. 
You  apparently  refer  to  a  letter  notifying  us  the  militia  would  be 
called  probably  at  a  latter  date  and  to  have  the  regular  forms  and 
things  ready.    I  do  not  remember,  Senator,  any  such  letter. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Brig.  Gen.  Sibert  says: 

Upon  receipt  of  notification  a  mustering  officer  was  selected  for  each  State 
and  a  chief  mustering  officer  for  department  headquarters. 

I  should  like  to  emphasize  this: 

These  officers  were  furnished  copies  of  mustering  regulations  and  were 
directed  to  study  them  so  as  to  familiarize  themselves  with  their  duties. 


UNIVERSAL    MIIITAHV   TRAINING.  1059 

As  a  result  of  this  process — 

The  various  duties  devolving  upon  the  governors  of  States  and  others  in  con- 
nection with  recruiting,  transportation,  and  subsistence  during  the  mobiliza- 
tion  were  promptly,  harmoniously,  and  successfully  carried  out. 

That  seems  to  be  rather  a  contrast  with  your  experience  in  other 
departments,  and  I  want  to  ask  why,  if  you  know  why,  was  this  par- 
ticular department  singled  out  and  given  this  preliminary  notice? 
'Why  all  of  them  should  not  have  had  this  preliminary  notice? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  think  the  letter  I  refer  to  above  must  have  gone  to 
the  others.  In  the  Eastern  Department  we  had  made  a  study  of  the 
question  of  mobilization  for  a  year  before  and  had  submitted  to  the 
Bureau  of  Militia  Affairs  a  very  extensive  set  of  recommendations  to 
govern  muster,  and  many  of  them  were  adopted.  So  far  as  the  ma- 
chinery of  mustering  in  went,  we  had  no  difficulty  once  the  regiments 
were  up  to  minimum  strength. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Let  me  call  your  attention  to  this  other 
remarkable  statement.  It  looks  as  though  these  western  people  were 
superior  in  some  way. 

Organizations  were  required  to  recruit  to  the  minimum  prescribed  by  the 

President's  call  before  'leaving  company  rendezvous. 

That  let  them  stay  at  the  company  rendezvous  and  have  a  chance 
to  recruit  where  they  were  able  to  recruit. 

The  necessary  equipment,  funds,  quartermaster,  ordnance,  and  medical 
stores  furnished  by  Federal  supply  departments  were  so  promptly  delivered 
that  in  many  Instances  they  reached  tin-  State  mobilization  camps  before  the 
troops  began  to  arrive. 

(Jen.  Wood.  Admitting  this  to  be  the  case,  this  doesn't  proVe  any- 
thing as  to  the  efficiency  of  the  mobilization  and  the  system, 
whole;  the  same  was  true  in  some  instances  in  the  Eastern  Depart- 
ment; generally,  the  supplies  were  slow  in  coming.  The  efficiency 
of  the  mobilization  and  system  is  measured  by  the  time  required  to 
Start  well-equipped  and  well-instructed  units  to  the  front. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  The  report  goes  on  to  say  in  another 
place : 

The  transformation  from  peace,  or  below  peace,  strength  to  war  Btrength 
created  contusion. 

That  was  rather  a  bad  policy,  was  it  not.  increasing  these  units  to 
war  strength  I 

Gen.  WOOD.  Of  course,  the  idea  in  doing  that  was  to  comply  with 
orders  and  have  as  Large  organizations  as  possible.  We  had  to  give 
it  up  eventually.  T  do  not  think  a  single  organization,  with  the 
iption  of  one  or  two  from  "Rhode  Island  and  a  few  Medical  Corps 
units  went  from  the  eastern  division  with  war  strength.  This  diffi- 
culty would  all  be  obviated  by  a  system  of  training  all  young  men 
who  an4  physically  lit. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  The  Xew  York  Times  says  a  number  of 
organizations  went  from  New  York  with  war  strength. 

<  ien.  Wood.  T  do  not  know  of  any  except  some  hospital  and  sanitary 
detachments.  Those  are  not  fighting  organizations.  T  think  that 
possibly  one  Signal  Corps  unit  went  at  full  strength. 


1060  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Look  at  this  further  and  remarkable 
statement  from  Gen.  Sibert's  report: 

The  supplies,  equipment,  etc.,  so  far  as  lies  within  the  responsihility  of  the 
State,  were  generally  ample  and  indicated  a  proper  degree  of  preparedness. 

Would  that  not  indicate  that  all  other  States  could  have  been 
gotten  up  to  the  same  condition  with  proper  attention  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  It  depends  on  State  interest  in  supplying  what  lies 
within  the  scope  of  State  authority.  All  equipment  and  everything 
is  furnished  originally  by  the  Federal  Government.  Some  States 
did  more  than  others  in  securing  it.  There  is  no  uniformity  under 
State  control. 

The  Chairman.  Is  there  not  this  difference  between  the  western 
and  many  eastern  departments,  or  many  of  the  Eastern  States,  that 
the  West  has  paid  particular  attention  to  the  National  Guard,  and 
has  built  very  extravagant  armories  not  only  in  the  larger  but  in 
some  of  the  smaller  cities? 

Gen.  Wood.  They  have  done  a  good  deal  of  that,  but  I  think  that 
statement  must  be  analyzed,  and  the  arrival  of  troops  from  the  West- 
ern Department  on  the  border  and  their  condition,  strength,  and 
efficiency  and  training  known  before  we  can  admit  that  statement, 
in  fairness  to  the  organizations  from  other  States  and  departments. 

I  will  insert  a  brief  statement  showing  the  date  of  departure  of 
the  organizations  of  the  Eastern  Department  during  the  10  days 
following  the  President's  call. 

The  date  of  departure,  strength  of  organizations,  completeness  of 
equipment,  and  thoroughness  of  instruction  are  the  index  of  the 
organizations'  efficienc}^.  The  date  of  arrival  upon  the  border  de- 
pended upon  the  distance  to  be  traveled.  Many  of  the  organizations 
from  the  northern  portion  of  the  Eastern  Department  went  south 
via  Chicago,  and  consequently  had  several  days  more  on  the  road 
than  organizations  from  the  Central,  Western,  and  Southern  Depart- 
ments. 

The  following  National  Guard  organizations  in  Eastern  Depart- 
ment were  en  route  to  border  stations  in  Southern  Department  10 
days  after  the  date  of  call : 

Date  of 
Massachusetts :  departure. 

Brigade  headquartes June  27. 

Ninth  Regiment  Infantry Do. 

Second  Regiment  Infantry ! Do. 

Eighth  Regiment  Infantry Do. 

Fifth  Regiment  Infantry Do. 

First  Squadron  Cavalry ; Do. 

First  Regiment  Field  Artillery,  First  Battalion Do. 

First   Regiment    Field   Artillery,   headquarters   and    Second    Bat- 
talion    June  28. 

First  Battalion  Signal  Corps June  27. 

Ambulance  Company  No.  1 Do. 

Field  Hospital  No.  1 i Do. 

Vermont,  First  Regiment  Infantry Do. 

Connecticut : 

First  Regiment  Infantry Do. 

Second  Regiment  Infantry Do. 

Troop  B,  Cavalry __, Do. 

First  Company  Signal  Troops Do. 

Ambulance;  Company  No.  1 Do. 

Field  Hospital  No.  1 Do. 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING.  1061 

Date  of 
New  Jersey:  departure. 

IMrst  Regiment  Infantry June  26. 

Troops  A  and  0,  Cavalry June 27. 

Battery  A Do. 

Battery    B June  26. 

Ambulance  Company June  27. 

First  Field  Hospital Do. 

New  York : 

Twelfth  Regiment  Infantry June 28. 

Fourteenth  Regiment  Infantry * June  27. 

Second  Battalion,  First  Field  Artillery June  28. 

Ambulance  Company  No.  3 Do. 

Field  Hospital  No.  1 Do. 

Seventh  Regiment  Infantry June  27. 

Seventy-first    Regiment  Infantry 1><>. 

The  first  organization  en  route  in  Eastern  Department  was  Battery 
B,  New  Jersey  Field  Artillery,  National  Guard,  which  left  at  11.30 
p.  m.,  June  26,  1916. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  You  would  not  question  this  statement 
of  fact,  though  \ 

Gen.  Wood.  No,  sir;  but  Gen.  Sibert  may  look  at  it  from  a  different 
standpoint. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Here  is  another  statement  from  the 
"Western  Department  report: 

The  changes  In  laws,  methods  of  procedure,  and  the  adoption  of  new  blank 
forms  have  rendered   the  present    mustering  regulations   practically   useless. 

and  have  been  the  source  <>f  much  confusion,  delay,  and  extra   paper  work  on 
the  pari  Of  those  connected  with  the  work  of  mobilization. 

Do  you  agree  with  that? 

Gen.  Wood.  That  is  right  in  all  which  relates  to  increased  work. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Here  is  a  further  statement,  and  one 
which  apparently  strikes  right  between  the  eyes  the  order  of  the 
War  Department  stopping  the  enlistment  under  the  Oliver  order  of 
1911.     Tien.  Sibert  says: 

Companies  should   be   recruited   to   war  strength   before   Leaving  company 

rendezvous. 

( Jen.  Wood.  To  war  strength? 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Yes;  the  report  is  clear.     It  says: 

Companies   should   be   recruited    to   war   strength   before   leaving   company 

rendezvous. 

In  other  words,  he  agrees  with  Gen.  Barry  that  the  natural  place 
to  enlist  a  militia  company  is  at  its  home. 

Gen.  Wood.  I  should  agree  with  that  statement,  providing  there 
was  no  hurry  in  getting  them  to  the  border  and  the  regimental 
organizations  not  too  much  scattered.  You  understand,  of  course, 
the  condition  under  which  these  troops  were  called.  First  came  the 
call,  then  there  began  to  come  orders,  with  more  and  more  punch 
behind  them,  to  get  these  men  off.     These  orders  follow : 

Washington,  D.  C,  June   fS,   1916. 
Commanding  General  Eastern  Department, 

Governors  Island,  N.  Y.: 


Following  telegram  to  all  governors  except  Texas,  Arizona,  and  New  Mexico 
sent  this  date,  repeated  for  your  information  and  guidance :  "  Having  in  view 
the  possibility  of  further  aggression  upon  the  territory  of  the  United  States 
from  Mexico  and  the  necessity  for  the  proper  protection  of  that  frontier,  the 
President  has  thought  proper  to  exercise  the  authority  vested  in  him  by  the 


1062  CJNIVEBSAL    MILITARY   TRAINIKCi. 

Constitution  and  Laws  and  call  out  the  Organized  Militia  and  National  Guard 
necessary  for  that  purpose,  I  am  in  consequence  instructed  by  the  President  to 
call  into  the  service  of  the  United  States  forthwith  through  you,  the  following 
units  of  the  Organized  Militia  and  National  Guard  of  the  State  of  (State  desig- 
nated), which  the  President  directs  shall  he  assemhled  at  the  State  mobiliza- 
tion point  (location  named)  for  muster  into  the  service  of  the  United  States 
< units  designated).  Organizations  to  he  accepted  into  Federal  service  should 
have  the  minimum  peace  strength  »now  prescribed  for  Organized  Militia,  the 
maximum  strength  at  which  organizations  will  be  accepted  and  to  which  they 
should  be  raised  as  soon  as  possible  is  prescribed  in  section  2,  Tables  of  Or- 
ganizations United  States  Army.  In  case  any  regiment,  battalion,  or  squadron 
now  recognized  as  such  contains  an  Insufficient  number  of  organizations  to 
enable  it  to  conform  at  muster  to  Regular  Army  Organization  Tables,  the  or- 
ganizations necessary  to  complete  such  units  may  be  moved  to  mobilization 
camp  and  there  inspected  under  orders  of  the  department  commander  to  de- 
termine fitness  for  recognition  as  Organized  Militia  by  the  War  Department. 
Circular  19,  Division  of  Militia  Affairs,  1914,  prescribed  the  organizations  de- 
sired from  each  State  as  part  of  the  local  tactical  division,  and  only  these  or- 
ganizations will  be  accepted  into  service.  It  is  requested  that  all  officers  of 
The  Adjutant  General's  Department,  Quartermaster  Corps,  and  Medical  Corps, 
duly  recognized  as  pertaining  to  State  headquarters,  under  Table  1,  Tables  of 
Organization,  Organized  Militia,  and  not  elsewhere  required  for  duty  in  State 
administration,  be  ordered  to  camp  for  duty  as  camp  staff  officers  such  num- 
ber of  these  staff  officers  as  the  department  commander  may  determine  may 
be  mustered  into  the  service  of  the  United  States  for  the  purpose  of  proper 
camp  administration,  and  will  be  mustered  out  when  their  services  are  no 
longer  required.  Where  recognized  brigades  or  divisions  are  called  into  serv- 
ice from  a  State  the  staff  officers  pertaining  to  these  units  under  Tables  of 
Organization,  United  States  Army,  will  be  mustered  into  service,  and  also  the 
authorized  inspectors  of  small  arms  practice  pertaining  thereto.  Except  for 
these  two  purposes  of  mobilization  camp  service  and  of  the  prescribed  staff 
service  with  tactical  unit  officers  of  State  headquarters  under  Table  1,  above 
mentioned,  will  not  be  mustered  into  service  at  this  time.  If  tactical  divisions 
are  later  organized  the  requisite  additional  number  of  staff  officers  with  rank 
as  prescribed  for  division  staff  will,  as  far  as  practicable,  be  called  into  service 
from  those  States  which  have  furnished  troops  to  such  divisions. 
"Acknowledge." 

Mobilization  points  referred  to  in  above  telegram  are  those  designated  in 
records  your  department.  The  units  designated  to  each  State  for  mobilization 
include  all  recognized  units  of  land  Organized  Militia  in  State  except  coast 
artillery  companies  and  infantry  organizations  not  utilized  by  State  as  part  of 
local  tactical  division  to  which  it  pertains  under  circular  19,  Division  Militia 
Affairs,  1914.  Itemized  list  of  units  designated  for  each  State  follows  by  mail. 
For  States  which  have  adopted  standard  of  medical  examination  prescribed 
for  Regular  Army  the  officers  and  enlisted  men  will  be  mustered  for  service 
without  further  medical  examination  previous  to  such  muster.  Immediately 
after,  as  an  administrative  measure,  all  officers  and  enlisted  men  will  be 
medically  examined  and  any  found  disqualified  for  the  military  service  will  be 
immediately  discharged  by  you.  Officers  and  enlisted  men  from  States  which 
have  not  adopted  standard  medical  examination  prescribed  for  Regular  Army 
will  be  examined  before  muster  into  service.  No  State  adjutant  general  will 
be  mustered  into  service  and  no  staff  officer  except  as  indicated  in  above  tele- 
gram to  governors.  Any  State  staff  officers  mustered  into  service  by  you  will 
be  immediately  discharged  upon  termination  of  their  particular  duties  relating 
to  mobilization  and  transfer  of  property.  Dental  surgeons  will  not  be  mustered 
into  service.  Organizations  mustered  into  service  must  conform  in  organiza- 
tion to  section  2,  Tables  Organization,  United  States  Army,  1914,  strength  as 
indicated  in  telegram  to  governors.  On  completion  of  muster  into  service  of 
Organized  Militia  and  National  Guard,  Secretary  War  directs  you  telegraph 
report  giving  following  information  for  each  separate  unit  presented  for 
muster :  Numerical  strength  of  each,  physical  condition  personnel  of  each, 
number  of  enlisted  men  in  each  actually  in  State  service  at  date  of  call,  also 
the  condition,  sufficiency,  and  serviceability  in  each  unit  of  its  arm.  clothing, 
personnel,  and  field  service  equipment.  To  date  no  National  Guard  recognized 
as  such  under  new  defense  act. 
By  order  Secretary  War. 

McCain. 


UNIVERSAL    MILITARY    TRAINING.  1063 

Washington,  i>.  <\.  June  .?•*.  1916. 

COMMANDING    GENERAL   KasTKKN    DKPABTMENT, 

Governor*  Island,  \ .  )'.: 
The  Secretary  of  War  directs  that  the  moment  any  complete  unit  has 
arrived  at  a  Stale  mobilization  cam])  within  your  department  and  the  muster- 
ing officer  has  reported  the  regiment,  separate  battalion,  or  other  separate 
unit  pertaining  to  the  state's  quota  reasonably  equipped  for  field  service,  you 
will  communicate  by  wire  with  Gen.  Funston  to  ascertain  the  place  on  the 
border  to  which  that  organization  should  be  sent,  and  on  receipt  Of  work  from 
him  you  will  direct  your  quartermaster  to  arrange  for  the  departure  of  that 
organization  to  that  point  without  a  moment's  unnecessary  delay,  and  you  will 
issue  the  necessary  orders.  You  will  understand  the  moment  a  regiment  or 
Other  unit  is  ready  to  move  it  is  to  go  Without  delaying  for  the  arrival  at  the 
mobilization  camp  of  the  rest  of  the  tactical  unit  to  which  it  belongs,  to  what- 
ever extent  necessary,  the  organization  into  higher  units  will  be  completed  on 
the  border  wherever  necessary.  The  transformation  from  the  present  Organ- 
ised Militia  to  the  National  Guard  recognized  under  tbc  new  law  may  be  com- 
pleted after  arrival  on  the  border.  You  will  advise  ibis  office  by  wire  the 
moment  an  organization  is  reported  to  you  as  ready  to  go  to  its  destination. 
the  hour  and  date  of  its  departure,  and  its  strength  in  officers  and  men. 
Organizations  will  take  with  them  such  field  transportation  as  accompanies 
them  to  mobilization  camps  and  BUCfa  as  may  be  furnished  them  while  there. 
When  otherwise  ready  to  move  they  will  not  be  delayed  on  account  of  any 
shortage  in  held  transportation,  which  will  be  supplied  them  after  arrival  on 
border.  On  departure  of  organization  for  border  you  will  notify  Gen.  Funston 
of  the  shortage,  if  any.  in  this  transportation.  Secretary  of  War  enjoins  on 
you  grave  importance  of  utmost  promptness  in  these  movements.    Acknowledge 

McCain. 


Washington.    1  ».    ( '..    June    >.i.    HUH 
JTJOMMANDING    GENERAL     Kami.kn     I 'i.I'AUT.MKNT, 

Governors  J slant! .    V.    )'.: 
[following  telegram  sent  to-day  to  all  mustering  officers  mobilization  points: 

"Secretary  War  has  ordered  department  commanders  to  send  to  points  des- 
ignated by  Gen.  Funston  each  regiment,  separate  battalion,  or  other  separate 
organization  the  moment  it  is  reported  by  you  as  reasonably  ready  for  field 
service.  The  organization  must  not  delay  on  account  of  shortage  in  field 
transportation,  which  will  be  supplied  after  arrival  on  border.  You  are 
ordered  not  to  delay  any  report  on  any  tactical  unit  on  account  of  other  units 
belonging  to  the  same  higher  tactical  organization  not  being  present  or  ready. 
Aoknowio.k 

McCain 


Washington,  June  25,  1916. 
Commanding  Genebal  Bastes*    Dkpabtmsnt, 

Qovernori  Island,  A.    P.: 
Grave   necessity   for  additional  troops  on  border.     Various   requests  being 

made  to  delay  movement  of  State  organizations  until  the  larger  tactical  units 
are  organized  at  State  camps.  Organization  of  these  units  will  be  perfected 
on  border.  Meanwhile  Secretary  of  War  repeats  previous  order  that  organiza- 
tions move  as  soon  as  each  is  ready  regardless  of  additional  recruits  which 
will  follow  organization  to  border. 

McCain. 

In  addition  to  the  above-quoted  telegrams  Gen.  Wood  informed 
the  committee  that  there  was  a  telegram  even  more  urgent  which 
came  in  code  and  which  he  did  not  consider  should  be  placed  in  the 
record : 

Governors  1st. and.  N.  v..  June  85,  1916. 
The  Adjutant  General,  United  States  Army, 

Washington,  D.  C: 

Acknowledge  telegram  25th  requesting  expediting  movement  troops  to 
front.  Am  doing  everything  possible  to  carry  out  the  wishes  of  the  depart- 
ment.    Inspectors  are  at  work  mustering,  and  medical  officers  are  directed  to 


1064  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 

work  without  regard  Cor  hours.  Organizations  which  report  themselves  ready 
are  not  ready  as  a  matter  of  fact,  and  it  would  be  a  very  dangerous  experiment 
to  send  them  until  we  have  completed  the  absolutely  necessary  equipment. 
Most  of  the  organizations  going  will  be  In  the  neighborhood  of  peace  strength 
or  a  few  hundred  over.  This  will  be  better  than  to  try  to  send  a  larger 
number  of  recruits.  As  it  is,  not  over  30  per  cent  of  the  enlisted  personnel 
will  represent  instructed  men.  In  accordance  with  telephonic  information, 
will  proceed  at  once  to  the  inspection  and  purchase  of  horses  and  mules  for 
New  York,  New  Jersey,  and  Massachusetts,  and  will  add  to  this  authorization 
Rhode  Island,  which  I  find  needs  about  650  horses,  and  has  most  of  them 
where  they  can  he  quickly  gotten.    Am  keeping  in  touch  with  Gen.  Funston. 

Wood. 

Washington,  June  27,  1916. 
Reference  your  telegram  25th  instant,  mounted  organizations  may  be  con- 
sidered reasonably  ready,  if  otherwise  acceptable,  even  if  they  do  not  have 
mounts.     Arrangements  have  been  made  for  supply   of  mounts  on  reaching 
border. 

McCain. 

Headquarters  Eastern  Department, 
Governors  Island,  New  York  City,  July  26,  1916. 
On  July  15  the  following  telegram  was  received  from  the  War  Department: 
"  Secretary  War  directs  that  all  militia  organizations  that  have  not   left 
mobilization  camps  be  held  there  until  completely  equipped  and  ready  in  every 
respect  to  move.    Acknowledge." 

In  answer  to  a  question  to  the  War  Department  as  to  whether  this  meant 
that  organizations  were  to  be  brought  to  war  strength  and  completely  equipped 
with  transportation  and  mounts,  the  following  answer  was  received*  from  The 
Adjutant  General  of  the  Army,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

"  July  21,  1916. 
"  With  reference  to  question  as  to  whether  horses  will  be  furnished  to 
militia  organizations  at  mobilization  camps,  you  are  notified  that  horses  have 
been  contracted  for  for  delivery  on  the  border.  Horses  needed  at  mobilization 
camps  will  be  hired  to  meet  necessities  of  hauling  wrhile  in  those  camps. 
Troops  will  be  moved  to  their  border  stations  as  soon  as  ready  and  at  not 
less  than  minimum  peace  strength,  and  when  tourist  cars  are  available. 
Notify  quartermaster  general  when  tourist  cars  will  be  needed  in  time  to 
have  such  equipment  assembled  at  mobilization  camps." 

On  July  25,  1916,  the  following  telegram  was  received  from  The  Adjutant 
-General  of  the  Army : 

"  Reference  instructions  this  office  July  15  that  militia  organizations  be 
held  at  mobilization  camps  until  completely  equipped,  and  your  telegram 
July  18,  complete  equipment,  except  transportation  and  mounts  should  be 
furnished  enlisted  men  these  organizations." 

Senior  assistant   mustering  officers   will   be  governed   by   the   foregoing   in 
reporting  troops  ready  to  be  sent  to  the  border. 
By  command  of  Maj.  Gen.  Wood. 

Geo.  T.  Bartlett, 
Colonel,   General  Staff,  Chief  of  Staff. 
Official : 

W.  A.  Simpson, 

Adjutant  General,  Adjutant. 

Of  course,  if  we  had  not  been  under  orders  to  get  a  force  down  to 
the  border  as  quickly  as  possible,  we  could  have  held  the  organiza- 
tions at  their  home  stations  and  perhaps  filled  them  to  the  required 
strength,  but  instructions  required  the  movement  be  made  as  soon  as 
possible.  In  most  cases  mobilization  camps  were  so  near  the  home 
of  the  organizations  that  there  was  no  trouble  in  recruits  joining. 
Such  was  the  pressure  to  get  the  troops  on  the  border  that  trucks, 
horses,  and  mules  were  bought  in  order  that  they  should  have  some 
transportation  on  arrival. 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY    TRAINING.  1065 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  On  the  subject  of  recruiting  and  blanks 
I  observe  a  memorandum  by  Gen.  Mills,  under  date  of  September  4, 
1915,  in  which  he  makes  a  plea  for  a  system  of  recruiting  in  case  of  a 
war  call.    I  will  read  the  following  clauses : 

5.  It  is  the  understanding  of  this  office : 

(a)  That  the  Organized  Militia  is  in  the  United  States  service  from  the  time 
of  its  appearance  at  the  place  of  company  rendezvous.  (See  Opinion,  Judge 
Advocate  General,  June  18,  1915.) 

(6)  That  while  the  Organized  Militia  is  in  the  United  States  service,  recruit- 
ing is  conducted  not  by  the  State  but  by  the  War  Department. 

(c)  That  existing  orders  providing  for  the  recruitment  of  the  Regular  Army 
do  not  fully  provide  for  conditions  that  may  arise  in  the  recruitment  of  the 
Organized  Militia  in  the  United  States  service. 

6.  As  illustrating  the  character  of  recruiting  problems  to  he  solved,  the  fol- 
lowing situations  are  presented  : 

(a)  With  the  appearance  of  each  unit  at  its  company  rendezvous,  recruiting 
to  war  strength  will  presumably  begin.  Federal  blank  forms  will  be  needed. 
How  will  these  he  supplied  and  how  will  the  recruiting  officers  he  instructed  in 
their  use? 

(b)  in  view  of  the  large  number  of  recruits  to  he  secured,  it  will  probably 
be  necessary  for  each  company  of  a  regiment  to  do  Its  own  recruiting.  A.  B. 
S4<>  provides  for  recruiting  by  regiment  or  post  only. 

(<■)  If  a  unit  not  fully  recruited  is  ordered  to  its  mobilization  camp,  will  it 
leave  a  detachment  behind  to  get  additional  recruit 

The  Mills  memorandum  continues: 

Senator  LKE  of  Maryland  (reading):  Who  will  compose  BUCh  detachments? 
How  will  the  recruiting  officer  learn  his  duties'.'  The  memorandum  of  the  War 
College  division  suggests  these  matters  he  provided  for  in  the  order  or  proclama- 
tion calling  the  militia  forth.  Would  it  not  he  better  to  give  these  instructions 
now  ? 

Evidently  there  was  a  difference  of  opinion  between  Gen.  Mills  and 
i  the  War  College,  the  latter  desiring  to  put  the  plan  for  recruiting  off 
j  to  the  time  of  emergency.  Gen.  Mills  wanted  to  provide  for  it  in 
advance,  did  he  not  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  We  met  that  as  far  as  we  could  by  using  our  instructor- 
inspectors  and  officers  of  the  Regular  Army  as  mustering  officers;  in 
fact,  our  correspondence  by  telegram,  meeting  the  emergencies  as 
they  arose,  was  enormous.  The  whole  thing,  Senator,  points  to  the 
need  of  the  fixing  of  responsibility  for  all  this  sort  of  thing  on  the 
department  commander  in  time  of  peace. 

Senator  Li  i:  of  Maryland,  (ion.  Mills  in  this  memorandum  says 
further  [reading]  : 

(d)  The  ad  Of  April  •_'."».  1914,  provides  for  reeruii  rendezvous  and  depots. 
Who  compose  the  personnel  of  these  establishments?  What  methods  do  they 
apply  in  regard  to  recruiting,  training  recruits,  disbursing  public  funds,  etc.? 
How  do  they  learn  their  duties? 

7.  It  is  again  recommended  that  an  order  he  issued  covering,  as  far  as  pos- 
sible, the  details  of  the  recruiting  system  to  be  put  into  effect  when  volun- 
teers are  raised  or  the  Organized  Militia  called  into  the  United  States  service. 
Confusion  must  result  if  the  issue  of  these  instructions  is  delayed  until  the 
-emergency  occurs. 

Gen.  Wood.  What  is  the  date  of  that.  Senator? 
Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  September  4.  1915. 
Gen.  Wood.  That.  T  think,  is  all  covered  in  subsequent  regulations. 
I  will  put  those  in  the  hearing. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  The  fact  that  Gen.  Mills  uses  the  word 
"  again."  "  is  again  recommended,"  indicates  a  previous  effort  on  his 
i  part  to  establish  a  system  for  recruiting  on  a  call. 

86205     17         in 


1066  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 

Gen.  Wood.  That  was  in  1915. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  "  That  an  order  be  issued  covering 
*  *  *  the  details  of  the  recruiting  system,"  etc.,  indicates  that  this 
controversy  between  him  and  the  General  Stan0  in  making  this  pre- 
liminary preparation  was  somewhat  of  old  standing. 

Gen.  Wood.  He  was  a  member  then  of  the  General  Staff  himself. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  But  he  was  only  one.  Of  course,  the 
responsibility  was  on  the  Militia  Bureau  to  do  these  things  in  a  way, 
or  to  suggest  them,  because  the  General  Staff  sent  the  inquiry  to 
Gen.  Mills. 

Gen.  Wood.  The  Chief  of  the  Militia  Bureau  was  a  member  of  the 
General  Staff,  ex  officio,  and  assistant  to  the  Chief  of  the  General 
Staff,  and  his  recommendations  went  to  the  Chief  of  Staff  and  were 
promulgated  by  the  Chief  of  Staff  in  the  name  of  the  Secretary  of 
War  and  by  his  order. 

-  Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Any  unprepa redness,  so  to  speak,  would 
be  on  the  Militia  Bureau.  That  office  would  be  responsible  if  there 
was  unpreparedness  in  respect  to  the  militia? 

Gen.  Wood.  In  certain  features:  in  shortage  of  forms,  and  so  on, 
but  not  in  the  matter  of  arms  and  equipment  for  new  men  or  for 
training  of  the  militia  or  in  case  the  militia  regiments  were  not  full. 
Senator,  I  think  there  is  certainly  no  disposition  among  the  officers  of 
the  Army  to  shirk  the  responsibility  for  the  shortcomings  which  are 
evident  and  which  I  have  referred  to  right  through.  I  refer  to  those 
which  relate  to  shortage  of  supplies,  equipment,  etc. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  I  asked  the  Secretary  of  War  for  the 
previous  information  on  this  subject,  and  he  gave  me,  in  response  to 
this  request,  an  order  of  April  24,  1914,  three  days  after  you  went  out 
of  office  as  Chief  of  Staff — I  think  you  went  out  about  April  20. 
That  evidently  was  an  order  passed  by  Gen.  Wotherspoon.  I  will 
put  it  in  the  record.     It  is  as  follows : 

The  Chief  of  Staff  directs  The  Adjutant  General  to  send  to  adjutants  general 
all  blanks  that  the  militia  need  to  prepare  their  organizations  preliminary  to 
offering  them  for  acceptance  (if  there  are  any  such  blanks),  and  that  the  other 
blanks  be  distributed  to  mustering  officers. 

If  the  discussion  was  about  the  preparation  and  distribution  of 
blanks,  was  it  not  rather  rough  on  the  Militia  Bureau  to  say,  "  if 
there  are  any  such  blanks  "?  This  order  would  seem  to  indicate  that 
instructions  to  prepare  blank  forms,  etc.,  had  been  suggested  and  had 
been  urged  by  the  Militia  Bureau.  Any  explanation  as  to  why  it  was 
not  carried  out  and  the  blank  forms  prepared  would  seem  to  be  ac- 
ceptable. This  order,  April  24, 1914,  should  be  taken  into  considera- 
tion with  the  only  other  published  matter  that  bears  on  the  question 
from  Gen.  Mills,  namely,  this  report  of  September  4,  1915. 

The  Chairman.  These  general  deficiencies  with  reference  to  mo- 
bilization and  transportation,  are  they  not  deficiencies  that  in- 
variably follow  the  attempted  mobilization  of  a  peace  army  to  a  war 
footing?     Is  that  not  true? 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes,  sir;  especially  where  there  is  dual  control  and 
general  unpreparedness  and  you  have  to  reach  out  and  take  things 
over  in  a  critical  moment.  There  would  not  have  "been  any  excuse  if 
these  troops  had  been  as  fully  under  our  control  as  are  the  Federal 
troops. 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING.  1067 

The  Chairman.  Take  the  British  Army,  for  instance,  as  I  read 
about  it;  they  have  the  same  difficulties  in  mobilization  that  our  own 
Army  lias  had:  that  is.  they  did  not  have  trained  men  to  handle  the 
transportation  facilities:  they  did  not  have  a  trained  soldiery,  so 
they  had  the  same  difficulties  whipping  it  into  a  system,  and  it  took 
them  practically  a  year  and  a  half  to  do  it. 

(Jen.  Wood.  That  is  right.  But  their  regular  army,  known  as  the 
expeditionary  force,  was  like  our  own  Regular  force,  ready,  and 
it  went  promptly.  Their  supply  departments,  like  our  own.  failed, 
and  they  had  to  create  the  great  munitions  commission  as  a  special 
commission  because  the  old  supply  departments,  dyed-in-the-wool, 
wedded  to  methods,  and  thinking  mostly  of  departmental  entourage, 
did  not  meet  the  demands  of  the  situation.  They  had  the  same  expe- 
rience we  had.  If  we  had  gone  on  with  this  war.  if  it  had  been  a 
real  war.  we  would  have  had  to  shake  things  up  and  form  some  com- 
missions, including  big  business  men  with  wide  experience  and 
energy,  or  fail  disastrously. 

Senator  Brady.  To  put  business  methods  into  the  organization? 

(Jen.  Wood.  To  get  the  cobwebs  out  of  the  supply  departments  and 
put  some  punch  into  them  to  convert  them  l'rom  a  wheelless  vehicle 
into  something  that  will  move  easily  and  smoothly.  That  is  the 
purpose  of  the  General  Staff;  that  is  why  we  want  to  see  the  coordi- 
nating powers  of  the  General  Staff  increased  instead  of  crippled. 
The  power  of  the  General  Staff  will  be  to  a  great  extent  the  measure 
of  the  Army's  efficiency. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Gen.  Wood,  you  are  pretty  well  com- 
mitted by  your  statements,  both  official  and  otherwise,  to  an  approval 
of  the  Swiss  military  system,  are  you  not? 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes.  sir:  adapted,  I  have  always  said,  to  this  country. 
Of  course  our-  State  arrangements  make  it  a  little  more  difficult  of 
application. 

Senator  Leb  of  Maryland.  On  January  27,  L916,  you  approved  the 
Swiss  system  before  the  Military  Committee  of  the  House,  and 
later,  on  page  772  of  the  House  reports,  you  say : 

The  system  which  I  believe  we  should  adopt  is  one  similar  i<»  thai  adopted 
by  Australia  and  Switzerland. 

Again,  at  pap'  777.  appears  the  following  answer  by  you: 

Gen.  Wood.  5Tes.  Take  the  Swiss  system.  Their  armed  rate  is  about 
12  per  1,000,000.  againsi  b  rate  of  124  per  i.ooo.ooo  here.  Taking  those  figures 
into  consideration  it  would  seem  that  their  military  training  has  done  some 
good.  They  arc  running  their  entire  military  establishment  Cor  about  $7,000,- 
000  a  year.  They  could  put  a  quarter  of  a  million  men  in  the  line  in  48  hours 
and  they  would  have  200,000  more  in  reserve.  This  is  done  by  means  of 
acceptance  of  the  general  principle  that  every  man  owes  something  to  the 
nation's  service.     That  is  what  we  will  have  to  come  to. 

In  Senate  Document  360,  of  the  last  session.  I  published  some 
direct  information  from  the  Swiss  military  authorities.  It  took 
them  10  days  to  get  out  200.000  men.  You  are  a  little  too  compli- 
mentary, then? 

The  Chairman.  The  territory  there  is  so  much  smaller  than  ours. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland,  'they  say  themselves  it  took  them  10 
days  to  get  out  the  200.000  men. 

Senator  Brady.  What  are  you  reading  from? 


prevent,  corps  of  troops  shall  be  formed 
from  soldiers  of  the  same  Canton. 
The  composition  of  these  bodies  of 
troops,  the  maintenance  of  their  effec- 
tive strength,  the  appointment  and  pro- 
motion of  their  officers  shall  belong  to 
the  Cantons,  subject  to  general  regula- 
tions which  shall  be  issued  to  them  by 
the  Confederation.     (Art.  21.)    • 


1068  UNIVERSAL    Mil  ITARY    TRAINING. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  I  was  reading  from  Gen.  Wood's  state- 
ment to  the  House  committee  of  last  year. 

Gen.  Wood.  I  am  taking  the  official  report.  Tt  would  take  36  to 
48  hours  to  mobilize  the  first  220,000. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  You  approved,  in  that  way,  the  Swiss 
military  system,  and  as  late  as  November  1,  1916,  you  wrote  an  intro- 
duction to  a  book  on  the  Swiss  system  by  Kuenzli,  in  which  you 
described  that  system  as  excellent? 

Gen.  Wood.  Excellent  in  principle. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  I  want  to  compare  with  you  the  militia 
clause  of  the  United  States  Constitution  and  article  21,  the  equiva- 
lent in  the  Swiss  constitution.  Of  course  you  are  familiar  with  our 
militia  clause,  so  I  will  not  read  that.  I  will  print  them  in  the 
record  opposite  each  other. 

The  Swiss  military  clause  read  as  follows: 

So   far   as    military   reasons   do   not       [Extract  from  Constitution  of  the  United 

States,  1787.  J 

Congress  shall  have  power : 
To  provide  for  organizing,   arming, 
and   disciplining   the   militia   and   for 
governing  such  part  of  them  as  may  be 
employed  in  the  service  of  the  United 
States,    reserving    to    the    States,    re- 
spectively, the  appointment  of  the  offi- 
cers and  the  authority  of  training  the 
militia  according  to  the  discipline  pre- 
scribed by  Congress.     (See.  8,  Art.  I.) 
Congress  shall  have  power: 
To    make    all    laws    necessary    and 
proper  for  ea rrying  into  execution  the 
foregoing  powers.     (Sec.  8  of  Art.  I.) 

The  words  "general  regulations"  in  the  Swiss  constitution,  article 
21,  seem  to  take  the  place  of  "  discipline  prescribed  by  Congress"  in 
our  Constitution? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  have  analyzed  that.  I  have  the  full  Swiss  law. 
The  idea  I  have  been  trying  to  drive  home  in  reference  to  the  SwTiss 
system  is  that  it  rests  primarily  upon  the  universal  training. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  You  certainly  emphasized  that. 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes:  the  citizenship  obligation,  the  better  bodies  from 
the  training,  the  better  morals  from  the  self-control  resulting  from 
the  discipline  and  respect  for  law  and  the  constituted  authorities. 
A  more  efficient  man  from  the  economic  standpoint,  because  of  the 
habits  of  promptness  and  thoroughness  and  the  habit  of  doing  things 
as  told  and  when  told;  a  better  citizen  and  a  better  national  spirit. 
These  are  some  of  the  results  which  will  come  from  universal  training 
and  obligation  for  service.  There  are  some  points  where  we  must 
modify  the  Swiss  system  to  fit  our  conditions. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  What  T  wanted  to  bring  your  mind  to 
and  your  constitutional  conscience  to  is  the  dual  control  feature  of 
the  Swiss  constitution. 

Gen.  Wood.  That  is  unsound  and  defective  in  Switzerland  if  it 
exists  so  as  to  in  any  way  hamper  full  Federal  control. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  There  is  more" dual  control  in  the  Swiss 
constitution  than  in  ours,  is  there  not '. 

Gen.  Wood.  I  think  T  can  disprove  that.  I  will  not  enter  into  an 
argument,  however,  with  so  able  a  constitutional  lawyer  as  you  are, 
Senator. 


(MYKKSAL    MILITARY    TRAILING.  1069 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  I  will  reread  these  words  to  you  from 
the  Swiss  constitution: 

The  composition  <>f  tii<-s»'  bodies  «>f  tr»»ups.  the  maintenance  of  their  effective 
strength,  the  appointment  and  promotion  of  their  officers,  shall  belong  i<>  the 

Cantons. 

Gen.  Wood.  Under  the  direction  of  the  federal  government. 
Senator  Lee  of  Maryland  (continuing)  : 

Subject  to  genera]  regulations  whirl,  shall  be  Issued  to  them  by  the  Con- 
federation. 

Subject  to  "the  discipline  prescribed  by  Congress  w  is  what  we 
say. 

Gen.  Wood.  We  do  not  prescribe  discipline  under  the  new  law; 
we  can  not:  the  governors  can  refuse  to  accept  it. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Then  it  is  a  constitutional  question  in 
your  mind  \ 

(Jen.  Wood.   It  is,  indeed. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  So  far  as  the  wording  of  these  two 
constitutional  articles  is  concerned,  the  Swiss  constitutional  pro- 
vision seems  to  give  more  dual  control  that  we  have; 

Gen.  Wood.  I  will  answer  that.  Senator,  in  full. 

Senator   Lee  of   Maryland.   If   we  can   SHOW   tbat    in    training  her 
army  Switzerland  has  solved  constitutional  questions;  as 
of  fact,   if  we  can  show  they   have   Lr«»t   an   efficient   army,  and   that 
under  their  laws  and  constitution  they  have  more  dual  control  than 
we  have,  then  Switzerland  has  solved  your  control  doubts,  has 
not.' 

Gen.  Wood.  You  will  have  to  state  the  latter  part  of  your  ques- 
tion again.  Switzerland  has.  as  1  understand  their  law,  what  is  in 
effect  absolute  Federal  control,  and  T  think  you  will  find  tbat  such 
control  is  made  effective  by  Federal  order-  .md  regulations,  and  we 
have  no  effective  Federal  control.  Every  Swis-  has  to  he  trained 
in  effect  tinder  Federal,  not  under  cantonal,  instructions,  and  lie  is 
a  well-trained  man,  and  when  he  respond-  to  call  he  will  probably 
be  an  effective  soldier. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  The  Swiss  officers  are  appointed  by 
the  Cantons,  are  they  not? 

Gen.  Wood.  They  are  under  certain  restrictions.  You  will  find 
the  Federal  Government  fixes  the  standard. 

nator  Lee  of  Maryland.   For  all  basic  units  all"  officers  are  ap- 
pointed by  the  Cantons. 

Gen.  Wood.  I  shall  have  to  look  that  up. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  We  find  that  in  the  Swiss  law. 

Gen.  Wood.  Then  it  is  a  mistake. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  It  operates,  does  it  not? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  do  not  think  you  are  right  in  the  assumption  that 
the  Federal  Government  does  not  exercise  control. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  I  will  read  you  the  section  of  the 
Swiss  law.  section  156,  which  is  as  follows: 

156.  The  Cantons  appoint  the  officers  of  the  basic  units  and  (he  officers  of 
infantry  that  are  on  the  stuffs  of  fusileer  battalions  composed  thereof. 

The  Federal  Council  appoints  officers  of  battalion  staffs,  and  also  company 
officers  when  the  company  is  formed  of  men  from  different  Cantons. 

Gen.  Wood.  The  Federal  Government  fixes  the  qualifications  of 
the  officers  absolutely. 


1070  IXIVKliSAl.    MILITARY    TRAINING. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Gertainly,  just  as  we  can;  just  as 
this  present  law  proposes  to  do.  The  Swiss  system  gives  a  very 
rigid  process  of  selection,  involving  the  approval  of  superior  officers. 

Gen.  Wood.  I  know. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Diligent  service  as  a  private  and  as  a 
noncommissioned  officer,  and  schooling  of  noncommissioned  officers, 
and  a  school  for  commissioned  officers,  from  all  of  which  processes 
the  candidate  for  commission  has  to  issue  successfully,  and  then 
he  gets  a  commission  from  his  Canton.  And  there  is  only  one  case 
in  which  the  Canton  can  not  give  the  commission,  and  that  is  where 
a  Canton  does  not  provide  the  proper  number  of  qualified  officers. 

Gen.  Wood.  But  they  all  do  that,  as  a  rule. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  No;  I  think  you  are  wrong  about  that. 
On  rare  occasions  a  Canton  fails  to  have  qualified  men  to  appoint, 
and  then  the  appointment  goes  outside  of  that  Canton. 

Gen.  Wood.  The  Federal  Government  prescribes  all  the  qualifi 
cations  for  officers. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Yes;  as  our  Federal  Government  can 
under  the  act  of  June  3. 

Gen.  Wood.  And  the  control  of  the  Swiss  Federation  in  military 
matters  is  practically  absolute.  No  Canton  has  any  voice  when  once 
a  condition  of  war  exists. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  General,  I  have  got  to  go  upon  the 
laws  and  constitution  as  published.  The  Swiss  Army  is  prepared 
in  time  of  peace,  and  the  commissions  issue  then.  Now,  I  will  call 
your  attention  to  these  statutes  a  little  more  in  detail  so  you  will 
appreciate  them.  It  is  of  vast  importance  to  us  if  we  can  operate 
successfully  a  militia  system  with  State  responsibilities,  dual  con- 
trol, as  a  safeguard  to  the  liberties  of  the  country,  the  Swiss  having 
created  an  efficient  army  under  equivalent  provisions  of  their  consti- 
tion,  and  I  will  therefore  proceed  and  call  your  attention  to  more 
details. 

Gen.  Wood.  Let  me  answer  that  in  detail  in  written  language,  if 
you  please. 

The  comparison  of  the  Swiss  and  American  Constitutions,  made  in  Senate 
Document  360,  Sixty-fourth  Congress,  first  session,  pages  i)  and  10,  to  my 
mind  is  misleading. 

In  Switzerland  the  army  consists  of  the  ahle-bodied  trained  citizens  of  the 
nation,  and  all  Swiss  must  perform  military  service.  (See  sec.  1.)  In  the 
United  States  the  Army  consists  only  of  the  officers  and  enlisted  force  author- 
ized by  Congress,  and  the  Constitution  makes  a  marked  distinction  between  the 
Army  and  the  militia. 

In  Switzerland  the  Federal  Council  is  in  charge  of  military  establishments. 
In  the  United  States  the  President  is  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  Army  and 
Navy  but  not  of  the  citizen  force  (militia),  except  when  called  into  actual 
service  of  the  United  States.  Consequently  the  Federal  control  in  Switzerland 
is  continuous  over  all  military  forces,  while  in  the  United  States  Federal  con- 
trol over  the  militia  is  only  when  it  is  called  into  the  service  of  the  United 
States,  and  the  Constitution  limits  this  call  into  the  service  of  the  United 
States  to  three  purposes — enforcing  the  law,  suppressing  insurrection,  and 
repelling  invasion. 

In  Switzerland  the  Cantons  have  authority  over  the  military  forces  of  their 
territory  in  so  far  as  this  is  not  limited  by  the  Federal  constitution  or  laws, 
and  military  instruction  of  every  kind  is  under  the  control  of  the  federation. 
In  the  United  States  the  States  have  absolute  government  of  the  militia  when 
not  called  into  Federal  service,  and  this  includes  also  the  training  of  the 
militia. 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY    TRAINING.  1071 

In  Switzerland  the  composition  of  the  troops,  their  recruitment,  and  the 
appointment  of  their  officers  belongs  to  the  Cantons  subject  to  general  regu- 
lations winch  .-ire  issued  to  thorn  by  the  federation.  In  the  United  States  the 
appointment  of  officers,  the  authority  of  training  the  militia,  and  t  he  government 

of  the  militia  when  not  called  into  the  service  of  the  United  States  for  one  of 
the  three  specific  purposes  stated  above  is  expressly  reserved  to  tl\e  States. 

In  Switzerland  there  is  no  limitation  to  the  general  regulations  which  may 
be  issued  by  the  confederation.  In  the  United  Slates,  when  the  militia  is  not 
called  into  Federal  service,  Congress  has  power  to  provide  only  for  organiz- 
ing, arming,  and  disciplining  this  citizen  force,  and  the  debates  of  the  consti- 
tutional convention  show  that  the  power  so  extended  in  respect  to  discipline 
was  to  be  Interpreted  as  limiting  the  central  Government  to  prescribing  the 
character  of  drill  in  order  that  the  forces  of  all  the  States  might  be  drilled 
under  the  same  rule  of  tactics. 

The  Swiss  system  makes  a  fair  distribution  of  the  military  burden — the 
United  States  system  is  as  Inequitable  a  plan  as  could  be  devised. 

In  a  word  the  Swiss  constitution  and  laws  call  for  universal  training  of  all 
physically  fit  citizens  and  give  the  Central  (Government  continuous  control  over 
the  citizen  army;  the  United  States  Constitution  and  laws  do  not  provide  for 
this  training  and  limits  complete  control  to  actual  hostilities  or  internal  trouble 
(or  the  imminence  thereof),  thus  delaying  effective  action  until  the  time  when 
the  <ro->ps  are  needed   in  a   crisis. 

It  has  been  hold  that  Congress  has  never  exercised  its  full  power  over  the 
armed  forces  of  the  United  States.  It  is  true  Congress  has  never  exercised  its 
full  power  to  raise  and  support  armies;  if  it  ha<!  it  would  have  pal  into  opera- 
tion a  law  such  as  has  been  put  into  operation  in  Switzerland,  i.  e.,  make  effec- 
tive a  system  by  which  all  citizens  would  be  trained  for  military  duty.  On  the 
other  hand,  it  is  believed  that  Congress  has  exercised  full  power  over  the  militia 
and  has  even  gone  beyond  its  power  in  the  so-called  national-defense  act. 

During  the  discussion  in  the  last  session  of  Congress  of  the  various  bills  and 
amendments  submitted  as  to  military  legislation  there  was  much  said  about  the 

powers  of  the  Federal  Government  over  the  militia,  and  the  decision  in  the  case 
of  Houston  r.  Moore  was  quite  frequently  cited,  it  s.-cms  to  have  been  lost 
sight  of  that  this  cas«.  involved  merely  the  question  of  punishment  by  the  Central 

(OVernment  or  by  the  State  of  a  militiaman  who  refused  to  respond  when  called 
to  service  under  a  call  authorised  by  the  Constitution.  The  case  in  no  way 
had  to  do  with  the  appointment  of  officers,  with  governing  the  militia  when  not 
in  the  service  of  the  United  States,  with  training  the  militia,  or  with  any  other 
of  the  greater  points  under  consideration.  The  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court 
in  this  case  was  the  broadest  Interpretation  of  the  Constitution  ever  made  on 
the  subject  and  was  dissented  from  by  Chief  .Justice  Story,  who  has  always  been 

considered  the  ablest  of  our  constitutional  lawyers. 

Some  of  the  militia  clauses  of  the  national-defense  act  are.  in  my  opinion,  an 
infringement  of  the  Constitution.  The  dual  oath  requires  the  officers  and  en- 
listed men  to  obey  both  the  President  and  the  governor.  Under  the  Constitution 
the  President  has  no  right  to  govern  the  militia  except  when  called  into  the 
service  of  the  United  States.  The  authority  given  the  President  to  appoint 
officers  to  command  militia  units,  the  system  of  courts-martial  prescribed,  the 
requirements  for  the  adjutants  general  of  States  to  make  certain  specific  re- 
ports, all  can  be  Interpreted  only  as  a  government  of  the  militia  when  not  in  the 
Service  of  the  Tinted  States,  and  consequently  are  unconstitutional.  The  Su- 
preme Court  undoubtedly  would  sustain  any  militiaman  who  refused  to  be  gov- 
erned by  these  sections  of  the  law  and  who  appealed  from  the  sentence  of  any 
court-martial  appointed  thereunder.     At  least   these  points  are  open  to  question. 

The  law  contains  no  means  for  enforcing  its  provisions.  To  my  mind  a  dis- 
tinct evidence  of  the  recognition  of  the  law's  weakness  appears  in  the  provision 
that  States  which  do  not  conform  shall  be  refused  their  portion  of  the  Federal 
allotment.  In  other  words.  Congress  gives  the  State  militia  money  and  if  the 
State  militia  does  not  obey  the  law  takes  the  money  back  again.  No  other  pun- 
ishment is  provided.  Doubtless  the  framers  of  the  law  recognized  that  no  other 
punishment  could  be  enforced. 

The  law  may  be  made  Inoperative  in  anv  State  by  the  governor,  who  is  the 
commander  in  chief  of  the  militia  of  that  State.  If  the  governor  provides  no 
recruiting  machinery  the  number  of  the  militiamen  required  by  the  law  can  not 
be  obtained.  If  the  governor  pays  no  attention  to  the  requirements  of  the  law 
as  to  qualifications  of  the  National  Guard  officers  and  proceeds  to  appoint  some 


1072  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 

men  not  having  those  qualifications,  those  men  are  officers  of  the  militia  regard- 
less of  any  action  the  Central  Government  may  take,  since  the  appointment  of 

the  officers  of  the  militia  is  expressly  reserved  to  the  States.  If  the  governor 
gives  orders  to  his  officers  and  militia  contradictory  to  those  Riven  by  the  Presi- 
dent, the  militia,  both  officers  and  enlisted  men,  are  under  orders  to  obey  the 
governor  as  well  as  the  President,  and,  since  the  Constitution  gives  the  govern- 
ment of  the  militia  to  the  States  when  it  is  not  in  the  service  of  the  United 
States,  then  the  logical  duty  of  the  militiamen  is  t<>  give  the  orders  of  their 
governor  precedence. 

In  my  opinion,  the  national  defense  act  promises  to  produce  a  political 
force  rather  than  a  military  force  unless,  due  to  the  individual  patriotism  of 
its  members,  this  is  prevented.  The  resignation  of  over  600  militia  officers 
and  the  general  statement  that  the  present  enlisted  men  are  not  willing  to  re- 
enlist  for  such  service  is  an  indication  that  the  militia  itself  does  not  intend 
to  permit  a  system  so  disastrous  to  continue.  It  certainly  should  be  recognized 
by  every  Congressman  that,  with  800  militiamen  in  each  congressional  district, 
all.  of  them  voters,  and  all  eligible  to  hold  offices  of  trust  and  profit,  local 
elections  and  even  general  elections  may  be  controlled  by  such  a  body.  Even 
the  election  or  reelection  of  a  Congressman  may  be  dependent  upon  his  attitude 
toward  the  militia  and  his  efforts  to  obtain  greater  privileges  for  that  class  of 
citizens. 

I  am  confirmed  in  this  opinion  by  the  minority  report  of  the  military  com- 
mittee in  1912  when  similar  legislation  was  in  contemplation,  and  quote  that 
report  as  follows : 

"  The  minority  making  this  report  is  convinced  that  the  legislation  proposed 
by  the  pending  bill  is  not  only  unwise,  but  that  it  is  dangerous  in  the  extreme. 
Rather  than  enter  upon  a  legislative  course  that  will  inevitably  entail  upon 
the  General  Government  an  enormous  expense,  which  may  be  found  in  dire 
emergency  to  have  been  wasted,  a  course  that  will  surely  lead  to  the  creation 
of  a  great  military  force  that  will  become  so  powerful  politically  that  Congress 
will  be  no  more  able  to  resist  its  demands  than  it  has  been  to  resist  the  de- 
mands of  the  far  less  compactly  organized  and  manageable  army  of  pension  ap* 
plicants  and  their  friends,  this  minority  would  favor  a  reasonable  increase  of 
the  Regular  Army,  leaving  the  States  to  maintain  their  own  troops  in  their 
own  way  and  at  their  own  expense  without  any  aid  whatever  from  the  "United 
States."     (Rept.  1117,  Pt.  II,  62d  Cong.,  3d  sess.) 

I  could  wish  that  the  minority  report  had  contained  a  recommendation  foi 
a  Federal  citizen  army ;  I  believe  that  such  would  be  the  recommendation  to-day. 

The  foregoing  will  indicate  why  I  am  unable  to  agree  with  Senator  Lee 
that  the  militia  under  our  Constitution  may  be  made  the  same  as  the  Swiss 
army  under  the  constitution  of  Switzerland,  though  a  comparison  of  se- 
lected sections  may  seem  to  justify  the  belief  thai  there  is  similarity.  A  cart- 
ful consideration  of  the  whole  situation,  especially  as  the  two  systems  operate 
in  practice,  shows  them  to  be  utterly  dissimilar  and  irreconcilable. 

Senator  Brady.  Does  not  the  Swiss  Government  require  universal 
service  in  training? 

Gen.  Wood.  It  does. 

Senator  Brady.  Do  you  not  believe  that  would  have  a  material 
effect  in  the  control  of  the  National  Government  over  the  soldiers  of 
the  National  Guard,  or  whatever  it  may  be  called  in  that  country,  by 
the  National  Government? 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Senator,  in  view  of  having  granted  this 
great  power  of  universal  conscription  to  the  central  government  the 
Swiss  have  taken  precautions  for  the  preservation  of  their  liberties 
of  a  very  radical  kind.  Those  precautions,  I  want  to  call  your  at- 
tention to  in  detail,  and  they  are  precautions  that  can  easily  be 
taken  in  this  country  and  do  not  stand  in  the  way  of  a  universal 
service  if  the  precautions  are  taken.  I  am  going  to  call  attention  to 
that  right  now. 

I  will  call  your  attention  to  Senate  Document  360,  of  which  I 
sent  you  a  copy,  Gen.  Wood,  and  to  a  statement  in  a  lecture  on  page 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY    TRAINING.  1073 

Gl,  delivered  by  Capt.  Wiley  Howell,  of  the  United  States  Army,  to 
the  field  officers'  class  at  Fort  Leavenworth.  Kans.  He  states  the 
conditions  as  to  officers  as  follows: 

OFFICEBS. 

The  method  by  which  officers  are  developed  is  Interesting.  Should  a  recruit 
show  particular  ability,  it  is  noted  on  his  record  by  the  instructors  of  the  recruit 
school,  and  this  report  goes  forward  also  to  the  commandant  of  the  military 
forces  of  his  Canton.  The  following  year,  when  the  noncommissioned  officers' 
schools  are  formed,  the  recruit  is  directed  to  attend.  lie  can  not  ask  for  this 
order  and  is  bound  to  obey  it  unless  excused  by  proper  authority.  These  espe- 
cially chosen  recruits  assemble,  to  the  number  of  about  a  hundred,  at  the  desig- 
nated place,  and  there  they  are  put  through  a  irrillini:  coarse  of  Instruction 
calculated  not  only  to  tench  but  to  try  out  the  metal  of  the  man. 

At  the  end  of  the  course,  if  he  has  been  found  satisfactory,  lie  is  appointed  a 
corporal. 

All  noncommissioned  officers  are  eligible  for  appointment  as  commissioned 
officers,  but  can  not  be  admitted  to  the  school  for  commission  candidates  until 
they  have  passed  a  certain  amount  of  time  as  drill  musters  in  the  recruit  schools 
and  have  received  the  recommendations  of  their  superior  officers. 

The  candidates  for  the  commissioned  grade  report  under  orders  after  the  com- 
pletion of  the  recruit  school  course  and  Undergo  a  course  of  instruction  which  is 
principally  theoretical,  and  includes  lectures,  recitations,  and  examinations.  At 
the  end  of  tin-  course  those  who  are  found  qualified  are  commissioned  as  second 
lieutenants  and  proceed  to  their  homes. 

Capt.  Howell  omits  one  very  important  thing  just  there:  These 
commissions  issue  from  the  Canton.  The  Cantons  commission  the 
line  officers  of  the  basic  units  according  to  the  Swiss  law  of  1907, 
section  156.  I  will  read  that  section  right  into  the  statement.  It  is  as 
follows : 

The  Cantons  appoint  the  officers  of  the  basic  units  and  the  officers  of  infantry 
that   are  on  the  staffs  of  fusileer  battalions  composed  thereof. 

The  Federal  Council  appoints  officers  of  battalion  staffs,  and  also  company 
officers  when  the  company  is  formed  of  men  from  different  Cantons. 

Section  157  is  as  follows : 

When  a  Canton  is  not  in  position  to  furnish  to  its  organizations  the  prescribed 
quota  of  officers  and  noncommissioned  officers,  the  Federal  Council  assigns  to  it 
supernumerary  officers  and  noncommissioned  officers  of  other  Cantons. 

Gen.  Wood.  The  Federal  Council  does  that. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  But  that  is  the  exceptional  condition. 
My  advices  are,  from  men  who  have  been  in  the  Swiss  Army,  that  it 
sometimes,  but  rarely,  happens  that  a  Canton  can  not  furnish  its 
proper  number  of  officers.  Sometimes  the  Cantons  have  not  got  the 
men  with  the  military  education,  and  then  the  Federal  Council  steps 
in  and  gives  that  Canton  officers  from  some  other  Canton,  and  then 
there  is  always  trouble  in  the  Swiss  Assembly.  There  are  representa- 
tions on  the  floor  and  a  special  row7  made  over  it ;  in  other  words,  it  is 
such  an  exceptional  thing  that  it  makes  a  political  question  nearly 
always  whenever  it  is  done.  And  it  is  very  important,  because  that 
is  the  real  crux  of  the  whole  militia  system  under  our  Constitution. 

Gen.  Wood.  1  think  the  distinction,  the  very  sharp  distinction, 
between  the  two  is  that  Switzerland  requires,  in  the  first  place,  of 
all  males  of  a  certain  age  and  physical  condition  a  prescribed  course 
of  training,  which  is  Federal  and  not  cantonal,  and  the  Cantons 
have  to  do  it  under  the  Federal  law.  Every  officers  examination  is 
fixed  and  prescribed  in  exact  terms  by  the  Federal  Government — 


1074  IXIVERSAL   MILITARY   TEAINING. 

also  his  course  of  training — and  in  time  of  war  or  threatened  war 
the  Federal  Government  assumes  full  control  of  all  the  cantonal 
resources  of  every  kind  and  description.  There  is  no  State  or  can- 
tonal line  left.     But  that  I  have  answered  above. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Will  you  answer  a  hypothetical  ques- 
tion, Gen.  Wood  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  will,  sir. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  That  if  the  Swiss  have  solved  the  dual 
control,  namely,  the  appointment  of  officers  by  the  Canton,  can  we 
not  solve  it  under  our  Constitution? 

Gen.  Wood.  No,  sir;  I  do  not  think  we  can.  We  can,  however, 
solve  our  military  problem  by  creating  a  citizen  Federal  force,  and 
this  we  should  do. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  You  would  not  admit  that  when  our 
only  effort  to  solve  it  is  in  the  late  act  of  June  3,  1916? 

Gen.  Wood.  No,  sir;  because  our  State  organizations  are  very 
different.  I  doubt  if  we  can  do  it.  I  will  make  my  answer  brief  at 
this  time  and  give  3011  my  reasons  in  writing.  I  think  that  was  one 
of  the  great  weaknesses  in  the  Civil  War,  namely,  the  State  appoint- 
ment of  officers.     It  led  to  political  chicanery  of  all  sorts. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  In  doing  so,  General,  bear  in  mind  some 
fewT  of  the  other  leading  powers.  Swiss  laws  give  the  Cantons  as 
follows  a  few  of  the  many  instances  of  dual  control : 

Sec.  151.  (Swiss  military  law.)  The  Cantons  have  control  of  the  matricula- 
tion of  men  compelled  to  perform  military  service.  The  registry  thereof  is  at 
the  base  of  all  military  control. 

Sec.  152.  The  Cantons  designate  arrondissement  commanders  charged  with 
the  maintenance  of  the  rolls  and  in  general  all  military  relations  with  men 
performing  obligatory  service. 

Sec.  153.  The  Cantons  form  battalions  of  infantry,  squadrons  of  dragoons, 
companies  and  battalions  of  the  landstrum,  etc. 

Sec.  156.  The  Cantons  appoint  officers  of  the  basic  units,  etc. 

Sec  162.  When  a  Canton  does  not  fulfill  its  obligation,  the  Confederation 
supplies  it  with  the  missing  funds. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  I  do  not  think  you  can  look  back  in  this 
matter;  you  must  look  forward. 

Gen.  Wood.  That  is  what  I  want  to  do. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  To  complete  efficient  exercise  of  Fed- 
eral power  under  Article  I,  section  8  of  the  Constitution.  You  admit 
there  has  never  yet  been  complete  exercise  of  Federal  power  of  Con- 
gress under  that  clause? 

Gen.  Wood.  You  mean  assuming  what?  There  is  no  limit  of  the 
power  implied  in  that  clause.  The  war  powers  of  the  Nation  know 
no  limit. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Article  I  of  section  8  provides  "  for 
organizing,  arming,  and  disciplining  the  militia,"  that  Congress  shall 
have  that  power.  Now,  is  there  any  limit  to  the  provision  that  Con- 
gress can  make  to  effectively  organize,  arm,  and  discipline  the 
militia  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  That  is  a  constitutional  question  in  which  you  have 
attempted  to  involve  me  in  argument  for  some  time,  and  I  am  not 
going  to  enter  into  it  now. 

(Note. — See  discussion  in  full  in  preceding  answer.) 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Before  you  come  to  a  conclusion  I 
should  like  to  refer  you  to  the  further  provision  in  that  Article  I, 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING.  1075 

section  8,  "  Congress  shall  have  power :  To  make  all  laws  necessary 
and  proper  to  carry  into  execution  the  foregoing  powers,"  and  the 
leading  case  of  McCullough  v.  Maryland. 

Gen.  Wood.  All  right,  sir. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Which  contains  a  strong  decision  by 
the  Supreme  Court  on  the  implied  powers  necessary  to  carry  out  the 
express  powers  of  the  Federal  Government. 

Gen.  Wood.  I  should  like  to  place  you  in  command  of  a  depart- 
ment in  a  mobilization  program  under  dual  control,  then  ask  you  to 
express  your  frank  opinion  on  the  subject. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  I  should  like  to  be  put  in  command 
before  the  mobilization  and  get  the  thing  going  right  on  the  Swiss 
basis. 

Gen.  Wood.  If  you  understood  the  dangers  of  our  present  system 
you  would  wipe  the  system  out. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  We  have  in  this  record  the  militia  defi- 
nition of  our  Constitution  and  article  21  of  the  Swiss  constitution, 
and  I  must  now  pass  from  questions  of  Swiss  law  with  you  to  ques- 
tions of  Swiss  efficiency. 

Gen.  Wood.  All  right,  sir. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  I  quote  from  report  of  Capt.  Charles 
W.  Exton  on  the  mobilization  of  a  part  of  the  Swiss  Armv  in  June, 
1915. 

Gen.  Wood.  I  have  been  there,  and  I  believe  it  is  very  efficient. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  It  is  favorable  to  the  Swiss  mobilization 
system,  and  I  will  put  them  in  the  record  in  their  order,  as  .follows: 

[From  report  of  Capt.  Chas.  W.  Exton.  U.  S.  Army  attache  at  Berne,  on  mobilization  of 
part  of  Swiss  Army,  June,  191">.] 

Moiuoz  \TIon   Df    PAST  OF    \    DIVISION,   swiss    ARMY,   -irNK.    191S. 

Before  taking  Up  the  subject  of  the  mobilization  proper,  it  may  be  of  interest 
tate  that  at  the  beginning  of  tbe  present  European  war  divisions  of  the 
Swiss  Army  were  mobilized  ami  disposed  for  the  protection  of  the  country's 
neutrality. 

These  troops  remained  in  service  until  Novemher,  1914,  when  several  divi- 
sions were  demobilized,  the  other  divisions  remaining  in  service  till  Starch,  1915, 

when  they  were  relieved.  The  same  divisions  were  relieved  in  June  by  the  same 
number  of  remoblized  divisions.     *     *     *      (S.  Doc.  360,  p.  50.) 

REPORTING  OF  THE  TROOPS. 

There  was  no  confusion,  as  all  details  had  been  properly  arranged.  *  *  * 
(S.  Doc,  SCO,  p.  51.) 

Equipment.    The  equipment  of  all  arms  and  including  special  troops  was 

Complete  In  every  detail  and  in  excellent  condition. 

Whenever  troops  are  demobilized  in  Switzerland  the  equipment  is  thoroughly 
renovated  and  repaired  before  putting  in  the  storehouse. 

The  rolling  kitchen,  so  common  in  Europe,  was  used  by  all  troops  except  the 
mountain  troops.  The  mountain  troops  used  camp  kettles  and  a  small  com- 
bination stove  and  tireless  cooker — four  to  each  company.  All  equipment  of  the 
mountain  troops  was  at  such  size  and  shape  as  to  be  easily  packed  on  a  pack 
saddle. 

The  transportation  pertaining  to  a  company  of  infantry  and  troop  of  cavalry 
consisted  of  one  ammunition  caisson,  one  baggage  wagon,  one  rolling  kitchen, 
and  one  farm  wagon  (requisitioned).     *     *     * 

Horses. — The  horse  in  Switzerland  is  a  valuable  animal. 


1076  UNIVERSAL    MILITARY    TRAIN  INC. 

Those  horses  regularly  belonging  to  the  military  department  have  been  pur- 
chased with  great  care,  principally  in  England,  Austria,  and  Germany. 

Since  the  war  began,  however,  some  have  been  purchased  in  the  United 
States.  All  new  horses  are  sent  to  remount  depots,  where  they  are  carefully 
trained  by  experienced  horsemen.  The  general  appearance  of  all  horses  is 
excellent. 

The  horses  requisitioned  for  service  at  mohilizalion.  as  well  as  those  in  the 
hands  of  the  individual  cavalryman,  have  also  heen  selected  with  care  and  were 
all  in  excellent  condition  when  reported  for  service.  *  *  *  (S.  Doc.  860, 
p.  62.) 

The  soldiers*- The  appearance  and  work  of  the  soldier  during  the  few  days  of 
mobilization  showed  him  to  have  so  benefited  by  his  previous  training  in  service 
as  to  make  the  Swiss  Army  probably  the  best-trained  army,  for  its  size,  in  the 
world  to-day. 

Every  man  seemed  thoroughly  familiar  with  his  duty,  which  he  i>erformed 
more  or  less  as  a  matter  of  business. 

The  discipline  appeared  excellent  and  of  the  character  that  is  cheerfully  ac- 
cepted rather  than  maintained  by  force.  The  relation  between  officers  and  men 
was  quite  intimate  at  times,  yet  there  was  at  the  same  time  such  an  observance 
of  details  as  might.be  found  only  in  the  German  Army. 

As  a  matter  of  fact  everything  about  the  Swiss  Army,  especially  their  thor- 
oughness as  to  details,  seems  modeled  after  the  German  Army. 

The  officers.— An  officer  of  the  line  should  never  be  judged  except  after  some 
considerable  service  either  in  campaign  or  at  maneuvers — yet  from  the  work 
observed  during  mobilization  and  from  conversations  with  Swiss  officers  during 
the  past  three  months,  it  is  believed  that  the  Swiss  officers  will,  especially 
since  their  service  during  past  year,  compare  favorably  with  the  officers  of  any 
army  in  the  world. 

It  must  me  remembered  that  the  Swiss  officers  are  selected  from  the  educated 
men  of  Switzerland,  and  among  them  are  found  the  leading  men  of  every  pro- 
fession and  business — and  when  one  considers  that  in  order  to  have  reached 
the  grade  of  second  lieutenant  he  must  have  spent  at  least  336  days  at  intensive 
military  training.  144  days  of  which  is  principally  school  work,  one  realizes  the 
seriousness  with  which  the  service  is  accepted  and  the  standard  of  thoroughness 
which  may  be  attained  in  such  a  militia  system.     *     *     *     (S.  Doc.  360,  p.  53.) 

[From  letter  of  Maj.  Edw.  P.  Lawton,  U.  S.  Army  military  attache  at  Berne  in  August. 
1914,  on  Swiss  mobilization.] 

The  test  of  war  can  alone  show  the  degree  of  efficiency  attained  throughout 
the  army,  but  the  apparent  smooth  working  of  the  machine  at  the  time  of 
mobilization  and  observation  of  the  army  generally  lead  me  to  believe  that  it  is 
an  ideal  system  for  the  country,  and  I  only  wish  that  we  could  install  some- 
thing equally  as  effective  in  our  country. 

The  day  mobilization  was  ordered  by  the  executive  council;  war  mobilization 
posters  were  pasted  in  every  cafe,  restaurant,  railroad  station,  and  other  public 
places  throughout  Switzerland.  The  next  day  found  nearly  every  man  in  ranks 
fully  armed  and  equipped  ;  the  day  following  they  were  at  or  near  the  frontiers. 
Every  man  had  his  arms  and  equipment  with  him  at  his  home;  practically 
every  farmer  had  a  Government  horse,  which  latter  were  started  for  the  ren- 
dezvous with  the  personnel.  Sentries  and  outposts  appeared  like  magic  at 
overy  station,  railroad  bridge,  and  public  building  throughout  the  country. 
Everything  seemed  to  work  without  a  hitch.     *     *     *     (S.  Doc.  360.  p.  58.) 

[From  lecture  by  Capt.  Willey  Howell,  U.  S.  Army,  January  7,  1916,  on  Swiss  Army.l 

With  a  population  of  3,750,000,  Switzerland  is  able  to  mobilize  within  24 
hours  an  army  of  240,000  trained  soldiers. 

Forty-eight  hours  later  a  second  line  of  defense  can  be  placed  in  the  field 
numbering  over  a  quarter  of  a  million,  a  total  of  nearly  half  a  million  soldiers, 
fully  armed  and  equipped  and  well  trained,  in  three  days. 

And  this  wonderful  defensive  strength  is  obtained  at  a  cost  of  less  than 
$9,000,000  per  annum.     *     *     *     (S.  Doc.  300,  p.  59.) 

*  *  *  There  are  15  per  cent  more  names  on  the  rolls  than  are  required  to 
till  the  company.  This  in  order  that  the  company  will  always  be  full  when 
turned  out.     (S.  Doc.  360,  p.  62.) 


CJNIYEBSAL    MILITARY    TRAINING.  1077 

[From  report  of  Col.  Bell,  November,  1911,  on  Swiss  Maneuvers.] 

*  *  *  To  the  anpracticed  eye,  accustomed  only  to  see  troops  in  parade  ami 
moving  with  the  precision  of  the  parade  ground,  the  maneuvers  of  the  Swiss 

Army  may  be  misleading,  but  to  the  trained  soldier,  who  can  separate  at  a  glance 
t\n>  essentials  from  the  nonessentials,  it  is  apparent  that  the  Swiss  is  a  man  who 
has  received  an  excellent  training  in  fieldwork,  and  while  he  may  be  far 
from  perfect  in  many  things,  mostly  because  of  the  shortness  of  the  time  at 
his  disposal,  there  is  nothing  essential  that  has  been  omitted  in  the  instruction 
required  of  him,  SO  when  the  time  arrives  that  his  services  are  needed,  his 
country  has  reason  to  believe  this  training  will  be  sufficient  to  enable  him  to 
defend  her  intelligently  and  to  the  best  of  his  ability. 

A  professional  soldier  may,  of  course,  find  much  to  criticize  about  the  niceties 
of  military  training,  but  there  is  something  about  this  army  which  impresses 
him  with  its  potential  power,  and  makes  if  more  to  be  dreaded  than  some  regular 
military  establishment  which  shows  more  skill  and  precision  in  exercises,  but 
does  not  possess  the  endurance,  education,  and  wonderful  patriotism,  which 
could  endure  anywhere.  One  short  campaign  or  good  skirmish  would  correct 
the  few  faults  or  deficiencies  Observed,  and  would  make  the  Swiss  Army  a 
magnificent  fighting  machine.     *     *     *     ( S.  I>o<-.  860,  p.  <)•">.> 

4.  Recruiting  officers  from  the  ranks.  Promotion  to  second  lieutenant  from 
tin*  ranks  takes  place  only  after  12  months  of  arduous  work  in  tin'  practical  per- 
formance of  a  second  lieutenant's  military  duties.  As  the  candidate  officers 
command  each  other  in  turn  under  severe  and  capable  instructors,  t  hi1  best  men 
Ore  readily  picked  out.  Mental  examination  is  practically  eliminated,  ;t  certifi- 
cate from  a  good  school  being  sufficient  proof  of  general  education.    The  whole 

effort   is  bent  to  seeing  if  the  candidate  has  the  military  qualities  that    make  a 

good  officer.    *    *    *     (S.  Doc.  960,  p.  ».) 

[From  report  <>f  CoL  William  Carj  Banger,  190 
l  BE   Mil  II  I  \   OF  SWITZERLAND. 

If  proof  were  needed  that  a  land  can  train  all  its  citizens  tor  the  <'Hi<-ient   and 

Intelligent   jierforiiiance  of  that   work  which  must  be  done  when   war  comes, 

and  at  the  same  time  escape  the  evils  of  what  is  to-day  called  militarism,  that 
proof  can  he  found  in  the  Republic  of  Switzerland.  A  Republic  with  the  strong- 
est democratic  tendencies,  with  a  constitution  not  unlike  our  own.  with  intense 
local  pride  and  cherished  local  traditions,  with  an  Inbred  conviction  that  the 
central  authority  must  not  unduly  encroach  upon  the  rights  of  the  Cantons, 
with  a  worthy  love  of  peace  and  its  blessings,  without  the  slightest  thought  of 
Adding  a  foot  to  their  territory,  hut  with  an  Intense  love  <>f  country  and  a 
Cheerful  Willingness  to  perform  every  duty  winch  their  citizenship  entails,  they 
have  evolved   and   developed  a   military  system  which   has  given   them   the  best 

militia  in  the  world.    It  is  of  the  greatesl  Interest  to  us  that  in  organizing  this 

splendid  body  of  "citizen  soldiers'1  they  have  worked  along  the  lines  laid  down 
by   the  men   who   framed   the  Constitution   of  the   United    States      *      *      *      ( S. 

Doc.  :?('><>.  p.  no.) 

You  would  not  question  any  of  these  statements  as  to  the  efficiency 
of  the  Swiss  Army,  would  you? 

Gen.  Wood.  As  far  as  I  know  it  is  an  effective  army. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Although  you  do  not  concede  the  con- 
stitutional points,  you  do  concede  the  efficiency  of  the  Swiss  Army? 

( Jen.  Wood.  I  decline  to  involve  the  military  mind  in  the  legal  con- 
troversy, sir.    I  admit  the  excellence  of  the  Army. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  The  constitutional  or  dual  control  fea- 
tures? 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes.  sir.  The  big  point  relating  to  the  Swiss  system, 
and  which  I  have  been  trying  to  emphasize,  is  the  universal  service 
and  the  sense  of  obligation  for  national  service  which  that  training 
builds  up.  It  is  universal  everywhere,  and  the  boys  get  physical 
training  and  grow  up  under  the  moral  obligation  to  give  service  to 
the  Nation. 


1078  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY    TRAINING. 

Senator  Brady.  And  you  must  take  into  consideration  the  fact  that 
Switzerland  is  about  the  same  size  as  Massachusetts. 

Gen.  Wood.  It  is  about  the  size  of  one  of  our  large  counties  in  the 
West. 

Senator  Brady.  And  about  the  same  population  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  have,  in  my  discussions,  in  the  final  analysis,  pre- 
ferred the  Australian  system.  I  emphasize  those  two  points  in  the 
Swiss  system,  universal  service  and  the  upbuilding  of  national  soli- 
darity and  character. 

Senator  Brady.  Do  you  not  think  we  should  adopt  an  American 
system  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  think  any  system  will  have  to  be  adapted  to  our 
people  and  national  genius.     We  can  not  copy  any  system  exactly. 

Senator  Brady.  Australia,  with  a  larger  area  than  the  United 
States,  has  less  population  than  New  York  City,  has  it  not? 

Gen.  Wood.  Not  a  great  difference. 

Senator  Brady.  Neither  one  of  those  systems  would  be  applicable 
to  the  United  States? 

Gen.  Wood.  It  is  the  principle  of  unhersal  military  training  I  have 
been  insisting  on.  I  have  always  said  any  system  must  be  adapted  to 
our  conditions. 

The  Chairman.  That  is,  the  system  of  no  other  country  would 
suit  ours? 

Gen.  Wood.  Not  exactly;  we  should  have  to  shape  it  to  our  own 
people  and  conditions. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  I  want  to  call  your  attention  to  an  ar- 
rangement that  might  favor  increased  instruction  of  the  National 
Guard.  Would  it  not  be  entirely  possible,  supposing  Congress  to 
pass  a  law  providing  all  the  means  for  organizing,  arming,  and  disci- 
plining under  the  militia  clause  of  the  Constitution  of,  say,  300.000 
men  coming  to  the  age  of  19  years  as  militia  in  the  several  States, 
with  proper  provisions  to  make  the  same  sure,  to  immediately  sup- 
ply inspectors  and  instructors,  commissioned  and  non-commissioned 
officers,  by  consolidating  all  existing  Regular  Army  units  at  war 
strength  and  thus  freeing  half  of  the  officers  for  this  purpose,  or 
nearly  half?  In  other  words,  if  you  consolidate  the  Army  units  to 
war  strength  would  you  not  immediately  free  a  lot  of  instructors  and 
inspectors  for  any  form  of  army  you  might  agree  on  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes,  sir;  you  would  release  a  number  of  officers  imme- 
diately. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Have  you  any  suggestions  whereby  the 
Army  and  Navy  and  the  National  Guard  enlistments  can  be  made 
larger  and  reasonably  sufficient  without  conscription? 

Gen.  Wood.  No,  sir;  either  conscription  or  an  enormous  increase 
in  pay. 

Senator  Lei:  of  Maryland.  Thoss  are  the  two  alternatives,  as  you 
see  it — either  conscription,  universal  service,  or  an  enormous  increase 
in  pay? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  am  for  the  universal  service,  even  if  I  knew  we  were 
never  to  have  a  war,  for  its  moral  and  physical  training  and  building 
up  of  the  citizenship-responsibility  idea,  which  is  so  largely  lacking 
in  this  country. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  If  it  were  incorporated  in  our  laws  that 
no  one  should  hereafter  receive  a  commission  in  any  Federal  land 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING.  1079 

force  who  had  not  served  as  a  private  or  noncommissioned  officer  in 
the  Army  or  National  Guard)  would  that  not  encourage  enlistment 
in  both  forces? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  do  not  believe  so.  It  would  be  a  cheap  appeal  to — 
what  shall  we  call  it — to  the  sentiment  against  the  highly  educated 
officer.     It  would  be  a  blow  at  West  Point. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Not  necessarily:  but  would  it  not  be  an 
illustration  of  the  great  principle  of  serving  the  flag  as  a  private? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  do  not  know. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Following  the  flag  under  obligation  to 
serve? 

Gen.  Wood.  Every  man  who  is  going  to  be  an  officer  should  have 
basic  military  training  unquestionably,  but  whether  no  man  should 
be  an  officer  who  had  not  been  a  private  is  a  question.  I  think  Ave 
should  lose  many  of  our  best  officers  in  time  of  war:  that  is.  lose  all 
officers,  for  instance,  in  the  great  supply  and  transportation  depart- 
ments, railroad  men  and  all  that  class. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Of  course,  we  can  make  exceptions  in 
those  services,  as  they  do  in  Switzerland.  Those  people  arc  excused 
from  general  service  in  Switzerland. 

If  it  were  the  law  that  after  a  certain  date  in  the  future  no  male 
person  could  qualify  for  any  Federal  civil-service  position  who  had 
not  at  some  time  served  or  offered  to  serve  in  the  National  Guard  or 
in  the  United  States  Regular  Army  (>!•  Navy,  would  that  not  en- 
courage enlistment  in  all  forces? 

Gen.  WOOD.  T  think  that  would;  yes:  but  I  think  that  should  be 
put  on  broader  terms.  T  should  say  that  no  man  should  be  eligible 
to  those  appointments  who  had  m>t  undergone  his  physical  training. 
unless  unable  to  take  it  because  of  recognized  disability. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  1  do  not  think  you  ought  to  cut  out 
men  who  had  offered  who  were  physically  efficient 

Gen.  Wood.  I  am  quite  agreeable  to  that. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  What  is  the  number  of  untrained  men. 
in  your  opinion,  that  can  be  added  to  a  trained  company  without 
crippling  it  for  immediate  service? 

Gen.  WOOD.  You  mean  service  in  action? 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Your  standard  is  to  put  a  unit  up 
against  the  most  perfect  European  military  body  with  its  military 
equipment.  That  is  your  standard.  I  want  to  get  that  comparison 
for  everything. 

Gen.  Wood.  None.  I  assume  you  mean  absolutely  untrained  men. 
I  understand  also  in  the  fighting  line.  They  might  be  added  as  cooks 
or  wagoners  or  something  of  that  sort. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  The  National  Guard  is  kept,  by  reason 
of  the  War  Department  policy,  or  other  reasons,  as  scant  or  skeleton 
in  strength,  or  65  men  to  the  company,  is  it  not? 

Gen.  Woon.  Yes.  sir. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  It  is  inevitable  there  could  be  training 
only  for  G5  men,  so  under  your  theory  they  are  immediately  rendered 
incapable  of  immediate  service  when  you  require  them  to  increase  to 
any  extent  for  war  purposes? 

Gen.  Wood.  Any  addition  to  the  uninstructed — over  half  of  them 
are  uninstructed,  anyway — would  simply  add  to  the  embarrassments 
and  inefficiency  of  the  organization. 


1080  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  No  matter  how  well  the  66  men  might 
have  been  trained,  the  policy  of  the  War  Department  in  handling 
these  men,  or  our  law,  makes  it  impossible  for  this  mobilization  to 
turn  out  troops  that  could  go  up  against  an  enemy  on  your  standard? 

Gen.  Wood.  Absolutely;  if  you  refer  to  filling  the  company  up 
with  untrained  men. 

The  Chairman.  That  applies  also  to  the  Regular  Army,  does  it 
not? 

Gen.  Wood.  Our  policy  in  the  Regular  Army  is  sound.  We  believe 
in  having  a  well-trained  reserve  sufficient  to  bring  the  Regular  or- 
ganizations to  full  strength  and  to  maintain  them  at  full  strength 
for  at  least  six  months.  Only  recently  did  we  secure  legislation 
which  makes  a  reserve  possible.  We  are  now  transferring,  after  a 
year's  service,  hundreds  of  well-trained  men  to  the  reserve.  During 
the  present  emergency  the  transfer  has  been  temporarily  suspended. 
As  I  have  stated,  and  as  you  will  find  in  my  report  on  the  militia 
mobilization,  I  said  the  sending  of  these  well-meaning,  uneducated, 
untrained  Americans  to  the  front  would  have  meant  their  slaughter 
in  case  they  had  to  meet  an  even  moderately  effective  enemy. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Could  there  be  any  other  effect  than  to 
make  a  company  of  65  men  recruited  to  150 — 95  green  men  added — 
unfit  for  immediate  service  against  a  disciplined  enemy?    . 

Gen.  Wood.  You  are  right. 

The  Chairman.  That  also  applies  to  the  Regular  Army,  does  it 
not? 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes,  sir;  to  any  organization  without  well-trained 
reserves. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  The  militia  system  had  nothing  to  do 
with  that? 

Gen.  Wood.  Nothing,  except  as  it  prevents  to  a  certain  extent  uni- 
versal training.  Its  existence  makes  our  people  think  they  have  a 
valuable  military  force. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  That  is  not  a  part  of  the  militia  system? 

Gen.  Wood.  Exastly ;  it  is  a  part  of  the  militia  system,  and  I  regret 
to  say  of  the  Regular  Army  system. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  It  is  a  part  of  our  whole  system? 

Gen.  Wood.  Both ;  and  defective  in  both  services  alike. 

Senator  Brady.  If  the  criticism  lies  against  the  militia,  it  would 
lie  against  the  Regular  Army  also? 

Gen.  Wood.  It  is  a  criticism  of  the  failure  to  provide  any  system 
of  training  of  reserves. 

Senator  Brady.  And  it  shows  the  necessity  for  some  action  along 
those  lines  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes,  sir;  that  is  what  we  have  been  arguing  for  for 
years. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  You  criticize  the  Xational  Guard,  how- 
ever, which  is  maintained  on  the  same  skeleton  basis,  on  the  theory 
that  its  units  must  be  instantly  ready  for  service  against  fully 
disciplined  bodies? 

Gen.  Wood.  Its  units  should  be,  but  as  a  matter  of  fact,  to  be  per- 
fectly frank,  of  even  the  65  men  who  are  there  I  doubt  if  25  per 
cent  of  them  are  well-trained  soldiers.     That  is  my  honest  opinion. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  You  differ  from  some  other  officers? 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING.  1081 

Gen.  Wood.  I  have  been  very  generous  in  the  expression  of  my 
public  opinions  about  the  efficiency  of  these  men.  I  have  tried  to  put 
it  as  far  as  I  could  on  the  militia  side. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  You  differ  from  these  other  major  gen- 
erals, because  I  think  Gen.  Barry  said  60  per  cent  were  trained  men. 

Gen.  Wood.  Unhappily,  then.  I  do  differ  very  radically. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  You  really  did  not  see  these  men  except 
as  they  were  getting  off? 

Gen.  Wood.  No;  but  I  take  that  simply  on  their  record.  Of 
course  you  must  judge  an  organization  by  its  general  record  in  the 
past.  Sixty-four  per  cent  of  the  men  had  had  a  year  or  more  of 
service;  36  per  cent  had  had  less  than  a  year  of  service.  Now,  a 
year  or  more  of  service  in  the  guard  may  mean  something  or  it  may 
mean  almost  nothing.  It  depends  altogether  on  the  character  and 
the  amount  of  their  instruction,  and  we  Know  it  is  very  short.  That 
is  the  system.  I  am  not  criticizing  these  men ;  I  am  criticizing  the 
system. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  I  heard  here  a  criticism  the  other  day 
of  the  Third  Tennessee  Regiment  by  Gen.  O'Ryan.  Tie  said  that 
regiment  lacked  a  good  deal  of  the  aspect  of  discipline  that  you 
require  from  garrison  troops  or  from  Regular  Army  troops;  that 
they  had  the  fundamental  capacity  of  being  good  soldiers;  they 
could  march  and  they  could  shoot  and  they  had  the  determination 
which  makes  good  soldiers.  Under  B  little  target  practice  they 
developed  into  a  wonderful  shooting  body  and  won  second  prize.  T 
think. 

Gen.  Wood.  Those  mountaineers  are  Dearly  all  good  shots.  They 
are  apt  to  be  good  shots.  And  there  again  you  meet  just  what  I 
said  in  the  las!  hearing,  that  the  time  required  to  develop  troops 
depends  on  several  things:  First,  the  intelligence  of  the  men.  the 
conditions  of  training,  the  psychology  of  the  moment,  and  the 
capacity  of  the  officers.  If  yon  get  a  regiment  such  as  T  had  in  the 
Spanish  War,  the  so-called  Rough  Riders,  made  up  of  men  who  had 
had  experience  with  the  rifle  and  with  horses  and  knew  how  to  live 
in  the  open  and  who  were  more  or  less  of  the  fighting  type,  you  could 
make  soldiers  out  of  those  fellows  very  quickly:  but  when  we  speak 
of  system  we  have  to  apply  it  to  the  generality  of  American  citizens. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  How  many  men  were  assembled  under 
call  of  the  President  for  the  Spanish  War? 

Gen.  Wood.  We  assembled  about  56,000  Regulars  first  and  last, 
and  232.000.  as  I  remember  it — these  are  just  recollections  of  the 
hazy  past — volunteers  and  militia  who  were  called  and  transferred 
into  volunteers.    About  280.000. 

Senator  Lee  i  f  Maryland.  How  long  did  it  take  to  get  those  people 
together  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  We  were  months  getting  the  men  and  equipping  them. 
In  a  war  with  a  great  power  we  would  have  lost  much  of  our  terri- 
tory in  that  time. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Has  the  War  Department,  under  a  call 
of  the  President,  ever  gotten  together  as  many  men  in  less  time 
than  assembled  under  the  call  of  June  18,  1916? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  think  so.  At  least  not  more  in  the  first  80  days; 
within  two  and  a  half  months  after  Mr.  Lincoln's  call,  for  example. 

8G205— 17 11 


1082  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Then  this  was  the  most  prompt  of 
responses,  under  this  old  Dick  law? 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes,  sir;  it  is  the  first  time  we  ever  practically  called 
out  everything.  We  have  not  yet  filled  our  quota.  In  this  depart- 
ment we  are  just  35  per  cent  short  of  our  quota. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Somebody  testified  the  other  day  that 
it  would  take  three  months  for  volunteers  to  get  into  the  position 
for  receiving  training. 

Gen.  Wood.  I  think  that  was  a  mistake.  We  sent  our  volunteer 
regiments  to  the  Philippines  with  an  average  period  of  about  four 
months'  training.  But  there  again  you  had  the  conditions  to  which 
I  have  referred  before.  You  had  in  many  regiments  a  nucleus  of 
men  who  had  a  little  training — about  250  men  per  regiment — who 
had  had  some  previous  military  experience.  There  were  a  number  of 
Regular  officers.  There  was  the  attraction  of  foreign  service  which 
drew  to  those  regiments  those  adventurous,  hardy  types  which  usu- 
ally make  good  soldiers.  These  regiments  were  gotten  into  a  fairly 
good  shape  in  an  average  period  of  from  three,  to  three  and  a  half 
months.  But  we  had  in  addition  to  this  nucleus  of  trained  men  some 
Regular  officers  and  others  who  had  had  some  training. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Do  you  think  the  Swiss  system  of  get- 
ting officers  from  the  ranks,  testing  all  as  noncommissioned  before 
giving  them  commissions,  is  a  good  one  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  Where  you  have  universal  service,  and  the  training 
of  many  men  and  officers,  that  would  have  to  be  the*  system  in  most 
instances ;  particularly  were  we  to  have  real  national  service  all  men 
would  serve  for  a  time  as  privates.  In  the  Civil  War  the  North  had 
127,000  officers  and  the  South,  roughly  speaking,  had  65,000  or  66,000 
officers.  There  were  nearly  190,000  officers  in  that  war  in  four  years— 
about  190,000,  in  round  numbers.  Now,  West  Point,  since  1802  up 
to  date,  has  only  graduated  some  five  thousand  three  hundred-odd 
officers.  It  is  my  belief  that  when  we  have  universal  service  the  bulk 
of  our  officers  must  come  up  through  a  course  of  training,  such  as 
exists  in  Switzerland,  or  through  some  special  system  of  training  of 
the  officer  body;  such  as  the  Officers'  Reserve  Corps  such  as  we  are 
working  on  now. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Do  you  not  think  that  if  the  men  were 
compelled  to  go  through  the  gateway  of  service  as  privates  or  non- 
commissioned officers,  which  is  the  same  thing,  before  they  get  any 
commission  it  would  very  much  strengthen  the  enthusiasm  and  democ- 
racy of  all  of  our  forces  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  Let  us  analyze  that  statement.  Every  boy  at  West 
Point  serves  as  a  private  in  the  ranks,  and  he  has  experience  as  a 
private. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Let  me  qualify  the  question  by  saying  in 
the  ranks,  where  he  is  under  the  supreme  obligation  of  obedience  to 
the  President  on  call.    The  West  Pointers  have  to  answer  that  call? 

Gen.  Wood.  They  have  to  answer  it,  of  course,  and  under  this  sys- 
tem of  universal  training,  which  we  have  been  urging  so  strongly, 
every  man  must  serve  as  a  private  and  must  serve  as  a  noncommis- 
sioned officer,  and  his  selection  beyond  that  depends  on  efficiency  in 
the  training  camp.  This  idea  is  embodied  in  a  set  of  regulations, 
which  we  have  just  sent  forward  and  had  approved  by  the  General 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING.  1083 

Staff  for  the  government  of  the  military  training  camps.    Every  man 
'  must  serve  as  a  private. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  I  call  your  attention  to  the  following 
I  extracts  from  a  report  on  the  Swiss  Army  by  Lieut.  Col.  George  Bell. 

November,  1911 : 

Recruiting  officers  from  the  ranks,     promotion  i  I  lieutenants  from 

the  ranks  takes  place  only  after  12  months  of  arduous  work  in  the  practical 
performance  o  id  lieutenant's  military  i  ite  officers 

command  each  other  in  turn  under  sev<  re  and  <-:;":!hh>  Instruct*  is,  the  host  men 
are  readily  picked  out.  Mental  examination  is  practically  eliminated,  a  cer- 
tificate from  a  good  school  being  sufficient  proof  of  general  education. 

Gen.  Wood.  The  practical  feature  is  marked  in  the  German  system 
t  also. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland   (reading) : 

The  whole  effort  is  bent  to  Seeing  if  the  candidate  has  the  the  military 
qualities  that  make  a  good  officer. 

Gen.  Wood.  That  is  exactly  what  we  are  doing  in  this  Officers' 
I  Reserve  Corps  in  the  training  camps.  That  is  what  we  are  doing  in 
■  part  in  the  selection  of  officers  from  civil  life. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  How  can  the  training  camps  give  evi- 
t  dence  of  service  of  a  genuine  sort  or  service  in  command  of  men  ? 
The  time  is  short ;  it  is  only  30  days. 

( Jen.  Wood.  We  give  more  hours  under  arms  in  30  days  than  a  man 
[gets  in  the  average  militia  organization  in  three  years,  and  the  course 
■recommended  is  three  months. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  You  have  been  actively  interested  in 
I  the  training  camps,  have  you  not? 

Gen.  Wood.  There  is  nothing  in  the  world  that  has  interested  me 
■more. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  And  all  of  those  men  in  the  military 
camps  are  favorable  to  your  plan  of  universal  service,  are  they? 

Gen.  Wood.  They  are,  because  they  are  sensible  men. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  They  have  been  so  educated? 

Gen.  Wood.  They  have  been  so  ^Incated,  but  it  would  be  unfair 
■to  say  of  such  men  as  George  Wharton  Pepper,  Robert  Bacon,  Mr. 
fctimson,  and  many  of  our  good  friends,  that  their  intelligence  is  so 
Mimited  that  they  have  not  acted  on  the  basis  of  reason. 

The  Chairman.  Do  they  not  find  out  in  a  very  few  days  the  abso- 
lute unfitness  of  the  ordinary  citizen  to  render  military  duty  ? 

(Jen.  Wood.  They  find  it  out,  and  their  very  souls  are  opened  to 
ftonviction  as  they  never  have  been  before. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  The  National  Guard  system  furnishes 
its  own  officers,  does  it  not? 

Gen.  Wood.  Not  always.  The  National  Guard  has  often  had  many 
■Federal  officers  in  the  higher  grades  in  war  and  their  assistance  in 
Hnobilization. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  That  is  a  very  small  percentage? 

Gen.  Wood.  We  had  to  do  very  largely  the  essential  work  of 

I  getting  them  into  the  Federal  service  and  in  the  training.     Without 

Federal  officers  they  were  often  rather  helpless.     They  would  not 

I  have  been  fit  to  meet  average  foreign  troops,  any  of  them.    Here  and 

There  you  would  find  a  good  regiment,  but  as  a  military  organization 

Ihey  were  of  relatively  little  value  for  actual  war. 


i 


1084  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  You  mean  to  say  that  inspiration  that 
they  get  from  the  Federal  officers  who  mustered  them  in  was  immedi- 
ately accepted  by  those  men,  and  inspired  in  them  the  military  char- 
acteristics that  they  had? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  mean  that  the  inspiration  that  they  got  from  the 
Federal  officers  in  learning  how  to  cook  their  food,  pitch  their  tents, 
and  clean  their  rifles,  and  to  dispose  of  their  excreta  and  take  care 
of  themselves,  gave  them  much  of  the  military  value  they  had. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Now,  if  in  so  short  a  period  we  can  ac- 
complish such  wonderful  results 

Gen.  Wood.  We  did  not  accomplish  any  because  they  were,  as  a 
rule,  very  inefficient  when  they  went  and  were  inefficient  when  they 
came  back.  I  am  speaking  of  them  now  as  to  their  fitness  to  meet 
first-class  troops. 

I  insert  two  reports  which  are  self-explanatory.  The  militia  dealt 
with  is  among  the  best  in  the  department.  Reports  from  the  other 
States  in  the  department  are  not  yet  available,  but  they  certainly  will 
not  indicate  better  conditions  than  those  existing  in  the  States  herein 
referred  to.    Standards  of  comparison  is  the  best  militia,  not  Regulars. 

Headquarters  Eastern  Department, 
Governors  Island,  N.  Y.,  January  30, 1917, 
Memorandum  for  Col.  Chamberlain : 

Thirty-two  reports  just  received  from  inspectors  on  organizations  (exclusive 
of  sanitary  detachments)  which  embrace  the  States  of  New  York,  Massachu- 
setts, New  Jersey,  and  Maryland  have  been  examined  with  a  view  to  determin- 
ing general  efiiciency  under  the  following  heads : 

1.  Organization  (conformity  with  the  act  of  June  3,  1916). 

2.  Records  (Cir.  No.  16,  D.  M.  A.,  1914). 

3.  Equipment  (Cir.  10,  M.  B.,  1910). 

4.  Care  of  property  (U.  S.). 

5.  Target  practice. 

■6.  Discipline  and  efficiency. 

A  brief  summary  may  be  stated  as  follows : 

As  to  organization,  7  conform,  25  do  not. 

As  to  records,  12  are  good,  6  are  fair,  3  are  poor,  and  11  are  bad. 

As  to  equipment,  4  are  equipped,  28  are  not. 

As  to  care  of  property,  31  good,  1  bad. 

As  to  target  practice,  20  held  practice,  12  did  not. 

As  to  discipline,  14  good,  14  fair,  4  poor. 

As  to  efficiency,  9  good,  18  fair,  4  poor,  1  bad. 

To  Capt.  Keen  for  Gen.  Wood.  , 

J.  L.  Chamberlain. 


October  11,  1916. 
From:  Department  commander. 
To:  The  Adjutant  General  of  the  Army. 
Subject:  Records  of  National  Guard  Organizations. 

1.  The  following  are  memoranda  submitted  by  the  department  inspector,  de- 
partment quartermaster,  and  the  officer  temporarily  in  charge  of  militia  affairs : 

department  inspector's  memorandum. 

Special  field  inspections  of  organizations  in  this  department  prior  to  departure 
of  same  for  the  Mexican  border  discovered  that  in  most  instances  the  records 
were  in  poor  condition,  being  incomplete  and  inaccurate. 

Officers  and  noncommissioned  officers  generally  were  woefully  ignorant  as  t$ 
records  and  appear  not  to  have  appreciated  the  importance  of  same. 

The  same  condition  of  affairs  exists  in  organizations  returning  from  the 
border,  as  a  result  of  which  their  muster  out  of  the  Federal  service  is  seriously 
delayed,  with  corresponding  increased  cost  to  the  Government. 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY    TRAINING.  1085 

DEPARTMENT    QUAKTEKM  A.si  Eli's     M  EM(  >KAN  IUM  . 

From  all  of  the  reports  received  by  me  it  appears  that  the  pay  rolls  and  other 
official  records  of  the  organizations  of  the  National  Guard  returning  to  their 
home  rendezvous  in  the  Eastern  Department  for  muster  out  are  in  a  more  or  less 
hopelessly   Incomplete  and  incorrect    condition. 

This  condition  of  these  official  records  is  greatly  delaying  the  muster  out  of 
these  organizations,  as  it  has  been  necessary  to  make  out  new  papers  in 
cases  as  far  hack  as  original  muster-in  pa] 

It  is  recommended  that  a  telegram  be  sent  to  The  Adjutant  General  of  the 
Army  requesting  that  the  commanding  general,  Southern  Department,  In  which 
is  now  stationed  practically  all  of  the  mobile  troops  of  the  Regular  Army  in  the 
continental  Hunts  of  the  United  States,  cause  all  of  the  records  of  the  National 
Guard  now  in  his  department  to  be  immediately  inspected  and.  where  incorrect, 
corrected,  brought  up  to  date  in  every  particular. 

The  pay  and  muster  rolls  of  the  regiments  should  he  correctly  prepared  in  the 
Southern  Department  under  the  supervision  of  officers  of  the  Regular  Army  de- 
tailed for  that  purpose,  leaving  blank  the  day  of  muster  out,  in  order  that  these 
pay  rolls  may  be  expeditiously  completed  upon  the  arrival  of  the  troops  nt  their 
mobilization  camps  or  home  rendezvous  and  the  organizations  promptly  and 
properly  mustered  out  of  the  Federal  sen 

DEPARTMENT    MllITIA    OFFICER'S    MEMORANDA,    I  0,     1916. 

York  National  Guard  arrived  September  29.  Being  mustered 
out. 

Fourteenth  New  York  National  Guard  scheduled  for  muster  out  October  n, 
1916.  This  regiment  arrived  at  Green  Haven  September  14,  linr,.  and  at  its 
armory  In  Brooklyn  September  -<>.  1016. 

Principal  causes  of  delay: 

1.  No  descriptive  lists  of  men  kept. 

2.  No  settlements  between  company  commanders  and  supply  officer. 

3.  Bad  condition  of  n 

4.  Ignorance  on  part  •  and  men  of  requirements  (referring  to  records, 

settlements,  etc.). 

r>.  in  most  cases  muster-out  officers  had  to  begin  on  the  records  from  the  time 

of  the  original  entry  of  the  men  in  the  Federal  service. 

These  remarks  will  apply  to  practically  all  organizations  returned  to  this 
department  for  muster  out. 

First  New  Jersey  arrived  at  Sea  Girt  September  9,  and  left  for  the  armory 
October  1. 

Nine  companies  of  the  First  New  Jersey  mustered  out  to  include  October  9. 

Everything  is  mustered  out  in  First  New  Jersey  except  headquarters  com- 
pany and  supply  company,  field  and  staff  hospital.  Field,  Staff,  and  head- 
quarters and  supply  companies  will  go  out  to-night  Hospital  detachment  will 
go  out  in  a  few  days. 

Fourth  New  Jersey  arrived  at  Sea  Girt  September  10  and  left  for  the  armory 
October  1.    Five  organizations  scheduled  for  muster  out  October  11. 

Fourth  New  Joisoy  Machine  Gun  Company  and  four  others  to-morrow  night 
Four  next  night  :  headquarters  and  four  others  next  night,  including  held  and 
staff. 

2.  Attention  is  Invited  to  the  greatly  increased  cost  to  the  Federal  (Jovern- 
ment  incident  to  this  condition,  and  it  is  earn  I  that  instructions 

be  sent  to  the  Southern  Department  to  have  special  attention  paid  by  all  or- 
ganizations to  bringing  their  paper  work  up  to  date.  There  is  no  sufficient 
reason  for  the  almost  entrire  failure  to  correct  and  bring  up  to  date  the  neces- 
sary organization  records.  This  condition  as  to  records  is  general.  There  seems 
to  i>"  ample  opportunity  on  the  border  to  give  this  important  subject  proper 
attention.  We  have  had  to  detail  a  large  number  of  officers  to  aid  in  the 
mustering  out  of  the  regiments,  and  practically  all  of  it  is  work  which  reason- 
ably competent  company  and  regimental  officers  ought  to  be  able  to  do  without 
the  assistance  of  Federal  officers. 

Leonabd  Wood. 
Major  General,  United  States  Army. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Then,  yon  think  those  things  you  have 
mentioned  were  of  no  importance? 


1086  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 

Gen.  Wood.  I  think  they  were  of  value  to  the  militia;  but  I  think 
it  would  have  been  a  crime  to  have  turned  those  men  into  a  campaign. 
They  were  well-meaning,  honest  fellows,  but  they  were  not  soldiers. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  You  have  also  stated  that  it  would  be 
equally  unfortunate,  or  almost  as  unfortunate,  to  send  our  Regular 
troops,  suddenly  expanded,  to  the  field. 

Gen.  Wood.  I  would  not  do  it.  No  soldier  would  do  it  if  it  were 
possible  to  avoid  it.  Our  Regular  Army  suddenly  brought  to  war 
strength  would  be  very  inefficient  unless  the  newT  men  were  trained. 
We  need  reserves  of  trained  men. 

The  Chairman.  Great  Britain  has  not  done  it. 

Gen.  Wood.  No,  sir ;  it  would  be  murder. 

The  Chairman.  Have  any  of  these  European  countries  done  it? 

Gen.  Wood.  No,  sir.  The  Swiss  Government  sends  her  troops  to 
the  front  well  trained.  All  governments  do  which  appreciate  the 
need  of  men  being  well  trained  for  modern  war. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  I  will  ask  you  this  question:  Does  not 
the  National  Guard  system  furnish  nearly  all  of  the  persons  in  it 
that  are  commissioned  as  officers? 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  There  is  no  room,  therefore,  in  the 
National  Guard  for  very  many  additional  commissions  from  the  out- 
side— summer  camps  or  the  Regular  Army  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  No,  sir ;  the  National  Guard,  of  course,  is  a  very  small 
aggregation  of  men. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  But  it  is  all  of  the  soldiers  we  have, 
outside  the  Regular  Army? 

(Ten.  Wood.  Yes,  sir;  it  is.    Tt  is  about  five  incomplete  army  corps. 

Seantor  Lee  of  Maryland.  It  is  our  all.  Now,  the  men  who  are 
trained  at  the  military  camps  are  trained  each  summer  about  a 
month  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  About  a  month. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  They  assume  no  obligation  to  serve  the 
country  and  can  not  be  called  on  by  the  President  under  the  existing 
law. 

Gen.  Wood.  I  think  under  the  present  law  they  have  to  take  en- 
listment of  one  month — a  month's  service. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  I  saw  a  number  of  those  circulars  that 
were  sent  out  last  summer  inviting  all  these  summer-camp  men. 

Gen.  Wood.  There  is  a  change  this  winter. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  And  these  circulars  said  the  men  are 
under  no  obligation  to  serve  the  Government? 

Gen.  Wood.  The  last  appropriation  carries  a  provision,  I  think, 
that  they  shall  enlist  for  30  days. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Now,  General,  jf  you  can  give,  under 
good  instruction,  so  much  to  these  summer-camp  men  in  such  a  short 
time,  why  could  you  not  under  similar  instruction,  in  a  preliminary 
period  for  the  National  Guard,  as  an  opening  period — coming  at  the 
year  of  19  in  the  States — why  could  you  not  do  the  same  for  the; 
National  Guard  system? 

(icn.  Wood.  If  we  can  take  your  National  Guard  under  the  same 
conritions  of  intensive  training  for  a  month  in  camp  we  would  ob- 
tain just  ms  good  results  with  those  men  as  with  any  other  class  of 
men  of  the  snme  intelligence. 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING.  1087 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Now,  if  you  can  do  that  with  the  sum- 
mer camps,  why  do  you  not  address  yourself  to  a  reform  of  applying 
these  intensive  training  principles  to  the  National  Guard  under  Fed- 
eral instruction? 

(ien.  Wood.  Because  we  have  no  control  over  the  National  Guard. 
That  is  a  State  force,  and  it  is  very  difficult  to  get  them  into  camp 
for  even  15  days.  Part  of  the  time  is  spent  going  there  and  part 
coming  back.  They  are  under  incompetent  officers  as  a  class,  and 
the  officers  freely  admit  it.  In  these  training  camps  we  have  the 
most  carefully  selected  of  our  officers,  men  who  understand  their 
work,  and  they  undertake  instruction  of  the  men  from  the  ground 
up.  We  could  do  much  with  the  National  Guard  if  we  could  get 
them  under  the  same  conditions. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Then,  it  is  just  a  matter  for  Congress, 
in  your  opinion,  to  get  them  for  a  training  period? 

Gren.  WOOD.  Tt  is  just  a  matter  of  making  the  National  Guard  a 
Federal  force,  without  a  shadow  of  State  influence  or  control. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  The  States  have  never  obstructed  any 
training  that  the  Federal  Government  wanted  to  irive  the  National 
Guard,  have  they  j 

en.  Wood.  It  is  a  good  deal  like  the  statement  of  old  John  Mar- 
shall when  he  was  arguing  for  the  Constitution  against  federation. 

He  asked  some  one  the  question,  "Would  you  want  a  horse  with  13 
bridle  reins  and  controlled  by  13  pairs  of  hands?"  or  words  to  that 
effect.  Tie  had  about  the  same  argument  put  up  to  him  as  our  State 
militia  friends  are  putting  up  to  us  now — a  question  between  a  con- 
federation with  a  shadowy  general  control  and  a  wvy  well-defined 
central  control. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Then,  you  urge  that  all  the  precautions 
that  appear  in  the  Swiss  constitution  and  laws,  apparently  creating  a 
dual  control — giving  the  Cantons  the  same  power  that  our  States 
ha1  c  -are  not  real  hut  imaginary. 

Gen  Woon.  I  consider  Federal  control  desirable  with  regulations 
by  the  Federal  council,  without  cantonal  control. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  The  Swiss  constitution  does  not  say 
general  control.    It  says  "  general  regulations"  issued  to  the  Cantons. 

Gen.  Wood.  That  is  the  same  thing.  If  it  says  general  regula- 
tions it  gives  the  Federal  power  full  control. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Do  you  contend  that  there  is  much 
difference  between  "  general  regulation  "  and  "  discipline  prescribed 
by  Congress  "  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes,  sir ;  because  we  can  prescribe  it  but  not  enforce  it. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Your  proposition,  General,  is  that  these 
gentlemen  who  go  to  the  military  encampments  are  to  get  commis- 
sions as  officers  of  the  reserve  corps,  are  they  not? 

Gen.  Wood.  After  examinations  which  are  open  to  every  officer 
of  the  militia. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Is  it  not  an  opening  held  out  to  them 
as  an  inducement? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  think  it  is.  Probably  800  or  900  men  have  gone 
through  the  examination  successfully  and  about  500  have  become 
officers  of  the  reserve  corps.  We  need  to  build  up  our  reserve 
corps  of  officers  as  rapidly  as  possible,  and  to  give  them  their 
training    through    attaching    them    to    Regular    troops    for    brief 


1088  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 

periods  of  service,  and  through  summer  camps  under  courses  es- 
pecially designed  for  this  class  of  officer.  We  also  should  build 
up,  as  fast  as  possible,  the  commissioned  increase  authorized  for  the 
Regular  Army.  We  need  all  these  men  as  rapidly  as  we  can  get 
them,  otherwise  instruction  provided  under  the  defense  act  at  col- 
leges and  universities  will  be  seriously  crippled. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  If  it  is  fair  to  hold  out  this  induce- 
ment to  make  these  men  train  for  three  months  in  three  years  for 
a  commission  on  your  plan?  would  it  not  be  equally  fair  to'  hold  out 
the  inducement  of  a  commission  to  the  men  in  the  National  Guard 
or  Regular  Army  as  privates  and  noncommissioned  officers? 

Gen.  Wood.  The  reserve  corps  is  open'  to  every  private  in  the 
Regular  Army  or  militia  to-day,  and  we  have  quite  a  number  of 
them  coming  up  and  taking  examinations,  and  we  are  very  glad  to 
get  them. 

The  Chairman.  Is  it  not  true,  in  the  Regular  Establishment  that 
more  than  50  per  cent  of  the  commissioned  personnel  of  the  Army 
come  from  civil  life? 

Gen.  Wood.  About  50%.  It  is  approximately  even.  I  looked  it 
up  a  few  years  ago,  and  there  was  a  difference  of  49  one  way  or  the 
other. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  I  quote  from  a  daily  paper: 

Another  drawing  card  for  the  1917  camps  is  that  the  men  who  attend  the 
three  camps  of  the  Regular  course  are  eligihle  for  the  Officers'  Reserve  Corps  by 
merely  taking  an  oral  and  practical  examination. 

Would  it  not  be  better  to  follow  the  Swiss  system  of  testing  the 
officers  first  in  the  actual  service  as  privates  and  noncommissioned 
officers  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  You  are  getting  back  on  your  old  horse.  We  are 
very  glad  to  have  them  get  that  training.  They  got  it  at  West 
Point  and  at  all  these  cadet  camps. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Would  it  not  be  more  democratic? 

Gen.  Wood.  That  is  why  I  advocate  universal  training — the  pure 
democracy  of  it. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Do  you  think  that  the  patriotism  of 
the  Swiss  or  their  love  of  free  institutions  is  greater  or  less  than 
the  patriotism  or  love  of  free  institutions  in  our  country? 

Gen.  Wood.  It  is  very  much  greater  among  the  Swiss,  as  evidenced 
by  their  preparedness  and  sense  of  individual  responsibility  for 
national  service. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  That  is  a  very  interesting  statement 
from  you,  because  the  Swiss,  with  their  love  of  free  institutions, 
have  taken  certain  precautions  to  preserve  them,  and  I  should  judge 
from  your  answer  that  in  view  of  their  having  this  great  love  of 
free  institutions  they  would  be  more  vigilant  even  than  our  people, 
and  that  such  precautions  as  the  Swiss  have  taken  would  be  far 
more  urgently  required  in  this  country.  Now,  I  will  proceed  to 
this  statement.  The  Swiss  military  system  has  some  leading  pro- 
visions safeguarding  against  militarism  or  revolution  against  the 
freedom  of  the  people.  I  mention  a  few,  as  follows:  First  precau- 
tion, the  commandment  that  there  shall  be  no  standing  army  (Swiss 
constitution,  art.  13) ;  second  precaution,  article  21  of  the  Swiss 
constitution  based  on  the  militia  clause  in  section  8,  Article  I,  United 


UN1VEKSAL   MILITARY    TRAINING.  1089 

States  Constitution,  and  which  article  21  provides  for  raising  troops 
from  soldiers  of  the  same  Cantons 

Gen.  Wood.  May  I  interrupt  you  there?  They  do  have  a  small 
standing  army. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  I  am  coming  to  that  in  a  little  while. 
And  that  article  21  further  says: 

The  composition  of  these  bodies  of  troops,  the  maintenance  of  their  effective 
strength,  the  appointment  and  promotion  of  their  officers  shall  belong  to  the 
Cantons,  subject  to  general  regulations  which  shall  be  Issued  to  them  by  the  con- 
federation. 

For  the  term  "general  regulation"  our  Constitution  used  the 
equivalent  expression  "discipline  prescribed  by  Congress."  Third 
precaution,  qualifying  all  officers  from  the  ranks  by  service  and 
schooling  and  limiting  the  professional  and  regularly  paid  officers 
to  230  in  number,  only  one-fourth  of  whom  are  permitted  to  com- 
mand troops  at  any  one  time. 

Gen.  Wood.  That  is  right. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  With  such  fundamental  precautions 
first  taken,  the  Swiss  granted  the  great  power  of  conscription  or 
universal  service  to  the  confederation,  but  made  action  by  the  Cantons 
essential  to  carrying  it  into  effect. 

Do  you  deem  it  wise  and  prudent  from  the  standpoint  of  preserv- 
ing a    republic   in   this  country,   and    in    view   of   the   alleged    le 
patriotism  here,  to  give  the  Federal  Government  the  power  of  con- 
scription for  in;  ice  without  taking  the  precautions  for 
liberty  which  the  Swiss  took  before  granting  this  great  powei 
people? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  think  it  is  perfectly  safe  to  give  to  the  Federal  <  rov- 
ernment,  or  to  have  the  Fedc  rnment  put  into  operation,  some- 

thing which  it  now  has  power  to  do — the  power  to  compel  the  train- 
ing and  service  of  everybody  who  is  physically  lit.  I(  is  not  unconsti- 
tutional. I  think  our  Constitution  provides  an  adequate  safeguard. 
In  fact,  I  think  that  universal  service,  obligatory  service — conscrip- 
tion is  not  used,  because  it  is  an  objectionable  word  as  it  brings  up 
the  Napoleonic  conscription — conscription^  or  universal  service, 
means  absolute  democracy,  equality  of  obligation,  and  equality  or 
opportunity.  All  these  different  schemes  which  place  a  military 
burden  upon  the  educated  class,  the  men  in  the  colleges  or  men 
who  do  this,  that,  or  the  other  are  all  undemocratic,  and  I  think 
most  un-American.  Our  Constitution  does  not  permit  the  Federal 
Government  to  govern  the  militia;  it  permits  it  to  prescribe  the 
training  and  discipline  of  the  militia,  while  reserving  to  the  States 
the  actual  training  and  discipline  and  to  prescribe  regulations ;  but  we 
have  not  the  power  to  enforce  them,  unfortunately. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Then  you  do  not  agree  with  the  McCul- 
lough  case? 

n.  Wood.  I  am  not  going  to  get  into  that  discussion. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  That  Congress  has  power  to  provide  for 
actual  discipline? 

The  Chairman.  Let  me  suggest  right  there  this  thought.  The 
Senator  speaks  of  safeguards  of  the  Swiss  system  against  anything 
like  militarism.  Can  that  danger  concern  the  American  people,  where 
Congress  is  limited  by  the  Constitution  to  making  appropriations 


1090  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 

only  for  a  period  of  a  year,  so  that  in  the  last  analysis  the  people 
themselves  control  the  whole  matter? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  think  you  are  right;  and  I  think  another  thing  can 
be  avoided.  Militarism,  as  I  understand  it — and,  I  think,  as  you 
mean  to  have  it  understood — is  a  condition  under  which  a  profes- 
sional military  group,  meaning  by  that  the  navy  and  the  army,  exer- 
cise an  undue  influence  upon  the  conduct  of  national  affairs  and 
national  policy.  In  other  words,  a  standing  army  of  large  size,  with 
a  large  professional  force  of  any  kind,  afloat  or  ashore,  tends  to  build 
up  a  professional  class  of  that  type.  But  where  the  army  represents 
the  people,  is  made  up  of  the  people,  and  the  people  are  the  army, 
every  living  man  who  is  physically  fit  has  had  his  training,  you 
never  can  have  militarism,  because  all  are  of  the  same  class,  all  are 
under  obligation  to  serve  in  one  service  or  the  other  and  have  been 
trained. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Is  not  the  power  proposed  all  Federal, 
in  the  hands  of  the  central  military  authority,  without  any  lightning 
arrester  whatsoever  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  It  must  be  in  the  case  of  war.  You  remember  in  the 
Revolutionary  War  there  were  dictatorial  powers  given  Washington 
on  various  occasions.  You  remember  in  the  Civil  War  we  had  finally 
to  give  Grant  almost  absolute  powers  over  military  operations,  and 
Lincoln  was  wise  enough  to  see  that  it  was  necessary  for  success. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Now,  General,  as  an  illustration:  We 
can  take  into  our  houses  wires  that  might  bring  a  thunderbolt  and 
use  them  safely  for  the  purpose  of  lighting  and  telephoning,  and 
in  times  of  peace  we  can  have  a  Swiss  preparation  and  discipline, 
yet  be  safe  from  the  thunderbolt  of  military  revolution  because  we 
have  the  lightning  arrestor  of  local  units  and  local  officers. 

Gen.  Wood.  Senator,  in  that  connection  we  have  a  great  many  inter- 
esting communications  growing  out  of  this  military  movement.  One 
of  them  came  in  the  other  day,  and  it  bears  someAvhat  on  your  line 
of  thought.  The  writer  proposed  that  the  President  should  have 
complete  and  absolute  control  for  defensive  Avar,  but  if  he  contem- 
plated an  aggressive  war  then  the  question  should  go  to  a  vote  of  the 
people,  to  a  referendum.  It  is  sometimes  difficult  to  determine  what 
is  purely  defensive  and  what  is  aggressive  action  in  war.  I  believe 
that  the  control  of  the  military  forces  of  the  Nation  must  be  in  the 
hands  of  the  Federal  Government  under  the  general  restrictions 
existing  to-day.  With  complete  organization  and  preparedness 
characterizing  as  they  do  the  great  nations  of  to-day,  it  would  be 
very  dangerous  not  to  have  the  instruments  of  defense  under  Federal 
control.  We  are — and  I  can  not  emphasize  the  word  too  strongly — 
wholly  unprepared  and  lack  the  organization,  the  weapons,  and  the 
reserves  to  meet  attack  by  a  first-class  power,  and  we  are  not  taking 
those  immediately  effective  steps  which  we  could  take  to  make  good 
our  present  most  alarming  shortage  of  weapons,  munitions,  and  sup- 
plies, for,  no  matter  what  system  we  eventually  adopt,  the  weapons 
and  supplies  of  war  require  time,  much  of  it,  to  make,  and  they  must 
be  manufactured  in  time  of  peace.  Let  us  be  perfectly  fair  and 
frank  with  ourselves.  We  have  spent  six  months  of  effort  under 
our  present  inefficient  military  system  in  mobilizing  and  sending 
to  the  border  something  over  156,000   militia   organizations  filled 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING.  1091 

with  patriotic,  self-sacrificing  men.  They  wear  the  uniform,  and 
you  try  to  imagine  that  they  are  trained  soldiers;  but  they  are  not. 
This  force  represents  the  effort  of  this  Nation  in  time  of  peace.  Of 
the  156,000  men  not  over  20  per  cent  were  reasonably  efficient  from 
the  soldier's  standpoint  when  they  arrived  at  the  scene  of  presumptive 
activity.  Had  we  depended  upon  this  force  to  meet  a  strong,  well- 
organized  nation,  the  country  would  have  been  largely  occupied 
while  we  were  engaged  in  preparation  for  defense,  and  we  could 
not  possibly  have  prevented  it. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Is  not  your  proposition  substantially 
to  turn  over  the  entire  military  control  without  question  to  the  War 
Department  that  has  failed,  as  you  admit,  to  properly  handle  this 
relatively  small  number  of  soldie: 

Gen.  Wood.  No,  sir:  T  would  turn  it  over  to  the  Commander  in 
Chief,  the  President  of  the  United  States,  and  I  would  go  after 
the  War  Department  supply  organization,  if  necessary,  with  a  sand- 
bag and  reorganize  it,  I  would  enlarge  the  coordinating  and  super- 
vising control  of  the  Chief  of  Stall'  until  efficient  supply  resulted. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  But  if  you  have  a  lot  of  people  inter- 
ested in  military  matters  in  the  country  you  have  an  audience  to 
appeal  to. 

Gen.  Wood.  The  strongest  "influence  of  the  men  from  these  train- 
ing camps  is  for  universal  service  and  training  for  citizenship  obli- 
gation for  preparedness  on  the  lines  of  true  democracy. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  I  hoped  they  were  to  join  the  militia  I 

Gen.  Wood.  The  militia  joined  them;  we  just  turned  it  around. 
One  of  the  strongest  influences  of  these  camps  is  in  building  up  an 
intelligent  discussion  of  the  entire  military  problem.  Many  of  the 
best  men  in  the  country  are  at  these  camps.  There  are  laymen, 
clergymen,  bankers,  railroad  men,  teachers,  doctors,  engineers,  stu- 
dents, workingmen,  men  from  the  ranks  of  labor,  indeed,  all  classes 
of  men  come  to  these  camps.  Some  of  them  are  employers  of  thou- 
sands of  men  in  their  own  establishments.  They  are  keen,  intelli- 
gent men,  accustomed  to  good  administrative  methods.  They  learn 
many  things,  among  others  the  need  of  a  remodeling  of  our  archaic 
and  inefficient  methods  of  organization  and  supply.  When  the 
knowledge  of  these  conditions  becomes  more  general  defects  and 
deficiencies  of  organization  will  be  corrected  by  the  force  of  public 
opinion. 

Last  night  in  Providence  three  young  men  came  up  to  me  and  said 
they  were  officers  of  a  Rhode  Island  battery,  one  of  the  few  organi- 
zations that  went  to  the  front  at  nearly  war  strength.  Two  of  them 
said  that  they  had  presented  their  resignations  and  were  going  to 
enter  the  Officers'  Reserve  Corps  because  they  felt  a  Federal  force 
must  be  built  up.  Those  are  facts  and  indicate  a  condition  that 
exists  throughout  the  country.  The  views,  as  I  understand  them, 
of  the  rank  and  file  of  the  militia  are  sound.  They  see  the  need 
of  a  change,  the  vast  majority  of  them.  You  gentlemen  do  not 
reach  the  great  mass  of  the  men,  but  hear  more  the  opinions  of  the 
adjutant  generals,  the  men  who  are  on  a  salary.  These  men,  in  my 
opinion,  do  not  represent  the  real  militia  opinion,  the  opinion  which 
has  resulted  from  the  mobilization. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  There  are  some  old  lines  to  the  effect 
that  "  Every  little  boy  and  girl  that's  born  into  the  world  alive  is 


1092  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 

either  a  little  liberal  or  else  a  little  conservative."  The  constitu- 
tional instincts  of  the  centralizer  and  the  democrat  naturally  differ 
and  especially  about  creating  armies? 

Gen.  Wood.  We  find  much  of  the  best  support — much  of  the  strong 
support — of  a  sound  military  policy  among  Democrats.  Thomas  Jef- 
ferson, as  you  remember,  became  an  ardent  universal  training  service 
man. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  But  he  was  strongly  against  a  standing 
Army. 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes,  but  he  was  finally  for  universal  training — the 
classifying,  training,  and  arming  of  our  men.  In  his  fifth  annual 
message  he  advocated  "the  organization  of  300,000  able-bodied  men 
between  the  ages  of  18  and  26  for  defense  at  any  time  or  at  any  place 
where  they  may  be  wanted,"  and  in  his  eighth  annual  message : 

If  war  be  forced  upon  us  in  spite  of  our  long  and  vain  appeals  to  the  justice 
of  nations,  rapid  and  vigorous  movement  at  the  outset  will  go  far  toward  secur- 
ing us  in  its  course  and  issue,  and  toward  throwing  its  burdens  on  those  who 
render  necessary  the  resort  from  reason  to  force."     *     *     * 

Considering  the  conditions  of  the  times  in  which  we  live,  our  attention  should 
unremittingly  he  fixed  on  the  safety  of  our  country.  For  a  people  who  are  free 
and  who  mean  to  remain  so,  a  well  organized  and  armed  militia  is  their  best 
security.  g 

The  militia  he  referred  to,  as  you  know,  included  all  men  from 
18  to  45,  in  other  words,  it  amounted  to  the  training  of  all  men  within 
these  ages.  It  was  in  effect  universal  training,  but  lacked  the  neces- 
sary organization  by  classes  to  make  the  force  immediately  available. 

The  General  Staff  of  the  Army  are  in  favor  of  an  Army  big 
enough  for  the  peace  needs  of  the  Nation,  but  it  is  not  in  favor  of  an 
enormous  standing  Army.  The  large  professional  standing  Army 
as  the  main  reliance  of  nations  passed  away  with  the  battle  of  Jena. 
As  I  see  it,  John  Marshall's  strength  as  Chief  Justice  rested  largely 
upon  his  appreciation  of  the  need  of  a  strong,  coordinating  central 
authority,  a  Federal  Government,  and  a  constitution  rather  than 
articles  of  confederation.  He  had  been  through  the  Revolution 
and  he  had  seen  the  miserable  fiasco  of  State  troops  trying  to  meet  a 
national  emergency.  He  had  reduced  in  his  own  mind  the  militia 
theory  to  its  true  proportions ;  he  saw  that  it  was  an  absurdity.  This 
you  would  see  if  you  had  to  handle  a  situation  incident  to  preparing 
the  militia  to  meet  good  troops. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  What  is  the  standing  Army  that  you 
advocate— about  200,000  men? 

Gen.  Wood.  About  250,000-300,000  men,  that  is,  if  Ave  hold  the 
Philippines,  Panama,  Hawaii,  Alaska,  and  Porto  Rico,  and  have 
an  adequate  training  force  at  home  and  a  force  sufficient  for  our  coast 
defenses  and  a  small  expeditionary  force. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Do  you  think  250,000  men  as  a  stand- 
ing Army  would  be  safe  to  associate  with  the  great  power  of  uni- 
versal service  in  the  hands  of  the  National  Government? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  think  so;  yes,  sir. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Let  me  call  your  attention  to  the  old 
conditions  in  the  British  Navy.  There  were  the  crews,  the  seamen 
that  were  seized  and  brought  aboard  by  the  press  gang.  When  they 
wanted  seamen  in  the  old  British  Navy  they  went  ashore,  conscripted 
by  force  and  brought  on  board  ship  for  service  the  captured  men, 


l.XiVEKSAL    MILITARY    TRAINING.  1093 

some  very  sore  and  mutinous.  They  disciplined  them  and  handled 
them  with  absolute  authority — put  the  cat-o'-nine-tails  on  them 
without  trial  at  the  order  of  an  officer.  That  would  have  been  im- 
possible but  for  the  fact  that  they  had  a  standing  Army  to  support 
the  conscription.  It  would  have  been  impossible  to  have  put  that 
arbitrary  process  into  operation  without  the  presence  of  a  sufficient 
police  force.  So  the  marines  on  those  ships  were  the  police  force 
of  the  old  British  Navy  and  the  marines  with  their  loaded  muskets 
stood  by  while  the  captured  sailors  were  flogged  into  submission  and 
discipline. 

tiator  Brady.  Senator  Lee.  do  you  not  think  that  would  be 
absolutely  impossible  under  a  republican  form  of  government  I 

(Jen.  Wood.  It  is  impossible  in  the  British  fleet  to-day. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Kxaetly.  that  practice  has  disappeared 
from  the  British  Navy,  but  is  it  not  your  proposition  to  revive  it  in 
a  way? 

Gen.  Wood.  In  what  shape? 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  By  putting  the  power  of  the  Central 
Government  over  the  whole  people,  the  authority  of  conscription, 
and  at  the  same  time  providing  a  standing  Ann  0,000  men  to 

see  that  the  orders  of  the  Central  Government  are  carried  out  as 
operating  upon  each  individual. 

Gen.  Wood.  Of  the  standing  Army  of  250,000  men  there  would 
be  about  70,000  abroad  when  the  foreign  garrisons  are  completed. 
The  remaining  W.000  exceed  a  little  t:  !  chauffeurs  and 

truck  drivers  in  the  State  of  New  York.  1  do  not  think  they  will 
impose  upon  the  hundred  millions  with  any  degree  of  ferocity. 

aator  Li  i  of  Maryland.  While  we  are  on  that  proposition,  is 
it  not  a  fact  that  this  period  in  military  history  is  one  where  a  thor- 
oughly equipped  military  force  is  more  powerful,  as  compared  with 
the  unequipped  citizens,  than  ever  before  in  the  history  of  the 
world?. 

Gen.  YVooi>.  Yes,  sir;  the  thoroughly  prepared  military  unit  as 
compared  with  the  inexperienced  and  unprepared  citizen. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  The  relative  power  of  250,000  men  in 
a  regular  arm  is  greater  now  than  ever  before? 

Gen,  Woon.  Not  when  all  your  men  are  trained.  How  would  this 
little,  puny  force  of  170,000  men — less  than  two  men  to  a  thousand  of 
population — be  able  to  do  much  with  a  citizenry  trained  and  armed? 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  There  would  be  the  authority  to  con- 
script and  to  issue  orders,  and  there  would  be  250,000  policemen 
behind  that  authority. 

(Jen.  Wood.  You  must  assume,  of  course,  that  the  President  of  the 
United  States  is  to  become  an  autocrat  and  establish  a  despotism. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  We  need  not  have  any  Supreme  Court, 
we  need  not  have  any  Congress,  or  States,  or  anything  else.  We 
could  just  select  a  divine  sort  of  president  and  let  him  run  the  affairs 
of  the  country.  In  this  system  you  are  obviously  throwing  the  Con- 
stitution overboard. 

Gen.  Wood.  Not  a  bit.  I  think  our  Constitution  is  an  adequate 
protection.  In  our  elections  we  are  perhaps  a  little  too  frequent  and 
make  too  frequent  changes  in  Congress.  But  anything  such  as  you 
suggest  is  absolutely  impossible. 


1094  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Let  us  go  back  to  the  old  three-decker 
of  the  British  Navy.    She  had  probably  600  or  700  sailors  aboard 

Gen.  Wood.  Sometimes  1,000. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  She  did  not  have  over  50  marines. 

Gen.  Wood.  Sometimes  less.  Now,  to-day  there  are  often  none  on 
the  ships. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Now,  it  is  none. 

Gen.  Wood.  Practically  none. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  The  point  is  that  a  sailor  is  not  seized 
or  conscripted  to-day.    Is  that  not  the  real  point  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  They  are  not  conscripted.  They  are  volunteers  to-day 
in  the  British  Navy;  but  unless  they  fail  absolutely  to  learn  any- 
thing from  the  lessons  of  the  war,  they  will  insist  on  universal  service. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  He  is  a  free  man  and  enters  that  service 
freely.  He  is  not  compelled  to  enter  the  service  or  to  be  subdued  by 
flogging  into  obedience. 

Gen.  Wood.  He  is  not,  because  flogging  into  obedience  is  medieval. 
All  those  things  have  been  eliminated.  We  used  to  flog  men  in 
prisons  and  on  our  ships.  The  point  is  that  England  has  had  to 
abandon  this  beautful  system  of  volunteers  in  the  throes  of  a  great 
war,  and  she  never  will  go  back  to  it. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Has  England  abandoned  the  system  of 
her  great  naval  defense? 

Gen.  Wood.  In  my  opinion  she  will  give  up  the  volunteer  feature 
of  her  present  system.  Great  Britain  after  the  experience  of  this  war 
will  go  to  universal  service.  Her  navy  has  always  been  popular.  As 
a  rule  they  have  as  many  men  in  the  British  Navy  as  they  want.  It 
has  been  the  dominating  navy  of  the  world  for  centuries.  Men  know 
it.  They  know  it  is  the  strongest  naval  power  afloat.  They  like  to 
serve  in  it.  The  army  has  been  a  small  army,  like  ours,  and  not  so 
popular  as  the  navy. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  You  are  looking  at  the  whole  matter 
from  the  standpoint  of  a  general  devotion  to  preparedness — you 
might  say  to  universal  service.  Is  it  better  to  reject  the  precautions 
the  Swiss  have  put  into  operation  and  our  own  Constitution  suggests, 
going  ahead  to  form  great  armies  without  any  precaution,  or  is  it 
better  to  perfect  a  military  service  under  the  precautions  of  our  Con- 
stitution and  the  Swiss  constitution? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  think  we  can  perfect  a  universal  service  under  Fed- 
eral control  without  violation  of  the  Constitution.  There,  again,  I 
am  not  going  to  argue  the  constitutional  point  with  you. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Is  not  the  real  dual  control  in  this  coun- 
try, the  one  that  gives  the  trouble,  a  professional  War  Department 
operating  on  a  professional  army  and  a  citizen  army  at  the  same 
time? 

Gen.  Wood.  Like  the  judges  of  the  courts,  the  Regular  officers  are 
trained  for  their  job. 

The  Chairman.  Let  me  ask  you  this  question — speaking  of  the 
large  number  of  officers  during  the  Civil  War  on  both  sides  and  the 
small  number  of  officers  who  are  graduated  from  West  Point — what 
does  the  history  of  the  world  show  with  reference  to  the  destruction 
of  the  commissioned  personnel  of  the  Army;  what  percentage  of 
them  have  to  be  replaced,  and  how  ? 


UNIVERSAL    MILITARY    TRAINING.  1095 

Gen.  Wood.  I  should  say  the  destruction  of  the  total  commissioned 
personnel  would  be,  at  the  rate  of  the  destructive  war  which  is  now 
going  on,  50  to  60  per  cent  per  year,  at  least. 

The  Chairman.  So,  even  the  ranks  of  the  commissioned  forces 
have  to  be  replenished.    ■ 

Gen.  Wood.  The  other  day  I  was  talking  to  an  American  who  has 
been  commanding  a  British  battalion  at  the  front  for  a  long  time. 
He  said  that  he  and  one  other  officer  were  the  only  ones  now  left  of 
those  originally  in  the  battalion.  Many  have  been  killed,  some 
wounded,  and  some  transferred.    The  loss  has  been  very  heavy. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Referring  to  the  rifle  practice  in  the 
National  Guard  while  in  the  United  States  service,  a  good  many  or- 
ganizations that  were  down  on  the  border  came  back  without  having 
had  any  rifle  practice  after  five  or  six  mouths  under  Federal  control. 
I  have  heard  of  a  cavalry  regiment  that  only  fired  their  rifles  some 
30  rounds.  This  has  reference  to  your  criticism  of  their  qualifications 
as  soldiers.  I  understand  that  there  were  only  two  rifle  ranges  on  the 
whole  border,  but  general  ranges  could  have  been  made. 

Gen.  Wood.  That  is  outside  of  my  department;  I  do  not  know  any- 
thing about  that.    I  have  heard  much  of  what  you  say. 

•iator  Lee  of  Maryland.  When  the  Fourth  Maryland  got  back 
under  you  on  September  8,  that  regiment  had  not  received  its  rifle 
practice. 

Gen.  Wood.  You  wrote  me  about  it. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Were  you  not  communicated  with  on 
September  8  by  Capt.  Waddill,  of  the  Regular  Army,  who  got  an 
answer  from  your  office,  from  Col.  Bartlett.  disapproving  the  request 
for  rifle  practice  for  this  regiment  I 

Gen.  Wood.  Let  me  tell  you  what  happened.  I  will  put  this  all 
in  the  record  when  T  go  over  my  statement.  We  approved  of  your 
general  idea  of  giving  these  troops  their  target  practice  before  they 
went  out,  but  the  answer,  as  I  remember  it — we  have  thousands  of 
these  telegrams  relating  to  muster  out  of  the  militia — but  I  have  a 
very  distinct  recollection  that  we  approved  that  request  of  yours  and 
the  War  Department  disapproved  it  on  the  ground  that  the  men  in 
the  ranks  of  the  regiment  would  be  continued  on  Federal  pay  for  a 
number  of  days  extra  if  the  target  practice  was  authorized. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  That  was  your  idea,  but  that  was  not 
the  actual  fact.  You  withheld  your  approval  until  the  21st;  three 
weeks  practically  elapsed  in  any  part  of  which  this  regiment  could 
have  had  its  practice.  They  were  only  testing  two  companies  a  day, 
and  any  battalion  could  have  gone  to  the  rifle  range  without  slowing 
up  the  muster  out. 

Gen.  Wood.  I  will  have  to  look  that  up  and  insert  the  exact  facts. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  I  wish  you  would  put  in,  if  you  do  that, 
Adjt.  Gen.  Henry  Warfield's  letter  of  September  9,  and  your  answer 
)f  September  21.  I  finally  got  the  War  Department  to  agree  that 
those  men  should  begin  rifle  practice,  but  there  were  only  three  days 
left.  That  happened  again  with  our  First  Regiment.  The  Second 
Battalion.  Companies  E,  F,  G,  and  H,  had  not  had  rifle  practice  and 
they  were  kept  in  Baltimore  from  October  24  to  November  4. 

Gen.  Wood.  May  I  ask  this  young  officer  who  had  charge  of  those 
papers  to  make  a  statement  with  regard  to  that  case?  Do  you  know 
about  that  Maryland  regiment  and  their  target  practice? 


1096  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 

Capt.  Keene.  Yes,  sir. 

Gen.  Wood.  I  wish  you  would  state  it. 

Capt.  Keene.  When  the  First  Infantry  was  being  mustered  out  at 
Laurel  they  requested  to  have  target  practice  and  a  telegram  was 
sent,  if  my  memory  serves  me,  disapproving  it.  The  regiment  was 
subsequently  transferred  from  Laurel  to  Baltimore,  to  its  armory,  to 
effect  its  final  muster  out.  Subsequently  to  the  muster  out  of  this 
organization  the  War  Department  sent  a  telegram  to  the  eastern  de- 
partment stating  that  target  practice  could  be  held,  and  that  it  would 
not  interfere  with  the  muster  out  of  the  troops.  When  the  First 
Infantry  arrived  at  Baltimore,  Md.,  and  before  muster  out,  it  was 
quartered  in  the  Fifth  Regiment  Armory  and  remained  there  until 
muster  out  was  completed.  The  adjutant  general  of  Maryland,  if 
my  memory  serves  me,  made  application  for  the  regiment  to  hold 
small-arms  target  practice,  and  the  War  Department  authorities 
authorized  the  mustering  officers  to  permit  the  organization  to  hold 
small-arms  target  practice,  provided  it  would  not  interfere  with  the 
muster  out  of  the  organization,  and  the  First  Maryland  held  that 
target  practice. 

Gen.  Wood.  Did  the  Second  Battalion  get  target  practice? 

Capt.  Keene.  I  do  not  remember  the  designation  of  the  battalion, 
but  I  know  there  were  some  organizations  that  held  small-arms 
target  practice. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  I  have  a  statement  here  from  the  ad- 
jutant general  of  Maryland  which  says  that  the  First  Regiment  was 
10  days  being  mustered  out  and  its  Second  Battalion  did  not  get 
rifle  practice.  The  Fourth  Maryland  Infantry  was  mustered  out 
September  26.    The  correspondence  is  as  follows  : 

Laurel,  Md.,  September  S,  1916. 
To  Commanding  General.  Eastern  Department, 

Governors  Island,  N.  Y.: 
Fourth  Maryland  arrived  from  Eagle  Pass  without  having  target  practice. 
Adjt.  Gen.  Warfleld  recommends  that  their  troops  be  ordered  to  Saunders  range 
by  battalions  for  four  days'  practice,  in  which  recommendation  I  fully  concur. 
Transportation  will  not  exceed  $1.10  per  man,  round  trip. 

Waddill. 


Governors  Island.  N.  Y..  September  S,  11)16. 

Adjutant  General  of  .Maryland, 

Annapolis,  Md.: 
Relative  your  telegram  of  September  8,  referring  to  target  practice  for  Fourth 
Infantry,  department  commander  regrets  that,  in  that  War  Department  -instruc- 
tions require  muster  out  of  Federal  service  to  be  effected  as  soon  as  practicable; 
he  is  unable  to  approve  your  request. 

Babtlett. 


September  0.  1910. 

From:  The  Adjutant  General. 

To:  The  commanding  ereneral,  Eastern  Department. 

Subject:  Rifle  practice  for  Fourth  Infantry,  Maryland  National  Guard. 

1.  Your  telegram  stating  that  it  would  he  impossible  to  comply  with  the  recom- 
mendation of  this  office  that  the  Fourth  Infantry  be  ordered  to  the  State  rifle 
range  for  rifle  practice  received. 

■2.  In  making  this  recommendation  it  was  believed  that  this  work  could  be 
done  without  Interfering  with  the  mustering  out  of  this  regiment.  The  idea 
was  to  send  one  battalion  at  a  time  to  the  range,  leaving  such  Officers  and  men 
at  the  mobilization  camp)  as  may  be  required  in  making  out  the  necessary  papers 
and    attending   to   all    details   incident   to   the  muster  out.     The  range   can   be 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING.  1097 

reached  from  the  mobilization  camp  in  less  than  two  hours.  so  that  troops  that 
may  be  at  the  range  could  he  gotten  back  to  camp  promptly. 

3.  If  the  regiment  is  mustered  out  of  the  service  it  would  be  impossible  for 
the  State  to  order  them  to  the  range  this  year  as  the  employers  would  undoubt- 
edly make  strenuous  objection,  owing  to  the  time  they  have  already  been  in  the 
service,  during  which  service,  unfortunately,  they  have  not  had  rifle  pi 

4.  This  matter  strikes  this  office  as  being  of  such  importance  that  the  liberty 
is  taken  to  again  bring  it  to  your  attention. 

Henry  M.  Waki  iki.d. 


Governors  [sland,  n.  v.,  Sepember  21,  1916. 
The  Adjutant  General, 

Annapolis,  Md.: 

Following  War  Department  telegram,  September  20,  repeated: 
"  Reference  your  letter  September  13,  relating  target  practice  National  Guard 
aents  ordered  muster  out,  target  practice  will  be  held  in  case  of  all  militia 
organizations  ordered  home  for  muster  out  when  troops  have  not  had  i 
practice  on  border,  and  provided  facilities  therefor  exist,  and  practice  will  not 
interfere  with  or  delay  the  muster  out. 

•^McOai 
ip  commander  advised. 


HXADQI  ETMENT, 

Governors  Island,  N.  T.,  September  U,  1916. 
The  following  telegram  is  published  for  the  Information  and  guidance  of  all 
concerned : 

"Washington,  D.  C,  8f< 
"Commandim,  General,  EQastebn  Dkpabtii 

wernors  Island,  \.  ) .: 
"  Reference  your  letter  September  13,  relative  targe!  practice  National  Guard 
regiments  ordered  mustered  out.  target  practice  will  be  held  in  case  of  all 
militia  organizations  ordered  home  for  muster  out  when  troops  have  not  had 
target  practice  on  border,  and  provided  facilities  therefor  exist  and  practice 
will  not  interfere  with  or  delay  the  muster  out. 

"McCain." 

Strict  and  careful  compliance  with  the  foregoing  is  enjoined  on  all  concerned. 
By  command  of  Maj.  Gen.  Wood : 

George  T.  Rartlett, 
Colonel,   General  Staff,  Chief  of  Staff. 
Official : 

W.  A.  Simpson, 

Adjutant  General,  Adjutant. 


Annapolis.  Md.,  September  22,  1916. 
The  Commanding  General, 

Eastern  Department,  Governor*  Island,  X.  v.: 

Rifle  practice  for  Fourth  Infantry  now  will  somewhat  delay  muster  out  owing 
to  delay  in  receiving  authority,  but  recommend  that  authority  be  given  to  begin 
practice  at  once,  same  to  be  expedited  as  much  as  possible.  This  office  will 
render  every  assistance  to  expedite  the  practice.  Can  have  range  ready  im- 
mediately.   Hope  for  favorable  action. 

Warfteld, 
The  Adjutant  General. 

[Mem.  of  Adjt.  Gen.  Warfleld,  of  Maryland.] 

In  re:  Rifle  practice.  First  Maryland  Infantry,  National  Guard,  1916. 
Regiment  arrived  in  Baltimore  October  24,  1916. 
Regiment  mustered  out  of  Federal  service  November  4,  1916.  ' 
The  second  battalion  (Companies  E,  F,  G,  and  H)  did  not  have  rifle  practice 
and  qualification  while  in  Federal  service. 

86205—17 12 


1098  UNIVERSAL   MILITAHY    TRAILING. 

Gen.  Wood.  There  was  considerable  difficulty,  Senator,  as  you  may 
have  hoard.  You  asked  some  time  ago,  I  think,  about  ammunition. 
Some  regiments  started  to  the  border  without  munitions.  They  were 
furnished  ammunition  by  the  Coast  Artillery  defense  commanders  on 
their  own  initiative.  I  cite  that  just  as  an  evidence  of  the  willingness 
of  those  officers  to  help  out.  Some  of  them  were  called  to  account 
for  it,  and  I  had  to  come  to  their  support  on  the  ground  that  it  would 
have  been  a  piece  of  folly  to  have  allowed  this  regiment  to  go  to  the 
border  without  munitions,  expecting  to  meet  munitions  at  some  desig- 
nated point  fixed  by  the  Chief  of  Ordnance  on  the  border.  They 
might  have  been  deflected  to  participate  in  action  anywhere,  and  for 
an  organization  going  to  the  front  to  have  rifles  without  ammunition 
would  have  been  inconceivable  from  a  military  standpoint. 

I  cite  that  simply  as  an  evidence  of  the  general  spirit  of  help- 
fulness on  the  part  of  the  officers.  They  took  their  own  ammunition 
and  turned  it  over  to  the  guard. 

Senator  Brady.  They  could  not  have  put  up  very  much  of  a  de- 
fense for  their  country  without  any  munitions  whatever? 

Gen.  Wood.  No,  sir. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  I  want  to  make  a  little  comparison  with 
certain  of  your  figures  in  the  interest  of  the  National  Guard  as  re- 
cruit getters.    You  have  condemned  them  as  organizations. 

Gen.  Wood.  The  system,  not  the  men.  I  am  going  to  keep  on  going 
back  to  that. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland  (reading)  : 

Organizations  raised  and  trained  as  these  are  are  not  trained,  disciplined 
troops.  The  portion  which  had  had  reasonable  training  would  nut  exceed  20 
per  cent. 

That  is  your  statement  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  That  is  right ;  I  think  that  is  liberal. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  I  infer  this  to  mean  that  20  per  cent  had 
reasonable  training  before  going  to  the  border  and  are  as  good  as  our; 
regularly  enlisted  men.  If,  for  the  sake  of  argument,  it  is  conceded 
that  the  training  etc.,  of  the  remaining  80  men  out  of  100,  who,  you 
say,  are  partially  trained,  is  altogether  a  loss,  then  the  net  result  as 
to  cost,  based  on  militia  appropriations  for  1916,*  is  approximately 
20  trained  militiamen,  at  the  cost  of  100  militia  for  1916,  $4,700 ;  less 
80  recruits,  at  $19  each,  $1,620;  net  cost  to  Government  of  20  trained 
militiamen,  $3,080.  One  year  cost  of  20  trained  enlisted  men.  United 
States  Armv,  $20,000;  net  saving  a  year  on  20  trained  militiamen, 
$16,920.      -  ' 

If  it  is  suggested  that  the  annual  cost  of  a  militiaman  is  to  be 
doubled  under  the  act  of  June  3,  1916,  it  is  also  to  be  considered  that 
the  number  of  reasonably  trained  men  will  probably  be  much  more 
than  doubled  under  the  new  law. 

So,  if  you  simply  broke  up  your  militia  organization  and  just  used 
this  supply  of  trained  men  to  fill  out  your  skeleton  regular  companies, 
you  would  be  saving  $16,920  annually  on  the  present  regular  system 
of  getting  the  same  number  of  men  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  When  I  used  the  words  "  reasonably  well  trained  "  1 
employed  as  general  a  term  as  I  could  think  of.  They  were  not  fit  to 
go  into  the  field.    They  were  not  comparable  to  the  regular  troops. 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY    TRAINING.   '  1099 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Do  you  tell  us  that  you  would  prefer 
the  poorest  20  men  out  of  100  of  the  Regular  Army  to  the  best  20; 
men  out  of  100  in  the  militia? 

(Jen.  Wood.  Not  a  bit;  because  I  might  get  Regular  Army  men 
who  have  been  in  the  Army  only  one  day,  but  I  would  rather  take  the 
average  of  two  to  one  of  any  regular  trained  soldiers  to  reasonably 
trained  militiamen.  I  was  trying  to  be  as  just  to  the  militia  as  pos- 
sible. The  militia  organizations  are  made  up  of  good  men,  but  they 
are  not  trained  soldiers. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  I  just  wanted  to  know  the  attitude  of 
your  mind  on  this  proposition.  You  prefer  the  20  worst  men  in  the 
average  regular  company 

Gen.  Wood.  No;  of  course  not. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  To  the  20  best  men  in  the  average  mili- 
tia organization. 

Gen.  Wood.  Of  course,  that  is  a  perfectly  absurd  statement. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  That  is  what  I  wanted  to  get  at.  It 
looked  to  me  that  way. 

Gen.  Wood.  It  is,  as  you  put  it.  absurd.  I  should  not  prefer  the 
20  worst  men  of  the  Regular  Army  to  20  of  the  best  men  of  the 
militia,  because  20  of  the  best  men  of  the  militia  may  probably  be 
found  to  be  old  soldiers  *  ho  had  been  well  trained. 

nator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Let  us  eliminate  that  part  with  refer- 
to  the  old  soldiers. 

Gen.  Wood.  That  is  a  pretty  Lr(><»!  way  to  get  out  of  it. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  You  understand  that  no  old  soldiers 
are  involved  in  the  20  best  militiamen  in  100. 

Gen.  Wood.  I  would  rather  have  20  of  the  best  men  in  the  militia 
because  I  would  get  men  of  your  type  of  intelligence. 

Senator  Lee  ofMaryland.  I  am\a  little  too  old. 

Gen,  Wood.  Not  a  bit  to  fight. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  I  think  I  called  your  attention  to  the 
fact  that  Gen.  "Barry  did   not  agree  with  you  about  this  training. 

Gen.  Wood.  I  am  sorry  he  did  not. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  I  will  put  that  in  the  record,  because  I 
would  like  to  have  it  appear  at  this  point  in  the  interest  of  the  Na- 
tional Guard: 

fFrom  report  of  MaJ.  Gen.  Barry,  Central  Department,  Oct.  19,  1916.] 
The  fact  that  as  n  role  fully  one-third  of  the  members  of  the  various  organi- 
sations were,  upon  muster  in.  untrained  recruits  or  men  of  but  a  few  months* 
Service  made  it  Impossible  to  regard  any  unit  as  properly  trained.  The  influx 
of  raw  recruits  at  any  time  cuts  down  very  greatly  the  efficiency  even  of  well- 
trained  regular  organizations.  In  the  ease  of  National  Guard  organizations 
it  is  especially  necessary  that  in  time  <>f  emergency  such  influx  he  not  permitted, 
and  they  should  not  he  accepted  into  Federal  service  unless  up  to  minimum 
strength  at  time  of  call. 

Or  in  other  words,  when  he  shows  his  disapproval  of  the  skeleton 
regiments  being  suddenly  expanded,  he  at  the  same  time  says  that 
two-thirds  of  the  militia  were  fairly  trained. 

Gen.  Wood.  They  had  a  year  or  more  of  service,  64  of  them  only, 
the  balance  very  little.  It  is  a  mistake  to  put  untrained  men  into  any 
organization  going  into  action 


1100  UNIVERSAL    MILITARY    TRAINING. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  In  your  testimony  you  say: 

I  feel  that  the  Federal  Government  must  own  and  control  the  military  forces 
absolutely   and   beyond   peradventure. 

You  throw  the  Swiss  system  over  in  that  respect? 
Gen.  Wood.  So  far  as  anything  interferes  with  Federal  control. 
Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Now,  at  another  place  in  your  testimony 
this  occurs: 

Senator  Thomas.  Was  there  observable  any  conflict  of  authority  between  the 
Federal  and  the  State  authorities  in  the  handling  of  its  militia  during  its  recent 
mobilization  or  in  the  operations  of  the  soldiers  on  the  border? 

Gen.  Wood.  No  essential  one,  except  that  the  standards  of  efficiency  are  all 
determined  very  largely  by  the  standards  of  interest  in  the  State — interest  of 
State  authorities. 

Senator  Thomas.  A  necessary  result. 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes,  sir.  There  are,  of  course,  possibilities  of  radical  differences 
of  opinion.  Governors,  if  they  wish,  can  muster  out  men  and  make  radical 
changes  in  personnel  of  organizations. 

I  call  your  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  governors  can  not  muster 
out  men  under  the  new  law. 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes.  This  is  claimed  to  be  the  case  under  the  new 
law.  but  the  question  of  the  application  of  the  dual  oath  is  still  to 
be  determined.  Just  where  the  authority  of  the  governor  begins 
and  ends  under  the  new  law  I  do  not  know.  I  believe,  however, 
that  it  will  be  found  that  the  governor  has  still  a  very  large  measure 
of  control  over  the  State  militia,  even  under  the  new  law. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.    We  are  now  rectifying  that  mistake. 

Gen.  Wood.  It  is  not  a  mistake.  That  is  where  they  take  the  dual 
oath. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  You  state  that  there  is  no  essential  inter- 
ference or  conflict  of  authority  between  the  Federal  and  State  au- 
thorities in  the  handling  of  its  militia.  I  again  quote  from  your 
testimony : 

No  essential  one,  except  that  the  standards  of  efficiency  are  nil  determined 
very  largely  by  the  standards  of  interest  in  the  State — interest  of  State 
authorities. 

Now,  General,  that  is  your  statement  after  having  been  Chief  of 
Staff  for  about  two  years? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  was  Chief  of  Staff  four  years. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  And  your  experience  as  major  general 
is  not  otherwise? 

Gen.  Wood.  That  is  right. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  That  you  left  the  efficiency  and  disci- 
pline of  the  National  Guard  to  the  States? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  did  not  say  that.  I  said  that  the  efficiency  depended 
largely  on  State  interest — that  is,  State  appropriations,  State  sup- 
port, and  all  that  sort  of  thing. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Yes,  sir:  that  it  was  left  to  State  au- 
thority.    It  is  very  obvious. 

Gen.  Wood.  I  did  not  say  it  was  left  to  the  interest;  I  said  it 
depended  very  largely  on  the  interest,  but  not  left  to  the  State 
authorities. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  In  other  words,  no  effort  was  made 
to  impose  discipline  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  did  not  say  that.  We  did  supply  instructors  and 
inspectors,  etc.,  and  their  efforts  depended  very  largely  on  the  sup- 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING.  1101 

port  they  received  from  State  authorities.     These  officers  could  not 
issue  orders;  they  could  only  advise. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Then,  as  a  matter  of  law  and  military 
policy,  there  has  never  been  any  final  and  conclusive  effort  to  impose 
discipline  on  the  militia  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  By  the  Federal  Government? 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  By  the  Federal  Government. 

Gen.  Wood.  I  do  not  think  there  has  been.  I  doubt  if  they  can 
do  it  under  our  Constitution. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  And  under  the  Dick  law  the  spon- 
taneous interest  of  the  State  authorities  was  absolutely  essential. 

Gen.  Wood.  Under  any  law. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  You  consider  that  so  now  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes,  sir;  as  long  as  we  have  a  militia  system  under 
which  the  State  authorities  interpose,  I  do  not  think  you  will  have 
troops  of  real  efficiency. 

Again,  I  desire  to  emphasize  my  previous  statements,  that  this 
lack  of  efficiency  is  not  due  to  the  quality  of  the  personnel,  but  to 
the  method  under  which  it  is  trained,  and  the  lack  of  certain  un- 
questioned Federal  control  at  all  times.  Modern  organization 
throughout  the  world  in  all  great  countries,  save  China  and  the 
United  States,  is  such  that  we  can  not  hope  to  offer  successful  re- 
sistance under  our  present  system.  War  is  launched  more  quickly 
than  ever  before,  and  its  organization  is  such  that  the  entire  re- 
sources of  a  country  are  promptly  available  not  only  for  its  incep- 
tion but  for  its  maintenance.  Conditions  are  very  different  from 
those  which  existed  at  the  time  the  Republic  was  rounded,  and  we 
must  make  adequate  prepa rations  to  meet  conditions  as  they  are, 
not  as  we  would  have  them,  or  as  they  were  a  hundred  years  ago. 
The  weapons  of  the  Federal  Government  must  be  its  own,  must  be 
prepared  by  it,  controlled  by  it,  and  used  by  it.  There  must  be  no 
uncertainty,  no  division  of  control.  A  governor  may  or  may  not 
heartily  cooperate  in  time  of  emergency.  When  war  begins  under 
modern  conditions  there  is  no  time  for  argument  or  discussion  be- 
tween Federal  and  State  authorities.  There  would  be  barely  time 
to  mobilize  the  forces  even  if  they  are  under  Federal  control  and 
completely  equipped.  Our  military  organization  must  be  in  har- 
mony with  our  policy.  We  assume  that  our  policy  is  to  be  non- 
aggressive.  Consequently  we  shall  not  be  making  preparations  for 
s  of  aggression.  But  we  must  have  immediately  available  the 
means  to  check  aggressive  attack  which  may  be  launched  again** 
us  at  any  moment  on  either  coast.  At  present  we  are  without  sue1" 
means  or  such  preparation. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  General,  in  your  testimony  you  said 
that  the  regular  organizations  are  short  of  inen,  practically  all  of 
them,  and  that  they  lack  much  which  modern  war  considers  of  vital 
importance  under  combat  conditions. 

Gen.  Wood.  Our  regular  organizations  lack  many  things  which 
are  vitally  essential  in  modern  war.  We  lack  machine  guns  of  all 
types ;  in  fact,  we  have  very  few  of  the  best  types  of  modern  machine 
guns,  either  light  or  heavy.  Such  light  guns  of  the  best  and  the 
most  modern  types  as  we  have,  we  have  secured  from  an  English  con- 
tract with  an  American  firm.  These  guns  do  not  use  our  ammuni- 
tion.   The  hand  grenade  or  bomb  plays  an  important  part  in  modern 


1102  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 

war;  we  have  nothing  approaching  an  adequate  supply  even  for  our 
present  small  Regular  Army.    We  are  without  trench  mortars  of  the 
type  in  general  use  throughout  the  battlefields  of  Europe.   We  are  with- 
out  various   kinds   of  field  signal  apparatus,   especially   for  night 
work.    We  are  short  of  modern  field  wireless  to  such  an  extent  that 
we  had  to  strip  Panama  in  order  to  secure  a  small  amount  for  use 
on  the  border.    We  are  without  any  of  the  modern  types  of  heavy 
mobile  artillery  such  as  is  in  general  use  in  Europe — artillery  which 
often  has  had  a  determining  effect  upon  operations.     I  refer  both 
to  the  type  which  is  moved  on  the  ordinary  artillery  carriage,  and 
to  that  powerful  type  which  is  mounted  and  moved  on  a  railway 
carriage.     We  are  dangerously  short  of  reserve  rifles  and  of  field 
artillery;  we  have  not  enough  field  pieces  to  adequately  equip  even 
the  Regular  Army  and  militia  at  war  strength,  and  not  a  field  gun 
for  volunteers.     We  are  inadequately  supplied  with  reserve  amu- 
nition.     The  fact  is  our  supplies  are  ridiculously  small.     We  have 
not  built  in  this  country  as  yet  any  of  the  modern  aeroplane  engines 
of  the  latest  millitary  type.     Steps  are  being  taken  to  correct  this 
deficiency,  but  it  will  be  a  long  time  before  we  are  moderately  pre- 
pared in  this  arm.    We  are  not  constructing,  as  we  should,  with  all 
possible  haste,  artillery  of  various  types.    We  are  building  little  or 
none  of  the  long  range  mid-caliber  type  of  artillery  such  as  is  now 
in  general  use.    We  have  made  no  adequate  increase  in  the  way  of 
reserves  of  munitions  of  war  since  the  war  began.     Indeed  we  are 
only  just  commencing  the  manufacture  of  the  approved  heavy  type 
of  machine  gun,  and  have  not  yet  determined  the  type  of  light  ma- 
chine gun  we  are  to  use,  although  these  guns  must  be  provided  in 
the  proportion  of  about  eight  of  the  light  to  one  of  the  heavy  guns. 
This  is  the  condition,  although  the  world's  greatest  war  is  twTo  and 
one-half  years  old,  and  its  lessons  as  to  equipment,  development  of 
arms  and  munitions  are  an  open  book  to  all  the  world.    We  have  not 
itaken  the  necessary  steps  to  complete  immediately  the  fire  control  of 
our  seacoast  guns.   We  are  without  adequate  searchlights  and  also  with- 
out anything  even  approximating  a  reasonable  supply  of  auto  air- 
craft guns.     We  are  not  making  effective  and  rapid  strides  in  the 
absolutely  essential  remodeling  of  the  carriages  of  our  major  caliber 
seacoast  guns,  a  remodeling  which  will  give  them  elevation  abso- 
lutely necessary  if  they  are  to  meet  similar  guns  afloat.    Our  arsenals 
for  small  arms  have  been  working  only  to  a  small  extent  of  their 
capacity.    We  are  without  reserves  of  clothing,  shoes,  or  other  equip- 
ment necessary  for  war.    We  have  not  taken  the  necessary  steps  to 
establish  nuclear  plants  for  the  manufacturing  of  our  military  rifle 
at  the  great  arms  factories  in  various  parts  of  the  country.    This  is 
absolutely  necessary  in  order  to  permit  that  expansion  which  will  be 
necessary  in  order  to  meet  the  demands  of  modern  war.    Our  arsenals 
are  wholly  inadequate  to  meet  these  demands.    This  is  a  fact  of  common 
knowledge.  Adequate  steps  have  not  been  taken  to  acquire  the  necessary 
reserves  of  those  things  which  we  do  not  produce  in  this  country,  but 
which  are  vitally  essential  in  modern  war.    We  stand  practically  as  un- 
prepared as  when  the  great  war  began,  and  are  apparently  unobservant 
of  its  clear  lessons  and  unappreciative  of  the  fact  that  no  amount 
of  money  and  no  amount  of  effort  can  purchase  time  or  make  good 
its  loss.    Whatever  the  ultimate  organizations  of  our  resources  may 
be,  there  is  no  question  whatever  as  to  the  necessity  of  supplying  a 


UNIVERSAL  MILITARY   TRAINING.  1103 

sufficiency  of  the  above  equipment,  arms,  and  munitions  to  promptly 
equip  and  arm  a  force  of  at  least  two  and  one-half  million  volun- 
teers with  adequate  reserves  for  a  year.  Whatever  the  ultimate 
organizations  of  our  resources  may  be,  it  has  been  strikingly  appar- 
ent for  two  and  one-half  years  that  we  should  immediately  prepare 
in  large  amounts  the  absolute  essentials  of  modern  war,  only  a  por- 
tion of  which  have  been  referred  to  above.  We  are  also  very  short 
of  reserve  officers  and  practically  without  reserves  of  instructed  men. 
Declarations  which  include,  in  the  list  of  instructed  men,  boys  who 
have  graduated  from  so-called  military  schools,  and  men  who  have 
had  short  terms  of  service  in  the  militia,  are  unworthy  of  serious 
consideration,  as  they  indicate  entire  failure  to  appreciate  the  fact 
that  these  men  are  not  trained  soldiers. 

Our  people  enthuse  over  some  new  form  of  torpedo  or  a  general 
discussion  of  the  question  of  organization  of  our  resources,  but  fail 
to  grasp  that  the  deficiencies  enumerated  above  relate  to  the  absolute 
necessities,  which  it  will  take  a  long  time  to  produce.  They  do  not 
realize  that  we  have  not  and  can  not  secure  for  many  months  these 
absolutely  necessary  every-day  weapons  and  equipment  of  war. 
They  fail  to  appreciate  that  these  must  be  produced  in  time  of  peace 
and  that  the  organization  of  all  our  resources  is  to  keep  up  the  sup- 
ply once  war  is  upon  n&  Furthermore,  they  do  not  realize  that  an 
untutored,  untrained,  and  undisciplined  people  can  not  pick  up 
thes-  ns  and  use  them  effectively;  that  this  preparation  also 

requires  time,  and   that   little  or  nothing  is  being  dor  t    in 

preparation  for  aexl  Bummer's  training  can  through  private 

efforts  conducted  with  private  funds.  Our  safety  now  is  dependent 
upon  the  forbearance  of  others  and  not  upon  our  ability  and  prepa- 
ration to  defend  our 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.   And  heavy  artillery? 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes:  heavy  artillery,  which  we  have  never  made,  nor, 
as  far  as  I  know,  even  designed  on  the  large  type.  There  is  also  a 
shortage  of  munitions  and  a  shortage  in  pretty  much  everything  for 
a  volunteer  force. 

Senator  Lex  of  Maryland.  Of  course  transportation? 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes;  the  Regular  Army  is  short  of  supplies  and  equip- 
ment, as  I  have  stated  above.  This  includes  aviators  and  modern 
machines.  The  militia  is  short  to  an  even  greater  extent  of  the  same 
articles.  As  for  supplies  for  a  Volunteer  Army — a  citizen  Army — 
with  the  exception  of  a  limited  number  of  rifles,  we  are  absolutely 
unprepared.  Our  seacoast-defense  guns  must  be  supplied  with  mod- 
ern carriages  which  will  not  deprive  the  guns  of  any  portion  of  their 
effective  range.  At  present  most  of  our  larger  seacoast  guns  are 
mounted  on  a  type  of  carriage  known  as  the  disappearing  carriage. 
This  carriage  permits  so  little  elevation  that  nearly  half  the  effective 
range  of  the  gun  is  lost.  Recent  developments  in  guns  afloat  make 
this  a  most  serious  defect  and  render  very  radical  changes  necessary. 

Unless  these  carriages  can  be  so  modified  as  to  permit  an  eleva- 
tion giving  maximum  effective  range  wherever  such  is  required,  this 
type  of  carriage  will  have  to  be  given  up  where  such  range  is  re- 
quired. Thus  far  the  indications  are  that  the  carriage  can  not  be  so 
modified.  That  a  seacoast  gun  should  not  be  mounted  on  a  carriage 
which  deprives  it  of  any  portion  of  its  effective  range  would  seem  to 
be  a  self-evident  fact. 


1104  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 

The  Chairman.  In  speaking  of  deficiencies,  would  you  not  put  in 
the  first  rank  of  deficiencies  trained  aviators  and  sufficient  machines 
and  accessories? 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes ;  nearly  all  which  is  needed  in  the  way  of  aviators 
and  machines  is  yet  to  be  provided. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  In  view  of  our  having  one  of  the  most 
expensive  armies  in  the  world,  certainly  on  a  peace  basis 

Gen.  Wood.  It  is,  undoubtedly,  I  expect.  Adequate  defense  at  rea- 
sonable cost  can  only  be  secured  through  universal  service. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  And  if  we  have  all  these  defects  that 
you  speak  of,  would  it  not  be  better  to  start  some  kind  of  competition 
in  the  shape  of  military  training  and  get  some  independent  military 
inspectors  and  advisers,  such  as  the  Swiss  officers,  for  the  National 
Guard  rather  than  to  keep  the  citizen  soldiers  longer  under  such  a 
defective  Regular  Army  system? 

Gen.  Wood.  The  Regular  Army  officer  has  never  been  referred  to 
as  defective.  The  system  is  generally  very  largely  responsible  for 
conditions.  If  you  will  read  our  recommendations  you  will  find  that 
we  have  been  very  frank  in  pointing  out  these  defects  for  years. 

The  Chairman.  In  the  last  analysis,  Congress  has  been  responsible 
for  most  of  it  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  think  so,  in  some  respects.'  Congress,  however,  in 
the  end  generally  does  what  the  people  want. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  I  notice  that  our  chairman  the  other 
day  introduced  a  memorandum  which  showed  that  Congress  had 
given  all  the  money  that  the  Army  had  ever  recommended  for  the 
development  of  the  citizen  soldiery. 

The  Chairman.  But  not  the  organization.  We  have  given  pretty 
generously  to  it,  but  not  the  organization  which  the  Army  asked. 
We  had  two  commissions  after  the  Civil  War.  Generals  in  the  Civil 
War  made  recommendations — 

Gen.  Wood.  And  after  the  Spanish  War,  too. 

The  Chairman.  Yes;  right  along.  We  had  reports  for  1908  and 
1915,  and  none  of  the  recommendations  were  adopted.  We  have 
been  pretty  generous  in  a  money  way. 

Gen.  Wood.  There  are  various  causes,  Senator.  The  fundamental 
cause  is  lack  of  knowledge  on  the  part  of  the  people,  first,  of  our  mili- 
tary history  with  its  stor}r  of  wastage  of  life  and  treasure  due  to  lack 
of  organization ;  secondly,  to  a  very  general  lack  of  information  con- 
cerning the  condition  of  preparedness  and  organization  throughout 
the  world  to-day.  Congress  represents,  as  a  rule,  the  opinions  and 
views  of  its  constituents.  Our  people  have  been  told  of  our  great 
wealth  and  resources  in  men.  They  have  never  been  told  that  these 
amount  to  nothing  in  the  way  of  meeting  an  immediate  attack  unless 
organized  and  trained  and  unless  the  materials  of  war  have  been  sup- 
plied. Panic  patriotism  and  patriotism  as  illustrated  by  the  putting 
out  of  flags  and  the  offer  of  money  and  material  after  war  is  upon  us, 
while  indicating  good  spirit,  indicate  a  lack  of  intelligent  apprecia- 
tion. It  is  too  late.  To  make  good  shortages  and  to  provide  equip- 
ment takes  time,  and  much  of  it  is  required.  No  amount  of  money 
can  buy  time,  and  months  of  it,  many  of  them,  are  needed  to  make 
even  reasonable  preparation.  The  knowledge  of  our  condition  is 
general  throughout  the  world  in  all  lands  except  our  own.  There 
has  been  a  lack  also  of  a  sound  policy  in  the  military  establishment 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING.  1105 

itself.  The  establishment  of  the  General  Staff  has  given  us  the  first 
strong  corrective  influence,  and  if  supported  a  sound  policy  will  grad- 
ually be  evolved.  In  my  opinion  much  of  the  delay  and  much  of  our 
shortage  in  the  way  of  anus  and  munitions  of  war  is  due  to  the  fact 
that  the  Ordnance  Department,  instead  of  accepting  its  proper  func- 
tion as  a  constructing  department,  has  assumed  too  much  the  atti- 
tude of  being  the  department  to  decide  what  type  and  what  quantity 
of  weapons  should  be  made  and  what  <!•  LOllld  be  accepted  as 

of  military  utility  and  what  rejected.  Instead  of  reaching  out  with 
a  view  to  studying  and  accepting  the  best  in  use  in  the  world  at 
the  time,  it  has  shown  a  strong  tendency  to  delay  acceptance  and 
attempt  something  of  its  own.  Able  as  many  of  its  members  are, 
the  Ordnance  Department  can  not  meet  in  competition  the  inventive 
genius  of  the  world.  This  has  prevented  as  from  talcing  advantage 
of  many  inventions;  for  example.  We  are  dawdling  along  to-day  in 
the  matter  of  machine  guns — are  going  to  make  a  trial  some  time 
next  spring,  although  we  are  to-day  practically  without  machine 
This  weapon  is  so  vital  that  we  should  have  been  making 
trials,  if  necessary,  during  the  past  winter.  Let  the  Genera]  Stan, 
which  has  representatives  of  all  arms,  decide  after  full  consideration, 
what  is  to  be  used  and  in  what  amounts,  and.  once  the  recommenda- 
tion has  been  approved  by  the  Secretary  of  War.  have  the  construc- 
tion departments  produce  the  articles  as  rapidly  as  appropriations 
will  permit.  Congress  is  to  blame  only  where  it  has  been  fully  and 
frankly  informed  and  has  not  met  the  clearly  apparent  needs  of  the 
Nation. 

The  Chairman.  Yes. 

Senator  Brady.  Congress  generally  does  what  the  people  want 
done. 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Brady.  And  if  there  has  been  any  lack  of  organization,  or 
any  lack  in  the  Army  of  a  greater  supply  of  men,  it  has  been  a  lack 
in  the  interest  on  the  part  of  the  people  themselves. 

( ien.  Wood.  After  the  Civil  War  we  had  for  20  years  1,000,000  men 
who  had  been  in  the  Civil  War.  We  had  scores  of  distinguished  offi- 
cers, and  had  a  feeling  of  conscious  ability  to  put  a  good  force  in  the 
field  in  a  hurry;  but  we  suddenly  awoke  to  the  fact  that  these  trained 
men  are  dead  or  too  old  to  serve ;  that  the  officers  are  no  longer  fit  for 
field  service:  that  from  the  old  condition  of  moderate  preparedness 
throughout  the  world  a  condition  of  thorough  organization  and  readi- 
ness such  as  the  world  never  dreamed  of  had  sprung  into  being:  that 
these  conditions  no  longer  permitted  the  old  haphazard  methods; 
that  we  stand  to-day  practically  wholly  unprepared  to  meet  organi- 
zation and  preparedness  of  this  kind.  It  may  or  may  not  be  unfortu- 
nate, but  the  fact  is,  it  is  here,  and  it  is  one  of  the  conditions  we  must 
meet.  After  the  Civil  War  we  were  engaged  in  developing  the  im- 
mense natural  resources  of  the  country.  AVe  had  a  rather  small  war 
with  Spain  which  we  got  through  without  serious  losses,  although  it 
was  conspicuous  for  bad  management.  The  new  condition  is  now 
upon  us.  We  must  prepare  to  meet  this  condition,  and  the  only 
way  this  can  be  done,  especially  under  a  democracy,  is  through  uni- 
versal military  obligation  and  service;  a  standing  Army  sufficient 
for  the  peace  needs  of  the  Nation  as  above  indicated,  an  excellent  and 


1106  UNIVERSAL  MILITARY   TRAINING. 

adequate  Navy  ready  at  all  times,  and  a  citizenry  trained  to  arms, 
under  conditions  which  will  interfere  as  little  as  practicable  with  their 
educational  and  industrial  lives,  a  training  to  be  given  under  a  brief 
period  of  intensive  training.  Six  months  of  such  training  will  be 
equivalent  to  a  year  and  a  half  of  average  training  in  the  regular 
establishment,  and  we  transfer  many  men  to  the  reserve  after  one 
year's  service,  because  we  find  them  to  be  efficient  and  well  trained 
soldiers.  Our  men  after  six  months  of  intensive  training  would 
average  higher  in  efficiency  than  these  men  after  a  year  of  service  in 
;the  regular  establishment.  The  average  period  of  intensive  training 
preliminary  to  going  to  the  front  of  the  British  recruit  (the  man 
who  has  had  no  previous  training)  is  14  weeks  for  the  Infantry, 
Field  Artillery,  Heavy  Artillery — in  fact,  for  all  arms  except  the 
Cavalry,  which  is  16  weeks. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  As  illustrative  of  the  limitations,  for 
the  safety  and  freedom  of  the  people,  the  Swiss  have  put  in  their 
small  standing  army  a  body  of  230  inspectors. 

Gen.  Wood.  May  I  suggest  that  they  have  had  much  trouble  in 
Switzerland.  The  people  are  made  up  of  various  racial  and  religious 
groups  and  bound  together  for  mutual  protection.  Kacial  and  re- 
ligious differences  have  sprung  up  among  them  from  time  to  time. 
The  cantons  of  the  different  racial  groups  and  religious  groups  have 
-rather  jealously  guarded  their  resources  and  powers.  Gradually, 
however,  everything  pertaining  to  defense  has  been  placed  practically 
in  the  hands  of  the  Federal  Council.  In  other  wTords,  the  Swiss  sys- 
tem is  under  Federal  control. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  Precisely;  we  understand,  of  course, 
that  they  have  racial  conditions  under  their  constitution  which  they 
have  solved  under  local  self-government.  Now,  we  have  racial  con- 
ditions here  which  we  solve  from  our  local  standpoint.  Is  it  not  a 
great  deal  better  to  respect  this  solution  which  has  been  so  success- 
fully made  under  State  or  contonal  arrangement  and  not  delay  pre- 
paredness by  going  to  work  and  .striking  at  all  these  local  solutions? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  wish  I  could  agree  with  you,  but  I  can  not.  I  think 
we  have  not  an  adequate  central  military  control. 

Senator  Lee  of  Maryland.  I  will  go  on  with  the  instructors  of  the 
Swiss  Army.     He  says : 

General,  I  call  your  attention  to  these  reports  showing  the  interest 
that  the  Swiss  have  in  the  freedom  of  their  people  and  the  efficiency 
of  their  Army  because  I  believe  you  are  earnestly  interested  and 
deeply  devoted  to  the  cause  of  general  preparation,  and  I  hope  you 
will  study  them  for  the  reason  that  it  seems  to  me,  as  I  look  at  the 
proposition,  that  the  inevitable  effect  of  your  efforts  wTill  be  to 
throw  the  national  defense  wholly  into  the  hands  of  the  Navy. 
Many  of  our  people  already  prefer  not  to  give  up  the  constitutional 
safeguards  as  to  land  forces  and  rely  only  upon  the  Navy.  The 
greater  safety  and  discipline  and  general  benefit  that  would  come  to 
our  people  through  a  Swiss  military  descipline  may  be  lost,  unless 
you  and  others  in  your  position  are  willing  to  respect  the  safeguards 
and  make  the  best  of  our  constitutional  provisions. 

Gen.  Wood.  Senator,  in  replying  to  these  very  interesting  but 
rather  difficult  questions  of  yours,  I  have  gone  into  the,  subject  as 
carefully  as  possible;  and  I  have  given  what  I  think  represents  a  fair 
statement  of  the  degree  of  Federal  control  exercised  by  the  Swiss 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING.  1107 

Federal  authorities  and  that  exercised  by  the  Federal  Government 
under  our  Constitution. 

The  Chairman.  I  wish  you  would  also  put  in  your  testimony  the 
number  of  National  Guard  officers,  if  you  have  a  list  of  them,  who 
applied  for  discharge  or  who  were  discharged  from  the  time  of  call 
until  the  muster  out. 

Gen  Wood.  I  will  be  glad  to  do  so,  Mr.  Chairman.  As  far  as  I 
can  learn  the  numbers  are  as  follows : 

Officers  submitting  resignations  which  were  accepted 575 

Officers  submitting  resignations  which  were  declined 82 

Total 657 

This  list  is  for  the  entire  militia  up  to  approximately  the  end  of 
the  year  1916. 

The  Chairman.  The  committee  will  now  take  a  recess  until  to- 
morrow morning  at  10.30  o'clock. 

( Accord intrlv  the  committee  adjourned  until  to-morrow,  Feb. 
1, 1917,  at  10.30  o'clock  a.  m.) 


STATEMENT  BEFORE  HOUSE  COMMITTEE 

JANUARY  27,  1917 


1109 


TO  LN CREASE  THE  EFFICIENCY  OF  THE  MILITARY  ESTAB- 
LISHMEYi'  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES. 


Committee  on  Military  Affairs, 
House  of  Representati 

T1iurs<lai/S  January  ..V.  1916, 
The  committee  met  at  10  o'clock  a.  in..  Hon.  James  Hay  (chairman) 

presiding. 

STATEMENT  OF  MAJ.   GEN.   LEONARD  WOOD,   COMMANDING 
DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  EAST. 

The  Chairman.  Gen.  Wood,  the  committee  is  ready  t<>  hear  you  on 
the  genera]  subject  of  preparedne 

(Jen.  AVood.  Do  you  wish  me  to  general  statement? 

The  C  .  1  think  that  would  desirable. 

Gen.  Wood.  I  believe  thai  we  need  a  very  material  inci  the 

strength  <>f  the  Mobile  Army,  the  Coast  Artillery,  and  the  Engin 
with  an  accompanying  increase  in  the  auxiliary  arms,  an  increase  pro- 
portionate to  whatever  increase  may  be  given  in  the  line. 

The  principal  shoi  I  day  are  limited  not  only  to  the  personnel, 

but  they  are  equally  alarming  in  the  materiel.  My  own  recommenda- 
tions called  for  a  regular  establishment  of  approximately  220,000  men 
with  proper  of  materiel  for  this  force,  and  also  a  reserve  of 

enlisted  men  equal  in  strength  to  the  regular  force.  They  also  called 
for  a  reserve  corps  of  officers  of  not  less  than  45,000,  for  which  we  have 
available  materiel  which  is  not  being  used. 

I  also  recommended  that  general  military  training  be  made  a 
national  policy.  T  do  not  believe  that  any  other  system  can  be  con- 
sidered as  other  than  a  makeshift  and  a  stopgap,  a  source  not  of 
safety,  but  of  delusion.  When  the  critical  moment  comes  it  will 
break  down,  as  it  has  broken  down  in  every  war  in  which  we  have 
been  engaged.  Any  attempt  to  depend  upon  a  volunteer  system, 
pure  and  simple,  admirable  as  is  the  volunteer  spirit,  will  fail.  It 
means  the  organization  for  war  after  war  is  upon  us  and  the  trans- 
ferring of  the  burden  of  war  to  the  time  of  war,  than  which  no  more 
unwise  policy  can  be  conceived. 

Those  were  the  essential  recommendations  which  I  made  with 
reference  to  increase  in  the  regular  establishment,  the  provision  of 
•ves  for  the  same,  both  of  men  and  materiel.  I  also  recom- 
mended the  general  training,  general  military  instruction  of  our  men 
of  suitable  age  and  physique,  a  reserve  corps  of  45,000  officers,  a  reg- 
ular establishment  of  approximately  220,000  men,  which  would  have 
to  be  increased  if  the  foreign  garrisons  should  be  increased  over  what 
1  recommended  in  my  report.  This  force  might  be  reduced  some- 
what in  strength,  so  far  as  the  troops  within  the  continental  United 

257 


258  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 

States  are  concerned,  when  we  have  an  adequate  and  well-trained 
reserve,  but  this  reduction  should  not  in  any  case  exceed  15  per  cent 
of  the  full  war  strength  of  the  organization. 

The  Chairman.  General,  when  you  say  general  training,  do  you 
mean  compulsory  training? 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes,  sir ;  a  national  training  modeled  on  the  Swiss  or 
Australian  system. 

I  also  recommended,  Mr.  Chairman,  that  we  should  accumulate 
sufficient  arms,  equipment,  and  reserve  supplies  for  a  million  and  a 
half  men  in  addition  to  the  reserve,  supplies,  arms,  and  so  forth, 
required  for  the  above  regular  force  and  its  reserve,  and  in  addition 
to  the  arms  and  supplies  required  for  the  militia  and  its  reserves, 
especially  those  arms  and  supplies  which  take  a  good  while  to  make, 
such  as  rifles,  field  artillery,  guns,  and  ammunition,  and  certain  por- 
tions of  the  equipment. 

Mr.  Tilson.  Gen.  Wood,  I  have  propounded  this  question  to  Gen. 
Crozier  and  others  who  have  appeared  before  this  committee, 
Whether  it  would  not  be  possible,  instead  of  storing  up  a  large 
amount  of  material,  arms,  and  so  forth,  to  make  preparation  in 
advance  of  special  appliances,  such  as  jigs  and  gages,  tools  and  fix- 
tures necessary  for  the  immediate  manufacture  of  arms  and  ammuni- 
tion, and  such  equipment  as  is  not  commercial,  so  that  we  could  begin 
the  immediate  manufacture  of  those  things  in  time  of  war,  instead 
of  storing  up  an  immense  amount  of  them  and  keeping  that  amount 
on  hand  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  You  mean  a  thorough  organization  of  our  industrial 
resources  ? 

Mr.  Tilson.  Not  only  that,  but  a  special  expenditure  by  the  Gov- 
ernment for  the  purchase  of  these  appliances.  I  have  found  upon 
investigation,  and  upon  making  inquiry  of  the  officers,  that  the  nec- 
essary fixtures  and  special  appliances  which  would  be  ready  for  the  - 
purpose  of  turning  out  small  arms  can  be  made  for  $275,000,  or  less, 
so  that  we  could  begin,  say,  next  week  to  turn  out  arms  and  ammuni- 
tion from  any  private  factory  not  now  engaged  in  the  manufacture 
of  modern  firearms  of  any  kind. 

Gen.  Wood.  I  think  that  would  be  a  wise  move,  but  I  do  not  think 
it  should  act  to  replace  the  supply  necessary  for  the  number  of  men 
required  to  meet  an  emergenc}^  such  as  war  with  a  first-class  power. 

Mr.  Tilson.  We  should  have  a  proper  amount  of  reserve  material, 
but  instead  of  having  anything  like  enough  on  hand  constantly  to 
carry  us  through  a  campaign,  to  have  these  fixtures  and  special  appli- 
ances ready  so  that  we  could  begin  immediate  manufacture  in  case  of 
necessity. 

Gen.  Wood.  I  agree  with  you  on  that,  provided  we  have  constantly 
on  hand  the  reserve  material  recommended  above. 

Mr.  Tilson.  That  has  been  the  trouble  with  our  manufacturers  in 
supplying  arms  and  ammunition  to  the  belligerents.  These  countries 
have  placed  their  orders,  and  it  has  taken  a  year  in  some  cases  for 
the  manufactories  to  get  ready  to  turn  out  the  arms  and  ammunition 
which  have  been  ordered,  and  the  principal  delay  was  caused  by  the 
time  taken  to  manufacture  these  special  appliances  which  are  of  a 
very  fine  and  very  accurate  nature  and  must  be  very  carefully  made. 

Gen.  Wood.  The  policy  what  I  feel  ought  to  be  followed  is  on 


IMVKKSAL   MILITARY    TRAINING.  259 

exactly  the  line  you  have  indicated,  for  the  purpose  of  upkeeping  the 
output  of  munitions.  If  there  is  any  particular  lesson  of  the  present 
war  which  has  been  more  impressive  than  another,  it  is  the  fact  that 
the  manufactories  in  this  country  were  wholly  unable  to  produce 
rapidly  and  in  large  amounts  arms  or  munitions  of  war,  with  the 
exception  of  powder.  We  did  produce  rapidly  large  amounts  of  food- 
stuffs, clothing,  shoes,  and  leather,  but  of  munitions  our  output  of 
powder  was  the  only  one  which  was  satisfactory,  and  this  was  because 
we  had  private  plants  organized  and  equipped  to  supply  powder  in 
large  amounts. 

In  the  matter  of  the  manufacture  of  rifles,  after  nearly  a  year  and 
a  half  of  war.  with  no  limit  on  the  prices,  the  prices  paid  being  much 
more  than  a  rifle  is  worth — sometimes  more  than  twice  what  it  is 
worth — we  were  putting  out.  up  to  a  few  week.,  ago.  less  than  3,400 
rifles  per  day  for  the  whole  United  Stati 

We  shall  be  able  to  put  out  a  good  many  more  by  the  first  of  May, 
but  we  have  had  to  go  to  work  and  build  plants  absolutely  de  novo, 
construct  the  machinery,  the  tools,  machines,  and  everything  else 
needed,  and  the  time  it  has  taken  us  to  get  ready  to  put  out  a  moder- 
ate supply  of  rifles  has  been  longer  than  the  duration  of  the  average 
modern  war,  and  this  has  been,  so  far  as  we  are  concerned,  in  a  time 
of  peace,  with  no  one  molesting  us  in  any  way. 

Now,  the  output  of  some  other  munitions  has  been  equally  slow. 
The  question  of  time  fuses  for  shrapnel  and  high-explosive  shell  has 
been  a  very  serious  question,  and  to-day  I  doubt  if  we  are  putting 
out  over  25,000  a  day.  We  were  putting  out  about  18,000  three  weeks 
ago.  We  should  be  putting  out  about  80,000  or  90,000,  or  perhaps 
more,  but  even  that  would  not  meet  the  demand  of  any  of  the  great 
nations  now  engaged  in  war-  for  average  daily  09 

The  Chairman.  General,  you  .stated  you  think  we  should  have  a 
Regular  Army  of  220,000  men  a  mobile  army,  which  includes,  of 
course,  the  Coast  Artillery? 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  It  has  been  testified  here  by  The  Adjutant  Gen- 
eral and  Chief  of  Staff  and  the  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff  that  50,000 
men  are  all  that  can  he  recruited  in  a  year  for  our  Army,  under  the 
volunteer  system.    Do  you  agree  with  that  statement  ( 

Gen.  Wood.  No.  sir;  I  disagree  with  it  absolutely  and  completely. 

The  Chairman.  How  would  you  change  the  recruiting  system  in 
order  to  get  the  recruits  to  fill  up  an  army  of  220,000  men  s 

Gen.  Wood.  I  would  establish  a  form  of  enlistment  under  which 
intelligence,  application,  and  industry  would  have  some  bearing  upon 
determining  how  long  a  man  shall  remain  with  the  colors  before  he 
goes  into  the  reserve.  I  would  have  no  minimum  period.  I  would 
authorize  company,  troop,  and  battery  commanders  to  recommend 
transfer  or  to  transfer  a  man  to  the  reserve  as  soon  as  in  the  opinion 
of  the  officer  that  man  is  a  well-trained  soldier. 

I  would  also  eliminate  absolutely  discharge  by  purchase  and  let 
the  transfer  to  the  status  of  a  soldier  on  furlough  in  the  reserve  be 
accomplished  through  proficiency  rather  than  through  purchase. 

The  Chairman.  Then,  as  I  understand  you,  you  would  provide  an 
enlistment  contract  which  would  not  have  in  it  any  period  of  years? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  do  not  care,  sir,  how  long  within  reason  the  maxi- 

86205—17 13 


260  UNIVERSAL    MILITARY    TRAINING. 

mum  period  is.  There  should  be  a  maximum  period,  but  I  would 
have  no  minimum.  I  would  authorize  the  transfer  of  a  man  to  the 
reserve  when  he  is  thoroughly  trained  as  a  soldier,  provided  he  is  not 
on  foreign  service.  I  think  in  case  a  man  is  on  foreign  service  he 
should  not  be  furloughed  to  the  reserve  until  he  has  served  at  least 
a  year,  unless  he  is  on  foreign  service,  where  transfers  of  recruits  and 
returning  men  can  be  made  by  transport  at  the  minimum  of  expense. 

The  Chairman.  How  would  you  discriminate  between  men  on 
foreign  service  and  men  who  are  at  home,  when  they  go  in  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  You  would  have  to  discriminate  from  the  fact  that 
he  is  on  foreign  service.  It  would  mean  that  his  transfer  should  be 
held  up  until  he  came  back  home  or  had  had  a  year's  service. 

The  Chairman.  Would  not  that  plan  make  it  impossible  to  say 
just  how  many  men  would  be  in  the  Army  at  a  given  time;  would  it 
not  require  the  recruitment  of  more  men  than  under  the  present 
system  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  Possibly  so,  but  this  would  be  a  very  minor  considera- 
tion in  comparison  with  the  benefit  which  would  accrue  under  such 
a  system,  and  the  variation  in  numbers  would  be  provided  against 
within  reasonable  limits.  I  think  you  would  secure  a  much  more 
intelligent  class  of  men  under  a  system  which  permitted  transfer 
to  the  reserve  as  soon  as  men  are  efficient.  There  are  plenty  of  men 
who  are  desirous  of  qualifying  and  being  passed  into  the  reserve, 
but  who  do  not  wTant  to  tie  themselves  up  for  a  number  of  years. 

I  think  it  is  safe  to  say  that  at  least  100  men  last  summer  applied 
for  information  as  to  whether  they  could  or  could  not  enlist  for  three, 
four,  five,  or  six  months.  They  said  they  would  be  willing  to  do 
that,  if  by  doing  so  they  could  qualify  to  get  into  the  reserve,  but  they 
did  not  like  to  tie  themselves  up  for  the  present  long  period  of  enlist- 
ment. 

I  think  the  length  of  time  a  man  now  has  to  serve  is  a  great  bar  to 
an  increase  in  recruiting  as  is  the  impossibility  of  furlough  to  the 
reserve  on  establishment  of  proficiency. 

The  Chairman.  The  other  officers  who  have  appeared  before  this 
committee  have  stated  that  they  did  not  think  the  time  would  have 
anything  to  do  with  the  question  of  joining  the  Army;  but  that,  of 
course,  is  a  matter  of  opinion. 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes,  sir;  that  is  a  matter  of  opinion. 

The  Chairman.  General,  what  is  your  opinion  as  to  whether  the 
organizations  of  the  Army  should  be  kept  at  full  strength  or  skele- 
tonized ? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  think  that  they  should  be  kept  at  full  strength  until 
we  secure  an  adequate  reserve.  After  we  secure  an  adequate  reserve 
we  might  then  cut  them  dowm  to  90  or  85  per  cent. 

This  should  not  apply  to  foreign  possessions;  the  garrison  there 
should  always  be  kept  at  full  strength  and,  I  think,  should  have 
about  10  per  cent  additional  to  each  organization. 

The  Chairman.  General,  I  think  you  are  an  advocate  of  keeping 
the  organizations  at  their  full  strength? 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes,  sir;  I  think  that  is  absolutely  essential,  at  least, 
until  we  have  an  adequate,  well-trained  reserve. 

The  Chairman.  What  is  your  reason  for  that,  General  '. 


UNIVERSAL    MILITARY    TRAINING.  261 

(Jen.  Wood.  I  will  illustrate  that  by  a  case  in  point.  For  three 
years  we  have  been  threatened  with  more  or  less  serious  difficulty  on 
the  border.  Our  Infantry  regiments  there  are  now  at  about  46  per 
cent  of  their  war  strength,  and  if  we  had  to  send  them  to  any  for- 
eign country  we  would  send  them  with  much  less  than  half  their  full 
war  strength,  with  a  corresponding  liability  to  disaster.  We  have 
only  a  handful  of  regiments  and  our  Infantry  on  the  border  is  only 
at  about  46  or  47  per  cent  of  its  war  strength.  One  of  our  regiments 
at  Panama  is  600  men  short. 

The  Cavalry  is  maintained  at  about  75  per  cent  of  its  full  war 
strength,  and  the  Field  Artillery,  although  we  have  only  a  few  regi- 
ments, is  maintained  at  about  77  per  cent  of  its  full  war  strength.  It 
is  a  dangerous  condition  and  spells  disaster.  Ami  it  is  a  condition 
which  exists,  although  the  Army  is  well  below  the  statutory  limit  in 
strength. 

The  Chairman.  However  small  the  Army  may  be.  you  think  the 
organizations  ought  to  be  at  their  full  strength  I 

Gen.  Wood.  1  think  so.  Until  we  have  secured  an  adequate  and 
well-trained  reserve  and  until  there  has  been  a  very  material  increase 
in  the  Regular  Establishment.  When  this  has  been  done  and  your 
reserve  built  up  you  could  safety  drop  about  15  per  cent  in  strength, 
but  I  would  never  go  below  that. 

The  Chairman.  You  mean  a  reserve  upon  which  you  could  call 
immediately  in  the  event  of  warl 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes,  sir;  furloughed  soldiers  in  the  reserve,  assigned 
to  organizations,  but  on  the  status  of  a  furlough. 

The  Chairman.  General,  I  believe  you  have  testified  before  the 
Senate  Committee  on  Military  Affairs,  have  you  not  ! 

(Jen.  Wood.   Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  And  you  have  stated  before  that  committee  that 
you  think  the  Field  Artillery  should  be  very  much  increased? 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  To  what  extent  do  you  think  the  Field  Artillery 
should  be  increased? 

Gen.  Wood.  Nineteen  regiments,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  That  would  make  how  many  batteries? 

Gen.  Wood.  That  would  be  25  regiments.  Some  of  the  batteries 
would  be  of  the  heavier  type.  It  would  be,  roughly,  25  regiments 
altogether,  including  the  6 ;  we  have  now  practically  150  batteries. 

The  Chairman.  Then  you  do  not  agree  with  the  plans  proposed  by 
the  War  Department,  to  the  effect  that  there  should  be  only  an  in- 
crease of  four  regiments? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  think  that  is  dangerously  inadequate,  wholly  inade- 
quate. The  Artillery  is,  perhaps  beyond  everything  else  the  weapon 
which  has  come  particularly  to  the  front  in  this  European  war,  and 
we  have  very  little. 

It  is  very  difficult  to  make,  and  it  is  extremely  difficult  to  train  men 
to  use.  and  I  think  we  ought  to  have  a  good  nucleus  of  Field  Artil- 
lery always  at  hand. 

The  Chairman.  Does  it  take  longer  to  train  a  man  to  be  a  Field 
Artillery  man  than  it  takes  to  train  him  to  be  a  foot  soldier ; 

Gen.  Wood.  No,  sir ;  not  if  we  could  train  the  Artillery  throughout 
the  year  to  the  extent  that  we  can  Infantry.    It  requires  a  great  deal 


262  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY    TRAINING. 

of  actual  firing  to  make  really  good  gunners  and  good  judges  of  the 
effect  of  fire.  This  is  difficult  to  get  at  many  posts,  because  of  lack 
of  proper  ground  to  fire  over. 

The  Chairman.  If  the  question  arose  as  to  whether  you  would 
increase  the  Infantry  or  the  Field  Artillery,  which  would  you  say 
ought  to  be  done? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  would  not  recommend  the  increase  of  either  without 
an  increase  in  the  other  branches.  If  I  could  only  recommend  the 
increase  of  one  I  should  recommend  the  increase  of  Field  Artillery  at 
the  present  time. 

The  Chairman.  You  think  they  should  both  be  increased  in  pro- 
portion ? 

Gen.  Wood.  My  recommendation  for  an  increase  of  19  regiments 
in  the  Field  Artillery  was  based  upon  the  assumption  that  we  would 
maintain  in  the  Philippines,  roughly  speaking,  about  20,000  men, 
exclusive  of  Philippine  Scouts.  This  estimate  contemplates  the  26 
companies  of  Coast  Artillery  with  field  and  staff  need  for  manning 
the  defenses  installed  and  now  approaching  completion.  We  now 
have  there  18,000,  including  Philippine  Scouts.  My  recommenda- 
tion upon  that  subject  was  based  upon  the  further  assumption  that 
we  should  maintain  in  the  Hawaiian  Islands  a  garrison  of  six  war- 
strength  regiments  of  Infantry,  a  regiment  of  Cavalry,  and  two 
regiments  of  Field  Artillery — a  garrison  of  about  18,000  men,  or, 
with  10  per  cent  increase,  approximately  20,000. 

The  Chairman.  Have  we  18,000  men  in  the  Philippines? 

Gen.  Wood.  Counting  the  native  and  auxiliary  troops,  I  think  we 
have  about  18,600. 

The  Chairman.  You  are  counting  the  Philippine  Scouts? 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes,  sir.  Then  we  shall  need  also  a  garrison  of  about 
15.000  men  in  Panama.  I  do  not  recommend  that  we  should  have 
as  heavy  a  garrison  at  Panama  as  some  others  have  recommended, 
nor  do  I  recommend  as  heavy  a  garrison  at  Hawaii  as  has  been 
recommended,  for  the  reason  that  I  believe  that  the  garrisons  which 
I  recommend  will  be  sufficient  to  meet  successfully  a  raiding  force 
from  a  fleet,  even  from  a  large  fleet,  which  would  probably  not  be 
able  to  land  over  12,000  or  15,000  men  at  most,  probably  not  over 
10,000.  These  garrisons  should  be  adequate  to  hold  these  places 
while  we  retain  sea  control  or  are  able  to  contest  the  control  of  the 
sea.  If  we  lose  sea  control  then  an  enemy  will  be  able  to  bring  any 
force  he  may  desire  and  all  these  places  must  in  time  fall. 

The  Chairman.  You  are  aware  of  the  fact,  of  course,  that  there 
is  pending  in  the  Senate  a  bill  proposing  to  give  up  the  Philippine 
Islands  in  four  years? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  have  seen  statements  to  that  effect  in  the  newspapers. 

The  Chairman.  If  that  bill  were  passed,  what  effect  would  that 
have  on  your  idea  as  to  an  increase  of  the  Army?  If  we  abandon 
the  Philippines,  to  what  extent  can  we  change  our  view  with  regard 
to  the  Army,  and  the  military  forces  which  we  ought  to  have  in  this 
country '( 

Gen.  Wood.  If  we  abandon  the  Philippine  Islands  altogether 
and  did  not  have  to  go  back  promptly  to  reestablish  order,  then 
you  would  be  able  to  reduce  the  Regular  Establishment  recom- 
mended, namely.  220,000,  by  the  strength  of  the  present  garrison  of 
the  Philippines. 


INIVKKSAL    MIIIIAKV    TRAINING.  263 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  not  consider  the  Philippines  ;>s  a  source 
of  military  weakness  to  the  United  States? 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes  and  no.  It  depends  entirely  upon  the  strength 
of  the  Xavv.  If  we  have  a  strong  fleet  a  base  in  the  Philippines 
would  tie  extremely  useful  for  operations  in  Asiatic  waters  or  for 
controlling  the  sen  communications  of  an  Asiatic  power.  The  Philip 
pine  Islands  would  he  a  source  of  military  weakness  to  the  extent 
that  we  might  lose  a  garrison  there  stationed  Unless  We  had  a  strong 
and  adequate  Navy  and  aide  to  clear  the  sea  and  relieve  the  pics- 
sure  on  our  force 

Mi*.  QuiN.  The  fad  that  we  have  the  Philippines  causes  us  to 
have  to  keep  an  army  then'  I 

(Jen.  Wood.    Yes.  sir. 

Mr.  Quin.  1^  that  not  one  of  the  1 1 1  i n ir>  that  causes  the  demand 
for  a  larger  Navy— the  fact  that  we  have  the  Philippine  Islands^ 

Gen.  Wood.  Not  ;it  all.  It  has  no  relation  to  the  holding  of  the 
Philippines. 

Mr.  QuiN.  Then  the  arguments  that  have  l»e. 'u  made  in  Congress 
on  that  proposition,  based  on  that  assumption,  have  been  fallacious? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  do  not  know  what  those  arguments  have  been. 

Mr.  Caldwell.  General,  you  had  charge  of  the  Business  Men's 
Camp  at  Plattsburg,  X.  V..  last  year? 

Ccn.  Wood.  Yes. 

Mr.  Caldwell.  Will  you  tell  us  something  about  your  experience 
there  and  whether  you  think  that  was  a  good  thing? 

Gen.  Wood.  J  think  it  was  a  very  valuable  piece  of  work,  for  two 
reasons.  Not  so  much,  perhaps,  because  of  the  military  information 
which  these  men  got  as  the  fact  that  they  went  away  from  that  camp 
convinced  as  to  what  training  really  means,  and  what  organization 
means,  and  they  became  pretty  thoroughly  grounded  in  the  basic 
principles  of  organization,  in  questions  of  training,  as  to  the  need 
of  officers,  the  need  of  supplies,  and  all  that  sort  of  thing. 

They  were  given  a  very  hard  month's  work,  about  as  much  work 
as  the  ordinary  militiaman  would  get  during  the  period  of  three 
years  in  an  average  militia  organization,  and  they  got  it  consecu- 
tively under  the  officers  of  the  Regular  Army,  carefully  selected,  and 
in  conjunction  with  regular  troops.  They  were  all  men  of  a  very 
high  grade  of  intelligence,  and  they  went  ahead,  as  compared  with 
the  average  recruit,  probably  at  the  rate  of  ()  or  8  to  1. 

The  officers  of  our  training  staff  reported  that  the  work  these 
men  had  accomplished  equalled  about  lour  and  a  half  or  live  months' 
work  by  recruits  under  favorable  conditions. 

Mr.  Caldwell.  How  long  do  you  think  it  would  take  to  make  a 
good  soldier? 

Gen.  Wood.  That  depends  upon  the  man's  intelligence,  his  willing- 
ness, his  interest  in  the  work,  and  the  conditions  under  which  you 
place  him. 

Take  the  men  such  as  we  had  at  Plattsburg  last  summer,  under  the 
conditions  that  existed  there.  They  had  at  the  Plattsburg  camp 
plenty  of  officers  of  marked  ability  who  acted  as  instructors,  Regular 
troops  which  served  as  model  organizations,  a  good  target  range,  and 
good  country  to  work  over.  Under  those  circumstances  you  could 
train  those   particular  men    very   well   in  three   months.      At    is   was. 


264  UNIVERSAL    MILITARY    TRAINING. 

the  average  in  shooting  was  something  like  66  per  cent  of  marksmen 
and  better,  covering  the  full  militia  course.  Anyone  who  is  familiar 
with  the  militia  record  knows  what  that  means.  And  in  saying  that 
I  do  not  mean  to  cast  any  reflections  on  the  militia.  That  average 
was  about  double  the  average  of  the  militia  for  the  whole  country. 

Take,  for  instance,  men  like  George  Wharton  Pepper  or  Bullitt. 
They  are  types  of  the  hundreds  of  men  who  were  there.  The  ele- 
ments of  military  drill  were  not  difficult  for  those  men  to  understand. 
That  type  of  men  you  can  train  to  be  good  soldiers  very  quickly. 
The  men  we  should  probably  get  as  recruits  under  the  continental- 
army  plan  could  be  trained  very  well  in  six  months  if  assembled  in 
large  training  camps  alongside  of  full-strength  organizations  of 
Regular  troops  and  under  the  instructions  of  carefully  selected  offi- 
cers of  the  Regular  Army.  Everything  depends  upon  the  condition 
under  which  men  are  trained  and  the  time  given  to  the  training 
each  day — the  following  out  of  a  carefully  prepared  and  progressive 
schedule.  None  of  these  things  are  possible  at  the  average  post,  at 
which  recruits  are  received  at  frequent  and  irregular  intervals,  and 
at  which  there  is  a  great  amount  of  police  and  administrative  work. 
There  is  absolutely  no  comparison  between  what  can  be  accomplished 
under  conditions  such  as  we  had  at  Plattsburg  and  conditions  such 
as  exist  at  the  average  post,  nor  should  the  results  obtained  under 
normal  conditions  at  the  Regular  Establishment  form  the  basis  for 
estimating  the  time  that  would  be  required  to  train  men  under  con- 
ditions such  as  would  exist  in  a  camp  equipped  and  prepared  for 
intensive  training. 

Mr.  Caldwell.  There  has  been  quite  a  good  deal  of  talk  here  in 
regard  to  the  idea  of  training  a  man  to  such  a  thorough  extent  that 
he  will  become  almost  unconsciously  obedient  to  the  word  of  the 
military  commanders.  Do  you  think  a  man  can  be  so  thoroughly 
trained  that  he  can  be  gotten  into  that  frame  of  mind  in  three  months 
or  six  months? 

Gen.  Wood.  That  is  a  rather  common  expression  used  by  those  who 
are  arguing  for  long  periods  of  training.  I  believe  the  training  can 
be  acquired  by  a  reasonably  intelligent  man  in  the  time  mentioned. 
The  conditions  of  modern  war  are  not  such  that  the  commanding 
officer's  voice  is  heard  at  all  times.  In  extended  order  and  in  modern 
battle  formation  men  have  to  develop  a  very  considerable  degree  of 
individuality  and  self-control.  This  condition  can  only  be  estab- 
lished to  the  highest  extent  where  there  is  a  large  measure  of 
intelligence.  There  are  two  kinds  of  discipline — one,  the  discipline 
of  intelligence,  where  a  man  surrenders  his  body  and  subordinates 
his  will  absolutely.  This  discipline  is  based  upon  intelligence  and 
upon  an  appreciation  of  the  needs  of  the  situation.  Intelligent. men 
appreciate  that  success  with  large  bodies  is  dependent  upon  subordi- 
nation, cooperation,  and  prompt  obedience.  They  know  and  appre- 
ciate this  because  they  are  intelligent  men.  They  have  read  and 
studied  enough  to  know  that  failure  comes  from  the  lack  of  subordi- 
nation and  concerted  effort.  The  other  kind  of  discipline  is  the 
discipline  of  habit.  This  is  the  type  of  discipline  that  ^yas  ham- 
mered into  men  in  the  days  when  soldiers  were  largely  illiterate. 
It  is  apt  to  be  destroyed  by  any  impulse  stronger  than  the  habit. 
It  is  not  founded  upon  an  intelligent  appreciation  of  a  soldier's  duty 


TNIYKKSAL    MILITARY    TRAINING,  265 

or  the  needs  of  the  situation.  It  is  applicable  where  mentality  is  low 
and  where  the  recruit's  body  has  not  been  made  subject  to  his  will 
by  training  or  exercises  which  tend  to  produce  that  result.  This 
class  of  recruit  has  to  be  drilled  until  certain  things  become  a  habit, 
but  he  is  never  as  valuable  a  man  as  the  man  who  does  things  because 
he  appreciates  something  of  the  reason  for  doing  them. 

The  intelligent,  reasoning  type  of  man,  if  he  is  driven  out  of  one 
position  and  sees  an  equally  good  one  before  him,  is  unwounded  and 
has  his  supply  of  ammunition,  appreciates  that  he  is,  if  his  organiza- 
tion holds  together,  practically  as  well  off  as  he  was  before.  The 
ignorant  man  is  less  appreciative  of  the  possibilities  and  more  difficult 
to  rally.  Modern  warfare  requires  not  only  discipline  but  intelli- 
gence. Men  frequently  have  to  work  intelligently  when  separated 
from  their  officers,  and  the  idea  that  officers  are  always  in  intimate 
contact  with  the  men  is  quickly  removed  when  you  appreciate  the 
extent  of  modern  actions  and  the  difficulty  of  the  officers  maintaining 
close  contact  with  the  men. 

When  the  intensive  method  of  training  is  adopted  under  a  well 
thought  out  progressive  plan,  recruits  can  be  trained  in  six  months  to 
be  reasonably  efficient  soldiers.  Pretty  much  depends  upon  the  sys- 
tem and  method  of  training  and  freedom  from  outside  work  which 
has  no  direct  relation  to  the  man's  military  training.  It  isn't  the  time 
a  man  is  in  the  service  necessarily,  but  it  is  the  amount  of  instruction 
he  receives.  A  long  continuance  in  the  service  under  conditions  which 
impose  work  of  a  nonmilitary  character  tends  to  produce  not  effi- 
cient soldiers,  but  men  disconnected  with  the  service  whose  interests 
have  been  destroyed. 

Mr.  Caldwell.  General,  do  you  think  the  men  at  the  Plattsburg 
Camp  would  be  equipped  to  Berve  as  officers  of  the  United  States 
Army  in  case  of  emergency? 

Gen.  Wood.  Not  at  all:  they  would  be  better  equipped  by  far  than 

any  men  we  have  ever  had  as  officers  of  volunteers  at  the  beginning 
of  a  war.  except  those  men  who  have  come  in  as  officers  of  volunteers 
alter  having  had  previous  service  either  in  the  Army,  Marine  Corps, 
or  some  well-instructed  militia  organization.  These  men  had  thor- 
ough basic  training  so  far  as  it  went,  but  weJB  prepared  to  take  hold 
of  and  commence  the  training  of  men  in  the  school  of  the  soldier, 
squad,  and  the  company.  They  were  familiar  with  the  rifle  and  with 
the  principles  of  target  practice. 

Mr.  Kaiin.  Have  you  changed  your  view  in  regard  to  short-term 
enlistments  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  Apparently  not. 

Mr.  Kaiix.  Did  you  not  think  several  years  ago  that  a  maximum 
enlistment  of  two  years  would  be  about  the  right  thing,  and  that  if  an 
enlisted  man  was  well  qualified  as  a  soldier  in  one  year  he  ought  to 
be  let  out  in  a  year? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  would  let  him  out  in  30  days,  if  he  qualified. 

I  recommended  a  measure  which  provided  for  an  enlistment  of 
three  years  with  the  colors  and  three  years  with  the  reserve,  with 
transfer  to  the  reserve  whenever,  in  'the  opinion  of  the  organization 
commander,  the  man  is  a  well-trained  soldier.  My  own  ideas  have 
been  somewhat  modified  by  recent  experiments  in  one-year  periods 
of  training  recruits  under  a  progressive  system  of  intensive  training, 


266  IWIVKKSAL    MILITARY    TRAINING. 

and  I  should  now  recommend  enlistment  of  two  years  with  the  colors 
and  six  years  in  the  reserve  under  the  provision  that  a  man  could 
be  transferred  to  the  reserve  whenever  he  is  well  trained. 

Mr.  Kaiin.  Now,  you  say  you  would  enlist  them  for  an  indetermi- 
nate period,  and  return  them  to  civil  life  when  they  are  proficient. 
Do  you  not  think  it  would  be  very  difficult  to  get  men  to  join  the 
Army  on  that  kind  of  an  enlistment,  with  an  indeterminate  period? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  said  it  made  not  so  much  difference  how  long  the 
period  is:  the  important  thing  is  that  the  man  should  have  an  oppor- 
tunity to  get  into  the  reserve  in  as  short  a  time  as  possible.  I  said 
that  was  the  important  thing. 

Mr.  Kahn.  I  thoroughly  agree  with  you  on  that. 

Gen.  Wood.  What  I  meant,  Mr.  Kahn,  was  that  if  you  or  I  enlist, 
we  would  not  care  particularly  whether  the  period  is  four  or  live  years 
if  we  knew  we  could  be  furloughed  into  the  reserve  the  moment  we 
were  proficient  and  we  intended  to  serve  as  reservists. 

Mr.  Kahn.  The  testimony  before  the  committee  is  to  the  effect 
that  there  is  considerable  difficulty  in  securing  men  to  enlist.  About 
50,000  per  annum  is  the  maximum  number  that  they  now  secure,  and 
they  contend  that  they  are  doing  better  now  than  they  have  ever  been 
able  to  do  heretofore.  Do  you  believe  if  the  strength  of  the  Army 
were  increased  to  220,000  men,  as  you  suggest,  that  we  would  find  no 
difficulty  at  all  in  securing  the  additional  men  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  Under  a  proper  form  of  enlistment  I  do  not  anticipate 
the  slightest  difficulty.  In  fact,  I  think  you  could  increase  the  number 
to  almost  any  extent  you  want  if  you  wTould  give  intelligence  and  apti- 
tude and  application  any  recognition  in  your  enlistment  act. 

Mr.  Kahn.  Do  you  not  think  it  would  be  easier  to  secure  men  for 
the  Army  if  you  wTere  to  enlist  them  for  a  period  of,  say,  two  years, 
with  the  understanding  that  if  they  are  proficient  inside  of  that  time 
they  can  get  an  honorable  discharge  and  go  into  the  reserve,  thus 
making  the  maximum  enlistment  period  two  years?  If  a  man  could 
not  be  trained  to  be  a  soldier  at  the  end  of  two  years,  do  you  not  think 
he  had  better  get  out  of  the  Army? 

Gen.  Wood.  If  he  could  not  be  made  a  soldier,  under  proper  instruc- 
tion, in  six  months,  he  isxnot  worth  using  in  the  line. 

I  recommend  a  six-year  period,  two  years  with  the  colors  and  four 
years  in  reserve,  two  years  on  the  active  list,  with  an  opportunity  to 
transfer  to  the  reserve  whenever  qualified.  I  think  under  an  enlist- 
ment act  of  that  sort  you  would  find  such  a  rush  of  men  who  would 
want  to  come  to  the  colors  that  you  would  have  no  difficulty  in  secur- 
ing the  desired  number  of  men. 

The  men  of  this  country  would  he  willing  to  serve  in  the  Army  for 
the  purpose  of  securing  training  if  there  was  an  opportunity  to  com- 
plete that  training  and  be  furloughed  into  the  reserve  when  quali- 
fied, but  they  are  not  willing  to  serve  under  an  enlistment  act  which 
does  not  recognize  through  making  transfer  to  the  reserve  practi- 
cable on  attainment  of  proficiency,  either  intelligent  application  or 
aptitude.  If  we  had  an  enlistment  act  under  which  these  qualities 
were  in  any  way  recognized  in  securing  transfer  to  the  reserve.  I  am 
confident  we  should  have  a  very  large  number  of  men  undergoing 
training  in  the  Regular  Army  for  the  purpose  of  preparing  them- 
selves to  lie  efficient  soldiers  in  time  of  war.     It  is  ridiculous  to  talk 


UNIVERSAL    MILITARY    TRAINING.  267 

about  men  not  being  willing  to  serve.  They  are  not  willing  to  serve 
under  the  present  enlistment  act.  as  it  is  inelastic. 

Mr.  Kaiin.  If  we  were  to  become  involved  in  war,  you  could  not 
very  well  spend  more  than  six  months'  time  in  training  the  men  before 
sending  them  to  the  front  i 

Gen.  Wood.  If  you  could  spend  even  six  months'  time  in  doing 
that,  it  would  be  because  the  enemy  had  gone  to  sleep.  The  man  must 
be  trained  and  in  reserve.  This  must  be  done  in  time  of  peace.  The 
country  to-day  is  wholly  unprepared  for  war  with  a  first-class  power. 

The  Chairman.  It  has  been  suggested  to  me  that  I  ask  whether  or 
not  you  think  the  pay  should  be  increased,  and  if  so,  how  much; 
whether  or  not  the  increasing  of  the  pay  would  cause  more  men  to  go 
into  the  Army  than  go  in  now? 

Gen,  Wood.  I  do  not  believe  the  pay  needs  to  be  increased.  I  would 
recommend  very  strong  against  it.  I  think  if  you  have  a  proper 
enlistment  act  the  men  will  come  in,  and  that  you  will  get  as  many 
men  as  you  can  handle. 

The  Chairman,  Then  suppose  you  had  a  plan  by  which  men  could 
more  easily  become  corporals  and  sergeants  and  other  noncommis- 
sioned officers,  or  suppose  there  should  be  a  way  opened  for  them 
to  go  to  the  rank  of  second  lieutenant,  do  you  think  any  plan  can 
be  devised  by  which  more  men  would  be  encouraged  to  go  into  the 
Army? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  think  we  should  only  make  noncommissioned  officers 
on  a  basis  of  efficiency,  and  T  believe  with  an  enlistment  act  which 
would  attract  men  we  would  get  a  better-educated  class  of  men,  and 
we  should  be  able  to  prepare  more  men  for  furlough  into  the  reserve 
and  develop  more  material  out  of  which  we  could  make  efficient 
officers.  Many  good  men  say  they  would  be  willing  to  enlist  for 
three,  four,  or  five  months,  and  that  they  would  be  willing  to  take 
the  training  and  do  the  work  for  that  length  of  time,  but  they  can 
not  afford  to  stay  longer  than  that. 

The  Chairman.  How  about  giving  them  a  chance  to  get  a  second 
lieutenancy? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  think  that  could  be  done  under  proper  conditions. 
If  a  man  shows  capacity  and  has  the  education  to  make  an  officerr 
he  could  he  well  furloughed  into  the  reserve,  with  a  recommendation 
that  he  should  be  given  an  opportunity  to  take  the  training  for  an 
officer  of  reserves. 

The  CHAIRMAN.  Would  you  recommend  that  it  be  made  easier  for 
an  enlisted  man  to  get  a  second  lieutenancy  than  is  the  case  at  the 
present  time? 

Gen.  Wood.  You  mean  lower  the  standard?  No,  sir;  I  would  not 
lower  the  standard  a  bit.  I  Would  try  to  get  a  better  class  of  men  to 
come  up  to  the  standard  more  quickly. 

Mr.  Kaiin.  The  present  requirement  is  that  a  man  must  have  been 
an  enlisted  man  for  two  years  before  he  can  be  designated  to  take 
the  examination  for  a  commission. 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes.  That  is,  he  can  not  be  commissioned  until  he 
has  had  two  years'  service. 

Mr.  Kahn.  Do  you  not  think  that  period  ought  to  be  lowered? 

Gen.  Wood.  You  can  lower  the  period  if  he  shows  capacity.  I 
think  capacity  and  fitness  once  demonstrated  is  the  important  thing 


268  CJ.NIVERSAL    MILITARY    TRAINING. 

rather  than  a  specified  period  of  service.  For  instance,  we  take  a 
man  from  civil  life  without  any  service  whatever  provided  he  can 
pass  a  satisfactory  examination.  We  know  little  or  nothing,  from 
observation  at  least,  of  his  character  and  habits.  I  believe  a  man 
after  a  year's  observation  if  he  displays  capacity  could  be  safely 
recommended  without  further  delay. 

Mr.  Kahn.  You  speak  of  an  army  of  220,000  men.  Can  you  give 
the  committee  the  proportions  you  would  propose  in  the  several 
branched  of  the  service? 

Gen.  Wood.  Do  you  refer  to  the  troops  of  the  United  States? 

The  Chairman.  Will  you  say  whether  those  220,000  men  includes 
the  Philippine  Scouts? 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes,  sir;  but  it  does  not  include  the  1.070  increase 
proposed  for  organizations  or  foreign  service. 

The  Chairman.  And  the  Porto  Eican  regiment? 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes;  that  includes  all  foreign  possessions.  I  recom- 
mended for  the  Continental  United  States  six  infantry  divisions 
complete  in  all  particulars;  that  each  division  have  two  regiments 
of  field  artillery  of  two  battalions  which  in  time  of  peace  be  ex- 
panded into  regiments  of  three  battalions  in  case  of  war;  that  each 
division  was  to  have  one  battalion  of  three  companies  of  engineers 
organized  as  pioneers  and  that  one  battalion  of  three  companies 
organized  as  pontooners  should  be  assigned  to  each  field  army  (three 
divisions).  There  should  be  sufficient  field  officers  to  permit  of  these 
engineer  companies  being  organized  into  regiments  of  two  battalions 
of  three  companies  each.  I  also  recommended  the  necessary  auxiliary 
troops  for  each  division  as  described  in  the  table  of  organizations  of 
the  present  Field  Service  Regulations  with  some  modifications  made 
as  a  result  of  the  developments  of  the  present  war. 

Mr.  Kahn.  How  many  battalions  of  engineers  would  that  be? 

Gen.  Wood.  That  would  be  a  total  of  3D  companies  of  engineers, 
and  as  I  remember  it,  an  increase  of  27  companies  over  the  present 
number  of  companies. 

I  also  recommended  an  aero  squadron  with  each  division,  two 
Cavalry  divisions  of  six  regiments  each,  six  regiments  of  heavy 
mobile  Artillery,  the  guns  to  be  not  larger  caliber  than  6  inches. 
That  was  the  general  proposition  for  the  United  States.  That  means 
39  new  regiments  of  Infantry,  19  new  regiments  of  Field  Artillery, 
6  new  regiments  of  Cavalry,  if  the  present  organization  is  continued, 
and  27  new  companies  of  Engineers.  I  recommended  an  increase  of 
Coast  Artillery  by  97  companies  with  an  appropriate  number  of  field 
and  staff  officers.  I  also  recommended  an  increase  in  the  various  staff 
corps  in  proportion  required  by  the  line  increase  especially  inviting 
attention  to  the  needs  of  adequate  aviation  corps. 

I  also  recommended  that  West  Point  be  not  only  filled  up,  but  that 
the  corps  be  increased  to  1,600  cadets  for  a  period  of  six  years,  the 
academy  at  the  present  time  accommodating  732  cadets*  I  think  you 
could  increase  the  capacity  somewhat  without  doing  any  harm,  per- 
haps putting  three  men  together,  and  I  would  put  up  an  economical 
cantonment.  I  would  increase  the  cadet  corps  to  1,600  and  keep  it  at 
that  number  until  we  have  officered  our  new  Army,  so  that  at  least 
a  fair  proportion  of  the  officers  shall  be  West  Pointers. 


UNIVERSAL    MILITARY   TRAINING.  269 

The  Chairman.  In  speaking  of  the  various  organizations,  do  you 
mean  that  they  should  be  at  their  full  strength  ! 

(ten.  Wood.  Yes;  until  we  get  a  reserve; 

Mr.  Kahn.  Would  such  an  organization  at  West  Point  as  you 
suggest  give  us  the  full  complement  of  45,000  officers  that  you  say 
would  be  required? 

(Jen.  Wood.  No;  but  it  would  give  us  a  greatly  increased  propor- 
tion of  graduates  of  West  Point  for  the  officers  and  the  Latter  por- 
tion of  our  increase  and  it  would  give  enough  graduates  to  very 
largely  fill  the  vacancies  occuring  in  the  Army  in  the  years  imme- 
diately following  the  completion  of  the  increase  in  organizations.  In 
order  to  do  this  it  will  be  necessary  to  increase  the  number  of  in- 
structors at  West  Point  and  to  remove  the  restrictions  of  the  de- 
tached service  law  so  far  as  the  instructors  at  the  academy  are  con- 
cerned. West  Point  at  best  can  only  furnish  a  very  small  propor- 
tion of  the  officers  needed  in  case  we  should  raise  a  huge  number  of 
citizen  soldiers.  The  officers  for  these  must  be  trained  in  time  of 
peace  and  held  as  a  reserve  corps  of  officers.  Fifty  thousand  should 
be  constantly  maintained. 

Mr.  KAHN.  You  are  familiar  with  the  French  system  which  allows 
a  combination  in  time  of  war  of  two  skeleton  regiments  under  one 
of  officers  1 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes;  they  have  that  arrangement,  especially  with  their 
artillery. 

Mr.  Kahn.  Do  you  not  think  that  in  organizing  the  new  regiments 
which  you  suggest  it  might  be  well  to  have  skeleton  regiments  with 
full  complements  of  officers,  SO  that  i  f  we  got  into  a  war  the  regiments 
could  be  combined  <  r  consolidated  to  lill  up  the  regiments  to  full  war 
strength  $  You  would  then  have  a  large  Dumber  of  extra  officers  on 
hand,  who  could  immediately  begin  the  training  of  recruits  or  who 
might  be  used  for  officering  the  new  regiments  that  would  undoubt- 
edly be  called  into  the  servic* 

Gen.  WOOD.  I  would  not  maintain  any  regiments  in  that  way  at  all 
now  until  we  get  an  adequate  reserve  and  such  a  system  of  general 
training  as  will  give  OS  reasonably  well-trained  volunteers,  and 
further,  until  we  get  our  corps  of  reserve  officers  I  would  not  advise 
having  anything  but  fully  equipped  full-strength  regular  organiza- 
tions in  the  220,000  men  which  1  recommend  for  the  Regular  Army, 
because  one  has  no  idea  of  the  demands  which  are  going  to  he  made 
on  this  country  for  troops. 

At  the  end  of  the  Civil  War  we  had  in  the  North  and  South  about 
1,250,000  men  in  arm-.  We  had  had  1,000,000  men  in  arms,  with  no 
oversea  complications.  Our  population  at  that  time  was  only  one- 
third  of  our  population  at  the  present  time,  and  the  wealth  of  our 
country  in  the  seacoast  cities  has  probably  increased  teu  times  over 
what  it  was  in  Civil  War  days. 

We  are  engaged  at  the  present  time  in  the  development  of  the  coast 
defense  of  the  Atlantic.  Unless  one  has  gone  into  the  matter  you 
can  not  realize  what  the  coast  defense  of  this  country  would  mean  if 
we  lost  sea  control.  The  idea  that  troops  can  not  be  moved  oversea  is 
the  idea  of  the  man  who  does  not  know  what  he  is  talking  about.  It 
is  the  easiest  and  most  convenient  way  of  moving  troops.  Troops 
can  be  landed  almost  wherever  it  is  desired  to  land  them,  except  under 


270  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY    TRAINING. 

the  amis  of  our  seacoast  batteries.  We  have  in  all  about  Si, 000  mobile 
troops  in  the  continental  United  States:  T  mean  cavalry,  infantryT 
and  field  artillery.  The  militia  numbers  about  120,000  men  and 
about  8,800  officers  on  paper,  or  a  total  of  about  130,000  troops.  I 
believe  I  compliment  the  condition  of  the  militia,  or  at  least  give  it 
the  fullest  credit  for  what  it  can  do  when  T  assume  that  it  could  place 
60,000  fairly  well-trained  troops  in  the  field  in  30  days,  properly 
armed  and  equipped.  This  force,  in  conjunction  with  the  regular 
mobile  force,  if  all  of  it  was  assembled — and  it  means  stripping  the 
entire  country — would  amount  to,  in  round  numbers,  90,000  troops. 
It  would  not  be  an  army — it  would  be  a  military  assemblage.  There 
would  not  be  in  that  body  of  troops  an  officer  who  had  ever  com- 
manded more  than  a  division  in  camp,  and  that  division  at  peace 
strength.  There  would  be  no  supply  officers  or  transportation  officers 
who  had  ever  handled  a  force  of  that  size.  It  would  take  time  and 
much  hard  work  to  make  an  army  out  of  this  force,  and  when  the 
work  had  been  completed  it  would  be  only  a  small  handful  of  troops 
in  comparison  with  what  would  be  needed.  It  would  be  without 
aviators,  without  adequate  machine  guns,  without  proper  field  artil- 
lery, without  armored  motor  cars,  ammunition  batteries  and  ma- 
terial, and  other  necessary  things.  And  what  area  would  this  little 
force  have  to  cover  in  case  of  a  threatened  attack  upon  the  xVtlantic 
coast?  It  would  certainly  be  necessary  to  attempt  to  prevent  an 
attack  within  the  limits  of  what  is  known  as  the  vital  area;  by  this 
I  mean  the  territory  inclosed  by  a  line  commencing  at  Boston  and 
running  out  around  Watertown,  Springfield,  and  then  to  Watervliet, 
N.  Y.,  and  on,  including  Bethlehem  and  out  at  Baltimore.  In  that 
area  are  the  great  bulk,  probably  over  85  per  cent  of  our  arms  plants, 
cannon-making  plants,  powder  plants,  etc.  Our  coast  defenses  will 
not  prevent  a  landing  on  our  coast.  Landings  can  be  made. by  good 
troops  under  great  difficulties.  Take  for  the  purpose  of  illustration 
the  recent  landing  at  Gallipoli.  There  were  some  126,000  allied 
troops  landed  on  the  coast  of  this  peninsula  in  face  of  the  most 
intense  opposition ;  an  opposition  prepared  long  in  advance  and  aided 
by  all  the  devices  of  modern  war.  There  are  relatively  few  beaches 
and  the  coast  was  rough  and^  precipitous  and  yet  they  landed  and 
stayed  there  for  months.  When  we  say  that  we  have  90,000  men, 
that  is  all  we  have.  We  may  develop  others  later,  but  this  is  the 
only  force  we  could  count  on  as  reasonably  effective  within  30  days. 

Mr.  Kahn.  You  think  the  paper  strength  of  the  militia  of  a  hun- 
dred and  thirty  thousand  w7ould  dwindle? 

Gen.  Wood.  The  militia  has  done  all  men  and  officers  can  do  under 
a  rotten  system.  I  am  not  criticising  them  at  all.  The  militia  has 
130,000  officers  and  men  enrolled.  But  when  I  say  they  can  turn 
out'  60,000  men  in  fairly  good  condition  I  think  I  have  stated  the 
limit.  You  might  turn  out  more,  but  they  would  be  untrained  and 
of  little  value. 

Mr.  Kahn.  Of  course,  the  thing  we  have  to  fear,  as  I  understand 
it,  is  not  an  attack  by  any  one  nation,  but  a  possible  combination  of 
nations  against  us? 

Gen.  Wood.  That  is  just  a  matter  of  opinion.  I  think  we  have  to 
assume  that  our  next  war  is  going  to  be  a  war  such  as  we  have  never 
had,  a  war  with  a  first-class  power,  thoroughly  prepared  for  war. 


UNIVERSAL    MILITARY    TRAINING.  271 

Mr.  K.min.  General,  have  yon  seen  the  book  cm  I  led  "The  War 
Between  Japan  and  America,"  a  Japanese  book  which  has  been  issued 
by  the  National  Defense  League  of  Japan,  of  which  Count  Okuma, 
the  present  Premier  of  Japan,  is  the  president? 

Gen.  Wood.  No,  sir;  I  have  not  seen  it.  I  have  heard  something 
of  it. 

Mr.  Kahx.  I  would  like  to  put  into  the  record,  Mr.  Chairman,  an 
English  translation  of  a  portion  of  that  hook. 

The  Chairman.  I  think  there  is  no  objection  to  that. 

[From  the  Continental  Times,  Friday,  Dee.  10,  1915.] 

JAPAN   PLANS   P0  INVADKTIIK  l  MTJil)  STATES-     A  STARTLING  AM)  SIGNIFI- 
CANT OFFICIAL  BOOK-  -ORIENTAL  CONTEMPT  FOB  AMERICA. 

[By  R.  L.  Orchelle.J 

We  all  kijt)\v  Um-  recent  hut-  and  cry  t ii:i t  was  raised  over  a  book — at  one 
time  a  comparatively  obscure  book  by  a  comparatively  obscure  author — "Ger- 
many   and    the    next    \v:ir."    by    (Jen.    Bernhardt,    a    retired    Officer    of    cavalry. 

The  book  attracted  little  attention  in  Germany,  and  save  in  Interested  circles, 

absolutely    no  attention   abroad.      But.  UO   sooner  did    war   break   nut    tbai    Con. 

Bernhardt,  good  man.  awoke  one  morning,  like  Byron,  to  And  himself  famous — 

or    infamous.      In    fad    a    disinterested    observer,    reading    the    English    papers 

and  those  American  Bheeta  that  echoed  them,  might  well  have  asked  himself 
whether  the  old  veteran  general  had  not  prepared  anil  precipitated  the  entire 

war  by  his  own   unaided  efforts. 

"Germany    and    the   next    war"    was    of   COUTSe,   merely    one    man's    warning 

voice  uplifted  to  bid  his  pacific,  trusting  compatriots  to  open  their  eyes  against 
the  terrible  danger  that  threatened  them,  it  was  the  honest  book  of  a  blunt, 
clear-sighted  soldier  and  its  predictions  have  in  nearly  every  instance  been 
fulfilled. 

of  a  character  quite  different  Is  a  book  recently  published  in  .Japan.  It  is 
not  the  private  opinion  of  an  individual,  but    the  official   opinion  of  a   powerful 

society  known  as  the  National  Defense  Association,  of  which  Count  Okuma,  the 
Premier  of  Japan,  is  president,  succeeding  Count  Yamamoto.  Baron  Kato,  the 
present  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  la  vice  president  of  the  association.  Its 
members  comprise  army  and  navy  officers,  cabinet   and  government  officials. 

More  than  a  million  copies  of  the  work  have  been  sold  and  it  is  now  in  its 
sixth  edition.  The  title  of  the  DOOK  is  "  The  war  between  Japan  and  America." 
[tS  tone  is  not  defensive,  but  a;:.urressi ve.  The  cover  is  decorated  with  a  tri- 
umphant  Japanese  dreadnaught   and  a  torn  and  reversed  American  flag. 

A  literal  translation  of  the  text   has  hi  by  Mr.  Lawrence  Mott   in 

collaboration  with  a  distinguished  Chinese  scholar,  Hain  .Ion  Kla.  it  is  In- 
deed CUrioUS  for  Americans  to  behold  themselves  as  seen  through  the  slant  eyes 
of  the  sons  of  Nippon,  and  for  this  reason  we  present  the  following  extracts 
from  this  popular  .Japanese  work.  The  present  war  has  taught  us  not  to 
despise  the  effect  of  these  literary  weapons  in  Influencing  the  origin  and  the 
COUTSe  of  wars. 

"The  hearts  of  sixty  million  .Japanese."  the  book  begins,  "all  loyal  subjects 
of  H.  I.  M.  the  Emperor,  are  aflame  with  courage  and  eager  as  the  great  winds 
that  blow  from  the  skies  to  begin  a  war  against  the  United  States  that  shall 
prove  to  the  boasting  Americans  that  the  .Japanese  people  do  not  know  defeat 
and  that  their  soldiers  are  invincible! 

"  Scarcely  ."»«>  years  ago  we  vanquished  the  Chinese  troops,  and  the  whole 
world  knows  of  our  defeat   of  the  -rent    Russian  armies  in  1903    L 

"And  now  we  are  still  stronger!  We  have  profited  by  the  lessons  that  we 
learned  in  Manchuria,  and  can  easily  conquer  the  very  bad  troops  that  the 
Americans  have. 

"The  question  then  follows:  Why  should  we  go  to  war  with  the  United 
States? 

"There  are  two  reasons: 

"First—Because  of  the  absolute  Inhumanity  of  the  Tinted  States  toward 
Japan  in  practically  prohibiting  Japanese  immigration:  and. 


272  r.NIYKKSAI.    M1UTAHY    TKAlNINCi. 

"Second — The  palpable  and  glaring  injustice  of  such  legislation  against  the 
Japanese.  The  United  states  differentiate  deliberately  between  us  and  Chinese, 
who  are  of  much  lower  standing  and  education. 

44  The  problem  of  California  is  so  much  in  the  minds  of  the  .Japanese  at 
present,  and  also  in  view  of  the  fact  thai  we  intend  to  colonize  it  shortly,  that 
we  give  its  description." 

)l^\-e  follows  a  description  of  California,  a  very  accurate  and  glowing  de- 
scription with  a  reference  to  "our  great  and  powerful  ally — Mexico — who  will 
help  us  against  the  United  States  when  the  time  comes."  Trained  soldiers 
are  to  be  sent  out  disguised  as  workmen  and  even  rich  merchants. 

44  These  will  slowly  he  reinforced,  with  the  object  always  in  mind  of  our 
capturing  the  Philippines  and  Honolulu. 

44  Capture  these  islands  we  must,  in  order  to  place  our  hands  firmly  and  once 
for  all  on  the  Pacific  Ocean. 

44  The  Americans  boast  of  their  Panama  Canal,  hut  it  is  only  too  ridiculously 
simple  for  us  to  dynamite  it  effectually — at  the  cost  of  an  old  steamship  fuil 
of  powder.  Nominally,  of  course,  the  ship  would  he  merely  a  "  cargo  "  vessel, 
but  at  a  certain  signal  the  lew  of  the  crew  that  it  carried  for  this  nohle  deed 
would  go  ashore  and  disappear.  Then  comes  the  explosion,  and  the  canal  is 
wrecked  for  many  months  at  least. 

44  And  before  the  United  States  warships  can  come  all  the  way  around  South 
America  we  will  have  seized  the  islands.  These  lie  much  nearer  to  our  shores 
than  they  do  to  the  United  States  coast,  and  it  will  be  a  very  difficult  matter 
to  oust  us,  as  our  navy  is  much  stronger  than  the  American,  better  equipped, 
and  better  officered. 

44  Let  us  ask  this  question : 

44  Why  is  Japanese  immigration  into  California  so  obstructed  and  impeded? 

14  The  answer  is  an  interesting  one. 

41  It  is  because  the  American  people  are  always  not  only  against  the  Japanese, 
but  very  much  in  awe  and  fear  of  them.  And  this  is  especially  true  of  the  in- 
habitants of  California. 

"  To  sum  up  the  situation  in  one  truthful  statement,  Californians  and,  in- 
deed, all  Americans  are  jealous  of  us  and  of  our  rapid  development  in  every 
art  and  manufacture.  More  particularly  are  they  jealous  of  our  magnificent 
army  and  navy,  to  winch  they  are  forced  to  grant  a  most  grudging  admiration 
and  envy.'' 

Intensely  interesting  is  the  Japanese  conviction  that  America  is  jealous  of 
Japan's  progress  and  that  she  ought  to  welcome  and  not  reject  the  superior 
civilization  of  Nippon. 

44  From  the  humanitarian  point  of  view  we  should  he  received  in  the  United 
States  with  open  arms,  but  for  the  reasons  that  we  have  mentioned  this  is  far 
from  being  the  case. 

44  Ever  since  we  vanquished  the  Russian  hordes  the  whole  world  has  held 
us  in  the  highest  esteem  and  reverence.  But  to  the  American  people  we  are 
a  giant  Nemesis  that  they  know  will  some  day  fall  upon  and  annihilate  them, 
smiting  them,  as  their  Bible  says,  'on  the  hip  and  on  thigh  with  great  strength.' 

44  The  various  activities  of  American  labor  unions  come  in  for  sharp  criticism, 
and  it  is  charged  that  many  United  States  paper  (which  are  all  purchasable) 
were  bribed  to  open  the  campaign  against  worthy  Japanese  workmen. 

44  But  we  wtre  not  surprised,  knowing  American  honor  to  he  as  deficient  as 
it  is.  We  only  laughed,  because  we  also  know  that  our  time  is  rapidly  com- 
ing, and  the  man  who  is  laughing  behind  will  soon  laugh  in  the  front  rank! 

"Many  conferences  have  been  held  in  cities  on  the  Pacific  coast  by  repre- 
sentatives of  those  deceitful  labor  unions,  and  :it  all  of  these  angry  and  fright- 
ened speeches  were  made  against  the  Japanese  nation.  The  result  h:is  been  by 
these  endless  rivers  of  lies,  that  the  Americans  have  been  taught  through  the 
bought  pupers  that  we  are  a  weak  nation  and  not  worthy  of  an  attention!  Let 
America  beware!  For  our  cry:  '<>n  to  California!  on  to  Hawaii!  On  to  the 
Philippines!  '  is  becoming  only  secondary  in  our  country  to  our  imperial  anthem! 

44  The  smoke  of  American  falsehoods  rises  as  a  vast  stinking  cloud  that  de- 
stroys the  beauties  of  the  innocent  heavens.  Whereas,  the  tire  in  our  hearts 
burns  brightly,  casting  its  golden  gleams  of  honor  and  power  over  the  entire 
world." 

The  author  now  indulges  in  withering  sneers  at  American  "Kiillur." 

44  The  Strange  part  of  the  present  situation  is  that  supposedly  well-educated 
Americans  are  against  us !  We  are  tempted  to  ask  the  Americans  their  defini- 
tion of  '  education !  '     If  their  vaunted  4  education  '  has  not  taught  them  even 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING.  273 

the  most  crude  rudiments  of  hospitality  and  manners,  of  what  use  is  such  an 
'education?  ' 

"It  must  be  remembered  that  the  Americans  are  a  crude  race  that  consists 
of  every  kind  of  riffraff  blood — Including  the  Qegro-white  mixture — of  every 
foreign  nation  (save  ours).  We  in  Japan  have  a  glorious  history  that  ante- 
dates by  thousands  of  years  even  the  knowledge  that  the  wild  and  Indian- 
infested  America  ever  existed ! 

"The  United  States  seems  to  us  like  a  huge  soup  pot,  into  which  every 
kind  of  thing  has  been  put  in  the  hope  of  obtaining  a  savory  mess.  The  'mess* 
is  there,  we  grant,  but  as  to  its  taste  wo  know  that  it  is  had,  and  that  its  smell 
is  worse !  We  arc  surprised  that  the  Washington  Government  has  not  more 
authority  over  the  acts  of  the  separate  states,  and  America  reminds  us  of  a 
man  (the  President  I  who  has  a  very  had  family  thai  ho  is  powerless  to  control! 
An  amusing  situation,  from  our  point  of  view. 

"If  Washington  is  not  strong  enough  to  enforce  Its  orders  on  the  Pacific 
coast,  we  are!  In  short,  the  United  States  Government  is  but  a  foolish  child- 
hood game,  such  as  checkers  or  jacks]  raws. 

"We  have  tricked  California,  however,  by  sending  our  men  as  residents  to 
the  Hawaiian  Islands.  There  they  became  'citizens.'  and  from  there,  after  a 
certain  time,  proceeded  to  California, 

"The  Hawaiian. Islands  are  only  distant  from  San  Francisco  a  few  hours  by 
OUT  fast  warships  and  cruisers,  and  in  the  island  are  at  present  80,000  Japa- 
nese— all  of  them  have  received  army  instruction,  and  they  know  their  duty: 

"The  Honolulu  group  of  islands,  however,  is  not  large  enough  to  adequately 
support  our  countrymen.  As  a  matter  of  fact  we  .an  setae  the  port  and  fortifica- 
tions (such  as  they  are)  with  the  greatest  of  ease,  thus  permitting  about  Go  per 
cent  of  our  people  already  there  to  help  in  breaking  in  California's  shut  door. 
When  that  State  realized  our  Intentions  she  tightened  her  vulture-like  claws 
and  forbade  our  people,  even  after  a  residence  in  the  Sandwich  Islands,  to  enter. 
Still,  we  have  found  means  of  overcoming  this  difficulty!  We  have  sent  both 
army  and  navy  officers  in  the  clever  disguise  of  workmen,  and  they,  having  been 
thoroughly  taught  in  Japan  how  to  swim,  have  quietly  slipped  overheard  and 
gained   a    landing  in  California   and   Oregon   ports,   under   the  very  nose  of   the 

asinine  United  States  customs  and  Immigration  officials, 

"These  officers  of  ours  are  scattered  everywhere  on  the  Pacific  const  to-day. 
We  do  not  need  to  explain  why  they  are  there! 

"We  confess  that,  the  methods  by  which  we  have  had  to  do  these  things  are 
not  according  to  our  ideas  of  honor.  Hut  when  it  is  considered  that  we  are 
dealing  with  a  nation  of  liars  and  evaders  of  justice,  we  must  perforce  'do  as 
the   Romans  do.' 

"In  short,  and  in  conclusion,  we  wish  our  people  to  know  that  the  Americans 
are  a   race  of  what-not^:  that  even  among  themselves  they  are  dishonest;  that 

crimes  among  them  run  rife  to  a  steadily-growing  greater  degree  every  year; 

and  thai   we  Japanese  are  Deeded  to  teach  them  honor,  morals,  and  cleanliness." 

Here  follows  an  attack  upon  American  habits  ot  personal  cleanliness  which, 
in  view  of  our  boasts  about  the  latest  plumbing,  etc..  is.  to  say  the  least,  some- 
what surprising.  There  are  satiric  references  to  our  sensational  murder  cases 
and  police  scandals,  such  as  the  Thaw  trial  and  the  Becker  case.  The  indignant 
censor  of  our  civilization  goes  on   to  say: 

"All  these  things  prove,  without  doubt,  that  the  Americans  are  savages — 
without  sense  of  law  or  reason.  In  Japan  we  would  never  permit  such  outrages 
of  common  decency  and  order!     The  United  States  has  much  to  learn  from  us} 

"Taken  all  in  all.  the  Japanese  people  are  far  more  thrifty  than  the  Ameri- 
cans and  t':ir  more  clever.  They  are  more  skillful  in  invention;  better  armed  in 
mentality  than  the  clunisy-w  itted  Californians.  for  instance;  and  it  may  truth- 
fully he  said  that  we.  in  Japan,  -an  find  to-day.  even  among  our  most  humble 
classes,  much  better  types  of  men  and  women  than  the  semi-Irish.  semi-French, 
Semi-German,  and  semi-everything  else  on  two  legs  that  may  be  called  a  human 
being — with   which  the  whole  of  tin*   Tinted   States  is  pestiferously  populated" 

"Pestiferously  populated  "  is  distinctly  good,  and  could  not  be  excelled  even 
by  Roosevelt,  ranting  at  his  top  note.  Invidious  comparisons  are  now  drawn 
between  the  Japanese  table  manners  and  American,  between  Japanese  clever- 
ness and  Yankee  clumsiness.  Much  patience  will  be  needed  by  the  Japanese  in 
teaching  the  Americans — "who  are  wonderfully  stupid."  American  "graft"  is 
duly  honored,  and  there  is  a  hint  of  the  future  control  of  China  by  Japan: 

"  President  Yuan-shi-kai  can  not  live  forever,  and  the  next  man  will  be  of  our 
Choosing  and    under  our   inlluence.      Yuan-shi-kai    has.   as  we   have   said,   been 


274  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 

bought,  body  and  bo.u1,  by  American  wealth.  The  Standard  Oil  Co.  is  such 
an  octopus  of  greed  that  even  the  Washington  Government  has  been  forced  to 
recognize  tins  smelling  nicer  in  its  side.  Bur  the  Standard  Oil  has  great  moneys 
at  its  control,  and,  after  all.  the  President  of  the  United  States  is  simply  a  man. 
Money  means  as  much  to  him — against  the  time  when  he  is  not  President  any 
more — as  it   does  to  anyone  else. 

"The  whole  of  the  American  people  are  stubborn  and  blind.  They  can  not 
see  <>ne  finger's  length  beyond  their  noses. 

"  Well,  stubborn  children  must  be  taught. 

"This  is  our  answer:  American  workmen  have  no  education.  They  are  a 
servile  lot  of  slaves,  bent  under  the  yoke  of  a  vicious  and  dangerous  body  of 
men  that  is  called — we  might  say  facetiously  called — a  labor  union.  This 
4  labor  union  '  has  insulted  us.  This  '  labor  union '  is  protected  by  Washington 
and  Washington  must  bear  the  consequences  of  the  triumphal  success  of  our 
men.  Instead  of  taking  a  wide  view — instead  of  having  an  open  heart — the 
Californias  especially  and  the  Americans  in  general  have  once  and  for  all  time 
shown  us  their  narrow  minds  and  their  petty  '  honor.' 

"  We  ask  no  clearer  vision  of  them- -except  that  which  we  will  have  over  the 
sights  of  our  rifles  and  over  our  battleships'  guns. 

"  The  disapproval  manifested  in  America  against  marriages  between  Japanese 
and  whites  arouses  the  scorn  and  indignation  of  the  Japanese  patriot.  Our 
petted  American  women  will  be  interested  in  the  oriental  view. 

"The  American  people  do  not  know  us.  They  think  that  we  are  mere 
animals;  indeed,  they  have  written  of  us  as  such,  and  it  is  for  this  reason  that 
we  are  not  allowed  to  marry  their  women. 

"  Not  that  we  regret  this,  as  our  own  women  are  better  in  every  way,  and 
especially  more  obedient,  but  we  speak  of  this  matter  merely  to  assure  all  our 
countrymen  that  they  need  not  in  the  least  be  troubled  by  this  attitude  of  the 
Americans.  W^hen  we  reach  there  we  will  regulate  these  things  in  a  proper  and 
sane  manner.  ♦  Just  think  of  it,  our  countrymen.  American  women  often  and 
often  marry  negroes.  They  like  this  sort  of  marriage  and  it  is  permitted  by  the 
barbarous  American  laws. 

"  What  can  we  think  of  such  a  people? 

"  The  only  logical  explanation  to  the  marriage  question  is  that  the  citizens 
(?)  of  the  United  States  consider  us  as  lower  than  the  common  black  man, 
whose  real  home  is  in  the  heart  of  burning  African  deserts — and  yet  the 
Americans  consider  the  black  men  as  their  slaves  to-day,  and  often  inflict 
terrible  secret  tortures,  such  as  burning  alive,  putting  out  their  eyes.  But  we 
point  out  these  matters  as  proof  of  the  fact  that  the  Americans  are  still  in  a 
barbaric  state  of  civilization  and  ideas.  It  is  most  amusing  to  hear  the 
Americans  boast  of  their  '  high  standards  of  life.' 

"  Returning  for  a  brief  space  to  the  marriage  between  Japanese  gentlemen 
and  American  women,  we  must  say  that  the  latter  are  always  exceedingly 
anxious  to  obtain  a  Japanese  husband,  who  is,  of  course,  the  finest  type  of  man, 
soldier,  and  father  that  the  world  knows.  Several  cases  of  the  infatuation  of 
Cnlifornian  women  for  Japanese  are  known,  and  our  clever  countrymen,  recog- 
nizing that  though  she  is  not.  perfect  by  any  means,  still  the  Californian  woman 
is  a  good  worker,  and  so  the  Japanese  have  kindly  condescended  to  go  into 
Mexico  and  have  a  sort  of  marriage  ceremony  performed  there." 

The  signs  are  indeed  ominous,  and  black  thoughts  and  huge  ambitions  seem 
,  to  be  fermenting  in  the  hearts  of  the  redoubtable  little  yellow  people.  No 
attempt  seems  to  be  made  to  conceal  these: 

"The  national  manifestation  that  took  place  last  year  in  Hibiya  Park,  in 
our  imperial  capital,  against  America,  and  that  was  attended  by  100,000  people 
vi  all  ranks,  shows  how  glad  we  will  be  when  the  first  shot  is  fired. 

"Among  the  many  speakers  that  addressed  our  loyal  crowds  was  Mr.  Yamaki, 
a  member  of  our  Imperial  Parliament,  who  said  in  a  superb  speech  that  all  the 
States  intended  following  the  example  of  California.  And  that  we  must  seize 
our  standards,  unfurl  them  to  the  winds,  and  advance  without  the  least  fear, 
as  America  has  no  army,  and  with  the  Panama  ('anal  destroyed  its  few  battle- 
ships will  be  of  no  use  until  it  is  too  late. 

"Mr.  lama,  who  is  one  of  our  most  able  and  popular  citizens,  then  said  that 
the  Americans  are  all  stupid.  See  their  crazy  actions  in  California.  We 
Japanese  have  done  everything  possible  in  a  quiet  and  civilized  way — and  failed. 
Now  to  arms:     Quick  to  arms! 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY    TRAINING.  275 

He  was  followed  on  the  platform  by  Dr.  Insaki.  who  said  as  follows: 

"Seek  in  our  history,  my  friends,  and  you  will  read  of  the  American  officer, 
Perry,  who,  when  he  came  to  our  shores,  roughly  and  rudely  asked  the  Tokugawa 
Prince  (Shogun)  why  Japan  was  so  barbaric  as  to  shut  its  doors  in  the  face 
of  all  foreigners,  and  Americans  especially?  He  accused  us  of  being  rude  and 
uncivilized,  stating  that  civilization  demanded  the  opening  of  our  doors  and 
pons. 

"And  now,  my  friends,  what  is  the  attitude  of  the  nation  that  sent  this  rough 
barbarian  Perry  to  our  beautiful  and  peaceful  shores  to  our  sweet-smelling 
land  of  Cherry  blossoms  and  scented  forests?  To  our  nation  that  had  until 
then  known  no  strife  and  only  desired  to  be  let  alone  to  develop  as  a  flower 
develops  through  the  bounteousness  of  Nature4.  1  ask  you  again,  what  is  the 
attitude  of  this  savage  Terry's  nation  to-day?  Is  it  not  exactly  the  reverse  from 
all  that  we  had  been  led  to  expect?  Does  it  not  shut  its  doors  and  lock  them  in 
our  faces?  ('an  these  things  be  denied?  I  defy  the  Americans  to  call  me  a 
liar!  We  must  all  defy  them,  however,  and  their  insults,  my  friends.  More, 
we  must  gird  on  our  swords,  sling  our  cartridge  bolts  over  our  shoulders,  and 
with  bright,  polished  weapons,  advance!  When  we  have  conquered  we  must 
live  up  to  our  BushidO  and  the  spirit  of  forgiving.  We  must  gently  try  to  tench 
the  Americans  that  although  we  are  their  cotupierers.  we  mean  only  their 
ultimate  good." 

The  Japanese  view  of  American  history  is  extremely  Interesting,  and  he  who 
is  properly  persuaded  of  the  fact  that  our  own  policies  have  not  all  been  pro- 
pounded by  a  council  of  archangels  may  even  find  food  for  reflection  in  them: 

"America  is  a  nation  of  sweet  words,  but  of  evil  deeds.  At  heart  the  Ameri- 
can people,  one  and  all,  are  a  nation  of  thieves,  with  the  hearts  of  rabbits. 

Their  actions  prove  this. 

••  i  continue,  my  friends,  to  tell  you  of  how  the  United  states  began.  In 
177<;  the  Declaration  of  Independence  was  made  in  a  small  village  called  Phila- 
delphia. Thirteen  States  signed,  and  shortly  after  President  General  Wash- 
ington threw  valuable  British  tea  into  the  water  in  Boston  Harbor,  by  this 
peculiar  way  declaring  war  against  England.  The  battles  were  numerous,  but 
the  English  never  were  good  warriors,  and  they  were  heaten. 

"In   180.'$    the   United    States   bought    from    Prance   a    certain    territory   called 

Louisiana,  and  they  acquired  great  territory  along  a  large  river  ended  the 

Mississippi.  Then,  in  IMP.  these  ' United  States'  purchased  a  Territory  called 
Florida  from  the  Spanish  Government  In  l^.'Jd  the  'Tinted  States'  brutally 
overpowered  our  present  staunch  and  most  valuable  ally.  Mexico,  and  deprived 
her  of  a  large  land  that  is  now  known  as  the  State  of  Texas. 

"  In  184S  the  '  United  States'  paid  300,000,000  yen  (£1,500,000)  to  Mexico  for 
various  mining  and  oil  rights  in  California.  This  did  not  mean  buying  the 
whole  land,  but  the  Americans  seised  it  as  their  own,  nevertheless.  And  the 
poor  Mexicans  could  do  nothing.  In  1867  the  'United  States'  bought  from 
Russia,  Alaska,  in  the  far  north.  In  ISPS  was  the  cruel  and  Inhuman  war  that 
they  ruthlessly  intlicted  on  poor  Spain,  and  in  consequence  they  seized  the 
island  of  Cuba  and  the  Philippines,  maltreating  the  inhabitants.  In  1900  the 
'United  States'  ruthlessly  annexed  the  Hawaiian  Islands — much  against  the 
wishes  of  the  industrious  and  sober  Inhabitants. 

"These  are  only  a  few  examples  of  American  '  humanity.'  We  call  it  down- 
right and  bold  robbery.  And.  as  I  have  said  before,  these  acts  prove  them  to 
he  villains  to  the  blood. 

"And  now  they  seek  to  Inflict  us  with  their  'honor'  by  driving  us  from  their 
country.  We  use  word  'honor'  in  jest,  because  the  American  people  do  not 
understand   its  meaning. 

"  At  any  rate,  my  friends,  let  us  take  to  our  arms,  both  by  land  and  sea,  and 
punish   these  devils." 

"At  the  finish  of  the  able  doctor's  speech  the  crowds  went  away  with  the 
firm  knowledge  of  the  truth  of  the  words  of  this  venerable  man,  who  has  made 
an  especial  study  of  the  strange  and  crooked  ways  of  the  American  people." 

A  resolution  was  passed  requesting  the  Government  to  declare  war  upon  the 
United  States.  The  Japanese  patriot  thereupon  turns  his  attention  to  the 
United  States  Army,  which  he  treats  with  scant  respect: 

"The  American  Army  is  so  insignificant  that  it  is  scarce  worth  mentioning 
in  these  pages.  Furthermore,  it  may  truthfully  be  said  ,in  paradox,  the  United 
States  Army  is  not  an  army  !     Nothing  hut  a  few  thousand  of  men.  who,  having 

86205—17 it 


276  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY    TRAINING. 

no  brains  wherewith  to  gain  an  agricultural  or  manufacturing  livelihood,  take 
up  an  army  life  for  the  few  dollars  and  the  uniform  that  the  United  States 
Government  furnishes  them  with. 

"They  therefore  have  good  food,  plenty  of  time  to  sleep,  and  nothing  to  do 
save  'stand  guard'  (what  a  .joke!)  over  a  few  starving  wild  Indians  in  the 
Western  States  on  prison  lands  which  the  Americans  call  'reservations'  but 
which  are  in  reality  nothing  hut  arid  deserts,  where  the  poor  redmen  are 
forced  to  do  hard  Labor  and  to  live  as  animals.  All  around  these  poor  people 
are  the  great  American  soldiers  with  lixed  bayonets,  so  afraid  are  they  of 
even  a  pitiful  armful  of  the  remnant  of  the  noble  and  illustrious  tribes  of  the 
redmen,  whom  they  have  ground  out  of  existence  by  the  cruelty  and  barbarity 
of  the  trading  merchants,  who  sold  the  innocent  and  simple-minded  real  Ameri- 
can much  had  whisky  and,  when  they  were  drunk  and  poisoned,  robbed  them 
of  everything.  And  Washington  made  no  criticism,  because  these  trading  mer- 
chants bribed  all  the  Senators  and  Representatives  to  imitate  blindness  to  their 
infamous  deeds. 

"And  still  the  Americans  say  that  their  '  Eagle  screams  with  pride."  Bather 
we  should' say  it  had  better  cry  and  squawk  with  shame,  or  that  the  United 
States  adopt  some  carrion  bird  of  filthy  habits  and  that  tills  its  beak  with  flesh 
of  human  bodies  from  whom  life  has — fortunately  for  them — departed.  This 
sort  of  a  bird  would  he  a  better  emhlem  for  the  United  States  we  think. 

"At  best  the  American  Army  consists  of  10,000  men,  all  of  them  raw,  un- 
trained, and  awkward,  who  scarcely  know  the  words  of  military  commands. 
Even  in  the  most  urgent  cases,  such  as  our  declaration  of  war  will  he,  the 
United  States  has  not  more  than  400,000  men  who  are  able-bodied  enough  to 
fight. 

"  In  comparison  to  these  facts  we  in  Japan  can  mobilize  and  put  in  the  field 
at  24  hours'  notice  12,000.000  soldiers,  every  single  man  of  whom  is  trained 
to  the  highest  point  of  efficiency,  every  man  of  whom  is  eager  to  fight  as  a 
hound  is  eager  to  follow  the  trail  of  a  fox,  and  who  is  officered  by  men  who 
have  already  served  noble  and  strenuous  apprenticeships  in  the  (Joddike  art  of 
war  for  their  country's  honor  and  inviolate  integrity." 

Japan  has  a  lofty  contempt  for  the  American  spirit  of  greed,  a  contempt 
which  must  surely  have  been  increased  by  the  latest  activities  of  Wall  Street 
and  the  floaters  of  war  loans  for  the  allies : 

"America  has  only  one  god  that  it  really  worships,  and  that  is  the  god 
of  gold.  They  fall  on  their  knees  to  it  and  with  much  supplication  implore 
it  to  cast  friendly  eyes  on  them  so  that  they  may  become  even  more  rich. 
Americans  have  no  philosophy  save  that  of  their  craze  for  gold.  Yet  we  have 
seen  in  their  Bible  a  proverb  that  says:  'Thou  shall  not  worship  any  golden 
image.' 

"America  is  too  material  in  its  beliefs.  Such  small  soul  as  it  has  is  covered 
by  a  heavy  cloud  through  which  no  light  of  education  or  understanding  can 
pass.  And  we  Japanese  must  be  the  ones  to  divide  this  terrible  cloud  of 
ignorance  under  which  the  Americans  suffer  so  that  the  great  light  of  our 
education  may  shine  through  and  lid  them  with  earnest  desire  to  become  as 
we  are,  viz,  sober,  industrious,  and  with  clean  mentality. 

"  Therefore  our  war  with  the  United  States  will  be  one  whose  intention 
is  for  the  general  betterment  and  benefit  of  the  world.  And  all  nations  should 
be  grateful  to  us  for  our  tearing  away  the  cloak  of  deceit  with  which  the 
American  people  have  so  long  covered  their  naked  badness. 

"  When  the  declaration  is  made  the  United  States  will  attempt  to  send 
from  California  ports  some  20.000  crude  soldiers  to  protect  (?)  the  Philip- 
pines. (Little  does  the  United  States  know  that  we  have  many  plans  arranged 
for  the  destruction  of  Manila  forts  and  guns.) 

"  Our  first  move  will  be  to  seize  Honolulu  !  This  can  very  simply  he  done 
by  a  fleet  of  transports  carrying  30,000  men  and  protected  by  our  fast  cruiser- 
ciass  ships.  We  will  take  control  of  the  wireless  station,  drive  out  the 
meteorological  priests,  so  that  they  may  not  give  false  weather  information 
from  their  observatories  or  communicate  with  the  Americans. 

"The  Japanese  Naval  Minister  is  now  occupied  in  the  greatly  pushed-on 
work  of  hastening  the  building  of  first-class  battleships,  transports,  and  sub- 
marines. Our  army  and  navy  commissariat  departments  at  Futagawa  are 
now  working  night  and  day  in  order  that  adequate  supplies  of  our  own  com- 
pressed  foods  may  he  ready." 


UNIVERSAL    MILITARY    TRAINING.  277 

That  all  this  is  nut  mere  Impassioned  patriotism  and  Injured  national  and 
racial  pride  is  proved  by  the  fact  thai  the  Japanese  are  not  stopping  at  mere 
theories  and  threats  but  are  busily  preparing: 

"The  Tokyo  arsenal  is  also  working  night  and  day  in  the  making  of  am- 
munition of  ;iii  kinds.  We  have  seen  the  red  glaring  smoke  arise  against  the 
skies,  and  we  have  heard  the  clank  and  shirr  of  machinery  as  our  deadly 
projectiles  were  being  formed.  We  have  been  glad  to  notice  that  double 
sentries  are  placed  at  every  trate — for  American  spies  are  many  in  Tokyo. 
and  we  must  be  careful. 

'<>ur  great  idea  and  system  to-day— in  order  to  vanquish  California,  to 
own  the  Sandwich  Islands.  Samoa,  and  the  Philippines— -is  that  we  must  all 
save,  first,  our  strength,  and  secondly,  every  sen  that  we  can.  Instead  of 
dressing  in  silks  our  women  musr  wear  cotton,  and  our  richest  men  must 
be  content  with  ha-olis  of  simple  texture,  and  hakamas  of  plain  cloth.  Instead 
of  drinking  our  favorite  sake,  or  wines  of  any  kind,  we  must  drink  water. 
All  these  personal  expenses  saved  we  must  give  to  our  army  and  navy. 

''All  our  professors  must  imbue  their  students  with  the  realization  that  the 
United  states  is  our  Insulting  enemy.  They  must  and  they  win  teach  those 
who  are  yet  toe  young  to  serve  all  the  crookedness  of  the  United  States,  calling 
upon  their  young  hearts  to  fight  nobly  against  American  injustice." 

There  is  a  second  half  to  the  book  which  treats  of  the  actual  war  that 
is  to  be  fought— the  capture  of  the  Philippines,  of  California,  etc. --but  as  this 
deals  entirely  with  fancy  (let  us  hope*  I  shall  postpone  any  discussion  of 
it  until  the  encounter  between  the  Stars  and  Stripes  and  the  rising  sun  of 
Japan  opens  in  thunder  upon  the  Pacific — that  shall  be  pacific  no  more. 

Mr.  Kaiin.  The  book  in  many  respect-  IS  similar  to  Hernhardi's 
book  entitled  "Germany  and  the  Next  War." 

Mr.  M<  Kknxik.  I  would  like  to  ask  Mr.  Kahn  whether  he  knows 
that  the  translation  he  has  is  a  correct  translation  or  whether  it  is 
authentic? 

Mr.  Kahn.  It  ha.-  been  published  in  this  country  in  several  Dews- 
papers,  ami  it  is  now  being  published  abroad.  Its  authenticity  has 
never  been  denied  in  any  publication  that  1  have  ever  seen. 

The   CHAIRMAN.    I    do   not    suppose    Mr.   Kahn   could    answer   that 

question,  Mr.  McKenzie,  unless  he  was  familiar  with  the  Japanese 

language. 

Sir.  McKknxik.  I  thought  he  might  have  some  knowledge  as  to 
whether  or  not  it  was  an  authentic  translation. 

The  Chairman.  I  think  the  question  is  wry  pertinent. 

Mr.  McKenzie.  If  it  was  published  in  a  newspaper  in  this  country. 
I  doubt  whether  that  would  he  any  ground  for  believing  it  was 
authentic. 

Mi-.  Kah\.  The  copy  which  I  desire  to  insert  in  the  hearings  is 
published  in  a  European  newspaper.  I  understand  the  translation 
is  authentic.  Of  course,  there  was  a  great  deal  of  Laughter  when 
Hernhardi's  book  was  published,  but  it  turned  out  to  be  a  serious 
proposition. 

The  Chairman.  His  book  was  published  after  the  war  began,  was 
it  not? 

Mr.  Kaiin.  No:  it  was  published  two  years  before  the  War  began. 
He  pointed  out  in  that  book  practically  vwvy  step  which  Germany 
has  since  taken,  and  even  discussed  the  possible  neutrality  of  Italy, 
and  her  out-and-out  opposition  to  the  central  powers.  It  was  all 
published  two  years  before  the  war  started. 

(Jen.  Wood.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  correct  my  testimony  in  ref- 
erence to  reserve  supplies.  1  wanted  to  state  that  the  experience  of 
the  present  war  has  demonstrated  that  you  have  to  have  two  rifles 
for  every  man  who  goes  into  the  field. 


278  IMVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 

The  Chairman.  I  think  Gen.  Crozier  said  he  thought  there  ought 
to  be  three  rifles  for  every  man. 

Gen.  Wood.  If  we  can  get  two  rifles  for  every  man  with  a  force  of 
2,000,000  I  think  we  will  do  pretty  well. 

Mr.  Kahn.  In  the  European  war.  General,  what  is  the  proportion 
of  artillery  to  infantry? 

Gen.  Wood.  The  proportion  of  guns  varies  somewhat.  It  is  safe 
to  say  it  is  between  five  and  a  fraction  to  six  and  a  fraction  guns  per 
thousand  rifles.  It  is  not  only  the  guns  which  have  been  increased. 
Our  old  allowance  was  3.18  per  thousand  rifles.  The  testimony  in 
regard  to  the  present  war  is  to  the  effect  that  the  expenditure  of  am- 
munition has  been  simply  unprecedented.  We  have  a  report  which 
showed  that  the  expenditure  on  a  certain  army  front  in  a  single  day 
last  year  was  200,000  rounds.  This  is  a  great  war,  with  many  million 
men  in  it.  An  officer  of  one  of  the  allied  Teutonic  powers,  who  had 
been  wTith  his  corps  during  a  great  deal  of  the  fighting,  told  me  that 
the  use  of  artillery  ammunition  had  exceeded  by  more  than  three 
times  the  maximum  estimate  of,  the  German  general  staff.  I  think 
it  safe  to  say  that  their  estimate  was  twice  ours,  and  remembering 
that  we  have  only  a  small  fraction  of  our  allowance  it  is  easy  to  see 
where  we  stand  in  the  matter  of  artillery  preparation.  As  I  said 
above,  our  condition  in  this  respect  is  most  dangerous.  It  has  been 
pointed  out  again  and  again  for  a  number  of  years. 

I  was  speaking  to  an  officer  the  other  day  who  had  seen,  practi- 
cally in  one  continuous  group,  some  500  heavy  field  pieces,  firing 
with  great  rapidity  and  almost  continuously  for  four  hours.  Similar 
statements  come  from  both  sides. 

The  Chairman.  What  do  you  mean  by  the  heavy  field  pieces? 

Gen.  Wood.  The  4.7,  the  6-inch  calibers  and  larger  calibers.  The 
group  to  which  I  refer  is  the  group  called  mid-caliber  artillery,  prob- 
ably from  5-inch  to  8-inch  caliber. 

The  Chairman.  When  you  referred  to  the  size  of  the  guns  a 
moment  ago,  you  meant  that  they  were  4.7  and  6  inch  guns  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes,  sir.  I  understand  that  most  of  them  were  sizes 
that  correspond  roughly  to  our  4.7  and  6  inch.  Our  4.7  fires  a  60- 
pound  shell  and  our  6-inch  a  120-pound  shell. 

Mr.  Kahn.  How  does  that  compare  with  the  guns  being  used  on 
the  fronts  in  Europe? 

Gen.  Wood.  That  is  about  on  a  line  with  their  mid-caliber  artillery, 
and  they  have  a  good  deal  of  heavier  mobile  artillery,  running,  we 
know,  to  the  12-inch  howitzer,  and  we  believe  to  the  17-inch,  although 
no  one  has  to  my  knowledge  seen  the  latter  gun. 

Mr.  Kahn.  In  your  opinion,  ought  we  to  have  some  of  those  large- 
caliber  guns  in  this  country — those  large-caliber  mobile  guns  ( 

Gen.  Wood.  I  have  recommended  that  we  prepare  with  as  little 
delay  as  possible,  for  the  purpose,  primarily,  of  coast-defense  mobile 
artillery,  including  the  14-inch  gun,  to  be  transported  on  railway  cars 
which  are,  in  effect,  gun  carriages.  The  car  and  the  gun  are  capable 
of  being  emplaced  so  that  the  gun  can  be  fired  from  the  car.  We 
know  that  guns  up  to  12  inches  are  being  moved  very  rapidly  on  the 
western  front  and  fired  a  few  minutes  after  being  placed  in  position. 

I  think  we  should  have  an  ample  allowance  of  heavy  guns  of  this 
class  in  order  to  cover  the  many  harbors  which  furnish  good  landing 
places,  but  are  not  of  sufficient  importance  to  warrant  construction 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY    TRAINING.  279 

of  permanent  fortifications.  Armament  of  this  class  should  be  han- 
dled by  the  Coast  Artillery,  and  in  case  of  defensive  operations  in- 
volving an  attack  upon  our  coast  lines,  or  operations  brought  about 
as  the  result  of  piercing  our  coast  line,  these  guns  would  be  available 
for  service  by  the  land  forces.  They  would  also  be  available  for 
service  on  either  coast.  They  should  be  handled,  under  all  conditions, 
by  the  Coast  Artillery.  Armament  of  this  class  would  be  of  great 
all-round  value.  Their  type  would  be  that  of  the  Coast  Artillery 
armament. 

Mr.  Kaiin.  Would  you  recommend  any  considerable  number  of 
those  large-caliber  guns  that  could  be  mounted  and  transported  on 
those  caterpillar  wheels? 

Gen.  Wood.  Very  large  guns,  up  to  12-inch  caliber,  are  carried  on 
carriages  provided  with  specially  built  wheels.  The  entire  mount  is 
carried  in  several  sections  and  assembled  at  the  place  where  it  is  to  be 
used.    We  should  have  a  liberal  supply  of  these  guns  and  carriages. 

Mr.  Kaiin.  Are  you  recommending  any  armoreq  automobiles? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  may  say  that  the  armored  automobile  has  not  had 
quite  as  Large  a  degree  of  utility  as  was  expected.  It  is  excellent  in 
the  advance,  in  breaking  through  light  screens  of  troops,  but  I  do  not 
think  they  are  using  them  much  now  anywhere  for  purposes  other 
than  those  of  observation.     We  want  a  certain  proportion  of  them. 

Mr.  Kaiin.  Information  has  come  to  this  committee  that  probably 
the  most  destructive  work  done  in  the  European  war  zones  is  done  by 
machine  guns.    Have  you  suggested  any  machine  guns? 

(Jen.  Wood.  I  have  recommended  that  each  Infantry  regiment 
should  have  a  machine-gun  company  of  L50  men,  with  -J  1  machine 
guns.  The  Cavalry  should  have  ;i  machine-gun  troop  with  is  machine 
guns.  The  machine  gun  has  come  to  stay,  and  there  is  almost  no  limit 
to  its  possibilities. 

The  number  of  machine  guns  varies  greatly  and  is  dependent  upon 
the  local  situation.  They  are  especially  valuable  for  defense,  and  when 
properly  unplaced  and  protected  by  shields,  us  they  often  are,  the 
exposure  of  men  is  reduced  to  a  minimum,  and  at  the  same  time  an 
effective  power  of  resistance  is  maintained.  At  the  shorter  ranges  the 
machine  gun  is  equal  to  about  30  rifles;  at  longer  ranges,  the  value  is 
somewhat  increased.  This  use  of  machine  guns  enables  the  fire  trenches 
to  be  held  by  relatively  small  numbers  of  men,  the  others  being  in 
the  supporting  trenches  under  conditions  which  give  them  reason- 
able protection.  The  machine  guns  tend  to  stop  a  rush.  Behind 
each  gun,  with  its  equivalent  value  of  30  rifles,  there  is  only  one  man 
exposed,  and  his  exposure  is  minimized  by  the  use  of  a  shield.  It  is 
understood  that  one  group  of  the  allies  went  into  the  war  with  not 
less  than  50,000  machine  guns,  and  that  at  present  they  have  several 
times  this  number.  Machine  guns  of  a  portable  type,  especially  of  a 
type  which  can  be  handled  by  one  man,  are  particularly  valuable  in 
the  defense  and  in  gaining  superiority  of  fire.  They  are  also  used 
extensively  in  connection  wTith  aircraft. 

Mr.  Kaiin.  Do  you  think  your  recommendation  in  regard  to  the 
proportion  of  machine  guns  to  a  regiment  would  be  ample  for  this 
country  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  think  it  would  be  sufficient  for  all  ordinary  occasions. 
Special  conditions  would  require,  perhaps,  more  guns,  but  generally 
speaking,  I  believe  that  24  guns  per  regiment  is  a  satisfactory  allow- 


280  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY    TRAINING. 

ance.  You  might,  of  course,  put  Is  machine  guns  as  thick  as  there  is 
room  for  them,  but  I  think  an  allowance  of  24  machine  guns  to  a  regi- 
ment, with  150  men  in  a  machine  gun  company  is  sufficient.  If  they 
were  used  for  defensive  work  you  might  have  four  or  five  to  a  com- 
pany.    You  save  men  by  putting  in  machine  guns. 

Mr.  Kaiin.  You  have  made  a  recommendation  for  a  considerable 
increase  in  the  aviation  corps? 

Gen.  Wood.  There  ought  to  be  an  aviation  squadron  with  each 
division. 

Mr.  Kaiin.  Have  you  looked  into  the  matter  of  the  new  Fokker 
flying  machine? 

Gen.  Wood.  No,  sir.  I  have  heard  of  it,  however.  I  was  talking 
the  other  day  with  some  men  who  are  flying  with  one  of  the  European 
armies,  and  it  appears  that  the  principal  uses  of  the  aeroplanes  now 
are  the  observation  and  control  of  artillery  fire,  putting  the  guns  on 
the  target  at  long  ranges  through  reporting  the  positions  of  shots,  and 
noting  errors.  The  work  accomplished  in  this  direction  is  remark- 
ably effective.  They  are  also  used  much  in  observing  the  movements 
of  troops  and  in  keeping  enemy  aeroplanes  away  from,  their  territory 
and  preventing  their  acting  as  observers,  in  other  words.  Most  of  the 
machines  engaged  in  controlling  artillery  fire  carry  a  pilot,  and  an 
observer,  and  are  equipped  with  a  wireless  sender  for  transmitting 
brief  messages. 

The  antiaircraft  guns  are  becoming  very  accurate  in  their  work, 
and  a  man,  in  order  to  be  safe  from  rifle  fire,  has  to  be  about  2,200 
meters  up  in  the  air.  They  can  get  him  sometimes  as  high  as  4,500 
meters,  with  the  antiaircraft  3-inch  guns. 

Mr.  Kahn.  The  dispatches  I  have  seen  regarding  this  new  aero- 
plane indicates  that  it  is  a  sort  of  dreadnaught  in  the  air. 

Gen.  Wood.  It  is  very  fast,  but  with  a  rather  limited  radius  of 
operation.  As  far  as  I  can  learn  the  biplane  is  taking  the  place  of 
the  monoplane,  and  stands  more  shooting  up.  They  are  using  the 
driver  more  than  the  tractor  with  the  English  and  French  forces, 
because  you  can  shoot  ahead,  and  it  is  more  dangerous  and  difficult 
to  do  so  when  you  use  a  tractor. 

Mr.  Kaiin.  Is  the  Army  making  any  effort  at  all  to  secure  models 
of  these  most  powerful  machines  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  do  not  know.  We  have  some,  possibly  10.  I  do  not 
know  how  many  of  them  are  fully  serviceable. 

Mr.  Kahn  (interposing).  I  mean  models  of  the  most  recent  ones, 
the  ones  that  are  doing  such  terrific  damage  to-day. 

Gen.  Wood.  I, think  you  will  find  under  the  new  development  that 
very  soon  you  will  see  a  fighting  plane  that  will  measure  120  feet 
from  tip  to  tip,  and  that  will  carry  a  number  of  men  and  powerful 
guns.  I  talked  to  a  man  the  other  day  who  is  familiar  with  the  sub- 
ject, and  he  says  they  are  going  up  to  any  limit  they  need. 

Mr.  Kaiin.  In  your  study  of  war  problems  to-day  have  you  given 
any  thought  to  the  activity  of  the  aeroplane,  and  do  you  think  this 
country  ought  to  embark  in  the  manufacture  and  operations  of 
aeroplanes  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes,  sir.  They  are  of  great  value  in  modern  war  upon 
the  lines  above  referred  to.  I  know  of  no  instance  where  they  have 
had  a  determining  influence  upon  any  large  action.    They  are  rapidly 


UNIVERSAL    MILITARY    TRAINIXc;.  281 

developing  and  it  is  difficult  to  say  at  the  present  time  what  their 
limitations  will  be.  We  should  proceed  actively  in  building  up  an 
adequate  force,  both  with  the  Army  and  reserve,  the  latter  force  to 
be  made  up  principally  of  civilian  volunteers,  of  whom  there  are 
many  who  are  now  keenly  interested  in  aviation. 

Mr.  Kaiin.  If  they  continue  their  work  along  the  lines  you  sug- 
gest, that  is,  securing  information,  will  they  not  supersede  cavalry? 

Gen.  Wood.  They  will  supersede  cavalry  for  observation  purposes 
in  clear  weather.  They  can  not  do  this  work  at  night:  gunfire  is 
forcing  them  to  Hy  very  high,  and  the  higher  the  more  difficult  is 
their  work.  At  a  height  of  10,000  feet  the  earth  looks  like  a  flat  sur- 
face, and  it  takes  the  strongest  kind  of  glasses  and  great  skill  and 
practice  to  pick  out  small  bodies  oi  troops.  There  are  no  great  move- 
ment of  troops  in  the  daytime,  unless  they  are  engaged  in  actual 
attack.  Movements  are  made  at  night.  I  asked  an  officer  who  has 
been  engaged  in  aerial  work  for  over  a  year  in  one  of  the  Kuropean 
armies  how  they  were  able  to  follow  the  movements  of  troops.  He 
said  that  they  tried  to  keep  very  close  watch  on  the  movement  of  rail- 
way transportation  in  bulk:  that  it  was  practically  impossible  to 
follow  the  movements  of  small  bodies  of  troops,  I  asked  him  about 
work  in  cloudy  weather  and  he  said  clouds  wen-  excellent  when  there 
were  enough  holes  in  them  to  enable  one  to  Look  down.  They  fur- 
nish a  good  deal  of  protection  to  the  flyers,  but  when  too  thick  pre- 
vent all  observation  work. 

Mr.  Kaiin.  You  spoke  of  the  comparative  ease  with  which  a  land- 
ing could  be  made  on  the  New  England  coast  by  any  probable  enemy 
of  this  country.     Is  that  not  also  the  condition  on  the  Pacific  ('<■ 

Gen.  Wood.  Oh,  yes.  It  is  even  more  BO  oil  the  Pacific.  There  are 
not  many  good  harbors  on  the  Pacific,  except  at  San  Diego.  San 
Francisco,  and  Puget  Sound.  I  mean  harbors  where  you  could  land 
troops  in  all  weather. 

Mr.  Kaiin.  Is  it  necessary  to  have  a  good  harbor  to  land  troops? 

Gen.  Wood.  Oh,  no. 

Mr.  Kaiin.    You  can  land  troops  on  a  shelving  beach? 

Gen.  Wood.  Ajg  at  Frenchmans  Bay. 

Mr.  Kaiin.  When  Japan  went  to  Chemulpo,  she  provided  for  a 
condition  of  a  80-foot  tide,  and  so  she  carried  on  her  transports  a 
large  number  of  trestles.  Those  trestles  put  down  by  her  engineers 
enabled  her  to  march  her  troops  direct  from  the  ships  to  dry  land 
over  the  mud  Hat.-. 

Gen.  Wood.  There  i.-  no  difficulty  in  landing  under  ordinary  cir- 
cumstances. 

Mr.  Kaiin.  The  great  military  nations  of  the  world,  through  their 
stall'  organizations,  plan  an  aggressive  campaign  against  all  the  other 
nations  of  the  world,  practically)  That  is  a  part  of  their  work,  is 
it  not? 

Gen.  Wood.  Absolutely. 

Mr.  Kaiin.  So  that  if  they  contemplate  activities  against  us  the 
chances  are  that  they  would  have  a  complete  plan  worked  out  which 
would  enable  them  to  make  a  landing  without  much  difficulty. 

Gen.  Wood.  They  have  their  plan  made,  worked  out  in  the  greatest 
detail,  and  when  they  strike  they  will  strike  promptly  and  the  blow 


282  IMVERSAL   MILITARY    TRAINING. 

will  not  be  preceded  by  a  note  of  warning  telling  us  where  and  when 
they  intend  to  come. 

Mr.  Kahn.  You  do  not  think  a  few  regiments  of  squirrel  hunters 
from  Arkansas  could  be  brought  hurriedly  to  the  coast  and  thus  kill 
off  the  invaders  as  they  tried  to  land  on  the  coast  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  am  afraid  the  squirrel  hunters  would  be  with  the 
squirrels. 

Mr.  Kahn.  I  agree  with  you.  But  such  a  statement  was  made  in 
all  seriousness  on  the  floor  of  the  House  a  year  ago.  You  were  say- 
ing, in  regard  to  the  training  of  the  men,  that  if  they  were  not 
required  to  do  so  much  gardening  or  domestic  work  they  could  be 
trained  very  much  more  readily  than  they  are  now.  Is  there  very 
much  of  that  going  on  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  When  you  have  a  large  post  with  extensive  grounds, 
and  a  great  many  buildings,  and  elaborate  arrangements,  a  great 
deal  of  the  men's  time  is  taken  up  with  nonmilitary  work.  I  think 
25  per  cent  of  the  men's  energy  is  used,  directly  or  indirectly,  in  that 
way. 

Mr.  Kahn.  Has  not  that  a  tendency  to  make  the  men  dissatisfied? 

Gen.  Wood.  It  has  a  tendency  to  keep  the  real  soldier  out  of  the 
Army.    He  does  not  like  to  be  a  scrubber. 

Mr.  Kahn.  How  would  you  remedy  that  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  Put  the  troops  in  cantonments  as  far  as  possible.  I 
am  very  glad  you  asked  me  that  question,  Mr.  Kahn.  I  recom- 
mended, in  connection  with  a  recommendation  for  six  divisions,  that 
at  least  two  of  them  be  kept  in  cantonments.  That  would  be  better 
for  the  men  and  for  the  country.  In  training  them  they  could  be 
handled  in  larger  units.  It  is  very  important  that  we  should  have 
something  of  that  kind,  because  our  people  do  not  understand  how 
completely  and  utterly  the  volunteer  system  has  always  failed  us. 

In  the  Revolutionary  War,  as  you  remember,  George  Washington 
warned  the  American  people  against  it  at  the  beginning  of  the  war. 
He  said  in  effect  it  would  be  a  failure.  The  Revolutionary  Army  was 
strongest  in  1776  and  diminished  every  year  until  1781.  In  1776  we 
had  89,000  troops,  47,000  Continental  and  42,000  militia.  In  1781  this 
force  had  dwindled  to  a  total  of  a  little  over  29,000. 

In  the  War  of  1812-1814  we  had  similar  difficulty.  The  system 
was  ^independable.  We  had  527,000  men  in  service  during  the  Avar. 
The  largest  British  regular  force  at  any  one  time  was  16,800.  They 
had  also  some  Canadians  and  Indians,  but  a  relatively  small  number 
compared  with  our  forces.  The  military  power  of  our  people  was 
held  in  abeyance  on  various  occasions  by  5,000  of  the  British  regular 
troops.  Our  Cupitol  was  burned  by  a  force  of  about  60  per  cent  of 
the  defenders,  and  we  abandoned  it  with  a  loss  of  8  killed  and  11 
wounded.  The  land  conduct  of  the  war  had  little  that  was  credit- 
able in  it.  It  was  the  system  and  not  the  men  and  officers  which 
was  at  fault.  In  the  Civil  War  the  South  went  to  draft  in  April, 
1862,  and  the  North  had  its  first  draft  order  in  August,  1862,  and 
went  to  the  general  draft  the  next  year.  The  condition  was  one 
which  no  soldier  or  no  man  who  has  the  best  interests  of  his  coun- 
try at  heart  would  ever  want  to  have  repeated,  nor  would  he  ever 
want  to  have  this  system  in  existence  in  case  of  a  war  with  a  first- 
class  country  prepared  for  war.     For  the  first  two  years  of  the  Civil 


IMVERSAL    MILITARY    TRAINING.  283 

War  our  Armies  were  in  the  process  of  the  making.  At  the  end  of 
the  war  we  had  two  excellent  Armies.  In  the  War  of  1812  we  had  not 
developed  a  good  Army  during  the  entire  war. 

Mr.  Kaiin.  If  we  were  to  become  engaged  with  any  first-class  mili- 
tary nation,  how  many  men  do  you  think  we  would  have  to  call  to  the 
colors  immediately  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  At  least  2,000,000. 

Mr.  Kahn.  If  we  increased  the  Army  to  220,000  men,  as  you  sug- 
gest, would  it  be  necessary  to  have  the  so-called  Continental  Army 
at  all  \ 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes,  sir.  I  do  not  know  thai  it  will  be  the  Continen- 
tal Army,  but  it  must  be  a  trained  reserve  of  officers  and  men. 

In  that  connection  I  would  like  to  say  this:  The  Morrill  Act  was 
enacted  in  1862  to  provide  officers  for  volunteers.  We  have  had 
these  land-grant  colleges  where  military  instruction  is  carried  on 
under  officers  of  the  Army,  and  there  are  approximately  30,000  stu- 
dents in  those  colleges  to-day.  We  have  had  private  institutions 
throughout  the  country — schools  and  colleges  and  universities,  all 
good  ones — where  military  training  has  been  given,  with  about 
10,000  students.  In  other  words,  there  h;i\c  been  in  those  institu- 
tions about  40,000  men  receiving  military  instruction  under  officers 
of  the  Army. 

Assuming  that  we  have  8,000  graduates  a  year  from  these  in- 
stitutions and  that  60  per  cent  of  them  are  physically  fit  to  undergo 
training  we  should  have  approximately  5,000  men  available  each 
summer.  Every  effort  should  be  made  to  place  these  men  in  United 
States  military  training  camps  under  officer  of  the  Army  and  in 
conjunction  with  regular  troops  in  order  to  give  them  1  month  of 
concentrated  training  at  the  end  of  their  sophomore  and  junior  years. 
We  should  also  make  every  effort  to  standardize  the  instruction  in 
these  institutions  so  that  men  may  come  to  us  who  have  had  the  same 
training.  We  also  have  as  a  source  of  supply  much  larger  than  the 
one  referred  to.  the  men  in  the  nonmilitary  colleges  and  universities. 

Many  of  these  big  universities  and  colleges  are  beginning  to  wake 
up  to  the  necessity  of  military  training  for  their  students.  Harvard 
University  has  just  agreed  to  give  a  course  of  theoretical  military 
training  for  2  years.  .The  course  each  year  includes  :'><)  lectures  and 
6  days  in  the  field  in  tactical  walks.  The  theoretical  course  in- 
cludes military  history  and  policy,  chemistry  as  applied  to  explosives, 
surveying,  one  modern  Language,  economics,  and  so  forth.  Then 
they  Dave  30  Lectures  by  the  military  instructors  on  the  different 
arms  of  the  service.  <',  days  for  tactical  walks,  and  then  5  weeks  in 
camp  at  Plattsburg  or  elsewhere  under  officers  of  the  Army.  These 
camps  follow  the  university  course  at  the  end  of  each  of  the  2  years. 
A  man  who  does  that  for  -J  years  and  does  good  work  in  the  course 
will  be  given  a  full-course  credit  toward  a  decree. 

Yale  university  has  just  organized  three  batteries  of  field  artillery. 
Princeton  University  is  considering  putting  in  a  military  course, 
and  the  same  thing  is  being  done  at  the  University  of  Pittsburgh 
and  at  the  University  of  Michigan,  at  Ann  Arbor,  and  the  matter 
has  also  been  taken  up  by  Williams  College.  The  movement  is  very 
general.  The  people  are  taking  the  movement  up  themselves  and 
leading  in  it.  What  they  want  now  is  to  get  officers  as  military 
instructors. 


284  UNIVERSAL    MILITARY    TRAINING. 

The  Genera]  Staff  is  working  upon  a  plan  for  the  establishment  of 
officers'  training  corps  units  in  the  various  nonmilitary  universities, 
as  well  as  in  universities  where  military  training  is  established.  The 
purpose  is  to  give  such  training  as  will,  in  conjunction  with  miltary 
traning  camps,  result  in  turning  out  a  reasonably  well  prepared 
officer  of  junior  grades  of  our  citizen  soldiery.  There  is  a  general 
appreciation  of  the  need  of  a  large  number  of  well-trained  reserve 
officers.  We  have  plent}^  of  material  available  and  should  make 
use  of  it. 

Mr.  Kahn.  Is  the  War  Department  fostering  that  movement? 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes ;  they  are  very  sympathetic.  They  are  supporting 
the  movement.  It  will  require  legislation  to  put  it  upon  a  working 
basis.  From  the  men  who  come  from  these  military  training  camps 
I  have  urged  that  we  take  not  less  than  1.000  and  commission  them 
as  under  a  temporary  commission  as  second  lieutenants  of  the  various 
arms  and  departments  of  the  regular  establishment,  with  a  view  to 
giving  them  training  to  fit  them,  for  the  grade  of  captain  or  major 
of  reserves.  We  do  not  propose  to  commission  reserve  officers  in 
grades  above  that  of  major.  A  year  with  the  regular  establishment 
will  give  these  men  training  in  administration,  supply,  and  organi- 
zation. The  men  who  do  not  pass  beyond  the  training  camps  will, 
as  a  class,  be  fitted  to  serve  only  as  lieutenants  or  in  some  instances 
as  captains,  especially  men  who  graduate  from  institutions  like  the 
Virginia  Military  Institute,  the  Pennsylvania  State  Military  Col- 
lege, the  Norwich  College,  or  some  other  of  the  better  class  of  col- 
leges. The  men  w7ho  have  had  a  year  of  that  sort  of  training,  plus 
two  years  in  college  and  a  year  with  us  should  be  well  trained  to  serve 
as  officers  of  volunteers.  This  plan  would  give  us  in  a  short  time  a 
sufficient  number  of  well-trained  men  to  make  up  the  corps  of  45,000 
officers  which  I  have  recommended.  We  had  127,000  officers  in  the 
Union  Army  during  the  Civil  War,  and  about  G5.000  officers  in  the 
Southern  Army.  That  made  a  total  of  192,000  officers  in  the  Civil 
War,  so  you  can  see  what  the  demand  is  going  to  be  for  officers  in  case 
we  have  a  real  war. 

Mr.  Kahn.  The  present  European  war  1ms  demonstrated  the  fact 
that  the  officer  is  a  very  essential  factor,  has  it  not? 

Gen.  Wood.  Absolutely.  You  will  have  no  time  to  make  an  officer 
after  the  war  starts.  Fifty  thousand  officers  are  barely  enough  for 
an  army  of  a  million  and  a  half  men. 

Mr.  Kahn.  You  say  you  think  this  country  must  eventually  come 
to  universal  military  training? 

Gen.  Wood.  It  seems  to  me  that  the  very  foundation  on  which 
this  country  should  stand  is  equality  of  service.  We  are  now  going 
on  a  basis  which  allows  a  man  of  means  to  go  out  and  buy  the 
services  of  a  substitute,  and  if  there  is  anything  more  damnable  that 
can  be  conceived  of  in  the  way  of  policy  in  a  democracy,  I  do  not 
know  what  it  is.  We  must  come  to  equality  of  service,  not  necessarily 
with  the  rifle  in  hand,  but  service  in  some  capacity.  A  man  may  be 
a  surgeon  at  the  rear,  or  he  may  serve  in  the  quartermaster  corps, 
but  somewhere  he  has  his  place.  He  must  know  where  it  is  and  the 
Government  must  know  it. 

Mr.  Kahn.  Do  you  not  think  that  in  this  country  it  ought  to  be 
the  general  rule  that  it  is  the  duty  of  every  patriotic  American  citi- 


UNIVERSAL    MILITARY    TRAINING.  285 

zen  to  defend  his  home  and  his  country  and   its  institution  if  they 
are  attacked  I 

Mr.  Gordon.  That  is  the  rule  now. 

Mr.  Kahn.  Unfortunately  it  is  more  honored  in  the  breach  than  in 
the  observance. 

Gen.  Wood.  We  have  never  conducted  a  war  in  which  our  \olunteer 
system  lias  proved  successful.  We  have  had  to  go  either  to  bounties 
Or  the  draft.  In  the  Civil  War  we  went  to  both,  and  permitted  the 
most  vicious  of  all  practices  namely,  the  purchase  of  substitutes. 

Mr.  Kahn.  England  has  been  trying  i<>  secure  volunteers  for  18y 
months.  Have  you  any  idea  how  successful  she  has  been  with  these 
volunteers \  Is  it  not  true  that  she  has  been  bo  unsuccessful  that  she 
has  just  had  to  resort  to  the  draft  in  the  midst  of  a  great  war!  If 
she  had  had  a  system  of  obligatory  service  earlier  there  probably 
would  have  been  no  war.  When  Lord  Roberts  was  at  the  head  of  the 
English  Army  he  advocated  universal  military  training  in  England 
for  a  limited  period  of  time. 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes.  Lord  Roberts  was  constantly  advocating  general 
training  and  preparedness.  A  prominent  Englishman  recently  wrote 
me,  saying  that  "if  we  had  listened  to  Lord  Roberts  we  should  have" 
been  ready  now.  The  pacifists  and  the  opponents  of  preparedness 
were  always  asking  Lord  Roberts  *  who  are  you  getting  ready  to 
fight?'  We  have  our  answer  now.  I  notice  that  a  similar  class  of 
people  are  asking  in  the  United  State-  •  whom  are  you  getting  ready 
to  fight?'  No  one  can  tell,  but  some  day  you  will  have  an  answer. 
We  are  not  getting  ready  to  light  any  particular  people.  Our  pre- 
paredne  iin-t  war  with  any  people. 

Mr.  Aniuow.  General,  the  War  Department  recommends  an  in- 
crease  in  the  regular  establishment  from  L00,000  to  140,000  men,  in- 
cluding officers.  Two  methods  have  been  put  before  this  committee 
as  to  how  that  should  be  done,  one  by  increasing  the  strength  of  the 
organization  we  have  to  full  war  strength,  and  the  other  by  increas- 
ing the  total  number  of  organizations.  Which  method  do  you  recom- 
mend ! 

Gen.  Wood.  I  recommend  first  the  filling  of  everything  we  have  to 
war-  strength.     That  would  be  the  first  step. 

Mr.  Anthony.  It  is  up  to  this  committee  to  decide  which  of  those 
methods  we  shall  adopt  in  order  to  bring  the  strength  of  the  Regular 
Ann\  up  to  1  10.000  men.  Which  method  would  you  recommend,  an 
increase  in  the  total  number  of  organizations,  say,  the  total  number 
of  regiments,  or  by  increasing  the  enlisted  strength  of  the  organiza- 
tion in  the  regiments  we  have? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  would  not  recommend  either  to  the  exclusion  of  the 
other.  If  our  force  is  to  be  limited  to  140,000  men  we  should  bring 
the  regiments  up  to  not  less  than  85  per  cent  of  their  full  war 
strength,  build  up  a  reserve  of  men  so  that  they  may  be  promptly 
filled  up,  and  provide  a  certain  number  of  new  organizations. 

Mr.  Avriioxr.  Those  two  are  the  only  ones  open  to  us,  and  that  is 
the  reason  why  I  ask  yon  which  ones  you  would  choose. 

Gen.  Wood.  You  mean  there  is  a  limitation  on  Congress? 

Mr.  Anthony.  I  regard  it  as  a  certainty  that  this  committee  will 
not  go  to  the  extent  you  recommend  in  the  total  increase  which  will  be 
asked  for,     Tf  we  grant  the  increase  asked  for  by  the  War  Depart- 


286  INIVERSAL    MILITARY    TRAINING. 

ment,  which  would  bring  the  total  strength  of  the  Army  to  140,000 
men  and  officers,  how  do  you  recommend  that  to  be  done — by  increas- 
ing the  enlisted  strength  of  the  organization  we  have  to  bring  them 
up  to  that  number  or  by  increasing  the  total  number  of  organiza- 
tions ? 

Gen,  Wood.  You  will  have  to  do  both.  Bringing  up  the  present 
organization  to  full  strength  would  not  give  you  140,000  men.  You 
will  have  to  create  some  new  organizations. 

Mr.  Anthony.  You  regard  new  organizations  as  more  valuable 
than  simply  having  more  men? 

Gen.  Wood.  If  you  are  limited  to  140,000  men,  I  should  fill  up  the 
present  organization  and  then  create  new  ones,  especially  in  the 
Field  Artillery,  up  to  the  limit  of  140,000,  but  if  you  do  only  that 
you  will  not  have  done  much  for  the  security  of  the  country.  You 
will  not  have  taken  any  adequate  measure  of  defense. 

Mr.  Anthony.  If  any  increase  is  made  you  think  it  should  be 
made  in  the  Field  Artillery  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  First  in  the  Field  Artillery. 

Mr.  Anthony.  General^  it  is  urged  that  auxiliary  forces  be 
organized  in  addition  to  our  regular  establishment,  and  the  proposed 
continental  army  is  recommended.  What  is  your  advice  to  this 
committee  on  that  ?    Do  you  believe  it  will  be  adequate  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  think  that  any  proposition  which  does  not  look  to 
placing  the  entire  military  resources  of  the  country  under  Federal 
control,  absolute  and  complete,  amounts  to  dodging  and  evading 
the  issue.  The  continental  army,  as  proposed,  gives  the  militia  an 
opportunity  to  come  in,  but  the  bill  providing  for  the  continental 
army  does  not  provide  for  the  withdrawal  of  all  support  from  that 
portion  of  the  militia  which  does  not  come  into  the  Federal  service. 
The  bill  is  faulty  and  dangerous  in  that  it  continues  our  dependence 
upon  a  system  which  has  always  failed  us — I  mean  the  volunteer 
system.  The  continental  army  will  not  give  us,  in  any  sense,  an 
adequate  defense.  It  will  improve  present  conditions  and  it  is  a 
step,  and  a  long  one,  in  the  right  direction,  in  that  it  embodies  the 
idea  of  a  Federal  force  replacing  the  militia.  The  continental  army, 
when  completed,  will  only  be  a  small  portion  of  the  force  needed. 
It  is  a  step  forward  but  it  is  not  a  measure  of  adequate  defense  in 
any  sense.  It  will  give  us  a  Federal  force  and  I  believe  that  the 
conditions  of  enlistment  will  induce  an  intelligent  class  of  men  to 
enter  it,  provided  the  service  is  at  camps  of  instruction  where  rela- 
tively large  bodies  of  men  are  assembled  and  where  the  training  is 
intensive,  and  provided  further  that  the  period  of  service  is  continu- 
ous for  six  months  for  all  who  have  not  had  previous  military  train- 
ing. If  men  have  had  previous  military  training,  this  period  may  be 
shortened.  I  think  it  is  most  unwise  to  pay  anything  to  the  militia 
which  does  not  come  into  the  continental  army.  Make  every  effort 
to  get  the  militia  in,  and  if  it  does  not  come,  withdraw  all  assistance 
and  devote  your  time,  material,  and  money  to  the  building  up  of  a 
new  force.  To  continue  the  two  forces,  a  continental  army  haying 
been  created  because  the  militia  is  unavailable,  and  to  still  continue 
to  pay  the  militia,  impresses  me  as  thoroughly  inconsistent.  It  is, 
rather,  a  dangerous  makeshift,  and  a  stop-gap,  and  will  lead  to  the 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING.  287 

establishment  of  a  new  demand  upon  the  Federal  Treasury.  Build 
up  the  Federal  force  (continental  army,  or  whatever  you  may  call  it) 
and  withdraw  all  assistance  from  that  militia  which  does  not  come 
in.  This  can  not  be  too  strongly  emphasized.  It  is  perfectly  fair  to 
the  Government  and  to  the  militia. 

Mr.  Anthony.  In  the  event  the  continental  army  is  not  created  as 
recommended  by  the  War  Department,  do  you  advise  an  attempt 
being  made  to  increase  the  efficiency  of  the  National  Guard  by  in- 
creasing its  members  and  federalizing  it? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  believe  that  the  National  Guard,  officers  and  men, 
have  done  all  that  men  can  do  under  the  vicious  system  that  exists. 
I  have  the  highest  respect  for  them,  and  I  have  always  supported 
them.  But  in  all  these  schemes  there  is  simply  an  effort  at  an  evasion 
of  the  fact  that  we  owe  service  to  the  country;  ever  man  owes  service 
to  the  country,  and  we  should  not  fail  to  recognize  that  fact. 

The  continental  army,  in  so  far  as  it  gives  us  a  Federal  force,  is 
strongly  to  be  commended,  but  the  period  of  training,  I  think,  should 
be  made  a  continuous  period  for  men  who  have  not  had  previous 
service,  and  with  that  training  must  go  the  immediate  preparation 
of  a  corps  of  officers. 

I  can  not  see  anything  but  disaster  in  stalling  a  new  force  and 
planting  in  the  military  pathway  a  struggle  for  money.  The  Na- 
tional Guard  will  he  struggling  for  money,  and  you  will  also  have 
the  continental  army,  witii  all  its  friends,  struggling  for  an  appro- 
priation. 

Build  up  your  continental  army;  I  am  for  it  if  you  will  drop  your 

assistance  to  the  National  Guard;  but  do  not  <lo  that  until  you  have 
urged  the  men  in  the  Xat'u  nal  Guard  in  every  possible  way  to  come 
into  the  continental  army.  Take  them  as  they  stand,  rank  for  rank. 
but  do  not  build  up  a  new  force  and  go  on  increasing  the  pay  of 
the  old. 

Mr.  Anthony.  You  have  used  the  words  "vicious"  and  •'rotten" 
in  reference  to  the  present  National  Guard  establishment.  What  do 
you  mean  by  that? 

Gen.  Wood.  It  is  vicious  in  that  you  undermine  ;m  instrumentality 
on  which  the  Nation  depends,  leaving  it  under  dual  control.  I  did 
not  mean  to  use  the  word  "virions"  in  a  moral  >ense.  It  is  a 
harmful,  unworkable1  system. 

Mr.  Anthony.  If  some  system  was  devised  by  which  the  National 
Guard  could  be  put  under  the  control  of  the  War  Department,  do 
you  not  think  the  National  Guard  could  be  made  a  most  effective 
military  weapon  in  this  country) 

(Jen.  Wood.  I  will  answer  that  in  two  ways.  If  you  will  put  the 
Regular  Army  itself  in  the  position  of  the  National  Guard,  and  con- 
trol it  as  the  National  Guard  is  controlled  to-day,  it  will  deteriorate 
as  fast  as  possible.  It  is  not  the  fault  of  the  National  Guard.  Take 
the  National  Guard  out  of  State  control  and  it  will  be  a  very  good 
force  indeed 

Mr.  Anthony.  If  we  can  unify  the  National  Guard  and  bring 
about  an  ideal  system 

(Jen.  Wood  (interposing).  Make  it  a  straight  Federal  force  with- 
out any   relationship  whatever  to  the  State.     The  men  and  officers 


288  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY    TRAINING. 

remain  whore  they  are  and  they  will  be  available  for  local  use  on  a 
call  made  by  the  governor  to  the  President.  This  will  make  it 
available  to  meet  any  emergency  requiring  the  use  of  force  in  excess 
of  the  police  force. 

Mr.  Anthony.  In  reference  to  the  summer  training  camps,  Gen- 
eral, do  you  think  it  would  be  advisable  to  continue  them  \ 

Gen.  Wood.  I  think  so.  I  think  that  in  those  summer  camps  we 
shall  develop  a  very  valuable  class  of  men. 

Mr.  Anthony.  Do  you  think  it  would  be  advisable  for  the  Govern- 
ment to  pay  the  transportation  and  subsistence  of  the  men  in  those 
camps  or  pay  any  of  the  expenses  of  those  men,  or  would  you  have 
the  men  pay  all  their  own  expenses? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  would  give  the  man  who  goes  to  one  of  those  camps 
his  clothing,  rations,  and  shelter,  but  I  should  go  rather  slowly  on 
the  question  of  transportation,  because  if  you  should  furnish  that,  I 
think  it  ought  to  be  furnished  under  very  carefully  drawn  regula- 
tions, so  that  men  would  not  go  for  pleasure. 

Mr.  Anthony  (interposing).  The  Government  should  take  care 
of  the  man  when  he  arrives  at  the  camp  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  would  not  pay  him  for  going  there;  I  would  see 
that  it  does  not  cost  him  anything  while  there.  You  get  a  very  un- 
usual lot  of  men  in  those  camps,  they  are  men  who  are  giving  up  not 
only  their  business  but  who  are  putting  in  a  month  of  hard  work.  It 
is  as  hard  work  as  you  ever  saw  any  man  do  in  camp. 

Mr.  Anthony.  There  has  been  some  discussion  before  the  com- 
mittee about  the  present  condition  of  the  country  for  defense,  par- 
ticularly the  coast  defense.  Do  you  regard  the  "coast  defense  in  a 
proper  state  of  preparedness  at  the  present  time  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  We  have  an  admirable  body  of  officers  and  men.  We 
are  short  of  both  officers  and  men  for  coast  defenses,  however.  We 
have  some  32  companies  without  captains  and  some  80  companies  that 
are  incompletely  officered.  You  need  a  lot  more  officers  than  you  have 
now,  and  if  you  add  any  companies  to  the  Coast  Artillery  you  must 
also  add  officers,  or  else  you  will  be  in  a  condition  of  greater  embar- 
rassment than  at  present,  for  want  of  officers. 

Mr.  Anthony.  What  I  refer  to  particularly  is  the  armament 

Gen.  Wood.  The  guns  in  our  coast  defenses  are  all  right.  The  dis- 
appearing carriage  was  an  admirable  carriage  when  it  was  designed, 
and  it  wrill  still  be  a  good  carriage  in  certain  positions  where  extreme 
range  is  not  required.  It  will  also  continue  to  be  a  good  carriage  if 
we  can  give  it  an  elevation  corresponding  to  the  maximum  effective 
range  of  the  gun ;  in  any  event,  it  should  permit  of  at  least  30  degrees 
of  elevation.  When  this  carriage  was  built  it  was  not  expected  that 
we  should  have  to  meet  naval  attack  at  ranges  greater  than  10,000 
yards.  Even  up  to  last  January  I  believe  that  our  own  Navy  did  not 
expect  to  fire  at  much  over  14,000  yards.  Then  came  the  develop- 
ments incident  to  the  present  wTar — the  sinking  of  the  Blucher  at  over 
17,000  yards — the  sinking  of  the  ships  in  the  Falkland  Islands  fight 
at  long  range,  the  Dardanelles  forts  by  the  Queen  Elizabeth  at  over 
21,000  yards.  This  brought  out  the  fact  that  there  are  many  places 
where  we  are  accessible  to  bombardment,  such  as  Boston  and  New 
York,  by  ships  lying  in  waters  our  guns  can  not  reach.  To  correct 
this  various  suggestions  have  been  made,  and  the  first  was  to  lighten 


UNIVERSAL  MILITAHV    TRAINING.  289 

the  weight  of  the  projectile  and  slightly  increase  the  capacity  of  the 
carriages  for  elevation.  By  this  means  it  was  thought  that  the 
range  of  the  gun  might  be  sufficiently  increased,  but  later  develop- 
ments tended  to  show  that  this  would  not  be  sufficient;  moreover,  it 
meant  loss  of  effectiveness  through  the  use  of  the  lighter  projectile. 
The  result  is  that  we  are  now  confronted  with  the  necessity  of  radical 
changes  in  the  disappearing  carriage  which  will  permit  extreme  ele- 
vation, or  the  adoption  of  a  type  of  barbette  carriage  which  will 
permit  at  least  30  degrees  elevation. 

Now.  we  are  confronted  by  the  question  of  remodeling  the  carriages 
for  the  longer  ranges.  The  disappearing  carriage  would  be  all  right 
in  some  of  the  narrow  areas,  but  all  our  guns  point  seaward. 

Take  one  of  our  12-inch  guns.  It  fires  a  projectile  weighing  1,070 
pounds.  That  gun.  mounted  on  one  of  the  old  carriages,  was  limited 
practically  to  a  range  of  13,200  yards.  If  you  change  the  carriage  so 
as  to  permit  increased  elevation,  you  can  increase  the  range  of  the 
gun.  If  you  give  it  15  degrees  of  elevation,  you  will  give  the  gun  a 
range  of  32,000  yards.  It  will  perforate  deck  armor  turret  tops  and 
most  side  armor  at  27,000  to  82,000  yards.  We  have  to  get  a  new  type 
carriage  and  also  mortars  of  much  longer  range. 

Mr.  Aniiio.w.  The  statement  has  been  made  to  this  committee 
that  in  spite  of  all  criticism  of  our  coast  defenses  they  are  in  such 
condition  to-day  that  no  fleet,  not  even  the  most  powerful  Meet,  would 
dare  attack  them.     Is  that  true  I 

Gen.  Wood.  No.  sir;  it  is  not  true,  even  in  part.  It  is  not.  The 
fleets  can  lie  outside  the  range  of  our  batteries.  They  are  not  going 
to  come  within  the  range  of  the  guns  of  the  fortress,  but  they  can  lie 
1,000  to  <').()()()  yards  outside  and  punch  them  full  of  holes. 

Mr.  A.NTHONT.  It  i-  not  true  that  there  has  not  been  a  successful 
reduction  of  modern  coast  defenses  that  has  been  thoroughly  made  by 
sea   attack  i 

Gen.  Wood.  I  can  not  cite  any  at  the  present  time:  but  it  is  not  a 
question  of  reducing  them.  The  only  question  is  that  the  guns  have 
not  the  power  or  range  to  reach  the  ships.  The  ships  might  lie  out- 
side the  coast  defenses  and  shell  them  at  will,  and  in  some  cases  bom- 
bard the  cities  behind  them  and  in  others  the  harbors  and  shipping. 
This  is  true  in  the  case  of  New   York.     Ships  could  lie  outside,  near 

Rockaway  Beach,  and  drop  shells  into  New  York  City  up  to  Four- 
teenth Street  ami  not  be  reached  by  the  guns  of  our  coast  defenses. 
The  Rockaway  waters  are  not  covered  by  coast-defense  guns.  They 
should  be. 

Mr.  Anthony.  It  is  the  intention,  as  I  understand  it.  of  the  proper 
department  to  cover  that  point. 

(Jen.  Wood.  Yes.  These  seacoa>t  defenses  are  also  vulnerable  to 
land  attack  unless  we  have  a  mobile  force  to  defend  them. 

Mr.  Anthony.  Gen.  Wood,  it  is  probable  that  there  will  be  an 
increase  in  the  number  of  regiments  of  the  Regular  Army,  and  that 
there  will  be  additional  officers  provided  by  legislation.  What  I 
want  to  get  at  is  your  opinion  as  to  how  this  increase  should  be  pro- 
vided, how  it  should  be  spread  among  the  different  branches  of  the 
service. 

In  the  past  there  has  been  a  good  deal  of  dissatisfaction  on  account 
of  the  increase  in  one  branch  at  the  expense  of  the  others.     Do  you 


290 


UNIVKKSAL    MILITARY    TRAINING. 


believe  there  should  be  absolute  equality  of  promotion  provided  for 
in  any  increase  in  officers? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  think  so.  I  think  we  should  equalize  the  present 
inequalities  as  far  as  possible. 

I  am  not  going  to  discuss  selection  and  elimination,  although  both 
are  vital  to  efficiency.  I  think  you  must  take  up  the  question  as  it 
has  been  taken  up  in  the  Medical  Department  and  Corps  of  Engineers 
and  extend  the  system  therein  applied  as  to  promotion  after  a  fixed 
period.  If  a  man  is  not  promoted  from  the  grade  of  lieutenant 
before  the  expiration  of  10  years,  he  will  become  a  captain  auto- 
matically at  the  end  of  10  years  in  service.  If  he  does  not  receive 
a  promotion  from  captain  to  major  in  a  period  of  eight  additional 
years,  he  will  automatically  become  a  major.  That  will  give  us 
majors  at  about  40  years  of  age,  and  the  period  between  major  and 
colonel  should  be  about  10  years.  In  other  words,  a  man  when  he 
reaches  the  age  of  about  50  years  would  be  a  colonel. 

The  question  is,  How  many  extra  officers  will  that  give  you?  If 
that  rule  was  applied  to  the  Army  regiments  to-day,  we  would  have 
as  a  result  about  600  extra  officers,  and  you  would  have  an  absolute 
certainty  of  promotion  within^ certain  time  limits.  After  you  have 
promotions  equalized,  it  would  work  along  smoothly.  The  single  list 
is  not  ideal  for  efficiency.  The  inequalities  are  very  great  at  the 
present  time.    There  ought  to  be  a  greater  equality  of  promotion. 

The  question  must  be  viewed  from  two  points.  First,  the  point  of 
efficiency  of  the  several  arms  of  the  service  due  to  proper  representa- 
tion in  the  staff  corps  of  the  department,  the  presence  of  officers  of 
the  different  arms  on  details  which  require  especially  officers  of  those 
arms.  By  this  I  refer  to  service  schools,,  details  to  militia,  details 
on  special  boards,  inspectors,  etc.  The  other  viewpoint  is  the  effi- 
ciency of  the  individual,  which  is  somewhat  dependent  upon  his  con- 
tentment and  pride  in  his  position.  This  latter  makes  it  strongly  ad- 
visable that  some  plan  insuring  substantial  parity  of  promotion  should 
be  adopted.  I  suggest  this  be  done  by  legislation  on  the  following 
lines  : 

1.  The  following  table  shows  the  number  of  extra  officers  there  would  have 
been  in  the  mobile  Army  and  Coast  Artillery  Corps  on  December  20,  1915,  if  the 
officers  in  these  arms  had  been  promoted  as  follows :  To  the  grade  of  lieutenant 
colonel  after  28  years  of  commissioned  service ;  to  the  grade  of  major  after  18 
years ;  and  to  the  grade  of  captain  after  10  years  of  service. 


Data  taken  from  the  Army  Register 

Dec 


1915,  and  the  Army  List  and  Directory, 
10,  1015. 


Infantry. 

Cavalry. 

Field  Artillery. 

Coast  Artillery 
Corps. 

Total 

Pro- 
moted. 

Extra. 

Pro- 
moted. 

Extra. 

Pro- 
moted. 

Extra. 

Pro- 
moted. 

Extra. 

extra. 

Major  to  lieutenant  colonel . . 

18 
113 
364 

18 
95 

19 

19 
64 
114 

37 

159 

Lieutenant  to  captain 

251           197 

12 

12 

7 

7 

384 

58( 

UNIVERSAL  MILITARY   TRAINING.  291 

2.  The  General  Staff  study  <>f  the  needs  as  to  detached  officers  shows  the 
following  are  required : 

Extra  colonels  and  lieutenant  colonels 87 

Extra  majors 136 

Extra  captains    577 

Extra  first  Lieutenants 368 

Extra    second    lieutenants 32 

Total i 1,  200 

3.  The  bill  prepared  by  the  War  Department  calls  for  Use,  extra  officers, 
including  the  200  now  authorized  by  law. 

4.  Considering  the  above,  it  is  plain  that  this  plan  will  not  al  present  produce 

the  number  of  extra  officers  deemed  0<  even  by  the  smallest  estimate  of 

our  needs.  Hence,  it  is  suggested  that  the  plan  calling  for  a  (••■••tain  number 
of  extra  officers  be  tilled  by  those  promoted  on  account  of  Length  of  commis- 
sioned service  when  that  will  supply  the  necessary  quota,  and  when  the  number 
furnished  by  this  plan  does  not  supply  enough,  the  additional  iieeessur  be 
detailed   from   the   several    anus   of   the   service   in    proportion    to   commissioned 

strength  of  each  grade  in  each  arm.  as  contemplated  by  the  War  Department 
bill  above  referred  to.    in  this  way  a  portion  of  the  extra  officers  will  always 

be  available  for  the  details  necessary  to  the  efficiency  of  each  arm  and  will  at 
the  same  time  prevent  the  Inequalities  of  rank,  which  tend  to  discourage  some 
officers. 

The  above  proposition  will  in  a  great  measure  rectify  past  Inequalities  and 
will  prevent  substantial   Inequalities  in  the  future. 

Mr.  McKenzie.  Gen.  Wood,  I  am  sure  you  appreciate  the  difficulty 
in  which  this  committee  is  placed  in  trying  to  handle  this  question  of 
the  increase  of  the  Military  Establishment  of  the  country? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  appreciate  that  thoroughly. 

Mr.  McKenzie.  So  far  as  I  am  personally  concerned — and  I  am 
sure  the  American  people  feel  the  same  way,  they  do  not  care  about 
the  details  but  they  want  to  know  why  it  is  necessary  at  this  time 
to  increase  our  Military  Establishment. 

I  am  getting  many  letters — and  I  judge  from  my  conversations 
with  other  members  of  the  committee  that  they  are  in  the  same 
position — getting  many  letters  from  intelligent  American  citizens 
protesting  against  an  increase  of  the  Military  Establishment. 

I  take  it  we  ought  to  have  some  very  concrete  reasons  Bet  forth  to 
this  committee,  such  as  you  have  been  giving  this  morning,  to  enable 
us  to  explain  to  the  American  people  why  we  recommended  any 
increase  of  the  Military  Establishment  in  this  country. 

If  1  understand  your  position,  you  recommend  an  increase  of  the 
Regular  Military  Establishment  as  it  now  exists,  eliminating  the 
militia  and  the  continental  army.  You  would  increase  the  regular 
standing  Army  and  provide  for  a  reserve. 

Gen.  Wood.  May  I  state  it  completely? 

Mr.  McKenzik.  That  is  what  I  would  like  to  have  you  do. 

Gen.  Wood.  I  believe  in  increasing  the  Regular  Establishment, 
including  the  native  troops,  up  to  '220,000  men,  plus  10  per  cent  for 
the  foreign  garrisons,  until  we  acquire  an  adequate  reserve,  and  then 
begin  to  reduce  those  Regular  organizations  at  home  to  not  less  than 
85  per  cent  of  their  full  strength,  if  deemed  necessary,  because  of 
expense. 

I  advocate  a  new  enlistment  act  such  as  I  have  outlined,  which  will 
make  the  reserve  practicable,  and  that  we  build  up  a  reserve  of 
trained  men  equal  to  the  strength  of  the  Regular  Establishment.     I 

80205—17 15 


292  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 

believe  that  we  could  accumulate  adequate  reserves  of  material  for 
2,000,000  Volunteers;  that  we  should  build  up  at  once  and  with  all 
expedition  a  Reserve  Corps  of  45,000  officers;  that  we  should  urge 
by  all  possible  means  the  general  application  of  universal  military 
training  to  a  point  which  will  make  our  citizens  reasonably  effective 
as  soldiers.  I  recommend  the  establishment  of  a  system  similar  to  the 
systems  which  lias  been  adopted  by  the  Swiss  and  Australian  Gov- 
ernments. 

In  addition  to  the  above  I  urgently  recommend  the  absolute  and 
complete  transfer  of  the  militia  to  Federal  control  and  the  with- 
drawal from  such  portions  as  is  not  so  transferred  of  all  financial  and 
other  aid  on  the  part  of  the  Federal  Government,  and  the  building 
up,  using  the  transferred  militia  in  part,  and  bringing  in  new  men 
from  which  new  organizations  will  be  created,  and  existing  trans- 
ferred organizations  filled  up,  of  a  Federal  force  of  at  least  25 
divisions  complete  in  every  detail.  Four  divisions  should  be  Cavalry 
divisions.  This  force  will  be  the  Organized  Federal  Militia  (or 
Continental  Army)  and  would  stand  ready  for  prompt  mobilization 
in  whole  or  in  part  in  case  of  need.  Its  reserves  would  be  drawn 
from  the  body  of  trained  citizen  soldiers,  from  which  body  would 
also  be  drawn  the  men  for  additional  organizations.  The"  reserve 
corps  of  officers  referred  to  above  would  provide  officers  for  approxi- 
mately one  and  a  half  million  citizen  soldiers.  In  addition,  we 
should  have  in  the  Philippines  the  arms  and  equipment  for  a  re- 
serve made  up  of  30,000  Americans  and  natives  organized  as  a 
reserve  force  behind  the  regular  garrison,  very  much  as  our  Conti- 
nental Army  will  be  organized  in  this  country.  In  Hawaii  Ave  should 
have  a  similar  reserve  of  not  less  than  5,000;  larger,  if  we  can  get  it. 
The  same  is  true  of  Porto  Rico  and  of  Panama,  so  far  as  the  em- 
ployees of  the  canal  can  be  utilized  and  also  American  residents 
within  the  zone.  Every  man  counts  when  a  possession  is  cut  off  and 
troops  of  this  kind  can  do  much  to  relieve  the  regular  force  of 
police  duty,  guard,  control  of  -population,  etc. 

Now,  with  reference  to  your  question  in  regard  to  a  concrete  rea- 
son. Let  us  take,  first,  the  theory  of  probabilities.  We  are  living 
in  an  era  of  war.  We  are  gradually  accumulating  most  of  the  gold 
of  the  world.  We  had  better  stiffen  that  supply  of  gold  with  a 
little  iron. 

Who  is  going  to  attack  us  I  can  not  tell.  A  question  was  asked 
me  the  other  day  on  just  these  lines,  "  Whom  are  we  preparing  to 
fight?" 

It  happened  to  be  a  lady  who  asked  me  that  question.  A  Cunar- 
der  had  just  come  in  from  a  stormy  passage.  I  said,  "  Madam,  if 
you  will  ask  the  captain  of  this  Cunarder  for  what  particular  storm 
he  carries  his  lifeboats  and  life-saving  apparatus  and  he  tells  you, 
I  will  tell  you  who  we  are  getting  ready  to  fight."  I  can  only  an- 
swer your  question  in  the  same  general  way. 

We  know  we  are  liable  to  be  in  trouble  on  account  of  our  trade 
and  commerce.     We  known  that,  if  we  know  anything. 

We  are  like  a  ship  at  sea  with  typhoon  signals  coming  in  every 
five  minutes.  We  must  get  ready  for  the  storm.  You  ask  me  who  we 
are  going  to  fight.  I  can  not  tell  you.  Nobody  can  tell  you  who 
we  are  going  to  fight.  God  alone  can  tell  you  that,  and  he  will  tell 
you  some  day. 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY    TRAINING.  293 

Mr.  McKenzie.  I  take  it,  Gen.  Wood,  that  it  is  your  opinion 
that  we  ought  to  have  an  Army,  of  the  size  you  recommend,  to  be 
kept  up  during  times  of  peace,  simply  to  take  care  of  the  prelimi- 
nary attack  that  may  be  made  upon  us  by  some  enemy? 

( ien.  Wood.  Yes;  it  is  an  insurance  for  peace  as  far  as  our  relations 
with  foreign  countries  go.  It  serves  as  a  training  nucleus  for  our  cit- 
izen soldiers  and  it  serves  for  the  maintenance  of  order  at  home  in 
certain  instances.  It  also  stands  ready  to  meet  with  great  promptness 
the  first  shock  of  war.  I  do  not  want  you  to  misunderstand  me. 
We  should  maintain  the  Army  only  suilicient  to  meet  the  peace  needs 
of  the  Nation.  By  this  1  mean  garrisoning  of  the  oxer-sea  possessions 
as  indicated  above,  provision  of  a  training  nucleus  at  home,  sufficient 
offipers  for  schools,  colleges,  militia,  etc.,  adequate  coast  artillery 
I  Poops  and  a  mobile  army  for  home  purposes  and  possible  expedition- 
ary force,  such  as  we  sent  to  Cuba  and  Later  to  Vera  Cruz.  The  total 
regular  force  necessary  to  do  these  things  will,  in  my  opinion,  be  ap- 
proximately 220,000  troops.  In  other  words  let  us  limit  the  Regular 
Army  to  the  demands  of  reasonable  necessity.  When  I  say  Regular 
Army  I  mean  the  men  always  in  service,  professional  soldiers.  Out- 
side of  this  our  policy  should  be  to  have  a  trained  citizen  soldiery, 
part  of  it  organized  as  the  Continental  Arm  v.  Federal  Militia,  or 
whatever  you  may  choose  to  call  it.  This  must  be  sufficient  to  create 
the  25  divisions  above  referred  to  and  provide  the  necessary  men  to 
complete  the  coast  artillery  organizations  required  to  adequately  gar- 
rison the  works.  Our  citizen  soldiers,  once  they  have  been  trained, 
will  return  to  their  normal  occupations,  returning  during  their  period 
of  liability  for  service  to  the  colors  for  brief  intervals  every  other  year 
in  order  that  they  may  be  kept  in  a  condition  of  efficiency.  The  sys- 
tem which  I  believe  we  should  adopt  is  one  similar  to  that  adopted  by 
Australia  and  Switzerland.  It  means  the  acceptance  of  the  basic 
principle  on  which  a  democracy  or  representative  government  rests, 
namely,  manhood  suffrage  means  manhood  service.  Such  a  system 
will  lead  to  unquestionably  better  citizenship,  reduction  of  the  crimi- 
nal rate,  better  people  physically  and  more  efficient  economically.  We 
must  get  out  of  our  heads  the  idea  that  the  national  service  is  a  service 
for  money.  We  should  have  it  thoroughly  instilled  into  the  minds  of 
all  the  people  that  the  service  is  an  obligatory  one,  one  that  all  men 
owe  the  nation  during  certain  periods  of  their  lives.  I  mean  all  men 
who  are  physically  and  mentally  fit.  We  must  have  them  understand 
that  military  service  is  like  any  other  service  for  the  nation,  if  the 
country  is  going  to  be  successful.  A  real  war,  a  war  with  a  prepared 
nation  will  not  be  successfully  fought  by  the  United  States  until  that 
principle  is  in  every  man's  head  and  has  been  acted  upon.  The  Ameri- 
can people  are  all  right  at  heart,  but  they  have  been  very  largely 
imbued  with  the  idea  that  in  case  of  war,  all  the  American  people  will 
have  to  do  will  be  to  gallantly  rush  to  the  colors,  and  by  simply  link- 
ing arms  with  one  another  go  forward  and  push  the  enemy  into 
the  sea. 

That  sort  of  doctrine  is  mere  folly.  It  spells  the  death  of  the  nation 
if  continued. 

Mr.  McKenzie.  General,  knowing  you  to  be  a  practical  military 
man.  I  want  to  ask  you  how  large  an  expeditionary  force,  in  your 
judgment,  could  be  landed  on  our  shores  within  six  months  after 
hostilities  opened? 


294 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 


Gen.  Wood.  A  million  or  a  million  and  one-half  men;  there  is 
practically  no  limit  to  the  number. 

Mr.  McKenzie.  What  nation  could  land  that  many  men  on  our 
shores  in  six  months? 

Gen.  Wood.  Germany  or  England,  after  this  war  is  over. 

Mr.  McKenzie.  In  six  months  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  Oh,  yes ;  any  first-class  military  power,  well  prepared, 
can  land  250,000  men  on  our  shores  in  15  days,  and  do  it  easily,  once 
they  secured  control  of  the  sea. 

Mr.  McKenzie.  Will  you  please  elaborate  on  that,  so  that  the  people 
of  the  country,  reading  your  testimony,  will  understand  how  that 
can  be  done  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  Our  Navy  is  easily  fourth  to-day  in  power.  # 

Mr.  McKenzie.  On  that  point  I  would  like  to  ask  you  a  question. 

Gen.  Wood.  I  said  our  Navy  is  fourth  to-day.  Of  course,  that  is 
the  opinion  of  one  who  is  more  or  less  of  a  layman,  so  far  as  the  Navy 
is  concerned.     I  am  only  a  soldier. 

Mr.  McKenzie.  If  you  are  not  prepared  to  elaborate  on  that  sub- 
ject now,  I  wish  you  would  put  an  explanation  of  that  in  the  record 
showing  that  our  Navy  is  fourth  at  the  present  time. 

Gen.  Wood.  I  think  I  can  demonstrate  that. 

Mr.  McKenzie.  I  would  like  to  have  you  put  that  in  the  record. 

Relative  strength  of  navies. 

1.  Tonnage  (based  on  1914  reports;  information  indicates  great 
activity  among  belligerent  nations  since  then)  : 

England,  2,713,756 ;  Germany,  1,304,640 ;  France,  899,915 ;  United 
States,  894,889 ;  Japan,  699,916. 

2.  Personnel  (marines  and  fortress  artillery  not  included). 


England. 

Germany. 

France. 

Japan. 

United 
States. 

3 

12 

22 

56 

702 

2,508 

639 

837 

593 

750 

122 

147 

2,740 

119,597 

2 

6 

12 

22 

154 

2,220 

448 

577 

340 

276 

162 

30 

3,183 

65,797 

2 
6 
19 

38 
270 
1,965 
119 
'         811 
364 
388 
135 

j 

0) 

15 
30 
360 
1.419 
77 
505 
390 
211 
187 

212 

1,680 

(*) 

(3) 

Medical  officers 

336 

Pav  officers 

231 

75 

24 

147 
60,505 

1,569 
50,050 

867 

52, 566 

6,393 
122,337 

4,249 
68,980 

3,194 
60,652 

4,117 
51,619 

2,584 

53,433 

128,730 

73,229 

64, 846 

4 55,736 

4  56. 017 

1  Special  detail. 
*  Included  in  line  officers. 
» Detailed  from  line. 

4  United  States  rated  after  Japan,  first,  on  account  of  disparity  in  officers,  and,  second,  on  account  of 
call  on  personnel  for  land  service. 

It  is  estimated  that  the  average  American  Navy  officer  spends 
only  about  55  per  cent  of  his  time  at  sea.  There  follows  a  statement 
of  naval  yards  and  stations  of  lesser  importance,  all  of  which  form  a 
drain  on  personnel. 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY    TRAINING. 

The  classification  is  only  approximate. 


295 


England. 

Germany. 

France. 

Japan. 

United 

States. 

Navy  yards 

12 
32 

6 

7 

6 
8 

6 
3 

9 

Stations  of  lesser  importance 

9 

Total '. 

44 

13 

14 

9 

18 

It  is  believed  that  the  above  estimate  (United  States)  for  sea 
service  is  high,  as  it  does  not  always  mean  sea  service  in  command  of 
war  units  (ships).  It  is  believed  in  the  aear  future  the  ships  now 
building  will  place  Japan  fourth.  Moreover  Japan  has  a  well- 
balanced  fleet  with  scouts  and  battle  cruisers.  We  have  not  a  single 
battle  cruiser  of  modern  type  in  the  United  States  Navy  or  any  laid 
down  or  appropriated  for.  nor  have  we  any  suitable  scout  ships,  nor 
has  our  Navy  that  compactness  of  organization  which  is  required  for 
the  highest  degree  of  efficiency  and  which  is  one  of  the  distinctive 
characteristics  of  the  Japanese  Navy,  nor  has  our  Navy  a  general 
staff,  a  lack  of  which  is  a  great  source  of  weakness. 

(Jen.  Wood.  We  know  this,  we  know   that  Britain  from  the 

1st  of  last  August  to  th»'  31st  of  last  December  (1  do  not  look  upon 
Great  Britain  as  a  probable  enemy)  has  put  overboard  more  light- 
ing power  than  is  in  our  entire  licet,  and  she  is  going  to  put  out  six- 
super  Queen  Elizabeths  in  the  next  \ 

We  know,  in  fact,  that  thai  expedition  for  Gallipoli  pulled  into 
Alexandria  Harbor — this  was  told  me  by  Lieut.  Commander  Jes- 
sup — with  126,000  men.  with  their  artillery  and  supplies;  they  dis- 
embarked them  there,  then  rested  them  for  two  or  three  weeks,  and 
went  away  so  quietly  that  one  hardly  noticed  it.  They  were  on  98 
ships,  some  of  them  big  ships,  like  the  A'/uitania,  of  nearly  40,000 
tons.  But  they  went  to  Gallipoli,  and  they  Landed,  not  only  against 
the  strongest  opposition,  but  against  thoroughly  prepared  opposition, 
with  barbed  wire  ami  all  that  sort  of  thing,  and  in  country  bristling 
with  defense.  That  cost  them  10,000  or  15.000  men,  but  they  went. 
We  would  have  no  opportunity  to  form  any  defense.  So  when  I 
hear  people  talk  about  the  impossibility  of  transporting  a  large  body 
of  troops  oversea,  I  say  they  do  not  know  what  they  are  talking 
about. 

Mr.  McKenzie.  Right  on  that  point,  General,  do  you  think  it  is 
the  proper  thing  to  assume  that  our  Navy  could  be  driven  from  the 
sea,  such  as  it  is,  within  30  days  or  60  days,  and  that  an  expeditionary 
force  could  be  landed  on  our. shores? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  do  not  think  our  Navy  would  be  driven  from  the  sea 
until  they  had  done  all  possible.  I  think  many  would  be  found  at 
the  bottom  of  the  sea,  and  the  rest  bottled  up. 

Mr.  McKenzie.  You  mean  at  the  end  of  60  days? 

Gen.  Wood.  Within  that  time.  When  a  condition  demanding  war 
comes  about,  the  enemy  nation  which  is  going  to  strike  knows  when 
and  where  it  is  going  to  strike.  We  are  not  going  to  get  a  polite 
warning  saying  that  we  are  going  to  attack  you  at  such  a  time  and 
such  a  place.  It  will  come  as  quickly  as  the  action  of  Japan  against 
Port  Arthur.  It  is  just  such  an  attack  as  that  which  is  going  to 
catch  us. 


296  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY    TRAINING. 

Mr.  McKenzie.  Do  you  not  think  our  ships  will  be  able  to  run 
away  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  do  not  think  they  will  try  to  run  away.  I  think  our 
Navy  would  fight  until  the  last  ship  goes  down,  if  such  would  do 
any  good. 

The  Chairman.  How  many  ships  will  it  take  to  land  a  million  and 
a  half  men,  with  all  the  animals  and  supplies  necessary  to  sustain  an 
army  of  that  size  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  The  supplies  would  be  mostly  gotten  in  the  country 
they  came  to.  The  number  of  ships,  based  on  the  expedition  I  have 
just  been  talking  about,  would  be  about  100  for  an  expedition  of 
120,000  men.  If  you  had  250  ships  for  the  first  expedition,  that 
would  be  sufficient  to  bring  over  250,000  to  300,000  troops. 

The  Chairman.  In  60  days? 

Gen.  Wood.  Six  months  was  the  period  we  were  talking  about,  but 
they  could  land  on  this  coast  easily  in  30  days  from  250,000  to 
300,000  men. 

The  Chairman.  You  think  that  would  be  the  utmost  they  could 
land  in  30  days? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  do  not  think  that.  The  number  depends  on  what  the 
enemy  country  does. 

Mr.  McKexzie.  General,  we  have  had  Army  officers  here  before 
this  committee  who  testified  that  in  six  months  we  could  have  suffi- 
cient equipment  for  700,000  men,  equipment  such  as  rifles,  and  so 
forth,  ready  to  be  put  into  the  hands  of  the  soldiers.  You  have  stated 
that  to  make  a  good  fighting  man  would  require  six  months.  My 
purpose  in  asking  the  questions  I  have  been  asking  is  to  demonstrate 
that  if  we  are  ruined  at  all  by  a  foreign  power,  it  must  be  done 
within  the  first  six  months  after  hostilities  open. 

Gen.  Wood.  At  sea,  you  mean? 

Mr.  McKenzie.  On  land.    We  are  speaking  about  the  Army. 

Gen.  Wood.  He  will  occupy  whatever  he  desires  in  six  months. 

Mr.  McKenzie.  He  will  have  to  do  that  in  six  months,  because  then 
we  would  be  in  a  position  to  cope  with  an  enemy  with  a  large  army? 

Gen.  Wood.  No,  sir;  whoever  told  you  that  is  mistaken. 

Mr.  McKexzie;  I  think  you  misunderstand  me. 

Gen.  Wood.  In  order  to  make  soldiers  in  six  months  out  of  aver- 
age intelligent  material  we  would  have  to  have  the  officers  first. 
Whoever  told  you  that  we  could  prepare  equipment  for  700,000  men 
in  six  months  was  gravely  mistaken. 

Here  we  have  been  at  it  a  year  and  a  half,  and  we  are  only  able 
to  produce  3,400  rifles  a  day,  and  it  took  from  14  to  16  months  to 
get  up  to  that  capacity.  Those  figures  I  have  given  you  are  very 
close  figures.  According  to  that  it  would  have  taken  us  a  year  to 
make  a  million  rifles. 

Mr.  McKenzie.  Is  it  not  true  that  we  have  700,000  Springfield 
rifles  now? 

Gen.  Wood.  We  have  about  that  number.  We  haye  300,000  Krags 
in  reserve,  in  round  numbers,  or  perhaps  a  little  more  than  that.  We 
have  altogether  a  million  rifles. 

Mr.  Hull.  General,  can  you  explain  why  it  is  that  this  Government 
institution  for  the  manufacture  of  rifles  is  standing  idle  while  we 
have  a  crying  need  for  rifles? 


UNIVEKSAL  MILITARY   TRAINING.  297 

Gen.  Wood.  I  can  not  explain  that.     I  am  sorry  it  is  so. 

Mr.  Hull.   You  know  it  is  so? 

Gen.  Wood.   I  know  it  is  practically  idle. 

We  are  short  in  field  artillery.  I  have  not  gone  into  the  details  in 
regard  to  field  artillery  for  some  time,  but  when  I  Inst  looked  into  it 
we  had  C34  guns  manufactured.  That  was  last  March.  I  presume 
we  have  now  about  800.  But  800  guns  would  only  be  enough  to  bal- 
ance an  infantry  of  about  140,000  rifles.  That  is  all  we  have  now. 
I  mean  field-artillery  pieces. 

In  last  March  we  had  only  a  small  fraction — about  one-fourth — 
enough  ammunition  for  the  guns  made.  I  i*  we  had  to  have  a  large 
army  in  the  field  we  should  have  to  have  for  the  Regular  Establish- 
ment and  Militia  as  now  organized,  roughly  speaking,  1,292  guns, 
which  is  about  the  number  we  are  contemplating  building.  I  believe 
1,292  is  the  present  estimate. 

Bat  that  does  not  give  us  a  single  gun  for  the  citizen  soldiery  (con- 
tinental force),  and  that  is  where  the  shortage  is  coming.  1  think  we 
ought  to  lay  up  a  sufficient  store  now.  If  foreign  countries  know  that 
we  are  prepared  and  know  that  we  have  ammunition  and  other  things 
necessary,  the  chances  of  war  will  be  very  much  smaller  than  if  they 
know  we  have  made  no  preparation  at  all.  When  we  have  made 
preparation  then  they  know  what  we  can  do. 

That  brings  up  the  very  important  question  of  the  wisdom  or  advis- 
ability of  the  United  States  manufacturing  its  own  arms  and  muni- 
tions of  war.  Personally,  T  think  that  no  greater  mistake  can  be 
made  from  the  standpoint  of  efficiency  and  organization  for  prepared- 
through  ability  to  Increase  rapidly  oin-  output  than  to  limit 
manufactures  to  Government  plants.    The  present  European 

war  has.  as  a  result  of  the  demand  made  upon  this  country  for  sup- 
plies, developed  and  is  developing  an  enormous  amount  of  machinery 
in  many  plants  suitable  for  the  manufacture  <»f  war  material.  We 
should  attempt  to  maintain  :it  least  nuclei  plants  at  certain  of  these 
various  establishments,  so  that  we  can  in  case  of  emergency  utilize 
them  and  the  skilled  men  attached  to  them  for  increasing  our  own 
output  to  meet  demands  which  may  be  made  upon  it.  Tn  order  to  do 
this  the  present  policy  governing  our  expenditures  in  certain  particu- 
lars— I  mean  particularly  the  legislation  which  compels  us  to  expend 
90  percent  of  certain  appropriations  in  the  arsenals  -should  be  done 
away  with  and  the  policy  reversed.  We  should  adopt  the  policy  of 
spending  enough  of  our  appropriations  at  such  plants  as  it  is  deemed 
desirable  to  maintain  to  warrant  their  keeping  nuclei  of  machines  and 
men,  neither  of  which  can  be  produced  in  a  hurry.  Moreover,  com- 
petition between  outside  plants  is  necessary  if  we  are  to  keep  pace 
with  improvements  in  machinery  elsewhere  in  the  world. 

Y<u  know,  in  the  case  of  this  European  war.  how  very  difficult 
it  was  for  the  manufacturers  to  get  skilled  men.  It  would  not  be 
very  difficult  for  you  to  find  out  how  much  they  had  to  nav  for 
the  services  of  those  men.  Tt  runs  into  sums  which  are  exceedingly 
high.  They  had  to  rake  ami  scrape  in  order  to  get  the  men  to  do 
that  work.  They  induced  officers  to  resign,  and  they  had  to  make 
big  inducements  to  other  men  to  secure  them  for  munitions  work. 
These  new  plants  are  really  just  about  ready  now.  Tf  we  had  been 
hit  by  a  big  war,  we  could  not  have  gotten  ready  until  it  was  too 


298  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 

late.  We  have  the  plants  now;  let  us  try  to  keep  little  nuclei  in 
many  of  them,  so  that  we  can  quickly  expand  when  the  necessity 
arises. 

Mr.  Hull.  I  do  not  know  whether  I  understood  you  correctly  or 
not,  but  my  understanding  of  your  statement  was  that  you  are  in 
favor  of  compelling  the  men  in  this  large  army  to  serve  without  pay? 

Gen.  Wood.  You  mean  the  big  citizen  army? 

Mr.  Hull.  Yes. 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes;  in  the  training  period.  In  time  of  war  you 
would  have  to  pay  them.  I  think  we  should  take  it  as  a  Nation 
service. 

Mr.  Hull.  Would  you  recommend  any  reduction  in  the  pay  of 
the  men  in  your  proposed  Regular  Army  of  220,000? 

Gen.  Wood.  No  ;  I  would  not  at  present.  But  I  do  think  when  the 
people  awake  to  the  fact  that  we  all  owe  a  man's  service  to  the 
country,  there  will  be  more  patriotism  and  less  dollars  about  it. 

Mr.  Hull.  Under  those  circumstances  we  could  maintain  a  large 
army  at  very  much  less  expense. 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes.  Take  the  Swiss  svstem.  Their  murder  rate  is 
about  12  per  1,000,000,  against  a  rate  of  124  per  1,000,000  here.  Tak- 
ing those  figures  into  consideration  it  would  seem  that  their  mili- 
tary training  has  done  some  good.  They  are  running  their  entire 
military  establishment  for  about  $7,000,000  a  year.  They  could  put  a 
quarter  of  a  million  men  in  the  line  in  48  hours,  and  they  would  have 
200,000  more  in  reserve.  This  has  been  done  by  means  of  the  accept- 
ance of  the  general  principle  that  every  man  owes  something  to  the 
nation's  service.    That  is  what  we  will  have  to  come  to. 

Mr.  Greek e.  General,  I  have  in  mind  to  ask  a  few  questions  in 
regard  to  matters  concerning  which  questions  are  very  likely  to  be 
raised  in  debate  in  the  House. 

Do  you  favor,  in  the  maintenance  of  the  Army  at  peace  strength,  a 
disproportionate  number  of  trained  officers  in  the  Regular  Establish- 
ment; that  is,  disproportionate  to  the  number  of  enlisted  men  nor- 
mally required,  so  that  in  the  event  of  the  expansion  of  the  Army 
to  war  strength  these  trained  men  will  be  ready  and  can  be  fitted  into 
their  places  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes,  sir;  I  advocate  that  for  several  reasons. 

The  first  one  is  the  one  which  you  have  outlined,  and  my  second 
reason  is  that  it  should  be  done  in  order  to  have  more  officers  as 
training  factors  in  time  of  peace. 

Take,  for  instance,  a  university  like  Norwich.  We  have  one  officer 
there,  while  we  should  have  two.  Then  take  the  case  of  the  Univer- 
sity of  Illinois,  with  6,000  students,  and  2,000  of  those  students  in 
uniform,  making  two  regiments  at  peace  strength,  with  only  one 
officer  there.  We  ought  to  have  four,  one  officer  for  every  500  men 
or  additional  fraction  thereof,  because  if  there  is  any  place  where 
men  can  do  valuable  service,  it  is  working  with  2,000  men  of  that 
class  as  instructors. 

•  At  the  University  of  Ohio  we  have  one  officer  who  is  doing  splen- 
did work,  but  he  has  some  1,200  men  enrolled.  We  need  at  least  three 
officers  there.  If  we  had  the  large  number  of  extra  officers  that  we 
should  have,  at  least  1,200,  we  could  do  very  much  more  in  the  way 
of  military  instruction,  not  only  at  the  military  schools  and  colleges, 
but  also  at  the  nonmilitarv  institutions. 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY    TRAINING.  299 

When  Yale  University  had  three  batteries  organized,  it  was  diffi- 
cult to  get  an  officer  for  them,  and  yet  there  were  at  that  institution 
three  batteries  of  the  finest  kind  of  personnel. 

Cornell  University,  which  is  one  of  the  land-grant  institutions,  has 
a  large  corps  of  cadets,  and  has  done  much  to  give  sound  military 
training.  We  could  use  two  more  officers  at  Cornell  University  to 
the  greatest  advantage.  It  is  the  best  investment  we  can  make  of 
trained  officers  in  time  of  peace,  and  we  ought  to  have  a  lot  of  them 
at  work. 

Mr.  Greene.  Would  not  the  same  reasoning  apply  in  regard  to 
the  same  number  of  noncommissioned  officers? 

Gen.  Wood.  If  we  could  get  them.  That  is  a  problem  we  have  not 
yet  tackled.  We  must  approach  it  sometime,  but  T  think  first  we 
should  get  our  reserve  corps  of  officers  of  the  civilian  type  from 
the  colleges,  and  we  must  have  a  very  material  addition  to  the  number 
of  regular  officers.  I  think  your  bill.  Mr.  Hay.  provides  for  over  700 
additional  '. 

The  Chairman.  It  provides  for  786. 

Gen.  WooD.  That  is  going  t<>  lie  of  the  greatest  assistance.  Tt  will 
of  greater  as^i>tance  in  the  matter  <>i'  training  than  any  single 
tiling,  and  will  help  tremendously  in  the  dissemination  of  military 
knowledg 

Mr.  Greene.  The  noncommissioned  officer  is  regarded  as  the  bone 
and  sinew  of  the  Army,  is  he  not  j 

Gen.  Wood.   Yes,  sir:  and    1   have  -   recommended  that  he 

should  have  a  better  status  than  he  has.  He  really  is  a  factor  of  tre- 
mendous value. 

Mr.  Greene.  The  public  generally  has  rather  been  led  to  be  indif- 
ferent to  the  Status  of  the  noncommissioned  officer,  having  only  in 
mind  the  commissioned  officer,  and  forgetting  that  without  the  or- 
ganization which  the  noncommissioned  officer  maintains  under  him- 
self the  personnel  would  go  to  pieces. 

Gen.  Wood.   Yes. 

Mr.  Greene.  Without  involving  the  question  in  any  field  of  strategy, 
but  merely  to  elucidate  an  answer,  stated  in  general  terms,  should 
we.  in  our  preparations  for  a  defensive  war.  have  in  mind  a  war  such 
as  is  now  being  waged  in  Europe,  or  docs  our  situation  present  some- 
what different  factors  I 

(Jen.  Wood.  Our  preparation  ia  really  a  preparation  against  war. 
I  think  if  we  make  reasonable  preparation  and  establish  a  condition 
of  genera]  military  instruction,  that  it  will  be  pretty  difficult  to  get 
anybody  to  attack  us.  If  we  were  attacked  by  any  European  power 
it  would  be  undoubtedly  an  attack  launched  on  the  Atlantic  coast  be- 
tween Baltimore  and  Boston,  at  the  great  lines  of  communication 
and  the  great  centers  of  wealth,  in  an  area  comprised  within  a  line 
drawn,  beginning  al  1><  ston,  and  including  our  arsenals,  our  muni- 
tion plants  in  Massachusetts,  New  York,  and  Pennsylvania,  and  run- 
ning out  at  Baltimore.  That  would  include  about  85  per  cent  of  all 
our  arms-making  and  ammunition-making  facilities.  That  would 
be  the  territory  at  which  an  enemy  would  strike.  An  enemy  would 
strike  at  that  territory  in  an  effort  to  cripple  our  supply  of  arms  and 
ammunition,  and  they  would  attack  the  main  lines  of  communication 
running  between  the  principal  eastern  cities,  and  from  the  eastern 


300  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 

cities  to  the  West.  We  have  nothing  in  the  West  which  would  con- 
cern an  enemy  very  much  in  the  way  of  arms  or  munition  factories. 
We  have  the  Rock  Island  Arsenal.  We  ought  to  have  our  arms  and 
munition  plants  more  scattered  and  some  of  them  in  the  Middle  West 

Mr.  Greene.  We  will  continue  to  hear,  and  we  have  heard  in  the 
popular  discussion  of  this  matter,  the  remark  of  President  Lincoln, 
which  has  been  frequently  quoted,  that  an  invader  never  could  water 
his  horses  in  the  Ohio  River.  Of  course,  that  is  a  patriotic  sentiment, 
but  in  your  opinion  would  an  invader  ever  attempt  to  do  that  ( 

Gen.  Wood.  It  is  hard  to  tell  what  he  would  do. 

Mr.  Greene.  In  other  words,  would  not  the  probable  intention  of 
an  invader  be  to  go  straight  to  the  locality  you  have  indicated  and 
then,  say,  for  instance,  occupy  that  territory  and  levy  tribute  on  the 
rich  cities  in  that  locality  (  Would  he  not  be  more  likely  to  do  that 
than  to  try  to  go  into  the  interior  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  He  would  probably  hold  New  York  and  Boston ;  possi- 
bly the  entire  arms  and  munitions  area  from  Boston  to  Baltimore, 
and  exact  such  tribute  as  he  wanted:  then  take  whatever  action  might 
be  necessary  to  prevent  us  from  longer  asserting  the  Monroe  doctrine. 
He  would  take  anything  he  wanted.  It  would  be  just  a  question  of 
how  much  he  wanted.  If  we  should  be  driven  out  of  that  compara- 
tively small  area,  we  Avould  go  back  practically  to  the  condition  of 
prehistoric  man  so  far  as  arms  are  concerned. 

A  great  many  of  the  supplies  that  we  need  in  case  of  war  come 
from  other  countries.  Take  nitrates,  for  instance.  All  our  nitrates 
come  from  Chili.  There  is  not  a  plant  of  importance  for  the  manu- 
facture of  synthetic  nitrogen  in  this  country.  We  need  synthetic 
nitrogen.  We  have  to  have  it  in  huge  quantities.  All  our  nitrates 
come  from  over  sea. 

Then,  taken  up  another  industry ;  we  do  not  make  any  optical  glass 
in  this  country.  There  is  not  optical  glass  sufficient  in  this  country 
to  equip  a  large  army.  It  is  particularly  needed  for  the  range  finders, 
field  glasses,  etc.  You  could  go  on  indefinitely  with  the  enumeration 
of  things  of  that  kind,  concerning  the  supply  of  which  this  country  is 
in  a  very  bad  condition. 

The  reason  we  could  not  make  arms  any  more  rapidly  was  because 
we  could  not  get  the  high-speed  tool  steel.  Why  was  that?  It  was 
because  we  could  not  get  certain  materials— antimony,  etc.  Those 
things  indicate  the  need  of  a  certain  industrial  organization  behind 
the  War  and  Navy  Departments.  The  Army  and  Navy  are  just  the 
edge  of  our  war  organization;  behind  are  moral  and  industrial 
organizations. 

Mr.  Greene.  I  think  it  is  the  idea  in  the  popular  -mind  that  in 
caring  for  the  defense  of  the  country  we  would  be  obliged  to  have 
ready  men  and  material  to  face  about  the  same  conditions  that  exist 
in  this  present  European  war,  and  I  am  of  the  opinion  that  most  of 
the  questions  likely  to  be  put  in  debate,  here  and  elsewhere,  will  be 
predicated  upon  conditions  that  will  be  about  as  obtain  in  the  Euro- 
pean war,  and  my  former  question  was  only  directed  to  obtain,  if 
possible,  your  judgment,  briefly  and  in  general  terms,  as  to  whether 
our  preparations  necessarily  wTould  cover  all  the  features  that  have 
been  somewhat  conspicuous  in  that  war. 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY    TRAINING.  301 

Gen.  Wood.  I  thing  we  should  have  to  prepare,  unless  sea  control 
is  lost,  for  a  highly  organized  and  very  well-equipped  attack  within 
the  area  I  have  spoken  of,  and  in  the  vicinity  of  San  Francisco  or 
Puget  Sound  on  the  Pacific,  and  our  entire  policy  would  be  to  keep 
the  action  as  near  the  wider  as  possible  and  to  keep  the  enemy  out  of 
the  country. 

Their  idea  would  be  to  push  back  as  far  as  the  Ohio  River  and 
occupy  this  great  machine-gun,  powder-making  and  rich  manu- 
facturing section  of  the  country,  knowing  if  they  can  hold  that  that 
we  could  not  rearm  and  reorganize  anywhere  else  in  the  country. 
They  would  bring  against  us  all  their  latest  implements  of  war. 
including  the  heaviest  movable  guns  and  mortars  such  as  are  used  in 
the  present  war.  Both  these  guns  and  the  guns  of  the  fleet  would 
he  brought  against  our  coast  fortifications.  Aside  from  seacoasl 
fortifications  the  day  of  the  concrete  fort  and  steel  turret  have 
probably  passed.  Artillery  must  be  capable  of  a-  much  movement 
as  possible  within  the  limits  of  a  fortified  area  in  order  to  prevent 
its  being  too  definitely  Located.  The  attack  always  has  the  advantage 
of  knowing  where  guns  are  when  they  are  in  fortifications,  and  can 
easily  put  them  out  of  action,  as  seen  recently  in  the  attacks  on 
permanent  works  in  Belgium,  A  thorough  study  of  thk  question 
lias  brought  uj)  an  exceedingly  interesting  problem— thai  is.  the 
possibility  of  a  heavy  mobile  armament,  including  guns  and  mortars 
of  the  largest  calibers,  mounted  either  upon  railway  cars  or  upon 
carriages  which  permit  rapid  mobility  by  roads  or  easy  transpor- 
tation by  rail:  of  a  design  which  permits  prompt  assembling  and 
use.  Some  of  the  designs  now  in  use  have  practically  converted 
the  Hat  car  into  a  gun  carriage.  One  of  our  problems  is  to  secure 
a  type  of  carriage  which  will  enable  the  transport  of  this  artillery 

over  oil!'  railroads  and  make  it  available  for  the  defense  of  harbors 
which,  while  furnishing  a  good  landing  for  an  enemy  force,  do  not 
warrant  the  construction  of  permanent  fortifications.  One  device 
which  has  been  brought  up  contemplate.-  a  car  which  will  be  so 
constructed  as  to  be  capable  of  emplacement  in  a  heavy  concrete  re- 
ceptacle or  block  which  will  give  the  necessary  stability  for  accurate 
fire,  (bins  so  emplaced  will  have  the  advantage  of  guns  in  perma- 
nent emplacement  in  that  they  can  be  used  in  connection  with  a  pre- 
established  lire-control  system.  Moreover,  the  arrangement  is  in- 
expensive. Railways  pass,  in  most  instances,  within  range  of  the 
harbors  we  should  want  to  cover,  and  all  that  it  is  necessary  to  do  is 
to  project  short  spurs  running  to  the  gun  position.  Some  of  these 
might  be  immediately  adjacent  to  the  main  lines  and  others  a  little 
more  remote.  If  our  coast  line  is  ever  pierced  these  heavy  guns  and 
mortars  will  become  available  for  use  against  an  enemy  force,  which 
will  undoubtedly  have  a  very  powerfully  if  not  an  equally  powerful 
equipment.  They  should  be  handled  by  coast  artillery  troops  espe- 
cially trained  in  their  use.  Their  primary  use  is  for  coast  defense, 
and  their  secondary  use  i<  in  connection  with  land  operations.  They 
will  be  available  on  either  coast.  It  is  a  most  important  feature  of 
our  preparation. 

Mr.  Greene.  Your  reply  suggests  that  the  popular  mind  tends  to 
confuse  the  coast  defense  with  a  general  defense  of  the  entire  coast, 


302  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 

whereas,  if  I  am  not  mistaken,  military  men  understand  that  term 
as  now  applied  to  mean  harbor  defense. 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes,  the  fixed  forts  are  for  harbor  defense  entirely. 

Mr.  Greene.  That  leaves  open  this  tremendous  area  of  coast  line 
between  fortified  harbors  for  which  we  have  no  preparations  for 
defense,  does  it  not  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  That  is  correct,  and  that  is  why  we  are  proposing  to 
have  these  mobile  guns. 

Mr.  Greene.  General,  do  you  believe  the  road  conditions  in  this 
country  would  permit  the  mobility  of  as  heavy  ordnance  as  is  now 
being  employed  in  Europe? 

Gen.  Wood.  Only  in  the  sector  of  improved  roads.  Our  idea  would 
be  to  use  the  railroads  largely  for  the  big-gun  transportation. 

In  the  European  theater  of  war  they  are  building  temporary  rail- 
roads for  the  transportation  of  the  big  guns  to  positions,  running 
them  off'  on  spurs.  Some  are  so  mounted  that  they  can  be  moved 
rapidly  on  good  wagon  roads.  You  always  want  big  guns  in  an  im- 
portant area.  The  important  area  is  the  area  you  will  be  trying  to 
defend.  That  is  where  the  6nemy  will  strike  and  strike  the  hardest. 
They  are  never  going  to  go  into  the  unbuilt-up  sections  of  country. 
The}T  will  strike  at  the  richest  and  most  important  section  of  the 
country. 

Mr.  Greene.  I  just  want  to  ask  you  one  more  question.  It  has 
been  suggested,  and  I  think  once  referred  to  this  morning,  that  the 
development  of  the  aeroplane  and  its  use  would  be  likely  to  render 
less  necessary  the  proportion  of  Cavalry  which  has  hitherto  been 
considered  essential.     What  have  you  to  say  in  regard  to  that? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  do  not  believe  it  would  affect  the  Cavalry  at  all. 
The  reports  from  the  present  war  I  do  not  think  should  be  used  as  a 
guide  until  they  have  been  coordinated.  One  situation  is  presented 
on  the  western  front,  which  is  really  a  beleaguered  fortress,  like  one 
of  the  old  cities,  surrounded  by  works  and  walls,  and  the  one  of  the 
old  cities  during  a  siege  surrounded  by  works  on  investment  the 
entire  force  is  immobilized.  The  situation  is  that  of  siege.  Cavalry 
are  dismounted  and  fighting  in  the  trenches  just  as  mounted  men 
were  frequently  fighting  dismounted  on  the  walls  and  in  the  trenches 
during  sieges  in  the  Middle  Ages,  On  the  eastern  front  there  has 
been  a  tremendous  use  of  cavalry.  I  do  not  believe  that  the  aero- 
plane is  going  to  eliminate  the  cavalry  in  any  way.  The  cavalry 
will  undoubtedly  have  its  part  to  play.  Cavalry  played  a  very  im- 
portant part  in  the  German  advance  and  in  the  French  effort  to  meet 
it.  During  this  period  the  cavalry  was  used  to  the  limit.  I  doubt 
if  cavalry  has  ever  seen  harder  service  in  campaign.  The  French 
Cavalry  made  192  kilometers  in  three  days. 

Mr.  Greene.  You  have  indicated  your  belief  that  the  industrial 
and  commercial  resources  of  the  country  should  be  very  highly 
organized  in  contemplation  of  the  possibility  of  war,  that  they  may, 
on  the  instant,  if  need  be,  coordinate  themselves  into  some  determined 
plan  of  the  War  Department. 

Gen.  Wood.  It  seems  to  me  in  connection  with  that  subject  that  we 
have  come  to  the  point  where  as  a  part  of  our  industrial  organization 
the  Government  should  know  what  shops  and  foundries  can  do  in  the 
way  of  making  arms  and  munitions.     These  establishments  should 


UNIVERSAL    MILITARY   TRAINING.  303 

on  their  part  know  just  exactly  what  they  are  expected  to  do.  Once 
this  is  done  a  long  step  forward  will  have  been  taken  in  industrial 
organization. 

It  is  the  same  thing  in  the  case  of  organization  of  transportation. 
On  the  seaboard  our  great  railway  authorities,  at  least  those  charged 
with  transportation,  should  know  something  of  our  general  plans 
and  what  we  would  expect  of  the  railroad  under  certain  conditions. 
This  is  necessary  in  order  that  sidings  may  be  put  in  in  important 
places  and  necessary  tracking  provided.  We  should  also  take  up 
with  the  railroads  the  question  of  constructing  the  right  type  of  car 
for  the  movement  of  men,  horses,  arms,  and  guns — a  type  which  at 
the  same  lime  would  lie  useful  for  everyday  work,  but  have  those 
essentials  which  would  make  it  available  for  the  use  above  referred 
to.  We  should  also  organize  our  railway  men  so  that  they  will  be 
available  in  time  of  war.  It  would  be  the  height  of  folly  to  take  over 
an  able  transportation  man  from  one  of  our  great  railroads,  where  he 
can  do  his  best  work,  and  use  him  as  an  officer  of  the  line.  The  same 
is  true  with  reference  to  communications,  telephone,  and  telegraph. 
Their  controlling  men  must  know  something  of  what  is  to  he  expected 
of  them  in  time  of  war.  and  from  their  forces  must  be  organized 
large  reserves  for  use  along  the  coast  and  with  the  troops.  These  are 
some  of  the  many  things  which  must  be  done  in  the  way  of  organizing 
our  industrial  resources. 

Mr.  Greene.  Would  not  the  cooperation  and  coordination  of  such 
an  emergency  organization  be  better  secured  by  having  not  only  the 
plans  well  prepared  but  the  personnel  who  are  to  act  under  those 
plans  known,  their  names  recorded,  and  have  them  organized  now, 
in  an  unofficial  sense? 

Gen.  Wood.  They  should  be  all  organized.  Every  man  should 
have  his  designation,  and  should  have  his  duties  defined,  and  know 
exactly  what  would  be  expected  of  him  and  where  he  would  go  in 
time  of  war. 

Mr.  Greene.  Would  it  be  necessary  to  have  any  legislation  that 
might,  in  some  way,  authorize  such  action :  or  if  that  is  not  necessary, 
to  help  to  maintain  such  a  nonofficial  or  nonmilitary  organization? 

Gen.  Wood.  They  would  have  to  be  organized  under  the  proviso 
for  general  training  and  liability  for  service. 

In  this  country  we  have,  in  round  numbers,  a  million  men  com- 
ing of  age  every  year.  That  means  possibly  500,000  fit  for  military 
service.  To  begin  military  service  at  18  years  of  age  and  terminate 
it  at  25  years  of  age.  you  would  have  three  and  a  half  million  men 
on  whom  you  could  depend,  and  that  would  be  a  force  up  to  the 
limit  of  need  in  any  ordinary  war. 

Out  of  that  force  you  would  have  organized  certain  military 
units — Infantry.  Cavalry,  Artillery,  field  and  coast  engineers,  re- 
serves, railroad  men.  etc.  Kv#erv  man  ought  to  be  used  in  that 
arrangement  in  the  line  of  work  for  which  he  is  best  fitted. 

Mr.  Greene.  So  that,  in  order  to  be  effective,  such  an  organization 
should  have  its  correlation  by  name  and  location  to  the  class  and 
character  of  duties  to  which  each  man  would  be  assigned  and  for 
which  he  should  be  expected  to  prepare  himself  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes,  sir;  to  be  ready  wThen  the  gong  strikes,  so  that 
when  the  gong  does  strike  he  knows  where  he  is  going  to  go. 


304  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 

Mr.  Kahn.  Mr.  Chairman,  Mr.  Morin  was  compelled  to  leave  the 
hearing  awhile  ago,  and  he  asked  me  to  ask  Gen.  Wood  a  couple 
of  questions. 

The  Chairman.  I  am  sure  there  will  be  no  objection  to  that. 

Mr.  Kahn.  The  first  question  is,  In  case  we  should  not  lose  control 
of  the  sea,  would  the  mobile  force  we  now  have  be  sufficient  to  hold 
back  an  invading  force? 

Gen.  Wood.  If  we  controlled  the  sea  absolutely,  no  one  could  land 
troops  unless  he  sent  them  in  from  the  north  or  from  the  south. 

Mr.  Kahn.  The  other  question  is  this:  If  we  lost  control  of  the 
sea,  how  long  would  our  present  force  be  able  to  hold  back  any  force 
of  invaders? 

Gen.  Wood.  It  could  not  do  it  at  all,  sir. 

Mr.  Greene.  General,  we  see  in  the  arguments  advanced  by  some 
of  our  friends  now,  in  the  attempt  to  compare  our  naval  and  land 
forces  with  those  of  foreign  powers,  compilations  of  tables  of  com- 
parative strength,  and  in  the  strategy  they  work  out  they  always 
put  our  greatest  strength  against  at  least  the  minimum  strength 
that  could  be  brought  against  us.  Is  it  not  a  fact  that  whatever 
tables  may  show  about  muzzle  velocities  and  calibers,  the  elements 
of  calm,  wind,  water,  and  tide,  and  all  the  freaks  and  caprices  of 
nature  tend  to  disturb  such  calculations  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  They  do,  to  a  certain  extent.  They  used  to,  especially 
in  the  days  of  sailing  vessels. 

Now,  when  you  have  big  ships,  such  as  the  Aquitama,  which  are 
more  or  less  indifferent  to  storms  and  weather  disturbances,  they 
bring  all  the  apparatus  they  need.  They  are  down  pretty  much  now 
to  the  railroad  train  as  to  schedule ;  they  arrive  on  time. 

Mr.  GibSENE.  I  particularly  had  in  mind  this  fact,  that  the  invader 
would  know  where  he  was  going  to  be,  and  whether  we  would  have 
odds  against  him  at  the  proper  place  and  time,  a  sufficient  force  to 
successfully  meet  the  invading  troops. 

Gen.  Wood.  We  would  not,  unless  as  was  once  suggested  we  were 
able,  by  an  intelligent  and  comprehensive  knowledge  of  the  enemy's 
movements,  to  move  our  troops  and  meet  him,  but  we  would  be 
engaged  in  a  lively  performance  up  and  down  the  seaboard.  Such 
movement  would  be  impossible. 

Mr.  Tilson.  First,  referring  to  the  National  Guard,  I  understand 
you  to  say  you  would  utilize  the  National  Guard  as  far  as  possible 
in  the  creation  of  this  new  Federal  volunteer  force  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  would  use  every  man  and  officer  in  it,  if  I  could. 
I  would  make  every  effort  to  get  them  into  it.  I  mean  the  Conti- 
nental Army. 

Mr.  Tilson.  Assuming  that  the  Federal  Government  would  have 
control  of  the  National  Guard,  which  you  deem  impossible,  that  the 
United  States  Government  should  ha^e  full  control,  and  you  would 
not  only  use  the  personnel  of  the  National  Guard,  but  also  use  the 
armories,  the  ranges,  and  so  forth. 

Gen.  Wood.  I  think  the  Federal  Government  ought  to  take  over 
everything  from  the  States  which  the  Federal  Government  can  prop- 
erly use.  It  will  want  those  places  for  training  centers,  storage  of 
arms  and  equipment.  The  very  fact  that  you  have,  for  instance,  in 
a  city  like  New  York,  several  such  places  means  that  you  will  not 


IXIVKIISAL    .MILITARY    TRAIN  INC.  305 

have  to  ship  men  off  and  pay  the  transportation.  Everything  is  at 
hand. 

Mr.  Tilson.  You  referred  to  the  matter  of  pay.  and  said,  I  believe, 
that  everyone  should  serve  for  patriotism.  In  view  of  the  fact  that 
only  a  small  portion  of  the  men  of  the  country  will  serve  or  could 
serve  under  this  arrangement,  is  it  fair  that  that  small  percentage 
of  men  should  bear  this  burden,  while  a  much  greater  number  would 
escape  entirely '. 

Gen.  Wood.  The  men  in  these  organizations  would  be  taken  from 
the  men  within  the  period  of  obligatory  service,  let  us  say  from 
18  to  25.  The  procedure  would  probably  be  to  permit  such  men  as 
wanted  to  enter  the  organized  unit  of  the  reserve  to  do  so  and  in 
case  any  district  failed  to  present  its  proper  quota  the  men  would 
then  be  drawn  by  lot.  The  number  01  men  in  each  district,  let  us 
assume  that  the  military  reserve  districts  correspond  to  congressional 
districts  as  they  will  be  based  on  population,  would  be  approxi- 
mately the  same.  All  men  liable  to  service  would  have  to  take  the 
chance  of  being  drawn  to  1111  up  any  units  which  were  not  filled  other- 
wise. This  liability  would  only  last  during  the  period  for  which  they 
are  liable  to  service.  These  organized  units  would  correspond  to 
the  present  militia  except  that  they  would  he  the  organized  units  of  a 
Federal  force,  presumably  the  continental  army.  They  should  be 
paid  a  little  something  while  at  maneuvers  and  camps  of  instruction, 
but  not  at  any  other  time.  Men  not  serving  in  these  organizations 
and  not  engaged  in  any  duties  as  instructors  <>r  otherwise  will  not 
receive  pay.  They  would  simply  he  performing  their  obligatory 
military  service  \'^v  the  Nation.  The  period  would  be  brief  and  they 
would  receive  benefits  far  more  than  equivalent  to  the  time  they  give 
to  the  Nation. 

Improved  Health,  Strength,  and  Economic  Efficiency. 

Mr.  Tilson.  There  is  only  a  small  proportion  of  these  men  be- 
tween the  ages  you  mentioned  who  can  be  used,  and  so  would  there 
not  be  an  element  of  unfairness  when  certain  men  were  drawn,  or  if 
certain  men  volunteered  or  whatever  the  system  of  selection  might  be, 
and  would  it  not  be  fair  to  pay  them  to  help  to  sustain  their  families 
while  they  are  away  ■ 

Gen.  Wood.  I  think  during  the  training  period  they  should  be 
paid  when  they  are  assembled  in  camp.  When  I  said  I  thought  they 
should  not  be  paid.  1  was  referring  to  the  time  when  they  are  not 
mobilized.  * 

Mr.  Tilson.  You  spoke  of  a  man's  chances  to  become  an  officer. 
Do  you  not  think  that  would  be  one  of  the  greatest  inducements 
that  could  be  offered  to  cause  young  men  of  intelligence  to  go  into 
the  Army,  that  is.  the  fact  that  he  had  an  opportunity  to  become  an 
officer? 

Gen.  Wood.  I  think  that  is  one  thing.  I  think  the  real  thing 
would  be  the  training  they  would  get  and  the  fact  that  they  were 
performing  their  citizens'  duty. 

Mr.  Tilson.  Kef  erring  now  to  the  matter  of  promotion,  can  you 
state  what  are  the  plans  in  the  different  European  armies  in  con- 


306  UNIVERSAL   MILITARY   TRAINING. 

nection  with  promotion  ?  We  have  always  had  trouble  on  that  subject 
in  this  country. 

Gen.  Wood.  In  all  European  armies  they  have  selection.  Some 
have  selection  beginning  at  the  bottom  and  some  at  a  certain  grade. 
In  either  case  when  yon  reach  a  certain  grade  then  they  have  selec- 
tion. I  think  in  the  French  Army  they  have  selection  after  a  cer- 
tain grade,  and  up  to  that  promotion  goes  by  seniority.  I  think  the 
same  is  true,  in  effect,  in  the  German  Army,  based  on  a  system  which 
effects  the  certain  elimination  of  those  unfit  for  promotion.  But  in 
all  of  the  European  armies  selection  and  elimination  play  an  impor- 
tant part. 

Mr.  Tilson.  What  do  you  think  of  having  an  increase  in  armored 
autotraction,  especially  in  the  case  of  field  artillery  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes;  I  think  it  is  going  to  come  to  motor  transport 
almost  altogether  in  the  field.  I  think  the  day  of  the  horse  and  the 
mule  for  drafts  is  very  largely  gone,  at  least  in  the  built-up  sections 
of  the  country  where  the  are  good  roads. 

Mr.  Tilson.  As  I  remember  it,  the  instructions  to  infantrymen  in 
firing  guns  are  to  fire  at  the  horses,  the  fact  being  recognized  that 
the  wounding  of  one  horse  will  put  a  whole  battery  out  of  commission. 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes. 

Mr.  Tilson.  So  that  it  would  be  important,  would  it  not,  that  auto- 
traction be  substituted  as  far  as  possible  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  You  can  pass  the  danger  zone  more  rapidly.  The  space 
per  truck  is  not  more  than  two-fifths  the  length  it  would  have  with 
the  horses. 

Mr.  Tilson.  It  is  much  more  difficult  to  hit  the  vital  part  of  one 
auto-truck  engine  than  it  is  to  hit  one  of  the  horses,  is  it  not  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes;  and  then  there  are  other  factors  which  give  the 
auto  truck  the  advantage.  You  can  hitch  on  other  wagons  to  an 
auto  truck.  The  rapidity  of  movement  and  capacity  for  covering 
great  distances  make  the  auto  truck  valuable.  Then,  too,  in  the  cost 
of  maintenance  it  is  cheaper. 

Mr.  Tilson.  You  spoke  of  moving  the  larger  field  pieces  on  cars. 
Are  there  any  being  moved  which  are  larger  than  the  6-inch  gun  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  They  are  using  now,  as  far  as  we  can  tell — we  know 
they  are  moving  8-inch  pieces  on  what  is  practically  a  railroad  car. 
That  is,  the  gun  is  mounted  on  the  top  of  the  car,  and  alongside  the 
car  are  flanges,  and  the  gun  can  be  swung  around  in  any  direction. 
There  are  all  sorts  of  devices.  We  are  trying  to  get  the  best  one  for 
our  own  service. 

We  know  they  are  moving  8-inch  guns  on  #these  cars,  and  they 
are  moving  12-inch  guns  on  the  caterpillar  wheels,  and  we  heard 
that  they  are  moving  the  lT-inch  gun,  but  I  have  not  found  anybody 
who  has  seen  the  17-mch  gun  being  moved  that  way. 

Mr.  Tilson.  You  have  spoken  of  the  number  of  machine  guns  you 
would  recommend  for  a  regiment.  Would  you  not  recommend  a  very 
large  general  reserve  of  these  guns,  so  that  they  could  be  sent  to  one 
place  or  another,  as  they  might  be  needed? 

Gen.  Wood.  We  should  have  a  reserve  of  at  least  2~>,000  of  those 
guns. 

Mr.  Tilson.  Under  such  a  scheme  as  I  have  proposed  in  regard  to 
the  preparation  of  appliances,  do  you  not  think  it  would  be  possible 
to  arrange  matters  so  that  these  guns  could  be  turned  out  rapidly? 


UNIVERSAL   MILITARY    TRAINING.  307 

Gen.  Wood.  So- far  as  the  manufacture  of  machine  guns  in  this 

country  is  concerned,  several  firms  are  building  the  guns.  One  firm 
which  is  building  them  expects  to  put  out  50  machine  guns  a  day. 
beginning  the  first  of  April.  They  have  just  filled  one  order  for 
2,500,  and  they  have'taken  an  order  from  one  of  the  European  coun- 
tries for  10.000  of  those  machine  guns.  That  is  the  Lewis  machine 
gun.  an  American  invention.  I  think  you  will  find  that  in  the  end 
the  machine  gun  will  be  one  which  can  be  carried  by  one  man.  as  can 
the  Lewis  gun.  which  is  carried  as  a  rifle  would  be  carried,  and  which 
weighs  a  little  bit  under  26  pounds. 

Mr.  Tilson.  You  have  spoken  also  of  having  a  flying  squadron 
with  each  division.  Would  you  not  also  have  a  very  large  general 
reserve  of  flying  machines  I 

(Jen.  Wood.  We  can  make  flying  machines  in  every  way,  pretty 
rapidly,  except  the  engine.  We  have  not  yet  gotten  a  good  engine. 
The  engines  now  in  use  are  too  heavy.  I  suppose  we  will  overcome 
that. 

Flying  machines  in  great  numbers  are  going  to  be  absolutely  neces- 
sary, because  when  the  enemy  trys  to  make  observations  you  try  to 
keep  him  back.    It  is  simply  Cavalry  translated  to  the  air. 

Mr.  TiLSON.  The  fact  was  developed  the  other  day  dining  the 
examination  of  the  officers  of  the  Signal  Corps  that  these  machines 
go  to  pieces  rather  rapidly,  even  in  time  of  peace.  What  would 
you  say.  regarding  these  machines  as  arms  and  equipment,  or  as 
ammunition:  would  they  not  conic  under  the  head  of  ammunition  to 
plained  I 

Gen.  Wood.  I  think  you  will  have  to  maintain  a  considerable  re- 
serve of  machine.-.  I  think  we  can  build  the  machines  pretty  rapidly. 
We  ought  to  train  as  many  men  to  fly  as  we  can.  We  can  build 
the  machines  very  rapidly,  but  the  engine  is  now  the  big  problem. 

Mr.  Tilson.  If  we  have  a  certain  number  of  machines  nt  the  begin- 
ning of  this  year,  there  is  no  assurance  that  we  are  going  to  have  that 
number  a  year  from  now.  even  in  times  of  peace  \ 

Gen.  Wood.  I  should  create  a  Hying  corps  on  a  war  footing,  main- 
tain it  on  a  war  footing  always,  and  I  should  organize  a  flying  reserve 
corps  from  among  the  civilians  of  the  country.  I  think  you  would 
have  no  difficulty  in  getting  a  good  and  a  numerous  flying  reserve 
corps. 

I  was  talking  the  other  day  with  one  of  our  American  boys  who  is 
flying  on  the  other  side,  and  I  asked  him  about  the  number  of  ma- 
chines over  there.  He  said.  "  We  had  a  review  the  other  day.  and  we 
started  off  on  a  bomb  raid.  We  had  1*21  machines  lined  up.  in 
columns  of  fours,  and  we  were  in  the  air  and  off  in  18  minutes."  1 
think  we  could,  perhaps,  put  up  10  machines.  Those  121  machines  to 
which  my  friend  referred  comprise  only  part  of  the  machines  on  one 
army  front. 

Mr.  Tilson.  You  spoke  of  the  reasons  why  we  should  be  prepared, 
and  one  of  the  reasons  you  gave  was  that  we  are  accumulating  most 
of  the  gold  of  the  world.  Is  it  not  a  fact  that  we  are  also  accumu- 
lating some  of  the  ill  will  and  enmity  of  other  peoples  of  the  world  I 

Gen.  Wood.  That  is  a  matter  of  opinion;  but  I  think  we  are. 

Mr.  Hull.  General,  as  I  understand  your  answer,  you  think  it  is 
advisable  to  have  an  increase  in  the  arsenal  capacity  located  west  of 
the  Allegheny  Mountains? 

86205—17 16 


308  UNIVERSAL    MILITARY   TRAINING. 

( ien.  Wood.    It  is  advisable. 

Mr.  Hull.  You  also  think  it  best  to  maintain  a  reserve  of  supplies 
and  equipment  in  the  small  towns  ? 

Gen.  Wood.  Yes,  sir:  a  reserve  at  those  armories  which  may  be  used 
as  the  headquarters  of  the  training  units  of  the  Continental  Army  or 
other  Federal  reserve  force.  I  have  also  recommended  that  our  pres- 
ent supply  of  reserve  arms  and  equipment  be  more  widely  distributed, 
and  that  some  of  it  be  held  in  the  smaller  arsenals,  and  some  of  it 
stored  in  the  armories  which  are  of  fireproof  material,  in  cities  like 
New  York  and  Buffalo,  for  instance,  and  in  arsenals  such  as  Water- 
town.  Springfield,  Watervliet,  Augusta,  Allegheny:  in  brief,  our  ma- 
terial is  stored  in  too  large  quantities,  and  as  we  shall  not  be  able  to 
ship  it  promptly,  considerable  delay  will  be  unavoidable.  Again,  it 
is  not,  in  my  opinion,  as  secure  against  fire  as  is  desirable  or  as  would 
be  the  case  if  distributed  as  I  have  above  recommended. 

(Thereupon,  at  12.15  o'clock  p.  m.  the  committee  adjourned,  to 
meet  to-morrow,  Friday,  January  28, 1916,  at  10  o'clock  a.  m.) 


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